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Origins, Negotiations, and Implementation 
of the Confidence-Building Measures of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Marie-France Desjardins King's College, University of London 
This thesis examines the origins, negotiations, and implementation of the Confidence-Building 
Measures (CBMs) adopted at the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE). More specifically, it traces the reasons for introducing the measures on the agenda of 
the Conference, and reviews their development to 1987 when they were replaced by a more 
comprehensive set of measures. 
This thesis argues that, contrary to popular belief, the 15 NATO member states that proposed the 
negotiation of CBMs in the CSCE --and later took credit for their development-- had no clear 
view of what they wanted to achieve with the measures, and saw no intrinsic value in them either. 
Furthermore, fears that any measures negotiated in the CSCE framework might interfere with 
talks on force reductions led to the adoption of a negotiating strategy that called for only modest 
steps to be taken. This directly contributed to the failure of the Conference to achieve more 
comprehensive results in this field. 
The thesis further argues that the compliance record of the Warsaw Pact nations --an area that 
was always very poor, selective and of questionable reliance-- leaves no doubt that the most 
prominent goals ascribed to the measures were never met in practice. Furthermore, the NATO 
member states never truly challenged the East for a better record of compliance, and neither did 
they rely on the measures to increase their own security in any way. 
Taken together, these considerations lead to the conclusion that the implementation of the CSCE 
CBMs regime does not necessarily constitute the success story so often ascribed to this, the first 
attempt at introducing such measures in Europe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last twenty years, Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) have been eagerly 
endorsed world-wide as promising tools to help regulate political-military relations. Today, 
almost every region of the world is implementing or considering some form of CBMs. 
Judging by how the subject is filling the agenda of diplomatic negotiations, current efforts to 
implement CBMs are surpassing initiatives made during the Cold War to achieve arms 
control agreements. Considered as useful undertakings to help dispel unfounded fears of 
threats emanating from potential adversaries, the measures are believed to reduce tensions and 
suspicions between nations, enhance predictability, strengthen stability, and improve 
security. I 
Unlike traditional arms control, CBMs do not aim at limiting military equipment or forces. 
The focus of the measures, rather, is on regulating military operations and providing 
reassurance about military intentions. Different forms of information exchanges, observation 
and inspections of military activities, as well as operational constraints imposing certain 
restrictions on military activities are the most common tools of this approach. Though there 
is yet no agreed theory of CBMs, the most widely acknowledged value of the measures is that 
they help reduce the possibility of accidental wars through miscalculation or failure of 
communication, and diminish the dangers of surprise attack. 2 There are a number of ways in 
which CBMs are said to fulfil these goals. 
' Although CBMs are currently considered for application in a number of fields, the present discussion 
relates to the military measures developed in the framework of the European experience during the 
Cold War, which is the subject matter of this study. Among the most significant attempts to define the 
European CBMs, and the basic references used in the following discussion on the main goals and 
objectives of the measures, see Johan Jörgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, "European Security 
and Confidence-building Measures", Survival, XIX: 4, July-August 1977, pp. 146-154 [Hereafter: 
Holst and Melander, "European Security"]; Johan Jörgen Holst, "Confidence-building Measures: A 
Conceptual Framework", Survival, XXV: 1, January-February 1983, pp. 2-15 [Hereafter: Holst, 
"Confidence-building Measures"]; Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The 
Military Aspects", in Jonathan Alford (ed. ), The Future ofArms Control, Part III, Confidence-Building 
Measures, Adelphi Paper 149, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979, pp. 4-13; F. 
Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds. ), Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, East-West 
Monograph Series Number One, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983,221 pages; 
Allen Lynch (ed. ), Building Security in Europe, East-West Monograph Series Number Two, New 
York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1986,181 pages; R. B. Byers, F. Stephen Larrabee, and 
Allen Lynch (eds. ), Confidence-Building Measures and International Security, East-West Monograph 
Series Number 4, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1987,157 pages. 
2 Though less extensively discussed in the literature, a third important task ascribed to the early 
European CBMs is inhibiting the use or threat of use of force for political intimidation. As argued by 
Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-building measures may contribute to the establishment of thresholds 
against military intervention into another participating state, as such transgression would constitute a 
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The risks of war can be decreased by reducing misunderstanding and misinterpretation. 
Because military activities are inherently ambiguous, they can easily be misinterpreted. A 
routine military training exercise, for instance, can be mistaken by another state as an 
offensive action and trigger an undesirable reaction, leading to unintended conflict. Advance 
notification of military activities, however, can help reduce such dangers by allowing states to 
recognise normal patterns of routine peaceful activities. 
Observation of military activities can also play a useful role in reducing the risks of 
misunderstanding or miscalculation by allowing all parties the opportunity to confirm the 
accuracy of information previously given. In theory, military observers invited to monitor a 
military activity can provide a reliable assessment of its purpose and character. 
Beside helping to avoid erroneous interpretation of peacetime activities, a requirement to 
notify military activities in advance and to accept observers can also reduce risks of surprise 
attack because any non-notified activities, or refusal of observation, would alert decision- 
makers of possible aggressive operations providing critical time to undertake necessary 
defensive measures. 
In addition to volunteering information about military activities, the sharing of information 
about troop structures, training capabilities, military doctrines, weapon acquisitions or defence 
budgets can also contribute to reducing misperceptions. Increasing transparency in military 
matters lies at the core of the confidence-building approach. The lack of information about 
matters related to defence policies or armaments, for example, is strongly believed to create 
mistrust and tensions. Secrecy breeds suspicion, and when states do not communicate, or 
there is a lack of information about other states' military capabilities or activities, officials 
tend to make worst case analyses. 
For proponents of CBMs, the importance given to the benefits of exchanging information 
does not only stem from the acquisition of raw data which, in some cases, can provide 
evidence that certain behaviour or actions do not constitute a threat, but from the expectation 
that once information is shared between CBMs partners, it can be opened to discussion and 
further clarification. In this later regard, another important aspect of CBMs, which has gained 
challenge to the integrity and purpose of the arrangements themselves. " Holst, "Confidence-building 
Measures", p. 3. For a similar view suggesting that CBMs could raise the political cost of a decision to 
use military force in Europe, see Richard E. Darilek, "Reducing the Risks of Miscalculation: The 
Promise of the Helsinki CBMs", in Larrabee and Stobbe (eds. ), Ibid, pp. 65-66. [Hereafter: Darilek, 
"Reducing the Risks of Miscalculation"]. 
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ever more significance since the concept first came into being, is establishing regular contacts 
and consultations between military and defence officials. 3 Such regular exchanges of views 
between representatives involved in military planning are thought to contribute to greater 
mutual understanding. Consultations and dialogue on defence matters enable the parties 
involved to present and explain their views, discuss their positions, expose their goals and 
motives, and uncover each other's perceptions and interpretations. The result of these 
activities is believed to contribute to bringing a transformation in thinking, a reassessment of 
policies, and a redefinition of objectives, ultimately leading to the adoption of policies and 
behaviour more mutually profitable to all. 4 
Another value of CBMs is in establishing principles, rules, norms, or standard of conduct 
regulating states' behaviour. 5 At a general level, most CBMs applications are deemed useful 
by making behaviour of states more predictable. In this latter respect, most CBMs are also 
seen as helping to stabilise inter-state relations by making them more orderly. Over time, 
such an application could become a standard against which any deviation may be judged 
unlawful, thus contributing to the creation of new rules of behaviour in states relations. By 
accepting constraints on the operations of military activities, such a code of conduct is also 
expected to have immediate benefit. Limiting the number, scope or duration of activities that 
may give rise to apprehension reduces the risks that such activities may be misinterpreted. 
Restraining certain activities to certain areas, or prohibiting them close to borders, helps create 
additional barriers against surprise attack while also directly contributing to increase the sense 
of security of the parties by providing concrete evidence of non-aggressive intentions. Even if 
considered the most militarily significant arrangements, limiting, constraining or prohibiting 
activities are usually reserved for a second stage of application, after more modest measures 
have been tried. 
3 This aspect of what CBMs should do has become more prominent in the early 1980s after the United 
Nations sponsored a meeting of government experts to undertake a comprehensive study on CBMs. 
Although recognising the usefulness of measures designed to address specific military concerns, many 
nations strongly argued that confidence building should be viewed more as a process aimed at 
improving understanding and co-operation in all fields of interstate relations. In line with this view, the 
study recommended that regular personal contacts at all levels of political and military decision- 
making could serve to enhance the goal of confidence building and should be promoted and 
encouraged. United Nations, Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures, Study Series 7, 
New York: United Nations, 1982,42 pages. 
4 For a discussion, see United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Report of the Secretary- 
General, Study on Defensive Security Concepts and Policies, Study Series 26, New York: United 
Nations, 1993, pp. 39-40 and p. 41. [Hereafter: UN, Study on Defensive Security Concepts]. 
5 See United Nations, Confidence-building Measures, Disarmament Fact Sheet 57, New York: United 
Nations, 1989, p. 15. 
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Finally another important role ascribed to CBMs is that they can facilitate agreement on arms 
control and disarmament. Because CBMs involve less ambitious undertakings than 
traditional arms control, 6 it is believed that states may be more inclined to adopt them and, by 
doing so, that they can start to lay down the necessary conditions to achieve arms control. 7 
Justified or exaggerated, the high hopes placed in the measures only partly accounts for their 
current popularity. Equally, if not more significant, for explaining the ever-growing pre- 
eminence of the concept on the international scene is the European experience with the 
measures. The term "confidence-building measures" itself only came into common usage 
following the negotiation of a few modest measures during the first meeting of the 35-nation 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), held in Helsinki, in 1975. 
Marking the beginning of the longest and most comprehensive multilateral application of the 
measures to date, the development and evolution of the CSCE CBMs have been filled with a 
number of significant accomplishments, often considered as concrete evidence of their value. 
When the Helsinki CSCE CBMs regime was negotiated in the mid-1970s, the European 
continent was divided into two roughly symmetrical military blocs opposing the largest 
concentration of military power in the world. Political mistrust and suspicion prevailed on 
both sides of the East-West divide, while the excessive secrecy shrouding all military matters 
of the Soviet-dominated Communist bloc only served to feed Western fears of surprise attack. 
In an era of bloc-to-bloc confrontation, the successful negotiation of measures to increase 
transparency in military affairs constituted a major breakthrough. 8 
6 See, for example, Michael Krepon, "The Decade for Confidence-building Measures", in Michael 
Krepon (ed. ), A Handbook of Confidence-building Measures for Regional Security, 2' Edition, 
Handbook No. 1, Washington, D. C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1995, p. 2. [Hereafter: 
Krepon, A Handbook of Confidence-building]. 
The belief that CBMs can contribute to, or constitute the first step towards, arms control and 
disarmament has always been prevalent in the literature. One of the very first writings on CBMs, for 
instance, claimed that "by continuing to build confidence and diminish fear, a climate can be created 
that should enhance the chances of agreement in the efforts more directly to arms control and 
disarmament. " J. D. Toogood, "Helsinki 1975: What Was Achieved in the Field of Confidence- 
Building Measures? " Canadian Defence Quarterly, 5: 2, Winter 1975, p. 31. [Hereafter: Toogood, 
"Helsinki 1975"]. A more comprehensive explanation related specifically to the negotiation on force 
reductions suggests that "once the force postures have become transparent and States have been able to 
gain sufficient degree of confidence that the forces as a whole are organized largely for defensive 
postures, they may be willing to engage in a process leading to actual reductions in military equipment 
holdings. In many cases, agreement on force reductions cannot therefore precede the effective 
implementation of confidence- and security-building measures. " UN, Study on Defensive Security 
Concepts, p. 46. 
8 As described by the British Foreign Office at the end of the CSCE, CBMs "bring the member 
countries of the Warsaw Pact into a system of obligations in the military field which would have 
seemed inconceivable before the conference began. " G. Bennett and K. A. Hamilton (eds. ), The 
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Building upon this initial success, the Helsinki measures remained in place for more than ten 
years, despite a severe deterioration in East-West relations combined with serious deadlocks 
in arms control negotiations. 9 More significantly, the Helsinki measures only ceased to be 
applied when a new set of more ambitious and comprehensive measures, renamed 
Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), replaced them in 1987.10 The 
negotiation of this "second-generation" of measures was of historic importance because, for 
the first time, the Soviet Union accepted the principle of mandatory on-site inspections, 
opening a new era in arms control. ' 1 
When the Cold War ended and a completely new set of security challenges emerged, the 
relevance of CBMs took on added significance. By the time the CSCE was institutionalised 
in 1995 to become the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), three 
other CSBMs agreements had been successively agreed and implemented, always improving 
and expanding on the previous one. 12 Today, the OSCE remains deeply committed to the full 
compliance and full implementation of a comprehensive set of mutually complementary and 
mutually reinforcing measures. In the view of its (now) 55 participating States, these 
measures greatly contribute to stability and security throughout the continent and, more 
significantly, now constitute the basis upon which Europe is developing a concept of 
collective security whereby states no longer define their relationship in a competitive fashion, 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972-75, Series III: Volume II of Documents on 
British Policy Overseas, London: The Stationery Office, 1997, p. 456. [Hereafter: Bennett and 
Hamilton: The Conference]. For similar comments emphasising the importance of the breakthrough, 
see Toogood, "Helsinki 1975", p. 28, and J. D. Toogood, "From Helsinki to Belgrade: What Happened 
to the Confidence Building Measures", Canadian Defence Quarterly, 8: 2, Autumn 1978, p. 14. 
9 Following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, East-West relations took a sharp downturn. 
In addition, reacting to the 1983 NATO deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, the 
Soviet Union broke off the negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe (INF) and 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and suspended the Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reduction Talks (MBFR). For many observers, the continuation of CBMs during this period and the 
opening, in January 1984, of a new round of CSCE negotiations devoted to strengthening the Helsinki 
measures was of major significance. For a discussion, see Richard E. Darilek, "East-West Confidence 
Building: Defusing the Cold War in Europe" in Michael Krepon, Michael Newbill, Khurshid Khoja, 
and Jenny S. Drezin (eds. ), Global Confidence Building. New Tools for Troubled Regions, London: 
Macmillan, 2000, p. 288. [Hereafter: Darilek, "East-West Confidence Building"]. 
10 Agreement on the new measures emerged from the Conference on Confidence- and Security- 
Building and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), held in Stockholm between January 1984 and September 
1986. The Stockholm Document was adopted on 19 September 1986, but its provisions only came 
into effect on 1 January 1987. 
" The precedent was immediately successfully applied in the superpowers agreement on Intermediate- 
Range Nuclear Forces in Europe, signed in December 1987. 
12 Those talks took place in Vienna, and the documents approved became commonly referred to as the 
Vienna Document (or VD) 1990,1992, and 1994. For background on these and earlier CSCE 
negotiations, see Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE Handbook, Vienna: 
Secretariat of the OSCE, 2000,197 pages. [Hereafter: OSCE, OSCE Handbook]. 
12 
but "work together, achieving security together with others ". 13 
The long and impressive record of the development of CBMs in Europe has left little doubt 
about their success. The most authoritative statement in this regard certainly comes from the 
OSCE itself who maintains that "the CSCE can be credited with reducing military tensions 
through its implementation of confidence-building measures which enhanced military 
transparency ... at a time when many threats to security stemmed from mistrust. " 
4 
Sweeping endorsement of the experience has also characterised the assessments of most 
academic analysts and practitioners. 15 Some describe the inclusion of CBMs into the CSCE 
as "the starting point of another success story". 16 Others emphasise the "essential role" 
CBMs have played in "improving East-West relations". 17 
13 Ibid., p. 2. 
14 Ibid., p. 12. 
15 Even during the Cold War when the application of the measures was less than satisfactory and 
difficulties or failures often had to be openly acknowledged, scholars and practitioners concluded that 
CBMs had proven their validity and should be pursued. Presenting the view of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, for instance, Ambassador Henning Wegener remarked in 1983 that "the unique capability of 
confidence-building measures to enhance stability ... and to prepare and promote true measures of disarmament without immediate constraining effects on military hardware makes this new set of 
measures uniquely suitable for the Central European region. In an era of unprecedented density of 
armaments on either side of the strategic dividing line... confidence-building measures offer welcome 
assurances and appear to counteract effectively the possibilities of surprise and accidental attack. In 
that context, the Federal Republic of Germany has consistently stressed the usefulness of confidence- 
building measures, as agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act, and has generally refrained from 
expressing doubts or dissatisfaction about their actual application and scope. " Representatives from 
the European neutral and non-aligned states as well as from the Warsaw Pact nations also found 
important positive aspects in the experience. Writing in 1987, for instance, Ljubivoje Acimovic noted 
that "the CBMs regime of the Final Act was a modest, but important initial step on the road toward 
fostering security in Europe. Some shortcomings in its implementation were of a marginal nature and 
do not affect the ... positive assessment. " Four years earlier, Polish analyst Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, highly critical of the Western approach to CBMs, nevertheless argued the "significance" of CSCE 
CBMs which he described as deriving "from the establishment of a new channel of East-West 
communication". For the above quotations see, respectively: Henning Wegener "CBMs: European 
and Global Dimensions", in Larrabee and Stobbe (eds. ), Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, p. 
166; Ljubivoje Acimovic, "The CSCE Process from a Yugoslav Perspective", in Hanspeter Neuhold 
(ed. ), CSCE, N+N Perspectives, The Laxenburg Papers No. 8, December 1987, Vienna: Wilhem 
Braumüller, pp. 84-85; Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, "CBMs Between Helsinki and Madrid: Theory and 
Experience", in Larrabee and Stobbe (eds. ), Ibid., p. 106. For other positive assessments presenting a 
variety of reasons, see Mike Bowker and Phil. Williams, "Helsinki and West European Security", 
International Affairs (London), 61: 4, Autumn 1985, p. 615; James E., Goodby, "The Stockholm 
Conference: Negotiating a Cooperative Security System for Europe", in Alexander L. George, Philip J. 
Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds. ), US. -Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, 
Lessons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 148-150; John J. Maresca, "Helsinki Accord, 
1975", in Ibid., p. 120; Darilek, "Reducing the Risks of Miscalculation", p. 83. 16 Hans Günter Brauch and Gerd Neuwirth (eds. ), Confidence and Security Building Measures in 
Europe H. From Vienna 1990 to Vienna 1992 - Documents, AFES-PRESS Report No. 28, Mosbach: 
Peace Research and European Security Studies, 1992, p. 7. 
17 Michael Krepon, A Handbook of Confidence-building, p. 1. 
13 
Surprisingly, despite widespread recognition of the success of the CSCE measures, no one 
can explain precisely how this has been realised. Indeed, twenty-five years after their 
introduction on the continent, questions remain as to whether the CSCE CBMs regime served 
as agent of change contributing to diminishing mistrust and bringing a positive change in 
security thinking, or if it simply reflected a process of change already under way. 18 Was the 
application of the initial modest Helsinki measures necessary for the adoption of a second, or 
third, set of more demanding undertakings? 19 Did they contribute to the 1990 treaty on 
conventional arms control which had been eluding the parties for most of the later part of the 
1970s and the 1980s? 20 To what extent, and in what fashion, did they increase European 
security, affect or transform the perception of the participating States towards one another, or 
bring about the drastic changes of the late 1980s? 21 How much of the European experiment, 
or what precise measures, could be successfully duplicated by other regions? 
18 As noted by James Macintosh, "It does seem implausible ... that the 
CSCE CSBM negotiations 
single-handedly caused the transformation in European security relations during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. On the other hand, it is very difficult to accept that there was no positive change in 
CSCE/OSCE security relations..... Granting that there was a positive change, it is difficult to argue 
that the confidence building process played no role in facilitating that change. " James Macintosh, 
Confidence Building in the Arms Control Process: A Transformation View, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Studies, No. 2, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996, p. 
23. Although Macintosh does not really provide definite answers on the above, his study (highly 
critical of the current literature which he sees as avoiding taking a hard look at what precisely CBMs 
have accomplished and how) constitutes the most comprehensive attempt to explain how the 
development of a confidence building process can contribute to change relations. 
19 Writing in 1987, Heinz Vetschera argued that: "Building confidence requires time. It took a decade 
to take the step from the first generation of CBMs to the next, and it may have been inter alia the 
positive experience with the CBMs of the Final Act which paved the way for the next generation. 
Although further developments are desirable in a shorter period of time, negotiations on far-reaching 
further measures without any experience with the second generation of CBMs at all may not succeed. " 
Heinz Vetschera, "Effects of Basket I: Security and Confidence-Building", in Neuhold (ed. ), CSCE, 
N+N Perspectives, p. 122. 
20 According to Michael Krepon, "In the East-West struggle CBMs facilitated the negotiation of formal 
arms control agreements. " Krepon, "The Decade for Confidence-building Measures", p. 2. For 
Richard Darilek, however, the issue is not as straightforward: "In Europe, a long process of CBM 
negotiations preceded force reductions. CBM agreements may not, however, inevitably lead to force 
reductions. While force reductions followed in the European case after two CBM agreements had 
already been implemented, there is no clear, direct connection between those agreements and the CFE 
treaty. Force reductions in Europe were far more directly tied to political revolutions in the USSR and 
Eastern Europe. The Helsinki and Stockholm accords had little to do with these revolutions. " 
Paradoxically, Darilek concludes by noting that "nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine how force 
reductions in Europe could have somehow preceded CBM agreements in the East-West context. " 
Darilek, "East-West Confidence Building", p. 286. 
21 For a discussion, see Cathleen S. Fisher, "The Preconditions of Confidence Building: Lessons from 
the European Experience", in Krepon, Newbill, Khoja and Drezin (eds. ), Global Confidence Building. 
New Tools for Troubled Regions, pp. 291-312. For the view that CBMs were largely irrelevant in 
bringing the positive changes of the late 1980s, see James Macintosh, Confidence and Security 
Building Measures: A Sceptical Look, Working Paper No. 85, Canberra: Australian National 
University Peace Research Centre, July 1990, pp. 24-25. 
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While definite answers would go a long way in strengthening our understanding of this 
important security management tool, the purpose of this study on the origins, negotiations and 
implementation of the CSCE CBMs is much more limited. Its aim is not to seek new 
theoretical frameworks or draw lessons for other contexts of application, but to present the 
original practice in a more comprehensive and detailed manner than has been done before 
using key primary data once only available to a few government officials. More specifically, 
this thesis focuses on the motivations and objectives of the Western governments for 
introducing this new type of arrangement in the field of security, assesses their contribution to 
the negotiations, and reviews the practical record of implementation of the measures up to 
1987. 
The study 
When, on 1 August 1975, thirty-five Heads of State or Government from European nations, 
the United States and Canada gathered in Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the CSCE, the 
event was of historical significance. Marking the high point of detente in Europe and the first 
ever East-West multilateral gathering of this kind in the century, the Summit also concluded 
three years of difficult negotiations. Composed of what was called "baskets" in Conference 
parlance, the Final Act defined a set of normative commitments in three main areas of inter- 
state relations: security; co-operation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and 
the environment; and human rights and human contacts. 
The human rights provisions, included at the request of the West, represented a significant 
innovation in international relations. For the first time, an international document recognised 
that respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms were not just a matter of internal 
policy belonging exclusively to the internal affairs of any given state but were universal 
concepts impacting individuals in all participating States. 
Another aspect of the CSCE, which represented an important innovation in international 
affairs, was the adoption of CBMs in the military field. Also requested by the West, the 
measures devised by the Conference were quite simple. The 35 participating States agreed to: 
" give prior notification of military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, 21 days 
or more in advance; 
" invite observers to these manoeuvres on a voluntary basis; 
" voluntarily give prior notification of smaller military manoeuvres and major troop 
movements, and; 
" promote exchanges among their military personnel. 
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As defined in the Final Act, the objectives of these measures were threefold: 
" eliminate the causes of tension; 
" promote confidence and contribute to stability and security, and; 
" reduce the danger of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military 
activities which could give rise to apprehension. 22 
The visible discrepancy between these lofty objectives and the reality of the modest measures 
actually contained within the Final Act clearly suggested that the enunciation of these goals 
had more to do with conference rhetoric at a time of detente than with a clear statement of 
what was to be accomplished with the CBMs. In fact, as this study will examine, the 
motivations and objectives of the Western governments for introducing CBMs in the 
Conference had little to do with this somewhat idealised description of what CBMs could or 
should have accomplished and, in spite of the very real achievements recorded with 
subsequent regimes, the actual application of the Helsinki CBMs barely started to address the 
goals set forth for them in the Final Act. 
Stated in its most elementary terms, the main hypotheses of this study are that, contrary to 
popular belief, the 15 NATO member states who proposed the negotiation of CBMs in the 
CSCE --and who later took credit for their development-23 had no clear view of what they 
22 This and all subsequent quotations of the Final Act included in this paper are from CSCE, 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Helsinki, 1975,61 pages. 
23 Despite the fact that the leading neutral and non-aligned participating States of the CSCE strongly 
endorsed CBMs throughout the Conference, the Western governments regarded their adoption as being 
mainly the product of their own initiatives. As noted in a 1976 US government document: "At the 
insistence of the Western participants the agenda had been greatly expanded to include ... certain 
limited `confidence-building measures' in the military domain. " Even before the Conference 
concluded, the British government claimed that the three confidence-building measures under 
consideration at the Conference were "a Western idea". The view that the CSCE CBMs emerged 
principally from the efforts of the Western states was also sanctioned by the Council of Europe in 
1977: "Some Western democracies took the initiative of adding military measures to the political 
aspects of the [CSCE]; the so-called confidence-building measures. All other non-Warsaw Pact 
countries accepted the idea and became active partners in the discussions. " Finally, writing in a 
different context (discussing the introduction of CBMs into the United Nations), German Ambassador 
Henning Wegener went even further arguing that CBMs had been "the intellectual property ... of a 
few 
Western European governments, and, subsequently, of a limited number of experts". For the above 
quotations see, respectively: First Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Report submitted to the 
Committee on International Relations, US Congress, 94th Congress, 2d Session, December 1976, 
Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1976, p. 3; Bennett and Hamilton: The Conference, p. 226; Council of 
Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Twenty-Eight Session, 1976-1977, Documents, Volume 11, Report 
on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament presented by the 
Political Affairs Committee, by Mr. De Koster, Rapporteur, 22 April 1976, Document 3768,1977, 
Strasbourg, p. 1; and Wegener, "CBMs: European and Global Dimensions", p. 170. For other 
references giving credit to the West for the CSCE measures, see Ehni, Reinhard W., "Confidence- 
Building Measures: A Task for Arms Control and Disarmament Policy", NATO Review, 28: 3, June 
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wanted to achieve with the measures, and implementation was not necessarily the success 
story so often attributed to their application. This thesis argues that the initial objectives of the 
NATO partners for bringing the measures into the Conference had more to do with intra- 
alliance disagreement over what issues of European military security should be discussed in 
this forum than with any genuine interest for the adoption of measures to build confidence or 
security in Europe. Partly because of strong long-standing misgivings about the Soviet 
proposal for a Conference, the Western states only reluctantly agreed to consider the idea and 
slowly began preparations for the event. In this process, the decision to introduce a military 
content into the deliberations came very late, and CBMs even later, but only as a second 
"best-choice" that no NATO government was truly committed to. It is a strong contention of 
this thesis that the absence of genuine interest for CBMs, combined with fears that any 
measure negotiated in the CSCE framework might negatively impact on the negotiation of 
similar but more comprehensive measures in the parallel talks on Mutual and Balance Force 
Reductions (MBFR), was largely responsible for only a modest set of CBMs being proposed 
by the West and for the failure of the Conference to achieve more comprehensive results in 
this field. Another important contention of this thesis is that while the outcome of the CSCE 
in the field of security was the introduction of new procedures regulating the conduct of 
military activities in Europe, the NATO governments never relied on those procedures to 
increase their security and the measures never achieved their stated objectives. 
The approach chosen to substantiate these hypotheses closely follows the chronology of the 
CSCE. As the study seeks to reconstruct the origins, the negotiations, and the implementation 
of the CSCE CBMs from a Western viewpoint, emphasis is placed on the development of the 
policies of the member states of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Significant to the development of the Western approach to negotiating CBMs in the CSCE is 
the background to the Conference which, from its inception, was always a Communist 
project. Chapter 1 traces the origins of the CSCE from the first Soviet appeals in 1954 to 
NATO's first positive reply in April 1969. This period covers only (the first) two of the three 
different phases of the long Soviet campaign, highlighting the development of the deep-seated 
Western apprehensions toward a conference that strongly influenced their policies at a later 
stage. 
1980, pp. 24-25; Maresca, "Helsinki Accord, 1975", pp. 110-111; and Bernd A. Goetze, Security in 
Europe. A Crisis of Confidence, New York: Praeger, 1984, pp. 70-71 and p. 78. 
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The chapter also reviews in depth the background of NATO's first reply or "sign of 
movement" in April 1969. As the analysis emphasises, the development of detente in Europe 
continuously raised Western public expectations for a furthering thaw in the East-West 
confrontation, resulting in increased pressure on the NATO countries to abandon their purely 
negative stance toward the idea. Yet, even if the Western governments felt obliged to be 
more responsive to the Conference project, this did not mean that they were ready to enter 
such a gathering soon. At the time, the Allies continued to see the Conference as a one-sided 
project aimed at undermining the Western Alliance, and the key security preoccupation for 
them was negotiation of force reductions in Central Europe through which they hoped to 
diminish domestic pressure for unilateral troop cuts and strengthen their security. Western 
proposals to start MBFR negotiations, however, were unanswered by the Warsaw Pact, 
making NATO's "forced" reply on a Conference even more disconcerting for the Allies. 
In Chapter 2, the difficulties emanating from the decision to consider the Communist project, 
despite continuing widespread apprehensions about Soviet intentions, are exposed. From the 
moment the West indicated readiness to explore potential issues and modalities of 
negotiations with the East in April 1969, until May 1972 when the NATO countries agreed to 
proceed to multilateral preparatory discussions for a Conference, the Allies found themselves 
responding to two competing considerations: on the one hand, trying to satisfy public opinion 
expecting improvements in East-West relations and, on the other, avoiding a Conference 
based on the Eastern plan. Throughout this three-year period, the Warsaw Pact nations 
continuously pushed for an early convening of the Conference, while at NATO every issue 
related to the project became a source of internal disagreement. 
The chapter discusses how, after publicly committing themselves in April 1969 to identifying 
appropriate subjects for discussions with the East, before deciding on appropriate frameworks 
or forum for their negotiations, the Allies never managed to devise any comprehensive policy 
in this regard and experienced great difficulties in reaching consensus on how to move 
forward toward a process of negotiations. Differences concerning the establishment of pre- 
conditions for Western participation in a Conference; the pertinence, content, or timing of 
fresh overtures to the East; the identification of potentially useful subjects of discussions, or 
the most appropriate forum to start a process of discussion, always found the Allies in 
disagreement, resulting in the elaboration of only partially supported decisions hastily 
produced on the eve of the conclusion of a Ministerial Meeting of the Alliance. 
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In this continuing succession of last-minute compromise formulae, not always fully thought 
through, the Allies proposed in December 1971 that the CSCE should deal with "certain 
military aspects of security". As the historical record shows, the decision, taken during a 
difficult Ministerial Meeting for the member states, was not preceded by any extensive 
discussions as to why they should argue for introducing "certain military aspects of security" 
in the CSCE, or what precisely should be pursued under this general heading. The internal 
discussions at NATO, following the December meeting, disclose that when the Allies made 
their proposal no specific subject had been identified for consideration. Although a majority 
of Europeans nations were thinking of certain elements of the MBFR negotiations 
--negotiations still not accepted by the East-- other member states were completely opposed to 
the idea and it was only because the Allies found themselves deadlocked that they began to 
pay attention to confidence-building measures. 
Chapters 3,4,5,6 and 7 cover in turn NATO's discussions and preparations on CBMs for the 
different phases of the CSCE and the negotiations. Chapter 3 begins after the NATO 
Ministerial Meeting of May 1972 when the Allies officially agreed to enter into Multilateral 
Preparatory Talks (MPT) on the Conference, and traces their discussions to the opening of 
these talks in November of that year. 
This period begins with the first consultations in Brussels specifically devoted to the 
possibility of introducing CBMs into the CSCE and concludes with a decision to present two 
measures. Throughout this period, European governments still argued for including certain 
elements of MBFR into the CSCE and, for this reason, only the United States, who strongly 
opposed the suggestion, submitted a paper on CBMs. 
Of significance for the future development of the measures, the paper tabled by the 
Americans in July 1972 was not a thorough analysis of the subject, but a general discussion of 
advantages and disadvantages for introducing CBMs into the context of the Conference, 
accompanied by strong warnings about possible implications for the future negotiations of 
similar, but more exacting and desirable, measures in MBFR. 
NATO's consultations during this crucial six-month period preceding the opening of the MPT 
indicates that the Allies spent most of this time criticising the US paper with nothing of 
substance being extensively reviewed or firmly agreed upon. Furthermore, fears that the 
Soviets might use the negotiation of CBMs in the CSCE to reject similar measures in MBFR 
led to a general agreement that the measures to be presented should be of a limited character 
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and not precisely defined. As a result, when the Allies entered the multilateral consultations 
on the CSCE, they were neither prepared nor willing to push for a thorough development of 
CBMs. No military or technical studies had been undertaken on any of the proposed 
measures, and the Allies only had one goal (a negative one): avoid a comprehensive 
discussion on, and elaboration of, CBMs in order to keep all options open for MBFR. 
Chapter 4, which is entirely devoted to the MPT, held in Helsinki from 22 November 1972 to 
8 June 1973, presents the record of these first multilateral consultations on a CSCE, often 
considered as the "blue-print" for the entire Conference. After a brief overview of the overall 
meaning and results of the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, the analysis concentrates on the 
development of the negotiations discussing, first, how the NATO, Warsaw Pact and the 
Neutral and Non-aligned states (the three main groupings represented at the CSCE) entered 
the talks with completely differing views on the importance of discussing military issues at 
the Conference and, then, on what topics, if any, should be placed on the agenda. For reasons 
already discussed in the previous chapter, the proposals of the NATO delegations in the field 
of security were limited to only two modest confidence-building measures: the notification of 
major military manoeuvres and movements, and the exchange of observers at manoeuvres. 
For the Neutral and Non-aligned states (NNAs), the Conference was seen as an opportunity to 
obtain a greater say in the "military affairs" of the continent and, in support of that objective, 
these states wanted a long list of CBMs, arms control and disarmament proposals dealt with 
by the CSCE, while also requesting that the Conference discuss force reductions. 
The approach of the Warsaw Pact nations was fundamentally different from the other two 
groups. Although initially requesting a "security" conference, Moscow's main objective for a 
Conference after 1968 was only to obtain a symbolic high-level meeting which would 
endorse a political document recognising the political and territorial status quo in Europe and 
Soviet hegemony in its sphere of influence. Accordingly, the Eastern states arrived at 
Helsinki without any programme of military measures and took the position that none should 
be introduced in the Conference. 
The chapter examines how, with a majority of participating States advocating consideration of 
a variety of issues in the military field, the Warsaw Pact countries found themselves 
completely isolated and in a position of weakness because they were the demandeur for the 
Conference. The analysis emphasises how the strong insistence of the NNAs for a maximum 
programme of military issues in the Conference eventually forced Moscow to accept 
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discussions of some CBMs, but that Moscow's reluctant acceptance of the measures only 
meant the beginning of the discussions because the positions of the parties were far apart. As 
the study details, months of debate were necessary to produce a compromise whereby, as 
defined in the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, the Conference was 
tasked to produce recommendations on both the notification of manoeuvres and on the 
exchange of observers, but was only requested to study the issue of the notification of 
movements. Despite the weaker commitment on movements, and a very vague mandate 
which could have allowed for a comprehensive or restrictive development of the measures at 
the CSCE, the chapter closes by highlighting that the final outcome of the MPT was a success 
for the Western states, but that in spite of this important achievement and the certainty that 
their proposed CBMs would be the focal point of the main negotiations in the field of 
security, the Allies did not enlarge the scope or nature of their preparations. 
Chapter 5 returns to NATO's discussions on CBMs, focusing on the work in Brussels from 
the opening of the MPT, in November 1972, to the beginning of the Conference itself, in July 
1973. Although overlapping and presented after the examination of the multilateral 
preliminary consultations, the Helsinki discussions had very little impact on the way the 
Allies conducted their preparations for the Conference. As the record clearly demonstrates, 
the NATO governments remained committed to having only a minimal development of the 
measures and did not undertake any study to further their knowledge or understanding of 
CBMs. 
As hastily agreed before the MPT, the Allies believed the only strategy that could ensure that 
the CSCE discussions on CBMs would be kept simple was to seek comparison of illustrative 
lists of military activities which would exemplify what each side would be willing to notify. 
But, as discussed at length in this section, NATO's lack of prior studies on CBMs, and the 
absence of extensive discussions among Allies, resulted in difficulties developing an agreed 
package of Western lists. These initial difficulties pointed to the need for a more precise 
formulation of Western objectives for CBMs, implying much more detailed development and 
definition of the measures which not all NATO governments were willing to consider. 
In addition to the problems in the development of their negotiating strategy, the Allies also 
began to experience difficulties with their own proposals because, four months into the 
negotiations, the United States began to raise concerns about the Western proposal for the 
notification of movements and demanded that it be taken out of the CSCE deliberations and 
considered only in the framework of the force reductions talks. 
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As the study of NATO's preparations for the Conference concludes, Alliance preparations 
throughout this period made no progress and, when entering the CSCE, the West still had no 
common agreement on many basic aspects of their own proposals. 
Chapter 6 reviews, in turn, the three Stages of the CSCE beginning with the discussions of the 
Foreign Ministers in Helsinki from 3-7 July 1973; followed by the main negotiations held at 
expert-level in Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975, and; concluding with a 
three-day Summit meeting of the CSCE Heads of State or Government, who signed the Final 
Act in Helsinki on 1 August 1975. As Stage I and III of the Conference were mainly 
procedural, the focus of the analysis is on Stage II where the real negotiations took place and 
where the parties had to give meaning to the decisions reached at the MPT. Despite 
agreement on the Final Recommendations and the definition of mandates for each agenda 
item, as soon as the main negotiations opened it immediately became clear that the 
compromises reached at Helsinki did not satisfy the NNAs and the Warsaw Pact nations. 
The chapter traces the evolution of the position of the parties, the proposals and counter- 
proposals, the bargaining and trade-offs, and the necessary compromises allowing for a final 
agreement on a document of confidence-building measures. As for the MPT, the negotiating 
record of the Conference reveals that the Eastern bloc eventually had to accept more than they 
wanted to, while on the Western side the final results of the CSCE represented another 
success because they closely reflected their positions. But, as the next chapter explores in 
detail, this Western "victory" on CBMs can be questioned on a number of grounds. 
Chapter 7 returns to several important aspects of the main negotiations focusing on the 
positions put forward by the West. The analysis reveals that on a number of crucial points the 
NATO states were equally, if not sometimes, singularly responsible for the meagre results of 
the Final Act. 
The chapter begins by analysing why the only strategy developed at NATO for the 
negotiation of the notification measures never materialised and how the Western states arrived 
at the Conference with no agreed lists of military activities in hand and never managed to 
table one in the Conference room. More substantially, the chapter discusses how 
concentration on the illustrative lists only served to derail discussions on important aspects of 
the measures and prevent the development of a comprehensive Alliance policy on CBMs. 
Indeed, NATO's internal discussions on CBMs during the CSCE revealed many significant 
disagreements among the Allies which invariably resulted in the adoption of a negotiating 
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policy requiring only a minimal development of CBMs. Furthermore, as emphasised in this 
section, NATO's inability to develop and present comprehensive measures also stemmed 
from the opposition of some member states, especially France and the United States, who 
only wanted minimal development. As the chapter concludes, the NATO member states 
initially adopted CBMs only as a second "best- choice" that no one was truly committed to, 
and the Allies never agreed to develop measures that would be useful from a military point 
view, seeing them as having primarily political value. 
Chapter 8 leaves the negotiations to concentrate on the application of the Helsinki CBMs 
regime. After a general review of the main provisions of the Final Act's CBMs Document, 
the study presents a detailed analysis of the implementation record of the measures for the 
three major groupings represented at the CSCE. General observations on the application of 
the CBMs divulges an obvious qualitative difference between the participating States, 
whereby in sharp contrast with the Western and NNAs who gave a liberal interpretation to the 
CSCE commitments and offered a forthcoming and rather comprehensive implementation of 
the measures, the pattern of application of the measures by the Warsaw Pact nations 
remained, throughout the entire period, very poor and of questionable reliance. In addition to 
an obvious sketchy and selective record of compliance, the Soviet Union openly violated the 
agreement during the political crisis in Poland in the early 1980s, bringing to light the 
inadequacies and failure of the regime. 
After analysis of the application of the measures, the study reviews the most prominent goals 
ascribed to CBMs emphasising how the Eastern record of compliance with the regime never 
allowed for a fulfilment of the objectives set forth for the measures. The chapter closes by 
discussing how, fully aware of the many loopholes left in the Final Act, the Western states 
never truly challenged the East for a better record of compliance, preferring instead to argue 
for a new set of measures with strict provisions. 
This thesis concludes that the existing positive outlook on the CSCE CBMs experience is 
overstated and needs to be further assessed in light of empirical evidence. The widely held 
belief that the Western governments did all they could to obtain the best out of the CSCE, or 
that only the Soviets were to blame for the meagre and vague results, is not as definite a case 
as usually assumed. Similarly, the idea that the implementation of CBMs may have improved 
trust and confidence between the parties, or increased predictability and stability, is very 
difficult to reconcile with the important breaches of the Warsaw Pact nations and the final 
conclusion of the Western countries which was to require measures with strict provisions, 
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including mandatory on-site inspections. 
Notes on Background and Literature 
The arguments contained in the body of this study sharply contrast with the vast literature 
discussing the CSCE CBMs experience. One of the main problems with existing literature is 
that it is not based on thorough examination of the historical record of the CBMs and, with 
very few exceptions, offers only a superficial and redundant treatment of the subject matter. 
In essence, it is common to suggest that because the CBMs were proposed by the West, and 
the Warsaw Pact nations adamantly opposed them throughout the negotiations, the measures 
embodied in the Final Act were the best Western negotiators could extract from the 
negotiations. Similarly, it is common to appraise the implementation of the Helsinki CBMs 
as a success because, despite weaknesses, they have remained in force for more than a decade 
and brought a more demanding and valuable set of measures at a later stage. 
One reason explaining the superficiality and redundancy in assessments is that most writings 
on CBMs concentrate on the development of the Helsinki-type of measures to new 
applications. 24 With this focus in mind, it appears sufficient to relate as way of "background" 
that the CSCE CBMs were the first of their kind to be negotiated between rival states, and that 
they were implemented on the continent with the greatest concentration of armaments and 
forces in the world. 
Another factor explaining the lack of attention given to the historical record of the 
negotiations is that a large section of the literature concentrates on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the measures. 25 When CBMs came into being in Europe in 1975 there was 
24 From measures to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the North Pacific region 
to proposals for implementing maritime-specific CBMs in the Middle East, the variety of new security 
contexts where CBMs can be applied has attracted enormous interest with a large body of literature on 
the topic including official publications, reports from international and regional organisations, 
academic books, articles and pamphlets. For a good example of such work, refer to the work of the 
Washington-based Henry L. Stimson Center which has devoted many reports and papers to the broad 
range of application of CBMs world-wide. In addition, the United Nations serials entitled 
Disarmament. Topical Papers, and Study Series provide a good sample of such analysis. 
25 Several of the most prominent studies published in this regard have been used and are quoted in 
Chapter 8 in the section dealing with "the purposes of CBMs. " Furthermore in addition to the sources 
suggested in the note above, which also contain several diversified studies on the concept of 
confidence-building and the objectives of CBMs, one can mention the excellent study produced by 
James Macintosh, in which he reviews and assesses the most important work and concludes that most 
academic literature on CBMs suffers from analytic oversimplification. See James Macintosh, 
Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective, 
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no theory of confidence-building. In fact, as already noted, the term itself only entered the 
diplomatic language at the time of their negotiations. 
A third, and, perhaps most important reason explaining why the historical record of the CSCE 
in general, and the CSCE CBMs in particular, has remained largely under-researched is the 
absence of substantive work it has generated, even at the time of the negotiations. One 
explanation for this is due to the nature and the length of the CSCE itself and the fact that 
apart from Stage I and III of the Conference, which only consisted of official pronouncements 
and speeches, no official record of the proceedings have been kept or have been published. 26 
When the preliminary talks started in Helsinki in late 1972 expectations were certainly very 
important for this first ever East-West multilateral encounter, but when the more than 200 
delegates withdrew behind closed doors for almost six months of consultations, basically to 
only produce an agenda which did not even promise the reduction of any single weapon, 
enthusiasm for the enterprise greatly diminished. Furthermore, even if the presence of some 
35 Foreign Ministers for the opening of the Conference offered wide publicity, immediately 
after the speeches were over, the proceedings again moved behind closed doors, for almost 
two years, with little filtrating from behind them. Finally, despite the fact that the signing of 
the Final Act was of historical importance, the event, in the eyes of many, was not to be 
remembered for its positive contribution to history. On the contrary, in the West, the Final 
Act was initially greeted with very severe criticism by a wide spectrum of the press who 
described it as a "deception in 30,000 words", and depicted the overall results of the CSCE as 
a shameful sell-out to the East, especially because of its provisions recognising the 
inviolability of frontiers. 27 
In short, the virtues of the CSCE, as we know them today, were not recognised at the time. In 
fact, as subsequently officially acknowledged, the merits of the Final Act were only 
recognised a few years after its signature, and only after groups of dissidents in the East 
brought world-wide attention to it. But, even if more (and more positive) interest was brought 
to the CSCE, the focus of attention remained primarily on human rights provisions. Although 
Arms Control and Disarmament Studies No. 1, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, 1985,136 pages. 
26 See bibliography. 
27 For an interesting review of the reactions of many leading newspapers, commentators, and 
politicians in the West, see Hugo Walschap, "The Great European Jamboree: The East, the West, the 
Non-Aligned and the Neutrals at the Pan-European Meeting (CSCE)", Res Publica, 18: 1,1976, 
especially, pp. 50-57. [Hereafter: Walschap, "The Great European Jamboree"]. 
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confidence-building measures represented the only security issue seriously negotiated at the 
Conference, the measures were basically a "non-subject" at the start of the CSCE, and with 
negotiations in this field progressing at an even more excruciatingly slower pace than others, 
the subject was not conducive to bringing any attention to the measures. As one newspaper 
commented in May 1974 about the discussion on the notification of manoeuvres: "No one 
denies that these are basic matters of national interest, but it is still somewhat ridiculous that 
eight months of talks have led to one 114-word text in which only four words are not 
bracketed. "28 
This study does not claim to present the comprehensive history of the Helsinki CBMs. 
However, one of the motivations in undertaking this research has been to fill in an important 
gap in knowledge and to provide a more empirical analysis than has been previously 
available. 
One of the main difficulties in carrying out this research was the overwhelming amount of 
documents currently available on CBMs and the CSCE and, ironically also, the paucity or 
absence of real substance on their introduction and negotiations, as well as (though to a lesser 
degree) on their implementation. Hence, numerous books and journals were consulted but 
very few provided any specific data. An exception to this trend are the published records of at 
least five direct participants to the CSCE negotiations from the United States, Italy, the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia and Germany who, with their diversity of backgrounds and political 
affiliations, helped provide a good overview of the negotiations from different national 
perspectives, and very often filling in gaps. 29 
Another important source of information came in the form of books or articles written by 
government officials involved in the later CSCE negotiations. In this category, one can note 
the writings of US Ambassador James E. Goodby (first Head of the US Delegation to the 
28 Alan Tillier, "The Labyrinthine Search for European Security", International Herald Tribune, 3 May 
1974. [All future references to the International Herald Tribune are identified as IHT]. 
29 John J. Maresca, To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975, 
Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1985,292 pages. [Hereafter: Maresca, To Helsinki]. Luigi 
Vittorio Ferraris (ed. ), Report on a Negotiation: Helsinki-Geneva-Helsinki, 1972-1975, Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff and Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneve, 1979, 
439 pages. [Hereafter: Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation]. Lev Mendelevich, "Diplomatic Notes on the 
1972-1973 Helsinki Multilateral Consultations to Prepare the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe", International Affairs (Moscow), December 1983, pp. 88-111, and p. 132. [Hereafter: 
Mendelevich, "Diplomatic Notes"]. Ljubivoje Acimovic, Problems of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981,349 pages. [Hereafter: Acimovic, Problems 
of Security]. Of interest also, numerous articles published by Götz von Groll, a leading member of the 
West German delegation at the CSCE. 
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CSCE Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Europe --CDE); Carl C. Krehbiel (US delegation at the Stockholm CDE); 
John J. Toogood (Chairman of the NATO caucus on CBMs during the Belgrade Follow-Up 
Meeting); Bernd Goetze (Canadian delegation to the CSCE at Stockholm); Adam-Daniel 
Rotfeld (member of the Polish delegation to the CSCE Follow-Up Meetings in Belgrade and 
Madrid); Rolf Berg (Norwegian delegation at the CDE in Stockholm), and a number of 
others. 30 In comparison to the first group of authors who reported on the minutia of the CSCE 
proceedings as they evolved at the time or shortly after, the work of this second group of 
writers deals primarily with subsequent CSCE negotiations. Yet, the value of their work was 
of great significance for this study because these authors were involved in negotiations trying 
to improve the CBMs of the Final Act and had a keen interest in discussing a number of 
issues related to initial Western policies, including difficulties encountered, weaknesses, or 
mistakes made in the past. 
A third crucial source of informed analysis was found in manuscripts written by academics 
who had access to their government's diplomatic archives. Here, one can note the 
comprehensive Canadian studies put together by Michael Spencer, as well as the one from 
Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann. 31 These authors, who were given unrestricted access to 
all records of Canada's Department of External Affairs, not only quoted extensively from 
them but offered a solid analysis based on the wealth of historical data they had found. 
Also of great interest and of the highest standard are the numerous writings of Victor-Yves 
Ghebali who has followed the evolution of CBMs from the very start of the CSCE 
negotiations, and offered the only "paragraph-by-paragraph" analysis of the Final Act 
Document on CBMs. 32 
Lastly, for the section dealing with the goals and implementation of the Helsinki CBMs 
regime, the study has largely benefited from the writings of a number of authors specialising 
in the field of arms control. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, effective verification of arms 
30 References to some of their writings can be found in the bibliography. 
31 Robert Spencer (ed. ), Canada and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies, 1984,440 pages. [Hereafter: Spencer, 
Canada and the Conference]. Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada 
and Disarmament, 1945-1988, Montreal: McGill University Press, 1992,663 pages. [Hereafter: 
Legault and Fortmann: A Diplomacy of Hope]. 
32 Victor-Yves Ghebali, Confidence-Building Measures Within the CSCE Process: Paragraph-by- 
Paragraph Analysis of the Helsinki and Stockholm Regimes, UNIDIR Research Paper, No. 3, New 
York: United Nations, March 1989,108 pages. [Hereafter: Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph]. 
27 
control constituted a major stumbling bloc to agreement. Growing disenchantment with the 
results of negotiations brought many analysts and practitioners to turn their attention to the 
potential of Confidence-building Measures, especially with regard to increased openness and 
transparency in military matters. Many of these writings remain today the most 
comprehensive attempts at explaining the merits of CBMs, 33 and provided very useful 
assessments helping form the background of the analysis. In this section also, extensive use 
has been made of the World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbooks published by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which constituted one of the only 
open sources providing yearly data on the application of the regime. 34 
To palliate the insufficiency of what can be described as a rather thin existing published 
record of the negotiations of the CBMs, extensive use has been made of primary sources. 
First, a meticulous review of five leading newspapers from France (Le Monde), the United 
States (the International Herald Tribune and the New York Times), and from Great Britain 
(The Times and The Guardian) covering the entire period of the CSCE negotiations (1972- 
1975) and the previous three years of intense "East-West" dialogue (1969-1972) has been 
done. To ensure the greatest accuracy, almost without exception no newspaper reporting has 
been quoted without a parallel confirmation found in at least one other newspaper preferably 
from a different country. In fact, given the extensive use made of newspaper articles, it 
should be noted that the full citation is only provided the first time an article is quoted, after 
which only an abbreviated version is offered. 
Another critical primary source of information from which crucial data has been obtained 
came from the archives of Canada's Department of External Affairs (or DEA) who provided 
virtually unrestricted access to all of the CSCE files from 1969 to 1979. With almost three 
years of negotiations and an additional three years of preparations to cover, the tasks of 
searching through the huge number of daily cables was daunting, though this proved an 
absolute necessity in providing a wealth of raw information forming the backbone of this 
analysis. Here, however, certain limitations should be noted. First, as is the case for all 
national archives, the primary focus of the documents found was on the reporting of 
implications for the national position, and/or request for instructions on evolving situations. 
33 For a selected list of the most significant studies, see note 1. For a critical analysis of the concept of 
CBMs, written during the same period, see Lawrence Freedman, Arms Control. Management or 
Reform, Chatham House Papers 31, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1986,102 pages. 
34 Full references are provided in the bibliography. 
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In this regard, the material emphasised the Canadian position rather than NATO's position 
which is the focal point of this study. A second limitation which, as in the first case, was 
certainly not unique to Canada was that the main interest of the Canadian government in the 
CSCE was not for CBMs. In fact, recognising that the measures were to be implemented on 
the European continent with lesser implications for Canada, Ottawa felt that it was preferable 
for its diplomats not to be too pro-active in this field and instructed them likewise. Although 
these limitations are important to note, they are not related here to suggest that the level or 
quality of reporting of the Canadian diplomats were affected in any way by these 
considerations, but simply to point out that, perhaps, in comparison to other areas of greater 
interest to Canada, less in-depth analysis of CBMs or thorough description of all the positions, 
moves and counter-moves of other partners and participating States was generated. This 
being said, it should be noted that Canadian diplomats in Geneva took a keen interest in the 
negotiations of CBMs, even coming up with important original initiatives of their own when 
the proceedings were deadlocked. In this sense, Canadian interest for CBMs can by no means 
be considered as negligible. 
Another similar source of crucial information on CBMs that has been of great significance for 
the completion of this research came from the publication of a selective set of the CSCE 
archival material of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 35 The word 
"selective" is not used here to describe the content of the information (because it is presented 
"as is"), but the choice made by the editors when putting the volume together, in that only a 
selection of documents dealing with CBMs have been incorporated. Despite this limitation, 
the published record of the FCO files has been of immense value especially since Great 
Britain was the Alliance floor leader on CBMs. 
Primary source information on CBMs and the CSCE used to support the analysis also 
included a wide range of government reports, official speeches, communiques, Senate 
Hearings, etc. Because the 1969-1972 East-West "dialogue" on the future Conference was 
primarily carried out by means of final communiques of meetings of the political organs of 
the two military alliances, close scrutiny was given to all policy statements issued at the 
conclusion of the Ministerial Meetings of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with several excerpts 
incorporated. 
35 G. Bennett and K. A. Hamilton (eds. ), The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
1972-75, Series III: Volume II of Documents on British Policy Overseas, London: The Stationery 
Office, 1997,506 pages. [Hereafter: Bennett and Hamilton: The Conference]. 
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Similarly, great use has been made of the semi-annual reports on implementation published 
by the US Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Although the 
primary interest of the Commission was for human rights, 36 considerable details were 
provided on the implementation of CBMs, representing one of the few official governmental 
publications to make such information public. 
To complete the study, the author has also conducted several interviews with officials with 
CBMs responsibilities from the US State Department, the Pentagon, the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, the Rand Corporation, the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, and the US 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to collect information not available in 
open sources. 37 Some of these interviews were with serving government officials, and others 
were retired diplomats. Some were on the record while others were not for attribution. 
Outside the United States, the author has also benefited from several interviews with the 
Chairman of the NATO caucus on CBMs during the Belgrade Follow-Up Meeting (who was 
also involved in the initial CSCE negotiations), as well as a number of more informal 
discussions with former or current government officials from Germany, Britain and Poland 
who had in-depth knowledge of the subject or had been directly involved in the CBMs 
negotiations of the CSCE. 
With 15 NATO partners involved in the development of Western policy, 35 participating 
States taking part in the negotiations, more than three years of preparations, three years of 
negotiations, and more than a decade of implementation, this study can by no means be 
considered as a definitive assessment of what has been done or what has been achieved. It is 
believed, however, to fill a gap in historical knowledge and to provide a more empirically- 
based treatment of the subject matter than has been done before, especially with regard to the 
Western contribution to the experience. 
36 For an interesting discussion of the background to the creation of the Commission and the beginning 
of its work, see Richard Davy, "The United States", in Nils Andren and Karl E. Birnbaum (eds. ), 
Belgrade and Beyond. The CSCE Process in Perspective, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
1980, pp. 3-5. 
37 See list in the bibliography. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE ORIGINS OF THE CSCE (1954-1969) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), signed in 
August 1975, marked the conclusion of the first multilateral East-West negotiations of the 
century. The gathering, attended by thirty-five Heads of State or Government, was a major 
diplomatic event. Yet, for many of the officials present at the Summit meeting the event was 
primarily a relief. Three years of difficult negotiations had been necessary to achieve 
agreement on the document which, until the very end of the proceedings, often seemed simply 
out of reach. More significantly, for many participating governments, the conclusion of the 
negotiations was essentially a great relief for ending many years of apprehensions toward the 
Conference. 
The origins of the CSCE have always been associated with the Soviet Union who, as early as 
1954, began promoting the idea of a European Security Conference to discuss post-war 
problems. For nearly twenty years, with few intervals, convening a conference remained a 
recurring theme in Moscow's proposals for security in Europe. Despite several formulations, 
reflecting changing circumstances, the Soviet project always raised fears in the West. For 
almost 15 years the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance completely refused to 
consider the conference until, in 1969, they finally agreed to look more favourably at the 
issue. The changed Western response did not mean, however, a change of opinion because 
the West continued to have only misgivings about the conference. 
To understand Western apprehensions and the reasons why, as NATO was celebrating its 
twentieth anniversary, the member states felt compelled to consider the Communist proposal, 
it is essential to review Moscow's initiatives throughout this period. While highlighting 
Soviet security preoccupations, they also help to understand the development of Western 
attitudes toward the conference and recreate the context of their decisions. In many ways the 
origins of the CSCE, which began in the Cold War era, left an indelible impact on Western 
perceptions of the purpose, nature, and value of the conference, which not only affected the 
elaboration of Allied policies until the first NATO positive reply in 1969, but even afterwards 
when the Allies began to develop their positions for negotiations. 
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2. TRACING THE IDEA 
The idea of a large European conference directly emerged from the difficult context of 
relations developing between the Soviet Union and the West after the Second World War. In 
the immediate post-war period East-West relations were dominated by the German question. 
In numerous discussions, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet 
Union, the "Four Powers" of occupation having responsibility for defeated Germany, failed to 
reach agreement on a German settlement and on the mutual withdrawal of the troops left there 
at war's end. Between 1946 and 1949 a series of conferences of the "Big Four", convened to 
study plans for the demilitarisation, neutralisation and reunification of the country, repeatedly 
ended in deadlock over disagreements between Moscow and the three Western Allied Powers 
on every fundamental issue. ' In May 1949, the three Allied Powers established the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) and shortly after gave its first freely elected government, under 
Chancellor Adenauer, the right to administer its own internal affairs. Before the end of the 
year, the Soviet Union reacted by establishing the German Democratic Republic (GDR) but 
without self-determination and remaining under its tight control. Only Berlin (an enclave on 
the territory of East Germany), remained under Four-Power occupation, but clearly divided 
between the Eastern zone controlled by the Soviet Union (East Berlin) and the three Western- 
occupied zones of the Allied Powers (West Berlin). 
As differences over occupied Germany steadily degraded relations between the four wartime 
allies, a series of events deeply alarmed Western leaders over Soviet intentions in Europe. 
During 1947 and 1948 Moscow consistently tightened its political control over a number of 
Central and Eastern European countries bringing fears that the Soviet build-up of a monolithic 
communist bloc would extend westward. The February 1948 Communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia, taking over the last government in Eastern Europe still not fully ruled by 
Communists, and the illegal Soviet blockade of all land routes leading to West Berlin which 
started in June that year, dramatically increased Western suspicions of Soviet willingness to 
find co-operative solutions to post-war problems. The large Soviet military presence in 
' For a useful discussion of the different proposals submitted at the Conferences of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers of the Big Four during this period, see John Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe: The 
Soviet Union and the West Since 1953, London: Duke University Press, 1991, pp. 6-15. [Hereafter: 
Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe]; Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt, Detente Diplomacy: 
United States and European Security in the 1970's, New York: Dunellen Company, 1970, pp. 22-28. 
[Hereafter: Stanley and Whitt, Detente Diplomacy]. For an examination of the proposals emphasising 
the issue of troop withdrawal, see William B. Prendergast, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction: 
Issues and Prospects, Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978, pp. 2-6. [Hereafter: 
Prendergast, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction]. 
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Europe was also of increasing concern. Unlike the Western countries who had quickly 
reduced their defence establishments and demobilised their forces after the war, the Soviet 
Union had maintained its military forces at nearly full wartime strength2 and was showing 
little interest in attempting to correct the imbalance with the Western powers. 3 
Reacting to a growing sense of a Soviet threat, Western democracies began to look at ways to 
strengthen their defence. In March 1948, five Western European countries (Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) signed the Brussels Treaty aimed at 
developing a common defence system against outside aggression. A few months later, the 
United States and Canada joined the Brussels Treaty signatories in negotiations to create the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 4 
Despite the establishment of NATO in April 1949, the Western governments remained 
apprehensive about Moscow's expansionist policies in Eastern Europe and the large Soviet 
military presence on the continent and, in June 1950, when the Communist North Koreans 
invaded South Korea, the event sent shockwaves throughout the West. Fearful that a similar 
surprise attack could take place in Europe, the NATO partners quickly agreed to increase their 
military strength and to defend West European territory as far East as possible, including into 
West Germany. 5 
As originally conceived, the need to strengthen Western defences was to be achieved by the 
creation of a unified European army with West German contingents. 6 Negotiations between 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and West Germany culminated in May 
1952 with the signing of the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty. Two years later, 
however, the French National Assembly remained deadlocked over the question of German 
rearmament and voted against treaty ratification. 
Although ending the ambitious plans for the establishment of a European defence community, 
Z For different estimates, see Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, London: The 
John Hopkins Press, 1970, pp. 10-11. [Hereafter, Wolfe, Soviet Power]. 
3 Prendergast, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, pp. 1-6. 
4 In addition to the North American countries and the signatories of the Brussels Treaty, the 
participating States in April 1949 were Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal. In 1952, 
Greece and Turkey acceded to the Treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany joined in May 1955 and, 
in 1982, Spain also became a member. 
5 For a summary review of the discussions leading to this decision, see NATO, The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. - Facts and Figures, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989, pp. 36-38. 
[Hereafter: NATO: Facts and Figures]. 
6 See Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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the collapse of the EDC Treaty in 1954 did not alter Western resolve to secure the 
contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany to the future defence of Western Europe. At 
a conference held in London at the end of September that year, the Allies7 expressed their 
determination to invite the FRG to join the Brussels Treaty Group (subsequently renamed 
Western European Union), and NATO. These decisions were approved at a meeting in Paris, 
in October, which concluded with the signing of the so-called "Paris Agreements", also 
recognising the FRG as a sovereign state. 8 
While the Allies proceeded with relative speed and great determination in building up their 
defence, the political and military developments taking place in the West were monitored 
with great concern by the Soviet leadership. Since the end of the war, fear of German 
resurgence and revanchism dominated Soviet security considerations and, for the Kremlin, 
the only assurance that Germany would never be able to wage another war was its 
reunification, neutralisation, and complete demilitarisation. Four-Power agreement on these 
issues remained elusive and when the West began reconsidering the military status of West 
Germany, Moscow felt pressured to alter its policy. In a note addressed to the three Western 
Allied Powers on 10 March 1952 the Kremlin proposed the negotiation of a peace treaty for 
Germany calling for the neutralisation of the country, but not as before its complete 
demilitarisation. 9 The proposed treaty suggested that a unified Germany would be allowed to 
have its own military forces. In return, the unified country would pledge not to enter into any 
coalition or military alliance directed against the Soviet Union. '0 
The new Soviet approach to a German settlement was not favourably received in the West. 
Presented only a few months before the signing of the EDC Treaty, the proposal was 
immediately discarded as a deliberate attempt to prevent its conclusion and to avert West 
The countries represented were the five Brussels Treaty's signatories, the FRG, Italy, the United 
States, and Canada. 
8 The Paris Agreements contained some 20 separate documents on the status and character of the 
Federal Republic of Germany which, in the absence of a peace treaty with the USSR, regularised the 
relations between the FRG and the three Western powers of occupation and set the conditions for its 
accession to NATO. For a text of the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty and the 
Protocol on the forces of the Western European Union, see RITA, Documents on International Affairs, 
1954, London: Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. 28-32. [Hereafter: RITA, Documents, 1954; All 
future references to the Royal Institute of International Affairs are identified as RIIA]. 9 For a text, see, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, US, Department of State, Washington, D. C.: 
GPO, 1986, pp. 361-364. [Hereafter: Documents on Germany, 1944-1985]. 
10 See Prendergast, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, pp. 5-6; and Stanley and Whitt, Detente 
Diplomacy, pp. 23-24. 
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German rearmament. I l 
Two years later, still facing the prospect of West German rearmament and greater Western 
military integration, the Soviet leadership opted for another change of strategy whereby new 
proposals for a German settlement would be accompanied by proposals for the conclusion of 
a European Treaty of Collective Security to include both Germanies. As presented in 1954 
and early 1955, the conclusion of the treaty necessitated convening at least one general 
European conference. Although very different from what was later presented on the eve of 
the CSCE in the 1970s, these first appeals for a gathering of European states nevertheless 
marked the beginning of the long Soviet campaign for convening a large European security 
conference. 
3. THE FIRST SOVIET APPEALS: 1954-1955 
The proposal for the negotiation of a "Treaty of Collective Security in Europe" was first 
introduced at the Four-Power Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Berlin in January- 
February 1954. As presented by Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister, Viacheslav Molotov, the 
treaty aimed at bringing all the European states, including the two Germanies, into a common 
defence. Under its proposed terms, the signatory states would refrain from having recourse to 
the threat or the use of force and would agree not to participate in any coalition or alliance that 
would contradict the purposes of the treaty. 12 To implement the treaty's provisions, the 
Soviets envisaged convening periodic or special conferences and the establishment of a 
permanent consultative political committee and a military consultative body. More 
immediately, Molotov argued that the Four Powers should take the initiative for convening a 
conference to establish the treaty. ' 3 
This first appeal for a "Conference of European States" received no positive reaction in the 
West. Introduced in conjunction with a proposal for the negotiation of a peace treaty for 
Germany calling for the neutralisation of the country, 14 the most basic points of the Soviet 
proposals were unacceptable to the West. On behalf of the Allied Powers, British Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, argued that a reunified Germany should be given full 
11 See Bennett Kovrig, "European Security in East-West Relations: History of a Diplomatic 
Encounter", in Robert Spencer (ed. ), Canada and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1984, p. 6. 
12 For a text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 415-416. 
13 Ibid., p. 414. 
14 Ibid., pp. 411-413. 
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sovereignty to join future military arrangements and not simply as proposed by the Kremlin 
that, pending reunification, both East and West Germany could be parties to the Treaty of 
Collective Security. ' 5 Equally important to the three Allied Powers, the settlement of the 
German question required that it be initiated by free elections throughout the country; 
something the Soviets had completely ignored in their proposals and were not willing to 
consider. 
In short, if Moscow had anticipated that offering West Germany a role in a common 
European security system would be a successful formula to prevent its integration into 
Western security arrangements, 16 the West interpreted the offer as an obvious attempt to hold 
up the ratification of the EDC Treaty, still in progress in signatory states. '7 Furthermore, the 
fact that the proposed fifty-year security treaty was to be opened only to European nations and 
relegated the United States to the role of observer suggested that Moscow was also aiming to 
separate the United States from Europe, thereby leaving the USSR as the predominant power 
on the continent. 
Perhaps realising that its proposed treaty stood little chance in the West if it did not include 
the full participation of the United States, only two months after the failed Berlin conference, 
Moscow offered to reconsider American participation. As proposed in a note addressed to the 
three Western Powers on 31 March 1954,18 the condition for US participation in the European 
security treaty was Soviet membership in NATO. Immediately discarded by the Allies as just 
another ploy to undermine Western security, 19 the proposal was subsequently followed-up, in 
July, by another Soviet appeal for a conference to be held "in the next few months". 20 In this 
latest invitation, Moscow noted that it was expanding its proposed treaty by including a 
provision for the development of trade and other economic relations among its participating 
states. 21 The theme, which would later become an important aspect of the CSCE negotiations 
15 Better known as the first "Eden Plan", the proposal for German reunification tabled on 29 January 
1954 suggested a five-stage process beginning with free elections throughout the country. For a text, 
see Ibid., pp. 408-411. 
16 See Wolfe, Soviet Power, pp. 74-75; and John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reductions. The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe, New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1980, p. 4. [Hereafter: Keliher, The Negotiations on MBFR]. 
17 See Michael Palmer, The Prospects for a European Security Conference, London: Chatham House, 
PEP, 1971, p. 9. [Hereafter: Palmer, The Prospects]. 
18 For a text, see RITA, Documents, 1954, pp. 39-43. 
19 See "Reply of the Three Western Powers, 7 May 1954", in Ibid., pp. 43-46. The response noted that 
"it [was] unnecessary to emphasize the completely unreal character of such a suggestion. " 20 For Extracts from the Soviet Note (24 July 1954), see Ibid., pp. 46-51. 
21 Ibid. 
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had no impact on changing Western evaluation of the Communist project, and the Allies 
continued to ignore the Soviet initiatives. 
This was the case with the next Soviet offer made in November 1954 just after the Paris 
Agreements were signed, but still not ratified. 22 This appeal, addressed to 25 states, called for 
the immediate convocation of a conference to take place either in Moscow or in Paris. In the 
West, this renewed attempt at convening a large European conference was seen as "openly 
and explicitly aimed at delaying or preventing the ratification of the Paris agreements. , 23 As 
noted in the Allied reply, the essential basis for a useful conference did not exist and 
depended, at least partially, on the clarification of the Soviet position on the question of free 
elections in Germany. 24 Then, as the reply noted, a wider conference could be envisaged, but 
not before the ratification of the Paris Agreements. 25 
Undeterred by its failure to gain Western approval, the Soviet Government went ahead with 
its conference. Attended only by Moscow's closest allies, the conference of eight Communist 
states, held in Moscow in late November 1954, underscored their disapproval of the Paris 
Agreements and threatened the adoption of "joint measures in the organisation of their armed 
26 forces and commands" if the Agreements were ratified. 
In March 1955 the Allies proceeded with ratification of the Paris Agreements, opening the 
way for the accession of West Germany to NATO on 5 May. Moscow reacted within days by 
calling another conference which quickly concluded on 14 May with the signing of the 
"Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance", the basis for the formation of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). 27 Significantly, as not to close the prospect for a future 
agreement on a European security system, the treaty stressed that the WTO would cease to be 
operative from the day a general European treaty of collective security would enter into 
force. 28 
22 The Soviet Note of 13 November 1954 can be found in Ibid., pp. 58-61 23 US Reply to the Soviet Union (29 November 1954) in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 438- 
440. 
24 For a text, see RIIA, Documents, 1954, pp. 61-64. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Text of the "Eight-Power Declaration" (2 December 1954) in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, 
pp. 441-442. 
27 The signatory states were Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
Rumania, and the USSR. For a text, see Ibid., pp. 445-448. East Germany joined the Treaty in 
January 1956. 
28 This point is noted by Lawrence L. Whetten in Germany's Ostpolitik. - Relations between the Federal 
Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries, London: Oxford, 1971, p. 67. New archival evidence from 
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Until the accession of West Germany to NATO, the Western governments had widely 
interpreted Moscow's objectives for the negotiation of a treaty of collective security and 
convening a European conference as aiming to prevent the rearmament of the FRG and its 
integration into Western military arrangements. Failure to achieve these goals, however, did 
not diminish Soviet interest in a conference. From this point on, with two opposing military 
alliances on the continent, Soviet security proposals began to emphasise the abolition of both 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact to be replaced by an all-European security system that would be 
negotiated at a large conference of European states. 
4.1955: MORE OF THE SAME 
The new Soviet security proposal was presented to the West at the Summit of the Four-Power 
Heads of Government held in Geneva in July 1955. The plan, introduced by Soviet Premier, 
Marshal Bulganin, consisted of a revised general European treaty of collective security, 
established in two stages. 29 In the first phase, NATO and the Warsaw Pact would negotiate a 
non-aggression pact and freeze their armed forces at existing levels; in the second phase, the 
two military alliances would be replaced by the proposed all-European security system. 
Like Molotov's proposal presented eighteen months earlier in Berlin, Bulganin's plan foresaw 
the need for convening regular or special European conferences and the establishment of 
some consultative machinery to review the implementation of the treaty. Bulganin's 
proposed treaty also included Molotov's idea of greater economic co-operation between 
participating states while adding, as a new theme, the expansion of cultural ties. 
As for the economic dimension of East-West relations, the issue of closer cultural relations 
became an important element of the CSCE negotiations but, in the context of the mid-1950s, 
did not change the attitudes of the Western states toward the Soviet initiatives. Differences 
the former Warsaw Pact nations suggests that the signing of the treaty was "firmly within the context 
of Khrushchev's effort to bring about a new European security system, dominated by the Soviet 
Union", and that this new system was to be established by "an all-European security conference from 
which the United States would be excluded and the agenda of which would be set and controlled by 
Moscow posing as the main guarantor of European security". See Vojtech Mastny, "`We Are in a 
Bind' Polish and Czechoslovak Attempts at Reforming the Warsaw Pact, 1956-1969", Cold War 
International History Project, Bulletin 11, Cold War Flashpoints: New Evidence on Warsaw Pact 
Military Planning, Washington D. C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 
1999. [Hereafter: Mastny, "`We Are in a Bind"', CWIHP, 1999]. 
29 The text of the Soviet proposal (20 July 1955) is reproduced in Documents on Disarmament, 1945- 
1959, US, Department of State, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1960, pp. 481-484. [Hereafter: Documents on 
Disarmament, 1945-1959]. 
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over the German question remained unchanged and clearly entrenched at the core of the East- 
West discussions. Fearful that the Western proposal for a reunified Germany to have the right 
join any military grouping would lead to a decision to choose membership in NATO, the 
Soviets insisted that their proposed security treaty be established before considering the issue 
of German unification; a sequence of events unacceptable to the three Allied Powers, who 
insisted that the Soviet proposals could only be considered after German reunification based 
on free elections. 30 However, in recognition of Moscow's expressed concerns that "a unified 
Germany, rearmed and exercising its choice to join the NATO alliance would constitute an 
increased threat" to Soviet security, Sir Anthony Eden (then Prime Minister) presented a 
second version of his Berlin proposal including the possibility of negotiating a security pact 
between East and West. 31 In addition, Eden proposed, as "an experiment in arms control", 
the establishment of a demilitarised zone between East and West, and called for discussion on 
the number of troops and armaments on each side in Germany and in the neighbouring 
countries. 32 
Although the Summit concluded without agreement, the Four leaders instructed their Foreign 
Ministers to further consider the German question, and the following arms control issues: 
"a security pact for Europe, or for a part of Europe; 
" limitations, control, and inspection of armed forces and armaments and; 
" the establishment of a zone between East and West in which the disposition of armed 
forces would be subject to mutual agreement. 33 
When the Foreign Ministers met to discuss these issues in the fall of 1955, the West presented 
a more comprehensive version of Eden's plan including a draft "Treaty of Assurance on the 
Reunification of Germany". 34 As the title implied, the proposed treaty was designed to 
reassure Moscow against possible aggression once Germany would be reunified and, to this 
end, incorporated several elements of the Soviet collective security proposal. Elaborating on 
Eden's earlier arms control proposals, the Western proposed treaty also suggested that "in a 
zone comprising areas of comparable size and depth and importance on both sides of the line 
of demarcation between a reunified Germany and the Eastern European countries, levels for 
3o See the "Statement by President Eisenhower" (20 July 1955) in RITA, Documents on International 
Affairs, 1955, London: Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 34-35. [Hereafter: RIIA, Documents, 1955]. 
31 Prime Minister Eden's proposals and statements at the Conference can be found, respectively, in 
Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 448-451, and Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, pp. 
478-480. 
32 Eden's statement (18 July 1955), in Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Ibid. 
33 Text of the Geneva Directives to the Foreign Ministers (23 July 1955) in Ibid., pp. 492-494. 34 Text of the Tripartite Proposal (27 October 1955) in Ibid., pp. 529-532. 
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armed forces would be specified so as to establish a military balance". 35 In addition, the 
Allies proposed that in a zone closer to the line of demarcation special restrictions on the 
deployment of forces and installations could be implemented. 36 Finally, under the heading of 
"Inspection and Control", the Western draft treaty proposed that the parties could provide 
information on their armed forces, and that mutual inspections could take place to verify such 
37 data and to warn against any preparation for surprise attack. 
In spite of the fact that both sides agreed to consider a non-aggression treaty and, as the 
Soviets had also proposed at the Summit, the creation of a zone of limitation and inspection of 
armaments in Europe, 38 no progress could be made on these issues in Geneva. The Soviet 
Government was adamant that the question of German reunification should be considered 
after the establishment of a collective security treaty, while the West continued to insist that 
the main basis for progress was the reunification of Germany on the basis of free elections. 39 
Another important area of disagreement related to the withdrawal of occupation forces. 
Previous Soviet proposals had called for withdrawal of occupation forces from Germany 
only, but in line with Bulganin's Summit proposals, Moscow insisted on the "withdrawal of 
foreign troops from the territories of European states and the re-establishment of the situation 
which existed prior to the Second World War" which, by direct implication, meant the 
removal of American troops from Europe. 40 
Another revised treaty dealing with the establishment of a European system of collective 
security, submitted by the Soviet Government, received no positive attention from the 
Western powers 41 and, whether the Kremlin then realised that any further attempts for 
establishing such a treaty and convening a conference would be futile, Moscow left aside 




38 Molotov's statement (31 October 1955), in Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, pp. 532-538. 
39 For a discussion of the different proposals introduced by both sides at the Geneva Summit, see 
United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Selected Documents Relating to Problems of 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1954-77, Miscellaneous No. 17 (1977), Cmnd. 6932, London: 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, pp. 2-3. [Hereafter: UK, FCO, Selected Documents]. See also 
Keliher, The Negotiations on MBFR, pp. 5-6; Acimovic, Problems of Security, pp. 74-75; and 
Prendergast, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, pp. 7-10. 
40 As quoted in Prendergast, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, p. 10. 
41 Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, pp. 532-538. 
42 This point is made by Acimovic in Problems of Security, p. 74. Acimovic also notes one exception 
to this new policy. On 15 July 1958, Moscow proposed the conclusion of a "Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation Among the States of Europe", which included several elements of the conference project 
it will later advertise from the mid-1960s. See Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
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5. DISENGAGEMENT, PARTIAL DISARMAMENT, AND EARLY CBMS 
While the promotion of a pan-European Conference completely disappeared in the aftermath 
of the Geneva Summit, one agenda issue of the Foreign Ministers' Conference that received 
significant attention in the late 1950s related to the question of controlled zones of armaments, 
or so-called "disengagement" plans. Actively promoted by the Soviet Union, the idea 
enjoyed great popularity in the West. Among the many prominent Western observers who 
put forward proposals extending Eden's concept of zonal arms control, one could note Hugh 
Gaitskell (leader of the British Labour Party), Henry Kissinger, as well as George Kennan, 
who took up the theme in his famous BBC Reith Lectures. 43 Yet, the proposal which 
attracted the most attention was put forward by the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki. 
His first plan, introduced at the United Nations in October 1957, called for the establishment 
of a nuclear-free zone encompassing the two Germanies, Poland and Czechoslovakia. 44 
Immediately challenged by the Western governments because it did not deal with 
conventional armed forces in the area, Rapacki put forward, the following year, a second 
version of his plan giving more emphasis to this aspect. However, in spite of a number of 
revisions in the next few years (including those made by the Polish leader, Wladyslaw 
Gomulka, in 1964), Rapacki's plan was never seriously considered by the Allies. First 
presented at the time when NATO was introducing American-controlled nuclear weapons in 
Western Europe to compensate for Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces, the 
initiative was seen as an attempt to prevent their deployment. 45 Furthermore, another aspect 
which gave the plan little chance of success was that it involved the recognition of the GDR at 
a time when the Federal Republic, under Adenauer, not only refused to consider the issue but 
would not even attend international gatherings where the GDR was represented. 
During the same period, though more importantly in the early 1960s, another issue which 
attracted considerable attention was safeguards against surprise attacks. The Soviets were the 
first to raise this issue in the context of arms control negotiations. Their comprehensive 
disarmament plan put forward at the United Nations on 10 May 1955 included provisions for 
43 The most comprehensive discussion of the many proposals put forward after 1955, along with an 
excellent summary of the main recommendations, is presented offered by Eugene Hinterhoff in 
Disengagement, London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1959,445 pages. For another extensive discussion 
of the issues, see also Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, Washington 
D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961,641 pages. 
as For a discussion of this and subsequent plans, see Keliher, The Negotiations on MBFR, pp. 7-9. 
45 See for instance, UK, FCO, Selected Documents, p. 3. 
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the establishment of ground control posts to provide information on the troop concentrations 
and movements that were expected to accompany preparations for a surprise attack. 
However, the Soviets immediately rejected President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal of 
July 1955, which called for reciprocal aerial inspection of the United States and the Soviet 
Union and the exchange of military blueprints between the two countries. 
The idea of safeguards against surprise attack was examined again at the 1958 Geneva 
Conference on the Prevention of Surprise Attack. 6 But the meeting, which lasted just over a 
month, failed to reach any agreement because of fundamental differences between Eastern 
and Western participants over adopting inspection measures without any disarmament 
programme. 
Proposals on the issue continued to be introduced in the early 1960s, especially in the context 
of wide-ranging discussions on General and Complete Disarmament at the United Nations. 
At the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) in 1962, the United States 
proposed, amongst other measures, the prior notification of military movements and 
manoeuvres (seven days in advance), the establishment of mobile ground observation teams, 
and the exchange of military missions, all considered as suitable means to help reduce war by 
accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack. 47 In its amended version of a Draft Treaty on 
General and Complete Disarmament, also presented in 1962, the Soviets argued for the same 
measures, even proposing the outright prohibition "of substantial joint military movements or 
manoeuvres of armed forces of two or more States". 48 
However, despite the apparent agreement of the superpowers on most of these measures, the 
Soviet Union remained unwilling to negotiate these proposals outside the framework of 
general and complete disarmament. 
Soon most of these proposals were left aside, but they remain worth noting because, with the 
idea of mutual inspections, exchange of information on armed forces and special measures 
related to the deployment of military forces first discussed at the Geneva Summit, they were 
the forerunner of the "Confidence-Building Measures" introduced in the CSCE, and of the so- 
46 The documents of the "Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might be 
Useful in Preventing Surprise Attack", Geneva, 10 November-18 December 1958, are reproduced in 
Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, pp. 1213-1319. 
47 The US Working Paper of 12 December 1962 is reproduced in Ibid. pp. 1214-1224. 
48 Text of the Soviet Proposal (16 July 1962), in Ibid., pp. 658-659. 
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called "collateral" or "associated" measures discussed in the negotiations on Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reductions. 49 Similarly, proposals for the limitation of forces and armaments 
not limited only to Germany but also including countries of Central Europe, and the 
establishment of a military balance in the region (first proposed by Eden but widely discussed 
afterwards in the 1950s), were themes to be later exploited in the MBFR negotiations. 50 
6. RENEWED INTEREST FOR A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE: 1964-1968 
Renewed interest for convening an all-European conference surfaced in December 1964 
when Poland, not the Soviet Union, raised the issue at the United Nations. Addressing the 
General Assembly, the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, noted that "the time [was] 
ripe for examining the problem of European security in its entirety" emphasising "the 
advisability of convening for this purpose a conference of all European States. , 51 
Unlike the earlier Communist appeals for a conference, the Rapacki proposal was not directly 
linked to the resolution of the German problem. Although Rapacki's proposal had different 
characteristics than its Soviet precursors --even welcoming the full participation of the United 
States-- its reception in the West was not fundamentally different than toward Moscow's 
appeals nine years earlier. At the time of the Polish initiative, the Atlantic Alliance was 
considering an American proposal for the establishment of a Multilateral Nuclear Force 
(MLF) which involved drawing the Federal Republic of Germany closer to NATO's nuclear 
planning. Because the project was strongly opposed by the Warsaw Pact, the Allies 
interpreted Rapacki's initiative as a scheme designed to influence the outcome of the MLF 
negotiations. 52 The fact that the subsequent Eastern call for a conference came out of a 
meeting of the Warsaw Pact almost entirely devoted to criticising the MLF reinforced that 
belief. Indeed, the January 1965 meeting of the WTO, which endorsed the Polish proposal, 
was much more eloquent in its criticism of the American project than in its support of a 
49 The similarity with the CSCE CBMs is noted in John Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals: 
Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference, London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988, pp. 3-5. 
[Hereafter: Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals]. See also Jonathan Dean, Watershed in Europe: 
Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986, pp. 95- 
97. [Hereafter: Dean, Watershed in Europe]. 
so The similarity with the negotiations on MBFR is noted by Prendergast in Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reduction, pp. 9-10. 
51 Rapacki's Address (14 December 1964) is reproduced in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, US, 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D. C., 1965, pp. 523-527. [All future references 
to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are identified as ACDA]. 
52 See Palmer, The Prospects, p. 9. Palmer also notes that the initiative was viewed as an attempt to 
disrupt the Western Alliance and to question the United States presence in Europe. 
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conference, which was only addressed in one sentence in the final communique. 53 
The Pact's obvious lack of enthusiasm for a conference reflected Moscow' similar lack of 
interest for its own original proposal. 54 However, in early 1966, the Soviet leadership once 
again fully endorsed the idea of a European conference. In his opening statement to the 23rd 
Soviet Communist Party Congress in late March that year, Party leader Leonid Brezhnev 
proposed "to convene an appropriate international conference ... to 
discuss existing proposals 
... concerning a military 
detente and the reduction of armaments in Europe". 55 This first 
indication that Moscow was slowly regaining interest in its previous plan was followed by a 
much more important proposition formulated on the occasion of the next meeting of the WTO 
held in Romania in July 1966. 
The Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact concluded with the adoption of a long 
"Declaration on the Strengthening of Peace and Security in Europe". Described as absorbing 
"virtually all the separate concrete proposals on disarmament and security in Europe which 
had ever been put forward", 56 the Declaration did not offer any ready-made treaty. Rather it 
introduced an extensive programme of measures in the military, economic, technical and 
cultural fields, which all member states of NATO, the WTO, as well as countries not 
participating in any military alliance, could undertake. Specific proposals included: 
1) the development of good-neighbourly relations among European nations on the basis of 
the principles of national independence and national sovereignty, equality, non- 
interference in internal affairs, and closer economic, technical, scientific and cultural 
contacts; 
2) the simultaneous dissolution of military alliances; 
3) the adoption of partial measures leading towards a military relaxation on the European 
continent, including the dismantling of foreign bases; the withdrawal of all troops from 
foreign territories to within their national frontiers; a phased reduction of the armed forces 
of the two Germanies; the creation of nuclear-free zones; 
4) the prevention of West Germany's access to nuclear weapons; 
5) the recognition of the immutability of existing frontiers, including the Polish frontier on 
53 The Communique issued on 20 January 1965 can be found in Western European Union Assembly, 
The proposed European security conference, 1954-1971, Brief prepared by Mr. E. Nessler 
(Rapporteur), Paris: General Affairs Committee, Western European Union Assembly, Seventeenth 
Ordinary Session, December 1971, pp. 13-14. [Hereafter: WEU, The proposed conference]. sa See Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 286 note 21. Wolfe notes an earlier mention by Brezhnev during a visit 
to Poland, in April 1965. 
ss "Brezhnev's Report to the 23rd Party Congress", in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVIII, 
No. 12,13 April 1966, p. 13. For a discussion, see Mojmir Povolny, "The Soviet Union and the 
European Security Conference", Orbis, 18: 1, Spring 1974, pp. 203-204. [Hereafter: Povolny, "The 
Soviet Union"]. 
56 S. Beglov, "Dialogue Goes Ahead", International Affairs (Moscow), March 1967, p. 45. 
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the Oder-Niesse line and the frontiers between the two German states, and; 
6) the conclusion of a German peace settlement proceeding from the recognition of the fact 
of the existence of two German states. 57 
The seventh point of the Bucharest programme formally proposed convening a general 
European conference to discuss questions of "security and co-operation" in Europe. The 
specific purpose or agenda for such a conference was not clearly defined. However, the 
statement noted that "the accord reached at the conference could be expressed ... 
in the form 
of an all-European declaration ... which should 
be open for all interested states to join 
[emphasis added]. "58 Furthermore, this "all-European declaration" was to provide 
undertakings by the signatories to settle disputes by peaceful means, to hold consultations and 
exchange information on questions of mutual interest, and to contribute to the development of 
economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations. 
Despite the comprehensiveness of the Bucharest Declaration and its relative ambiguity 
concerning possible North American participation in a conference, which it did not expressly 
exclude, 59 NATO refused to explore its content. As most Eastern bloc statements of the time, 
the Declaration began with a virulent attack against NATO, the United States and West 
Germany; all identified as the main threats to European peace and security. More 
significantly, many of its provisions were simply not acceptable to the Alliance. From a 
Western perspective, the dissolution of NATO and the WTO, and "the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from other countries' territories to within their national frontiers" would have 
no impact on the several bilateral arrangements Moscow had signed with its satellites since 
the mid-1950s, 6° while the withdrawal of American forces from the continent would 
contribute to "create a vacuum which the Soviet Union would inevitably fill". 61 
Also, the demand for recognition of the existing borders in Europe and the conclusion of a 
57 Text in WEU, The proposed conference, pp. 17-19. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Although the Declaration did not exclude any country, it clearly emphasised that the Europeans were 
able to solve their own problems without any outside interference. For a discussion on the numerous 
ambiguities included in the policy statement, and how the West interpreted them as an attempt to 
divide the United States from Europe, see Palmer, The Prospects, p. 12; Wolfe, Soviet Power Ibid., p. 
311; and Wolfgang Klaiber, Laszlo Hadik, Joseph Harried, James Sattler, and Stanislav Wasowski, Era 
of Negotiations. European Security and Force Reductions, Lexington Mass.: Lexington Books for the 
Atlantic Council of the United States, 1973, p. 26. [Hereafter: Klaiber and others, Era of Negotiations]. 60 See Stanley and Whitt, Detente Diplomacy, p. 53, and p. 164 note 20; and Palmer, Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
Furthermore, new archival evidence from the former Warsaw Pact nations strongly reinforces these 
earlier assessments. Commenting on the importance of these bilateral agreements, Vojtech Mastny, 
who has reviewed internal documents of the WTO, suggest that "the added chain of command [of the 
Warsaw Pact] was largely superfluous". See Mastny, "`We Are in a Bind"', CWIHP, 1999. 
61 Klaiber and others, Era ofNegotiations, p. 40. 
45 
peace settlement with Germany that would ratify its permanent division simply contradicted 
Western policies. After the entry of East Germany into the WTO in January 1956, the Soviet- 
controlled Eastern bloc had completely abandoned plans for the reunification of Germany, 
concentrating instead on assuring the viability of the GDR as a separate state. In the West, the 
Allies remained strongly committed to the reunification of the country and never 
contemplated recognising East Germany which they considered as an artificial creation of the 
Soviets, established without self-determination. In March 1966, Adenauer's successor, 
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, offered to negotiate bilateral non-aggression pacts with the East 
European countries. The Erhard "Peace Note", however, was not even extended to the GDR, 
nor did it include recognition of any post-war borders. Discussions on the later issue was 
another "non-starter" for the West because both the West German government and its NATO 
partners considered the 1945 Potsdam agreement, compensating Poland with German 
territory up to the Oder-Niesse line, strictly provisional pending a peace treaty with Germany. 
From a Western perspective, accepting discussion on the issue of the permanence and 
legitimacy of borders outside the framework of a final settlement of the German question only 
amounted to recognition of the division of Europe and to giving up on the reunification of 
Germany. 
Finally, another element of the Bucharest programme which did not escape Western attention 
was the reference to the development of closer economic ties among the European nations, 
which was interpreted as having the ultimate motivation of disrupting greater West European 
economic integration. 62 
As NATO chose to ignore the Bucharest proposals, Moscow redoubled efforts to try to gain 
support for a conference. In late 1966 and early 1967 the top Soviet leadership actively 
advocated the idea in several Western European capitals63 and, in April 1967, another critical 
appeal was made on the occasion of a Conference of sixteen European Communist and 
Workers' Parties held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. One of the main purposes of the 
gathering, attended by leaders of both ruling and non-ruling Communist parties from Western 
62 Klaiber and others argue that "the Soviet bloc countries object[ed] to the barriers which the West 
European countries, especially in the Common Market, [had] erected to limit the inflow of agricultural 
products, traditionally an important component of the bloc's export to the West. " Ibid., p. 62. See also 
Marshall D. Shulman, "A European Security Conference", Survival XI: 12 December 1969, pp. 375. 63 This included appeals by Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin in Paris and Ankara in December 
1966, and in London in February 1967. See Keesing s Contemporary Archives 1967, London: 
Keesing's Limited, 1967, pp. 21879-21883. It also included appeals by President Nikolai Podgorny in 
Vienna in November 1966, and in Rome in January 1967. See, respectively, Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 
325 note 47; and Keesing's, Ibid., p. 21901. 
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and Eastern Europe, was to gain "support in every possible way for the proposal for the 
convening of a conference of European nations". 64 Another important objective of the 
Karlovy Vary meeting was to seek the abolition of NATO on the eve of its twenty years of 
existence. As Brezhnev himself told the Conference: 
In weighing the possibilities opened up by evolving events in Europe, we cannot 
ignore the fact that in two years the governments of the NATO countries will have to 
decide whether or not NATO is to be extended. In our opinion, it is quite correct that 
Communists and all progressive forces should try to use this circumstance to develop 
still more widely the struggle against the preservation of this aggressive bloc. 65 
Like the Bucharest Declaration, the strong anti-Western stance and propagandistic tones of 
the Karlovy Vary meeting were not conducive to a favourable Western reply. Most of its 
basic themes were also familiar to the Allies and were believed to be designed to exploit the 
weakening of American influence on the continent and growing internal difficulties within 
NATO regarding the future of the Alliance. 66 
Since the beginning of its massive involvement in Vietnam in 1965, the American leadership 
and future role in Europe were viewed with increasing scepticism by its NATO Allies. The 
Europeans did not endorse the US policy in Vietnam and, as American troops were being 
taken out of the old continent to support the war in Asia, Washington's partners felt that the 
Americans were being distracted by their commitments outside Europe. 67 Defence spending 
had also become a steadily growing source of irritation between the Western partners, with 
Washington repeatedly urging the Europeans to do more to reach a more equitable sharing of 
the burden of resources devoted to Western defence. 68 The mid-1960s also found the Atlantic 
Alliance facing its most serious challenge since its creation in 1949. In March 1966 French 
President, Charles de Gaulle, announced his decision to withdraw French forces from 
NATO's integrated military commands and requested that the headquarters of the Alliance be 
moved out of France. In parallel to these decisions, de Gaulle was actively engaged in 
promoting "detente, entente and cooperation" on the continent, often questioning the 
64 For a text of the Karlovy Vary final statement (26 April 1967), see WEU, The proposed conference, 
p. 24. 
65 "Speech by Head of CPSU Delegation Comrade L. I. Brezhnev", Izvestiia, 26 April 1967, quoted in 
Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 326. Wolfe notes that Brezhnev was incorrect in stating that the NATO 
member states would have to decide on the extension of the Alliance at the time of its twentieth 
anniversary in April 1969, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization contains no provision requiring a 
decision on its extension. See Wolfe, Ibid., p. 326 note 54. 
66 Shulman, "A European Security Conference", p. 376. 
67 See Prendergast, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, p. 15. 
68 For a discussion of the burden sharing issue within NATO, see Stanley and Whitt, Detente 
Diplomacy, pp. 58-62. 
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American role in these matters. During a two-week visit to the USSR in June 1966 the 
French President upheld the view "that the problems of Europe should be considered first of 
all in a European framework"69 Although the statement was later qualified as not "denying in 
any way the vital role which the United States must play in the pacification and 
transformation of the world", 70 it clearly underscored the serious questioning of American 
involvement in Europe and the growing strains within the Alliance. De Gaulle's actions also 
raised fears that at the end of the first initial twenty-year term of the Atlantic Alliance France 
might withdraw altogether from the organisation. 71 
NATO's internal difficulties provided a good opportunity for Moscow to promote a European 
conference as an important step toward establishing a new security system for the continent. 
However, the initiatives that were to have a greater impact on changing the response of the 
Western governments towards a conference came from the small East European states who, 
in a series of small steps, began to obtain official Western recognition of the idea. 
7. THE INDEPENDENT EASTERN APPEALS 
In parallel to the initiatives of the Warsaw Pact, the mid-i 960s saw most of the small Eastern 
European states (apart from the GDR) independently promoting the idea of a conference. In 
clear contrast to the Pact's endeavours, these national efforts were neither propagandistic nor 
directed against the West. 
From the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and more vigorously after 1964, East-West bilateral 
contacts had steadily increased and, for the small East European states, these bilateral 
exchanges held the prospect of many important benefits in a number of fields, especially in 
commerce and technology where they could benefit greatly from Western co-operation. 
Interstate co-operation outside the rigid bloc structure of the two military alliances also 
represented rare occasions for those states to increase their role in European foreign policy 
and gain greater independence from the Kremlin. 72 As conceived by the small Eastern 
69 "Text of Soviet-French Declaration on Intent to Collaborate on Leaders in Europe", New York 
Times, July 1,1966, quoted in Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 290. For other similar statements, see Philippe 
Devillers, "La securite en Europe en 1974", Defense nationale, February 1974, p. 42. 
70 De Gaulle's Kremlin's toast of June 20,1966, Grosser, Franco-Soviet Relations Today, pp. 44-45, as 
quoted in Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 290. 
71 See Klaiber and others, Era of Negotiations, p. 19. According to Article 13 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization "After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a 
Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given... " 
72 For an assessment, see Palmer, The Prospects, p. 18 and p. 40. 
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nations, the promotion of a conference provided further justification to the expansion of their 
bilateral contacts outside the Warsaw Pact, which could be supported by Moscow. 
73 
Of all the Eastern governments who independently engaged in the promotion of a conference 
in the West, Poland and Hungary were the most active, and Poland's exchanges with 
Belgium, Denmark and the United Kingdom proved particularly noteworthy because they 
returned the first official Western recognition of the Communist proposal. As early as 
February 1965, the fmal communique issued after a visit of Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki 
to Belgium stated that the Belgian Government had "taken note of the project. , 
74 Later in the 
year, accounts of Polish-British bilateral discussions were noting the interest of the British 
government in the idea75 and, in September, the Foreign Minister of Denmark was publicly 
acknowledging in Warsaw and Prague that a conference would be useful if it was well 
prepared. 76 
The idea of a pan-European conference was also explored multilaterally in the framework of 
the so-called "Group of Nine". 77 Composed of representatives from Eastern, Western, and 
Neutral and Non-aligned European states, this informal grouping had, at its origins in 1965, 
no known connection with the conference project. 78 It was at the initiative of Romania that 
eight other small European states of all allegiances (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Finland, Hungary, Sweden and Yugoslavia) were asked to support a United Nations 
resolution on "Relations Among European States Having Different Social and Political 
Systems" aimed at promoting co-operation between small states outside the bloc structure. 
79 
Between 1965 and 1968, the Group of Nine (which subsequently became the "Group of Ten" 
73 Analyses of Soviet views on this matter vary greatly. For an analysis asserting that Moscow 
probably encouraged the initiatives of its satellites, see Klaiber and others, Era of Negotiations, p. 19; 
and Keliher, The Negotiations on MBFR, p. 13. For an analysis arguing that the initiatives by the small 
East Europeans nations were basically independent, see Jeanne Kirk-Laux, "Divergence ou coalition: 
la position des pays de ('Europe de 1'Est ä I'egard de la Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en 
Europe: 1965-1972", Etudes internationales, IV: 1-2, March-June 1973, especially p. 97. [Hereafter: 
Kirk-Laux, "Divergences ou coalition"]. For an argumentation listing a number of reasons why 
Moscow probably did not pay any attention to the issue at the time, see Whetten, Germany's 
Ostpolitik, pp. 69-71. 
74 Kirk-Laux, "Divergence ou coalition", p. 94. 
75 See Ibid. 
76 See Ibid. 
77 For a comprehensive analysis of the origins and the work of the Group, see Jeanne Kirk Laux, 
"Prelude ä la Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe: 1'experience du groupe des Neuf 
comme exemple de diplomatie independante des petits Etats", Politique etrangere, 38: 6,1973, pp. 
675-696. [Hereafter: Kirk Laux, "Prelude ä la conference"]. 
78 See Kirk-Laux, "Divergence ou coalition", p. 99. 
79 For a discussion, see. Kirk Laux, "Prelude ä la conference", pp. 676 -677; and Acimovic, Problems 
of Security, p. 81. 
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after the Netherlands joined in March 1968) developed a loose association through ad hoc 
consultations between their representatives in different international organisations and by 
convening annual meetings of their Foreign Ministers in New York after the fall session of 
the United Nations (1966-1967). 80 The decision to endorse the conference project was 
reportedly adopted at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in 1966.81 More specifically, the 
Nine would have then agreed to use the idea of a conference as a means to justify their co- 
operative diplomacy82 claiming, in this regard, that a pan-European conference required 
intensive preparation both through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic exchanges. 83 But as 
the Group became increasingly more active and prominent, 84 it was also to be of short 
duration, and would never really reconvene after the military intervention of the Warsaw Pact 
in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. 85 
Following the Karlovy Vary meeting of April 1967, Soviet interest for a European conference 
diminished significantly. Relations within its own bloc were quickly deteriorating and 
"externally" the Soviet government showed less interest in its own original project. 86 The 
increased pace of liberalisation and reform introduced in Czechoslovakia, and the continuous 
problems with Romania, but also Albania and Yugoslavia --the so-called "deviationist" 
states-- threatened Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and Soviet-style communist rule. 
Moscow's difficulties with its Communist allies were such that they even extended to the 
conference project. The eighteen months of almost complete silence on the issue, which 
elapsed between Rapacki's appeal of December 1964 to the WTO's full-fledged endorsement 
of the idea in Bucharest in July 1966, was due to disagreement among the WTO nations, 
especially Romania, over the definition of the project. 87 Later on, in Karlovy Vary, neither 
the Romanians, the Albanians nor the Yugoslavs attended the meeting, thereby directly 
challenging Moscow's objective to present a unified Communist front in favour of a 
conference and, significantly for the Kremlin, the abolition of NATO. 88 
80 For background, see Kirk-Laux, "Divergences ou coalition", p. 99; and Acimovic, Problems of 
Security, pp. 81-82. 
81 See Kirk-Laux, Ibid., p. 99. 
82 See Ibid., p. 91. 
83 For this and other similar statements by members of the Group, see Ibid., p. 99. 
84 For an analysis of the influence of the work of the G-9 on the later definition of the Conference 
project after 1969, see Ibid. p. 105; and Kirk Laux, "Prelude ä la conference", pp. 684-685. 
85 For background on a last meeting organised in 1969, but without any concrete actions being 
undertaken, see Kirk Laux, "Prelude ä la conference", pp. 694-695. 
86 For a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet position, see Kirk Laux, Ibid., pp. 689-690; and Kirk- 
Laux, "Divergence ou coalition", p. 103. 
87 See Klaiber and others, Era of Negotiations, p. 18. 
88 See Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik, p. 73; and Povolny, "The Soviet Union", p. 209. On the 
importance of the meeting for Moscow, see also Acimovic, Problems of Security, pp. 81-82. 
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Probably as a sign that Moscow no longer approved the independent diplomacy of its 
satellites and the work of the Group of Nine, no communique was issued after the Group's 
meeting of Foreign Ministers in October 1967, and limited publicity was given to its activities 
throughout that year. 89 Another critical indication that Moscow was reconsidering the 
advisability of calling for a large conference to discuss issues of security and co-operation in 
Europe, at a time when it experienced increased difficulties within its own bloc, came from 
the next meeting of the WTO held in Sofia, in March 1968, which failed to mention the 
conference. 90 
Soviet endorsement of a conference ended almost completely in 1968. In one of the few 
official statements referring to the project that year, Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, noted 
in June that the Soviet Union would be ready to enter preliminary discussions "with those 
governments of European states which understand the need and urgency of co-ordinating and 
pooling efforts for this purpose. "91 Significantly, and as an indication of the kind of changes 
Moscow would make to its conference project after the military intervention in 
Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Gromyko made no mention of the mutual dissolution of the 
blocs. 92 At the time when the support of troops from other WTO nations proved necessary to 
help maintain the "gains of communism" in Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the military 
alliances became much less attractive for Moscow. But while this long-standing demand 
virtually disappeared from Soviet security proposals after 1968, Moscow's aspirations for a 
large European conference only took on more significance. 
8. THE 1969 BUDAPEST APPEAL 
The third and most intensive phase of the Soviet diplomatic campaign for a large European 
conference began only seven months after the military intervention in Czechoslovakia. 
93 At a 
meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in Budapest, on 17 
March 1969, the Eastern nations called for a meeting of all European states to establish the 
89 See Kirk-Laux, "Divergence ou coalition", pp. 103-104. For a discussion tracing the difficulties and 
the demise of the Group, see Kirk Laux, "Prelude ä la conference", pp. 688-695. 
90 This point is made by Povolny in "The Soviet Union", p. 209. 
91 As quoted in Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 332. See also Shulman, "A European Security Conference", p. 
377. 
92 This is noted by Wolfe in Soviet Power, p. 332. Wolfe further observes that "from mid-1967 on, as 
Soviet concern over developments in East Europe grew, references to dissolving the opposing alliances 
had disappeared from Soviet propaganda. " 
93 Marshall D. Shulman notes an earlier reference to the conference made by the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Gromyko, on 3 October 1968, in his address to the United Nations General 
Assembly. Shulman, "A European Security Conference", p. 378. 
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procedures for convening a conference and to determine its agenda. 
94 
The Budapest Appeal was much less polemic and much more business-like than previous 
Pact declarations on the issue. 95 Noting that detente was to be based in great part on the 
establishment of new relationships in the social and economic sectors among all European 
countries "irrespective of their social system", the Appeal indicated the possibility of carrying 
out combined large-scale projects in a number of fields, including power production, 
transport, environment and health. The statement from Budapest also drastically toned down 
the familiar demands for the recognition of the European post-war status. The inviolability of 
the existing frontiers in Central Europe, the division of Germany, the recognition of the 
German Democratic Republic, and the separate status of West Berlin were presented as 
simple "preconditions for safeguarding the security of Europe. , 
96 In the field of security, the 
Budapest statement was noteworthy because it did not put forward any concrete military or 
security proposals but simply upheld the validity of the 1966 Bucharest Declaration without 
naming any of its specific provisions. The statement also did not reiterate the long-standing 
request for the simultaneous dissolution of the military alliances, but only vaguely suggested 
that the conference could make it possible "to find ways and means of doing away with the 
division of Europe into military groupings". 97 
Probably as an attempt to encourage Western support for the proposal, two weeks after the 
Budapest Appeal the Soviet government privately informed the Americans and the Canadians 
that it would not object to their participation. On 3 April, in Ottawa, the Soviet Ambassador 
stressed that it was not a matter for the Soviet Union alone to decide, but that Moscow would 
(probably) not object. 98 The same day, in Washington, the Soviet Ambassador to the United 
States, Anatoly Dobrynin, delivered a similar message to the US National Security Advisor, 
Henry Kissinger, also emphasising that the Budapest Appeal had dropped the previous 
requirement for the dissolution of the bloc system in Europe. As interpreted by Kissinger, 
however, these changes did not amount to much: 
94 Text in WEU, The proposed conference, pp. 27-28. 
9s For different assessments of the nature and purpose of the Document emphasising separate sections 
of the text, see Shulman, "A European Security Conference", pp. 378-379; Whetten, Germany's 
Ostpolitik, p. 75; Acimovic, Problems of Security, pp. 83-84; Stanley and Whitt, Detente Diplomacy, 
pp. 32-33; Klaiber and others, Era of Negotiations, pp. 27-28; and Povolny in "The Soviet Union", pp. 
210-211. 
96 This point is noted by Povolny in "The Soviet Union", pp. 210. 
97 Text in WEU, The proposed conference, pp. 27-28. 
98 Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 36, in Spencer, Canada and the Conference. 
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I was not prepared to treat the withdrawal of two absurd preconditions as a 
concession. Writing to the President on April 4, I pointed out that `anyone who is 
serious about making progress on European problems knows that we must be a party; 
we should not make the Soviets think that they are doing us a favor if they agree to 
such an obvious fact of life. '99 
As suggested by Kissinger's reaction, the modifications introduced in Moscow's proposal did 
not impress all the Western governments. Yet, even if most NATO partners believed that the 
Budapest Appeal was predominantly aimed at easing public opinion after the Prague 
intervention, or at distracting attention from the Sino-Soviet dispute which had erupted into 
border clashes at the beginning of the year, '°° they were beginning to feel compelled to 
answer to the Eastern call for a conference. 
9. NATO'S INTEREST IN DETENTE: HARMEL AND MBFR 
With the development of detente that characterised the mid-1960s, pressure on the NATO 
governments to be more forthcoming in improving relations with the Warsaw Pact nations 
had been building for years. Western public opinion expected more progress in East-West 
relations and, for some Allied governments, this situation had long called for NATO to 
become more active in the pursuit of detente. As early as 1964 Canada had expressed 
concern about the "comfortable immobility" of NATO and had "urged that the alliance be 
used as a forum for dialogue with the East. "101 The following year, probably in recognition 
that prospective East-West negotiations could no longer simply be ignored, a number of 
Western leaders began to acknowledge the Communist proposal for a conference, and 
Western recognition of the proposal continued unabated throughout 1966. In one of the most 
positive comments, the British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, noted that "the sooner a 
security conference could be held the better, provided the conditions were created in which it 
stood a good chance of succeeding. " 102 Also in 1966, the Danish delegation at NATO 
organised an informal meeting of Alliance representatives for the sole purpose of gaining their 
99 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979, 
p. 414. [Hereafter: Kissinger, White House Years]. 
100 Among the many references suggesting the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations as a 
motivating factor for Moscow's renewed appeals for a European conference, see Walschap, "The 
Great European Jamboree", p. 39; Stanley and Whitt, Detente Diplomacy, p. 32; Klaiber and others, 
Era of Negotiations, p. 21 and p. 40; and Keliher, The Negotiations on MBFR, p. 19. As argued by 
these analysts, the Soviets were extremely concerned with the developments on their Eastern front and 
felt the need to "pacify" their relations with the West in case a war would erupt with China. 
101 Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 23. 
102 UK, FCO, Selected Documents, p. 6. The report notes that Mr. Stewart also suggested that the 
conference must include Canada and the United States. 
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support for an East-West conference. 103 
The Danish initiative was examined at the semi-annual meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in June 1966, but was not supported by the European partners on the grounds that it was too 
vague. The proposal was also opposed by the United States, who argued that the Alliance 
needed to adopt a common policy on East-West relations. By 1966, East-West bilateral 
contacts had become too numerous to count' 04 and, perhaps as a means to find ways to co- 
ordinate their individual exchanges with the East, ' 05 the Allies decided to undertake a study 
on East-West relations. As described in the final communique of the meeting, the goal of the 
study was to examine "the prospects of healthy developments in East-West relations" and 
should deal with all possible initiatives including European security. 106 
Six months later, at the December Ministerial Meeting, the NATO governments reviewed the 
recommendations. They confirmed their intention to continue efforts to secure better relations 
with the East, welcoming, without naming any, the wide range of suggestions made in the 
report. 107 
Despite this step forward, dissatisfaction continued in Brussels over the Alliance's lack of 
concrete commitment for a rapprochement toward the East. Some delegations argued that 
NATO should demonstrate its determination to work towards a European settlement and 
should "make clear in a public document the interest of individual members and, to the extent 
possible, of NATO itself, in the improvement of East-West relations. "' 08 
At the initiative of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, NATO agreed to undertake 
an analysis of international developments since its inception "to determine the influence of 
such developments on the Alliance and to identify the tasks which lie before it. "109 The 
"Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance", completed under Harmel's chairmanship, 
103 See Kirk Laux, "Prelude ä la conference", p. 689. 
104 Klaiber and others, Era of Negotiations, p. 19. 
105 This point is made by Lawrence Whetten in relation to the development of the Harmel Report. See 
Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik, p. 73. 
106 Communique issued after the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 7-8 June 
1966, in NATO, NATO Final Communiques, 1949-1974, Brussels: NATO Information Service, n. d., 
pp. 170-174. [Hereafter: NATO Final Communiques]. All subsequent references to the communiques 
issued at the conclusion of a Ministerial Meeting only include the place and date of the meeting. 
10' Paris, 15-16 December 1966. NA TO Final Communiques, pp. 177-184. 
108 Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 27. 
109 "The Future Tasks of the Alliance". NATO Final Communiques, pp. 198-202. 
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defined two main functions: "to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to 
deter aggression" and to "search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the 
underlying political issues [could] be solved. "110 As further suggested in the document, 
improving East-West relations was to be a paramount task of the Alliance noting, in this 
regard, that "each Ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with 
the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. "' 11 
The "Harmel Report" (as it became known) made no reference to a conference, although the 
subject was deliberated during the drafting process. At the North Atlantic Council meeting 
held in Luxembourg in June 1967 (i. e. during the completion of the report) the Allies agreed 
that "the question of a security conference should form part of the Harmel study". 
' 12 At the 
request of the French and German governments, however, no mention of a conference was 
made in the fmal communique, 113 and very little transpired from these discussions. 
Whatever the conclusions of the Council on the subject, soon after the adoption of the Report 
in December 1967, the idea of a conference continued to be acknowledged by some Western 
governments. During a visit to Moscow in January 1968, British Prime Minister, Harold 
Wilson, declared that such a conference "could be valuable, subject to the necessary 
preparation"' 4 and, reportedly, only Soviet unwillingness to say whether the United States 
would be invited to such a conference had "left the British wary of giving it unqualified 
endorsement. " 5 One month later, discussions in the Dutch Parliament were urging for 
"more active steps be taken in this direction. "116 Meanwhile, the European Neutral and Non- 
aligned nations began to demonstrate increased interest for the project, with Austria agreeing 
"in principle" to the idea of a pan-European conference. 117 
The continuing and growing flow of official public declarations favouring consideration of an 
East-West conference ensured that the subject would find its way on the agenda of the next 
North Atlantic Council meeting in Reykjavik in June 1968. According to one account of the 
10 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
112 Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 29. 
113 Ibid. 
114 "Joint Soviet-English Communique", Pravda, January 25,1968, quoted in Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 
331. 
115 Wolfe, Ibid. 
116 Ibid., p. 332. 
117 See Ibid. Wolfe notes that, like the UK, Austria was displeased with the exclusion of the United 
States. Another problem in the way of a full endorsement of the conference project was the 
participation of the GDR because this raised the question of its recognition. 
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meeting, the Council concluded that caution concerning a European security conference was 
appropriate. "' 18 More substantially, the Allies concluded the Reykjavik meeting by inviting 
the Eastern countries to negotiate Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe; a project 
very often described later as NATO's counterproposal to the Eastern conference. 
119 
10. MBFR 
The idea of implementing force reductions in Europe was not new. Since World War II both 
East and West had made numerous and various proposals. From the mutual withdrawal of 
forces of occupation in Europe, to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, to Eden's 
1955 proposal to create a military balance in the Central Region, the subject had been 
discussed extensively. 120 In the mid-1960s, however, the Western governments began to 
demonstrate increased interest for "mutual and balanced force reductions" in the Central 
Front. Paragraph seven of the final communique of the December 1966 Ministerial Meeting 
noted that the Allies hoped "to bring about conditions which could permit a gradual and 
balanced revision in force levels on both sides. "121 Six months later, at the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council in Luxembourg, the Allies re-stated their interest in the subject by 
noting that "if conditions permit, a balanced reduction of forces by the East and West could be 
a significant step toward security in Europe. , 122 This was followed, in December 1967, with 
the pronouncement in the Harmel Report that the Alliance was intensifying its study of arms 
control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reductions. 
'23 Finally, in 
Reykjavik in June 1968, the 14 NATO countries participating in the Alliance defence 
programme declared that "a process leading to mutual force reductions should be initiated". 
124 
"To that end", the communique noted, the 14 agreed "to make all necessary preparations for 
discussions on this subject", and to call upon the Warsaw Pact nations to join them in this 
1" Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 31. See also, Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik, p. 73. 
119 See, for instance, Keliher, The Negotiations on MBFR, p. 16; and Klaiber and others, Era of 
Negotiations, p. 27. As acknowledged in a 1983 report prepared for the United States Congress: "The 
West saw its proposal [on MBFR] as a response to Soviet proposals for a European Security 
Conference". US, House of Representatives, East-West Troop Reductions in Europe: Is Agreement 
Possible?, Report prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, for the Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on 
International Security and Scientific Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, V Session, 
Washington, D. C.: G PO, 1983, p. 5. 
120 For a comprehensive review of the post-war proposals on the issue, see Prendergast, Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reduction, pp. 2-12; and Keliher, The Negotiations on MBFR, pp. 3-15. 
121 Paris, 15-16 December 1966. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 177-184. 
122 Luxembourg, 13-14 June 1967. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 188-192. 
123 Text reproduced in Ibid., pp. 198-202. 
124 "Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions" (Reykjavik, 24-25June 1968) NATO 
Final Communiques, pp. 209-210. 
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process. 
Although NATO presented its willingness to discuss force reductions as an indication of 
goodwill to pursue genuine detente in Europe, few doubted that the Western appeal for 
negotiation was prompted by growing domestic pressures in many Allied countries. 
125 With 
detente steadily rising, Western public opinion increasingly insisted on a diminution of the 
military confrontation on the continent, and often blamed their own governments for not 
doing enough in this regard. Increased inflation also created additional pressures on many 
Western governments to implement cuts in defence spending. By 1966-1967, no less than 
five NATO partners (the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, the United Kingdom and West 
Germany) were announcing or implementing plans for unilateral troop reductions; 
126 while in 
the United States, the debate over the issue was growing ever more serious. The war in 
Vietnam had created a strong anti-military sentiment and the increased troop commitment to 
Asia had only created greater pressures on the Johnson Administration to implement 
substantial force reductions in Europe. In July 1966, Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, 
began arguing for a minimum reduction of 75,000 troops and dependents from Western 
Europe. 127 In August of that year, Mansfield tabled a resolution calling for a "substantial" 
reduction of US forces permanently stationed in Europe, which he reintroduced in January 
1967 as an "Expression of Sense of Senate" and which gained the support of more than forty 
Senators. 128 A few months later, unilateral troop reductions had become the subject of 
protracted hearings by a special Senate Committee. 129 
The prevailing view in the Johnson Administration was that a massive American unilateral 
force withdrawal from Europe would leave the Soviet Union in a preponderant military 
position on the continent and would destabilise Western security. Another fear of the US 
Administration was that a unilateral withdrawal would diminish the credibility of the 
125 The origins of the MBFR talks have been well documented. For a good accounting of the 
developments at the time, including a discussion of Western motivations for proposing the talks, see 
Prendergast, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, pp. 13-17; Keliher, The Negotiations on MBFR, 
especially, pp. 13-15; Dean, Watershed in Europe, pp. 99-103; and Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and 
Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1985, especially pp. 114-116 and pp. 479-480. [Hereafter: Garthoff, Detente and 
Confrontation]. See also the views of Henry Kissinger in White House Years, especially pp. 399- 402. 
126 See Prendergast, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, p. 16; and Dean, Watershed in Europe, p. 
100. 
127 See Keliher, The Negotiations on MBFR, p. 14. 
128 Ibid. 
129 For a good review of the debate in the Senate over the Mansfield resolutions, see Keliher, The 
Negotiations on MBFR, especially, pp. 13-15, and Prendergast, Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reduction, p. 17. 
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American commitment to European defence and, as a result, Allies' confidence in it, possibly 
leading to a diminished American droit de regard on European affairs. 
130 The idea of 
"negotiating" troop reductions (as opposed to simple unilateral withdrawal) was seen as a 
useful, if not only, means to halt or reverse support for unilateral cuts. The main assumption 
supporting this view was that Congress would be reluctant to endorse unilateral moves on 
reductions if the United States and NATO were engaged in negotiations with the Warsaw 
Pact that could result in reciprocal reductions. ' 31 Negotiations with the East could help satisfy 
an increasingly hostile public opinion towards military spending and troop commitments 
without negatively affecting Alliance cohesion. 132 For the European Allies, fearing the 
consequences of a massive unilateral US withdrawal from the continent and the pressure such 
a move could place on them to fill in the gap, negotiations on force reductions also became an 
interesting proposition. 133 
Whereas one of the primary motivations in launching the Reykjavik appeal may have been to 
undercut support for unilateral troop reductions, the initiative had the additional benefit of 
helping "counter the vague but seductive proposals of the WTO for a security conference". 
134 
Critics of the MBFR talks claimed that the 14 members of NATO's integrated command 
who proposed force reductions had no illusions about the response the appeal would have in 
the East because they anticipated a refusal. 135 The MBFR initiative, according to them, 
allowed the West to register a tactical gain by "cornering" the Warsaw Pact nations into a 
refusal, while providing a demonstration of Western willingness to disarm. 136 
How much the Reykjavik proposal for negotiations on force reductions reflected a desire to 
prove that the Western states were also preoccupied with the security of Europe and that, like 
the East, they could come up with proposals of their own on the matter is difficult to judge. 
Certainly, the increasing number of Western public acknowledgements of the Communist 
conference project suggested that several Allied governments were beginning to feel 
130 See Jean Klein, Securite et desarmemen en Europe, Paris: Economica for 1'Institut francais des 
relations internationales, 1987, p. 59. [Hereafter: Klein, Securite et desarmement]. 
131 Henry Kissinger makes this point in White House Years, p. 400. 
132 See Klein, Securite et desarmement, p. 59. 
133 See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 400. 
134 See Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 31. 
135 See Klein, Securite et desarmement, p. 60. 
136 Ibid. Klein claims that the French representative at NATO warned the Allies about the 
consequences of such a move, stressing that it was not desirable that the NATO countries attempt to 
give the impression of making a positive overture towards the East only to be able to better denounce 
their subsequent refusal. See also Michel Vincineau, "La position belge sur la securite europeenne", 
Politique etrangere, 37: 6,1972, pp. 746. [Hereafter, Vincineau, "La position belge"]. 
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compelled to be more receptive to the Eastern appeals and, according to Henry Kissinger, 
domestic pressure on Western governments to ease their opposition to a conference was 
already evident by the end of 1967.137 
Suggestions that the Reykjavik signal was motivated, at least partially, by tactical objectives 
as a means to divert attention from the conference is also supported by the fact that not all 
governments fully endorsed the initiative. The studies on force reductions undertaken at 
NATO following the recommendations of the Harmel Report were not completed at the time 
of the Reykjavik meeting, and several Western governments were wary of the appropriateness 
of launching an appeal for negotiations at a time when the implications of reductions were not 
fully known. 138 Furthermore, as noted by the MBFR critics, there were a number of reasons 
why Moscow could be expected to refuse any offer to open negotiation on the subject. 139 
First, the Soviet Union depended on its massive military presence in Eastern Europe to ensure 
that governments favourable to the Kremlin could remain in power and, therefore, it was 
impossible to conceive of any reason why the Soviets would accept a diminished military 
presence and risk losing their hegemony in the region. Second, if the Soviet Union was also 
aiming to increase its military superiority over the West, as many Western analysts believed at 
the time, then why would Moscow accept negotiations on force reductions while the West 
was engaged in unilateral disarmament? 
If Moscow had no predisposition or motivation for negotiations, there were additional 
inherent problems in the Western idea for "balanced" reductions. One difficulty was that the 
Warsaw Pact had many more numerous troops along the Central Front than NATO and, as 
Henry Kissinger explained, "its initial advantage would grow rapidly once mobilization 
began, particularly because of the proximity of Soviet divisions in European Russia. , '40 If 
equal reductions were to be applied with both East and West reducing proportionally, the 
Allies would only find themselves in worse conditions because the US forces would withdraw 
across the Atlantic Ocean, while Russian forces could simply be re-deployed to the Western 
districts of the USSR, in close geographical proximity to the Central Region. Hence, from a 
Western perspective, the only "safe" or advantageous negotiating formula, that could 
eventually be presented to the East, was that of asymmetrical reductions, which meant that the 
137 See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 413. 
138 See Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 110-111. 
139 The following two arguments were noted by Michael Palmer as early as 1971. See Palmer, The 
Prospects, pp. 21-22. 
140 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 947-948. 
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East would have to reduce a larger number of troops than NATO. Such a negotiating position 
had not yet been agreed upon at NATO when the Allies launched the Reykjavik appeal, but 
the fact that Western military planners were strongly convinced of the Pact's numerical 
superiority in the region certainly did not augur well for any reduction scenario that the Pact 
might find attractive or ever agree to consider. 141 
Another important weakness of the Western position was that France strongly opposed the 
idea. For the French government, then deeply involved in promoting a European policy of 
"detente, entente and cooperation" based on the rejection of the bloc structure in Europe, any 
negotiations between military alliances could only contribute to perpetuate the division of 
Europe. Another concern of the French government was that any alliance-to-alliance 
negotiations would be led by the superpowers and that they would not pay sufficient attention 
to the interests of the other states. Finally, the fact that French troops stationed in Germany 
could be limited by an international agreement with the Soviet Union also created difficulties 
for Paris who wanted to preserve the right to increase its stationed forces there, if 
necessary. 142 As clearly demonstrated by its refusal to sign the Reykjavik appeal, Paris would 
not associate itself with any subsequent decisions on the matter and would not hesitate to 
continuously break NATO's unity on this issue. 
Taken together, the above considerations certainly raised doubts about the uniqueness of 
purpose behind the Reykjavik signal. 143 But while it is clear that the Allies attached great 
'a' At the time of the Western Reykjavik signal for negotiation on troop reductions in June 1968, 
internal studies on the issue were only beginning at NATO. As noted by Garthoff, the studies made in 
Brussels in 1968-1969 were "predicated on proportional reductions" but they "were not accepted by 
the Alliance as a basis for later NATO negotiating positions". Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 
481. Furthermore, as explained by Jonathan Dean, the key word "balanced" which was used by the 
Alliance as early as June 1967 "represented an early NATO determination to try to achieve parity with 
the Pact in arms control negotiations and not to sign any agreement with the Warsaw Pact that would 
contractualize in treaty form any Warsaw Pact numerical advantage. Put another way, it represented 
NATO's determination, understandable given NATO's conviction that the Warsaw Pact had numerical 
superiority in men and weapons, to make the arsaw Pact give more than they received in any agreed 
troop reductions. " Dean, Watershed in Europe, p. 100. 
142 For background on the French opposition to MBFR, see Klein, Securite et desarmement, pp. 59-60; 
Klaiber and others, Era of Negotiations, p. 41; and Dean, Watershed in Europe, pp. 105-106. 
143 As argued by a high-level US official in 1973: "NATO countries, but principally the United States 
initially, advocated force reduction talks for two negative reasons. First, their insistence on MBFR 
talks before an ESC [European Security Conference] served to brake the Soviet conference proposal. 
Second, and very importantly, the imminence of negotiations was intended to forestall U. S. critics who 
called for unilateral troop withdrawals". Benjamin S. Rosenthal, "America's Move", Foreign Affairs, 
51: 2, January 1973, p. 383. Rosenthal was the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe of the 
House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs, who held Hearings on the Conference on 
European Security in 1972. 
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importance to providing a counter-proposal to the Communist conference project and 
probably hoped to derail it, this did not change the fact that many Western governments were 
still under pressure to provide some sort of a "measured response" to the Eastern overtures. 
After Western indignation over the military intervention in Czechoslovakia began to subside, 
and only one month after the conciliatory Budapest Appeal, NATO provided its first 
"official" reply. 
11. NATO'S FIRST REPLY: NOT ACCEPTING, NOT REJECTING 
On 10-11 April 1969 the Allies met in Ministerial Meeting in Washington to celebrate the 
twentieth anniversary of the Alliance. According to Henry Kissinger, his recommendation to 
President Nixon on the eve of the meeting was that "to turn down the Soviet overture 
completely would leave us isolated within NATO". 144 Kissinger remarked that "the apparent 
conciliatory Soviet tone [had] evoked enormous eagerness within the Alliance", 145 whereas 
the Italians, Germans, British and French all favoured consideration of the project. 146 
Kissinger noted that: 
While visiting Washington for Eisenhower's funeral, Mariano Rumor, then Italian 
Prime Minister, told Nixon that despite the propagandistic intent of the Soviet 
proposals the Italian political situation required a forthcoming response .... 
[German 
Foreign Minister] Brandt favored a European Security Conference for the strange 
reason that it would legitimize the American presence in Europe. [French Prime 
Minister] Pompidou embraced it as a means of avoiding separate German overtures 
toward the East and absorbing them in a multilateral framework. British leaders 
advocated it as a means to transcend the Cold War. 147 
As Kissinger suggested, most US NATO partners displayed a more favourable attitude 
toward the Eastern initiative than Washington but this did not mean that they were ready to 
accept the Communist conference proposal "as is", or to enter into any such type of gathering 
in the immediate future. There was, in fact, varying degrees of enthusiasm for the idea, and 
even at national levels the positions were not always clear or unified. 148 The Germans, for 
144 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 414-415. 
las Ibid., p. 414. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 For a useful discussion of the views of several NATO partners, prior to 1971. See Palmer, The 
Prospects, pp. 35-39. For the positions of Italy, Canada, Belgium, France, and the FRG at the time of 
the NATO Washington Ministerial Meeting, see "M. Brandt: l'appel de Budapest ne doit pas etre 
rejete `ä priori"', Le Monde, 12 April 1969; and "M. Debre; la detente n'est pas un voeu pieux mais 
une idee politique serieuse", Le Monde, 12 April 1969. On Italy arguing for a positive initiative to be 
undertaken towards the East, see "L'Organisation atlantique va s'engager prudemment vers la 
preparation des negociations avec l'Est", Le Monde, 13-14 April 1969. For an official assessment of 
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instance, were divided over the issue and sent mixed signals. 149 In Washington, Foreign 
Minister, Willy Brandt, argued that the Budapest Appeal demonstrated a change of tactics on 
the part of the Soviets and that the underlying motivations should be explored, while the idea 
of a conference should not be discarded "a priori". 150 In Bonn, at the same time, Chancellor 
Kiesenger was publicly criticising the Budapest Appeal as just another attempt by the socialist 
countries to gain the recognition of the GDR and Western acceptance of the status quo in 
Central Europe. ' 51 Furthermore, Brandt's endorsement of the conference idea was far from 
unconditional. Addressing the Bundestag a few days after the Washington meeting, Brandt 
argued that four points were essential for a successful conference: it should be adequately 
prepared; include North American participation; present reasonable prospects for success, 
and; no pre-conditions, such as the recognition of the GDR or territorial borders, should be 
attached. ' 52 Additionally, while in Washington, Brandt had also contended that convening a 
conference would require improvements between the two parts of Germany. 153 
In France, still under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle at the time of the Washington 
meeting, the position on a large East-West conference was also far from being one of 
unconditional support. In line with Gaullist's views on how detente should unfold in Europe, 
France favoured state-to-state relations and privileged bilateral contacts over multilateralism. 
Hence, under de Gaulle, France was rather cool to the idea of a conference. '54 Although 
publicly not opposed in principle, the French government had stressed that the proposition 
was premature so soon after the events of Czechoslovakia. 155 Furthermore, like Bonn, Paris 
the views of the NATO countries three years later, in April 1972, see Benneth and Hamilton, The 
Conference, pp. 40-43. 
149 On the differences in the Grand Coalition, see "Bonn entre deux politiques etrangeres", Le Monde, 




153 See Willy Brandt, People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975, London: Collins, 1978, p. 187. 
[Hereafter: Brandt, People and Politics]. 
154 See Pierre Hassner, "The Politics of Western Europe and East-West Relations", in Nils Andren and 
Karl E. Birnbaum (ed. ), Beyond Detente: Prospects for East-West Co-operation and Security in 
Europe, East-West Perspectives 3, Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1976, p. 30. Even after Prime 
Minister Georges Pompidou replaced Charles de Gaulle as President after April 1969, his initial 
reaction to the project was less than enthusiastic. According to Andre Fontaine, the French were rather 
annoyed to see their policy of "detente, entente and cooperation" advocated by other nations and 
Pompidou himself did not display any enthusiasm for a conference. See Andre Fontaine, "Detente- 
Entente-Cooperation", in Frans A. Alting von Geusau (ed. ), Uncertain Detente, Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979, p. 33. 
iss See Daniel Colard, "La Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe: ses origines et la 
position du Gouvernement francais", Chronique de politique etrangere, 26: 5, September 1973, pp. 
543-544. [Hereafter: Colard, "La Conference"]. 
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also argued that numerous obstacles would have to be surmounted before a conference could 
take place and that it would have to be carefully prepared. '56 In the meantime, as the French 
maintained in Washington, bilateral East-West contacts remained the best way to proceed 
forward. 157 
The attitude of the smaller NATO countries was in general quite supportive, but not without 
reservations or apprehensions. Canada, for example, went into the Washington session 
determined to press "the case for a positive Western response. "158 As argued by its Foreign 
Minister, Mitchell Sharp, "we shall know to what extent the Warsaw Pact interest is genuine 
only if we are prepared to explore thoroughly the intent behind their recent declaration. " 59 
This position, however, did not imply acceptance of the WTO proposal. Indeed, if Ottawa 
suggested that a "measured response" would be appropriate, ' 60 the Canadian government was 
well aware that any Western initiative or sign of movement on the issue would deprive 
Moscow of a propaganda advantage. 161 In this regard, an important motivating factor behind 
the positive attitude of Canada with respect to a conference was that the initiative for the 
development of East-West contacts should not be left to the Eastern states alone. 162 As noted 
in Ottawa's instructions sent to its NATO Mission one month after the April Ministerial 
Meeting, it was imperative that it not be assumed that the conference was necessarily 
undesirable, in principle, to the Western countries. 1 63 
In varying degrees, this consideration was also a predominant factor explaining the "positive" 
position of the other NATO partners. Only the United States took a clearly negative attitude 
towards the idea of a conference considering that "the net result" of such a gathering "would 
tend to set back prospects for an eventual resolution of European issues. "164 Yet, as Kissinger 
himself acknowledged on the eve of the Washington Ministerial Meeting, the majority in 
NATO believed that the Alliance could no longer simply refuse to examine the issue. 
Accordingly, the April 1969 Ministerial Meeting concluded by providing the first Allied reply 
to the long-standing Eastern proposal. As noted in the meeting's final communique: 
156 See "M. Debre... ", Le Monde, 12 April 1969. 
's' See Ibid. 
158 Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 37. 
159 As quoted in Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 37 
160 See Ibid., p. 36. 
161 Ibid., p. 41. 
162 Ibid., p. 37 and p. 41. 
163 As quoted in Spencer, Ibid., p. 40. 
164 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 415. 
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The Allies propose, while remaining in close consultation, to explore with the Soviet 
Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend 
themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution. Consequently, they 
instructed the Council to draft a list of these issues and to study how a useful process 
of negotiation could best be initiated, in due course, and to draw up a report for the 
next meeting of Ministers. It is clear that any negotiations must be well prepared in 
advance, and that all Governments whose participation would be necessary to achieve 
a political settlement in Europe should take part. 165 
As implied in the first Western response, which made no reference to a conference, the Allies 
believed that it was imperative to first determine which specific issues would be useful to 
discuss with the East before deciding on the type of forum that would be most appropriate for 
their negotiations. The cautious response clearly underscored that even if many Western 
governments were pressured by domestic public opinion to improve their dialogue and 
relations with the East, they were not willing to start a conference anytime soon. If helping to 
gain time, the Alliance commitment from Washington to start looking at possible subjects of 
discussions nevertheless opened the dialogue with the East which, in the following three 
years, was to be pursued through a regular exchange of communiques and declarations issued, 
almost clockwise, every six-months at the conclusion of Ministerial Meetings of the Atlantic 
Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. 
12. CONCLUSION 
By the time the Western governments provided their first sign of movement on the Soviet 
project for a conference, fifteen years had elapsed since the issue first appeared on Moscow's 
agenda of European security proposals. Throughout this period the West only accumulated 
misgivings for the project. 
The first wave of Soviet appeals of the mid-1950s has always been interpreted as attempts to 
prevent the rearmament of West Germany and its integration into NATO and, after failing on 
both those counts, to seek the abolition of the Atlantic Alliance. In the mid-1960s, when the 
Eastern states renewed their interest in a European conference, the aims of the initiatives were 
not interpreted much differently. At the time, the Soviet campaign was believed to be seeking 
the division of the NATO partners, to gain the elimination of the political and military 
presence of the United States from the continent, to achieve the abolition of the Atlantic 
Alliance, and to pressure the FRG to accept the post-war borders. 
165 Washington, 10-11 April 1969. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 218-221. 
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Throughout both these periods, a prevailing goal ascribed to the Soviet initiatives was the 
establishment of a European system of collective security. In spite of varying formulations 
over the years, and even if more formally and forcefully pursued in the mid-1950s when it 
was presented in the form of a treaty, the idea had consistently raised apprehensions in the 
West, where the aims and consequences of such a system were feared to be "the political, 
military, and economic domination of the Soviet Union in Europe. "166 Not surprisingly, 
Western reaction, for more than a decade, had been to simply ignore the appeals for a 
conference. But, as Henry Kissinger commented on the long Soviet campaign for its 
initiative: 
Soviet diplomacy has one great asset. It is extraordinarily persevering; it substitutes 
persistence for imagination. It has no domestic pressures impelling it constantly to put 
forward new ideas to break deadlocks. It is not accused of rigidity if it advances 
variations of the same proposals year after year.... Like drops of water on a stone, 
Soviet repetitiveness has the tendency sooner or later to erode the resistance of the 
restless democracies. "' 67 
Probably more than Soviet perseverance, it was the development of detente and strong public 
expectations in the West for a further warming-up of East-West relations that eventually 
forced the NATO partners to change their response. As acknowledged in an internal 
document of the British Foreign Office in early 1972: 
Unpalatable though it may be to have to admit it, Western countries have had to 
accept [the Conference] largely because of domestic political pressure: they have had, 
in effect, to accept the Soviet thesis that support for a Conference [was] the only 
acceptable evidence of willingness to work for detente. ' 68 
But while the Western governments had to yield to the demand of their public constituencies, 
they continued to only have apprehensions for the project and some, especially the United 
States, were strongly opposed to it. Although recognising signs of progress in the offer made 
from Budapest in March 1969, most governments believed that the first initiative for a 
conference after the military intervention in Czechoslovakia was a scheme predominantly 
aimed at restoring the image of the Soviet Union as a peace-loving nation. The fact that all 
military aspects, along with the dissolution of the bloc system, had basically disappeared from 
the proposal went largely unnoticed at the time. For Western officials, the conference 
proposed by the Soviets continued to be seen as a "security" conference with a primary goal 
of establishing a new European security system based on the dissolution of the military 
166 Palmer, The Prospects, p. 23. 
167 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 413. 
168 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 4 
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alliances, especially NATO. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Washington reply, the situation was particularly 
disconcerting for the Western governments because the key security issue for them was force 
reductions, and the Eastern states had paid no attention to their appeals for negotiations. 
Furthermore, while the West was forced to start recognising the possibility of a conference, 
they did not believe that the Soviet Union was really interested in true negotiations that could 
help solve outstanding East-West problems. Hence, from the moment the Western 
governments publicly committed themselves to look at possible issues for discussions with 
the East, they were facing competing considerations. On the one hand, to continue to try to 
satisfy public opinion by making progress on the issue; on the other, avoid being dragged into 




AND THE EMERGENCE OF CBMS (1969-1972) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When the NATO member states provided their first positive signal on the Communist 
conference, the Allies only knew that they could no longer simply discard the proposal. 
Indeed, if they all agreed that the project, as presented by the Warsaw Pact, was unacceptable, 
and that anything else would be better than the proposed Communist scheme, they had no 
strategy on how prospective talks should unfold. Divided over the appropriateness of the reply 
from Washington, and with those having supported it having done so only to satisfy public 
opinion, the Alliance had no plan on how to move forward. The NATO policy statement of 
April 1969 suggesting that the Allies would first look at subjects before considering forums 
could certainly help to gain time, but the Western governments had no alternative framework 
to propose, no subject to put forward, nor was there any commonality of views on possible 
objectives or desirable outcomes. Agreement on all these aspects --forum, topics and even 
conditions that would justify moving further down the road of negotiations-- created 
enormous difficulties for the NATO member states who, in the following three years leading 
to the opening of preliminary consultations on the CSCE, in November 1972, were 
continuously challenged by the East to start the conference. 
Throughout this period, the Allies constantly struggled to reach common policies. In this 
process, the West proposed, in December 1971, that the conference should consider military 
issues. Despite the fact that the move was made more than two years after NATO began its 
examination of potential subjects of discussion at a conference, the issue immediately 
developed into the most difficult aspect of NATO's preparations for the CSCE, which was 
only to be resolved by a decision to sponsor the introduction of confidence-building measures 
in the conference. 
2. FIRST SIGN OF MOVEMENT 
The Allied reply from Washington, in April 1969, only noted the readiness of the Western 
governments "to explore which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation 
and an early resolution", and only committed them to draft a list of these issues in time for the 
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next Ministerial Meeting scheduled for December. ' The statement, meant to signal that the 
Allies would only be willing to advance with great caution on the issue via some step-by-step 
approach was, however, immediately misinterpreted. 
Two weeks after the Washington meeting, the Finnish government took the issue of a 
conference a step further. On 5 May, following a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Nordic 
countries, Finland distributed a memorandum to all governments concerned including the 
FRG, the GDR, Canada and the United States, offering to host a conference on European 
security matters. 2 The initiative, apparently motivated by the fact that Finland had interpreted 
"the attitude of the NATO countries as indicating that the West was now prepared in principle 
to join a security conference"3 was not warmly welcomed in the West. In the United States, 
in particular, the Administration was concerned that it "had created a presumption that the 
conference would in fact take place. "4 
For the East, however, the Finnish memorandum presented an excellent opportunity to push 
the conference project forward. At a meeting of the Warsaw Pact, held in Prague on 31 
October 1969, the Eastern states welcomed the positive reception of their proposal "on the 
part of the majority of European States", noting that their governments had given a positive 
reply to the Finnish initiative. 5 More substantively, the WTO meeting formulated, for the first 
time, two specific agenda items for a conference: 
1. the creation of security in Europe and the renunciation of the use of force and the threat of 
force between European States, and; 
2. the expansion of commercial, economic, technical and scientific relations based on the 
principle of equal rights. 6 
Particularly noteworthy, the communique made no reference to any specific military 
measures, confirming that the Kremlin had abandoned all immediate aspirations to make the 
large gathering of European states a "security" conference which could be used as an 
instrument to establish a system of collective security in Europe, based on the dissolution of 
the military blocs. Moscow's most immediate concern in late 1969 was the quick preparation 
'Washington, 10-11 April 1969. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 218-221. 2 For a text of Finnish Memorandum (5 May 1969), see WEU, The proposed conference, pp. 30- 
31. For a discussion, see Acimovic, Problems of Security, p. 85. 3 Maresca, To Helsinki, pp. 5-6. 
4 Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 40. 
5 For a text, see WEU, The proposed conference, pp. 31-33. 
6 For a text of the Communique (31 October 1969), see WEU, The proposed conference, pp. 31- 
33. 
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of such a conference. In this regard, the Prague meeting revealed a sense of urgency on the 
part of the Eastern bloc by noting that the WTO nations were "ready to examine any other 
proposals which serve the preparation ... of the all-European conference", and emphasising 
that a conference could be held in Helsinki in the first half of 1970. 
Eastern impatience for holding a conference within a few months did little to change the 
views of the NATO states who were barely beginning their consultations on this issue in 
Brussels. 
3. NATO'S PREPARATIONS: SUBJECTS BEFORE FORUMS 
In line with the instructions of the Washington April Ministerial session requesting that a 
report be prepared for the December meeting of the Alliance, the US State Department 
immediately initiated work on a list of potential issues for negotiation. 7 Reflecting the 
difficulties the Allies were to experience in identifying potential subjects for discussion with 
the East, the list produced by Washington in late April 1969 was, in the words of one of its 
drafters, "nothing more than a rehash of everything under the sun that the Soviets have been 
telling the West and what the West have been telling them in the past many years, including 
almost everything from previous arms control negotiations like those in London in 1957 or 
the ENDC [Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee]. "8 In addition to Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reductions --to which NATO was already committed since its June 1968 
Reykjavik appeal for negotiations-- the list contained a number of so-called "confidence- 
building measures", such as the prior notification of military exercises, the observation of 
military manoeuvres and the establishment of observation posts; all themes previously 
discussed in the disarmament negotiations of the 1950s and 1960s. 9 
After being massaged by the Bureau of European Affairs of the State Department, the list was 
sent to Brussels where it was introduced as a working paper to form the basis for work by the 
NATO Council. Efforts were then made in the Senior Political Committee to catalogue the 
issues in terms of what could be right for negotiations, what needed more study, and what 
would probably never be ready for negotiations. 10 
Interview with US Ambassador James E. Goodby, Washington D. C., 14 February 1992. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. In his 1971 monograph, Michael Palmer notes that NATO had examined: "The exchange 
of advance warnings of the holding of manoeuvres, the exchange of observers at manoeuvres, the 
establishment of observation posts, and the discussion of strategic doctrines and of diplomatic or 
military `warning lights'. " See Palmer, The Prospects, p. 52. 10 Interview with US Ambassador James E. Goodby, Washington D. C., 14 February 1992. 
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On 5-6 November, at a special meeting of the Deputy Ministers of the North Atlantic 
Council, convened to prepare the December meeting, the Council streamlined the list from 
fifty to twenty-six issues. " Along with some unspecified economic, cultural and 
technological aspects, MBFR and confidence-building measures remained on the list as 
possible "negotiable" topics. '2 
Officially, the Alliance remained committed to the policy outlined in the April Washington 
final communique which called for determining "issues" before deciding on "forums" for 
their discussions. After the meeting, NATO Secretary-General, Manlio Brosio, re- 
emphasised this point by noting that the session had "examined the various issues from the 
point of view of their possible negotiation with the East. " According to the Secretary- 
General, the "discussion [also] revealed the readiness of Alliance members to consider all 
possible procedures for negotiation of these issues, including a conference or series of 
conferences, provided these should be constructive and appropriate to the subject discussed. " 
In short, as Brosio concluded, "there was no desire to hold a conference for conference's sake, 
but rather a strong determination to promote the careful preparation of all kinds of possible 
negotiations and the resolution of the serious problems dividing Europe". ' 3 
While NATO's consultations appeared to be proceeding smoothly, with good Alliance unity, 
this was not necessarily the case. The first Allied discussions exclusively devoted to potential 
negotiations with the East uncovered important differences among the NATO partners. On 
the "List of Issues", for instance, the Allies were divided on whether to allow the Eastern 
states to choose from their list of negotiable subjects (like a "repas a la carte"), or to propose 
all the questions they themselves would want to see resolved (like a "menu de table 
d 'höte"). 14 
In addition, no agreement could be reached on how, if at all, to move forward on the issue of a 
conference. Denmark and Belgium, for instance, argued that the idea of a conference should 
be kept alive. 15 Others, more inclined to go forward with concrete proposals, maintained that 
11 "Nato Review Today of East's Policy", The Times, 5 November 1969; and Whetten, Germany's 
Ostpolitik, 1971, p. 78. 
12 Interview with US Ambassador James E. Goodby, Washington D. C., 14 February 1992. 
According to Robert Spencer, the list also included cultural, technological and economic aspects. 
See Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 40. 
13 For a text, see WEU, The proposed conference, pp. 33-34. 
14 See "Les allies durcissent leur attitude ä 1'egard du projet de conference sur la securite 
europeenne", Le Monde, 7 November 1969. 
is Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik, p. 78. 
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NATO should not appear "passive, slow, unduly concerned with mere studies, or on the 
defensive", and that the Council "should support the idea of an eventual conference". 16 The 
United States, however, adopted an unequivocally negative attitude toward any suggestion 
that might imply movement toward convening a conference. Presenting the American 
position, Under-Secretary of State, Elliott Richardson, argued that the Soviet Union was not 
serious about negotiating European security and that the West should not make any 
concessions that could lead to "illusory detente. " 17 Richardson further maintained that three 
issues should be regarded as a test of Soviet willingness to promote a genuine detente in 
Europe: "the Warsaw Pact's attitude towards the German problem, the status of Berlin, and 
the mutual reduction of forces. "18 In other words, Washington was not willing to bow further 
to pressure and intended to make these three subjects pre-conditions for NATO's acceptance 
of a conference. 
Such a "hard-line" position, 19 as characterized at the time, was in keeping with the views of 
the US National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger who, just before the NATO spring 
meeting in Washington, had recommended to President Nixon to make US agreement in 
principle "depend on progress on concrete European issues, especially Berlin ,. 20 The 
suggestion that progress on Berlin should be made a pre-condition before NATO agreed to 
move forward had been supported by Willy Brandt, who had argued a similar position in 
Washington while also adding improvement in the relations between the two parts of 
Germany. 21 But, if the Americans could find support by suggesting some pre-conditions 
linked to the German question, US determination to make talks on force reductions a pre- 
requisite to a conference was a completely different matter. US insistence on the issue at the 
November meeting had apparently "diverted the council from framing a positive answer"22 to 
16 Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 45. 
17 "Warsaw Pact Bid Causes Shift in Gears", IHT, 10 November 1969. 
18 See Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 46; and Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik, p. 78. 19 "U. S. Sees Force Reductions as Key to East-West Detente: Detente Tied to Arms Cut", IHT, 6 
November 1969. 
20 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 415. 
2' As acknowledged by Brandt: "Speaking in Washington in April of the same year, I said that the 
scheme for an all-European conference should be carefully prepared, not left to hang fire on 
principle. We could not dispense with the participation of the United States and Canada. I 
received brickbats from the East and a mixed reception in the West when I said that the Federal 
Republic's presence at a European security conference would serve no purpose unless relations 
between the two parts of Germany were regularized beforehand. ... 
Our allies accepted this 
attitude. They adopted our demands and later linked them with the conclusion of a quadripartite 
agreement on Berlin. " Brandt, People and Politics, p. 187. 22 "U. S. Sees Force Reductions as Key to East-West Detente: Detente Tied to Arms Cut", IHT, 6 
November 1969. 
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the Eastern proposal, creating widespread dissatisfaction among allies, most notably France, 
Norway, Denmark, Italy and Belgium. 23 
NATO's immediate difficulties in agreeing on what specific pre-conditions the East should 
meet before the Allies would consider a conference were compounded in the following 
months by divergence on a host of other related issues. Meanwhile, a number of important 
initiatives were launched for easing East-West relations that would indirectly help bring the 
conference closer to realisation. 
In the summer of 1969, following a degradation of the Western position in Berlin with the 
imposition of new visit and travel restrictions for Berliners and harassment of access to the 
city by the East German Government, France, Britain and the United States invited the Soviet 
Union to join them in quadripartite discussions aimed at improving the situation and defining 
the rights and responsibilities of the Four-Powers as well as those of the German people on 
both sides. 24 More significantly, in September, a general election in the FRG brought to 
power a new coalition of Social Democrats and Free Democrats, headed by Willy Brandt. 
The change of government in Bonn was to have a decisive impact on resolving outstanding 
post-war issues and, eventually, in removing the "German question" as an obstacle to 
reconciliation and negotiation with the East. 
Committed to broaden Germany's Eastern policy, Chancellor Brandt's coalition was to carry 
on its Ostpolitik in ways preceding governments, led by Chancellors Erhard and Kiesinger, 
had not succeeded. Previous efforts to improve relations with the East and reach binding 
agreement on non-use of force had faltered in the face of strong reactions that the proposals 
did not include recognition of the GDR. Hence, Chancellor Erhard's Peace Note of March 
1966, suggesting a negotiation of non-aggression pacts (less East Germany), and exchanges 
of observers at military manoeuvres, had been met with the demand that the FRG first 
recognise the "reality of Europe" and accept the post-war political and territorial status quo. 25 
After the Great Coalition of Chancellor Kiesinger took office in December 1966, the Federal 
Republic had renewed the offer for exchanging declarations on the renunciation of force, but 
23 See Ibid. Also "Warsaw Pact Bid Causes Shift in Gears", IHT, 10 November 1969; and 
Povolny, "The Soviet Union", p. 214. 
24 For the events leading to the Western appeal for negotiations, see Jonathan Dean, "Berlin in a 
Divided Germany: An Evolving International Regime", in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley 
and Alexander Dallin (eds. ), US. -Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, especially pp. 93-96. [Hereafter: Dean, "Berlin"]. 
25 For a text, see WEU, The proposed conference, pp. 14-17. 
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without more success although the proposal was then also extended to the GDR. 26 In the final 
months of the Great Coalition, the Federal Republic slowly began to abandon its opposition to 
attend any international gatherings which also included the participation of the GDR27 but, 
despite past efforts at reaching reconciliation and normalising relations with the East, the 
initiatives remained in vain because they did not include the recognition of East Germany and 
the acceptance of the territorial changes emanating from the Second World War. 
Signs that Brandt's coalition was to take bold steps in this direction were given as early as 28 
October when, presenting the program of his coalition, the Chancellor acknowledged the 
existence of "two states in one Germany". 28 Indication that the new coalition also intended to 
establish a modus operandi with the GDR (and, eventually, also to recognise it as a separate 
state), included abandonment of the "Hallstein doctrine" which, for 15 years, had called for 
the Federal Republic to break diplomatic relations with any country that recognised the East 
German state. More immediately, however, the priority of the new government was to reach 
agreement with the Soviet Union and Poland. Hence, on 16 November, a note was sent to 
Moscow proposing negotiation of a bilateral agreement on the renunciation of force and, later 
in the month, a similar offer was made to Poland with the aim of achieving agreement on the 
Oder-Niesse frontier. 
Indications that the East would soon agree to join these talks came during the December 
meeting of the WTO, which positively acknowledged the West German initiatives. 
Surprisingly, the Pact's meeting added nothing new to the conference proposal and did not 
even reiterate previous appeals for an early convening. This change of attitude toward the 
conference reportedly ensued from a Pact decision to accept Western reticence on the matter 
"as momentarily insurmountable". 29 But, while the Warsaw Pact nations felt it advisable to 
retract momentarily from the discussions, the NATO states were beginning to feel just the 
opposite. Indeed, the presentation of an agenda, schedule, and site for a conference, 
introduced in the WTO Prague Declaration of 31 October, had heightened Western views, 
including the United States, that the initiative needed to be taken away from the East. 30 A few 
days after the Prague Declaration and the special November meeting of the Alliance, the 
26 See Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 349. 
27 See Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik, pp. 76-77. 
28 As noted by Stanley and Whitt, Detente Diplomacy, p. 33, the statement, along with a later 
similar declaration and pledges to respect the territorial integrity of the GDR, amounted to "de 
facto recognition that two Germanies exist[ed], at least as `an enforced reality'. " 29 Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik, p. 80. 
30 Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 45. 
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American Administration privately acknowledged that it would be risky to be entirely critical 
of the conference idea and that time had come to regain the high ground . 
31 Believing that the 
best way to proceed was to put forward counter-proposals, the American Secretary of State, 
William Rogers, authorised the US Mission at NATO to participate in the drafting of a 
declaration on European security. 32 For the many NATO partners who were concerned that 
the Alliance should not be seen as dragging its feet on the matter, the decision was very 
timely, and the Alliance December Ministerial Meeting swiftly endorsed the initiative. 
4. DECEMBER 1969: SETTING CONDITIONS 
The Declaration on East-West relations, released from Brussels at the end of the Ministerial 
Meeting on 5 December 1969, set out to counter the agenda items proposed by the WTO. 33 
For the Allies, the issue of renunciation of force, proposed by the Warsaw Pact in the Prague 
communique, was "difficult to reconcile" with the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty 
developed after 1968 to justify the intervention in Czechoslovakia. 34 Hence, and in an 
implicit reference to it, the NATO Declaration opened by outlining a lengthy "code of 
conduct" for inter-state relations underlining that the essential basis of European security 
rested upon the respect of certain principles including territorial integrity, non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of any state, and the right of peoples to shape their own destinies, while 
emphasising that "past experience has shown that there [was], as yet, no common 
interpretation of these principles". 35 On the issues of economic, scientific and technical 
exchanges (the second agenda item proposed by the WTO in Prague), the NATO Declaration 
endorsed the issues and added the theme of cultural exchanges. Here again, however, the 
Western states underscored their views on the matter by stressing that "in these fields more 
could be achieved by freer movement of people, ideas, and information between the countries 
of East and West". 36 
To ensure that NATO's discussion of these issues would not be construed as proposed agenda 
items for an eventual conference, the Declaration stressed that they were simply "subjects 
lending themselves to possible discussions or negotiations". 37 Furthermore, in keeping with 
31 Interview with US Ambassador James E. Goodby, Washington D. C., 14 February 1992. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Brussels, 4-5 December 1969. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 229-232. 34 UK, FCO, Selected Documents, p. 9. 




the strategy adopted in Washington whereby "forums should follow content", 38 the 
Declaration noted that the Allies would continue to intensify their contacts through all 
channels, bilateral or multilateral, believing that progress was "most likely to be achieved by 
choosing in each instance the means most suitable for the subject. "39 Further indications that 
NATO was not prepared to enter a conference anytime soon was made clear in the 
Declaration: 
Ministers consider that, as part of a comprehensive approach, progress in the bilateral 
and multilateral discussions and negotiations which have already begun, or could 
begin shortly, and which relate to fundamental problems of European security, would 
make a major contribution to improving the political atmosphere in Europe. Progress 
in these discussions and negotiations would help to ensure the success of any eventual 
conference in which, of course, the North American members of the Alliance would 
participate, to discuss and negotiate substantial problems of co-operation and security 
in Europe. 40 
Though vaguely written, the statement left little doubt that Western approval for a conference 
was premised upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. In addition to North American 
participation, NATO appeared to expect progress in the Four-Power negotiations to improve 
the situation with respect to Berlin and in the establishment of working agreements to 
normalise relations between East and West Germany. These "pre-conditions" were made 
somewhat more explicit in another part of the Declaration discussing Western initiatives with 
regard to a Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and the efforts of the FRG to reach a modus 
operandi between the two parts of Germany. In this section, entitled "Germany and Berlin", 
the Allies remarked that they were "bound to attach great weight to the responses to these 
proposals in evaluating the prospects for negotiations looking toward improved relations and 
co-operation in Europe. 41 
While the Alliance's policy statement seemed to link the prospects of an eventual conference 
with North American participation, progress on a Berlin agreement and the talks between the 
two Germanies, other pre-conditions were not as clearly expressed. Indeed, even if the 
Declaration underlined Allied support for Brandt's Ostpolitik and the West German initiatives 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Poland, it was unclear whether the conclusion of the 
renunciation of force treaties with Moscow and Warsaw were also to be considered as pre- 
38 Interview with US Ambassador James E. Goodby, Washington D. C., 14 February 1992. 




requisites for a conference. Similarly, given the overall vague formulation of the NATO 
statement requesting "progress in the bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations 
which have already begun, or could begin shortly", several newspapers interpreted the 
Western pre-conditions as also including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a positive reply to NATO's invitation 
for negotiation on MBFR. 42 
Such ambiguity over precisely what the Warsaw Pact would have to deliver before NATO 
would agree to a conference certainly suited the most sceptical NATO partners, especially the 
United States who resisted any action that might signal endorsement of the initiative. Yet, this 
did not mean that full Allied agreement existed on the issue of pre-conditions. Similarly, 
while the Alliance seemed to have regained the initiative by laying down its position on 
possible subjects of discussions with the East, and some "ground rules" for what appeared to 
be a step-by-step approach to some process of negotiations, other ambiguities of the 
December Declaration suggested NATO did not have such a plan. Although the Alliance 
remained committed to finding subjects before deciding on forums, the last paragraph of the 
December Declaration made reference to the possibility of "one general conference or 
conferences. " 43 Apart from a similar comment made by Manlio Brosio at the conclusion of 
the November extraordinary meeting of the Alliance, NATO had avoided making any 
mention of a "conference" in its policy statements because no agreement existed in Brussels 
regarding the type of forum that would be most appropriate to initiate East-West discussions. 
Without wanting to accept the Communist conference proposal, several Allies, including 
Belgium, Denmark, Canada and the Netherlands wished for movement on the issue. 44 
Dissatisfied over Western inaction, Denmark argued at the December meeting that "the 
important thing was to get the process of talks started with NATO making an active 
contribution. " 45 Concrete proposals were also presented during the Ministerial Meeting. 
Denmark and the Netherlands, supported by Belgium, suggested that bilateral and multilateral 
contacts could lead to a series of conferences or a series of preliminaries. 6 The United 
42 See, for example, "NATO Wary on Security Talks", The Guardian, 6 December 1969; 
"Cautious Welcome from NATO for Security Talks", The Times, 6 December 1969. The Times 
suggests that Brosio himself had mentioned SALT, Germany's initiative towards East Germany, 
Poland and the Soviet Union, and Four-Power Agreement on Berlin. 
43 Text in NATO Final Communiques, pp. 229-232. 
44 Vincineau, "La position beige", pp. 743-744; and "U. S. Rebuffed on Condemning Brezhnev 
Doctrine in NATO", IHT, 8 December 1969. 
45 See "U. S. Takes Hard Line on East-West Meeting", IIIT, 5 December 1969. 
46 See Ibid.; and Vincineau, "La position beige", p. 744. 
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Kingdom suggested the establishment of a Standing Commission on East-West Relations 
involving nations from NATO, the WTO, and the European neutrals and non-aligned, which 
could be used "to develop positions on issues for a forthcoming all-European meeting". 47 
The United States, however, maintained its negative stance toward any action that might 
encourage early convening of a conference. Summarising the American position, Secretary 
of State Rogers cautioned: 
We must be careful not to confuse the process of negotiation with real progress 
toward agreements, and we must not lull ourselves into a false sense of detente. What 
is proposed [by the East] cannot properly be described as a security conference at all. . 
.. We are opposed in practice to an unrealistic and premature exercise which could lead to disappointment and quite possibly a deterioration in East-West relations. We 
would favor a negotiation that holds out realistic hope for a reduction of tensions in 
Europe. But we will not participate in a conference which has the effect of ratifying 
or acquiescing in the Brezhnev doctrine. 48 
Clearly implied by Rogers' statement, not all Western governments were ready to consider 
"one or more conferences" as suggested in the December Declaration. Furthermore, as 
reported at the time, the only agreement existing at Brussels on the issue of a framework, or 
forum, for possible talks was that almost anything would be better than the Eastern proposal 
for a grand conference. 49 Whether the NATO statement on "one general conference or 
conferences" was meant to convey this message to the East, or constituted a concession to 
those within the Alliance who wanted NATO to present a concrete initiative in response to the 
Pact's proposals, 50 the Allies had no plan of action with regard to how, or when, East-West 
discussions could be initiated, nor could they agree on any future course of action to that end. 
During the December Ministerial Meeting, the Scandinavians and the British argued that the 
Alliance's final communique should include language on the WTO Prague Declaration 
emphasising that it needed clarification. 51 The Americans strongly opposed the idea claiming 
that NATO had to be careful not to get into a situation where it would be bargaining over a 
47 "U. S. Takes Hard Line on East-West Meeting", IHT, 5 December 1969. See also Palmer, The 
Prospects, pp. 46-47; Stanley and Whitt, Detente Diplomacy, p. 15; and "La session ministerielle 
de I'OTAN. Les pays atlantiques considerent avec prudence et mefiance les projets de conference 
europeenne", Le Monde, 6 December 1969. 
48 "Address by Secretary of State Rogers to the Belgo-American Association at Brussels, 
December 6,1969", in Documents on Disarmament, 1969, US, ACDA, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 
1970, pp. 628-633. [Hereafter: Documents on Disarmament, 1969]. 
49 See Le Monde, 6 December 1969. 
50 Italy considered the reference to a "conference" as a victory. See "NATO Supports Bonn in 
Overtures to East", IHT, 6-7 December 1969. For the views of other NATO partners, see "U. S. 
Takes Hard Line on East-West Meeting", IHT, 5 December 1969. 
51 "U. S. Rebuffed on Condemning Brezhnev Doctrine in NATO", IHT, 8 December 1969. 
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conference agenda. 52 The Americans "won the day" and the only reference or phrasing 
related to the WTO proposal was dropped from the communique. For Henry Kissinger, the 53 
December meeting was a success in that "euphoria for a conference for a conference's sake 
was contained. "54 Yet, the Allies remained without any clear position on how to move 
forward. 
The Americans came to the December meeting prepared to push their three pre-conditions for 
a conference. As described by US Secretary of State, William Rogers, a "reply to a 
conference should be conditioned" upon "constructive responses" with regard to Brandt's 
initiatives toward German reconciliation; a "demonstration of Soviet willingness toward 
improving the situation in and around Berlin", and a "positive Warsaw Pact response to our 
repeated proposals" for MBFR. 55 Some of these demands were brushed aside by a number of 
Allies including France, Canada, Italy and the Scandinavian countries. 56 On the Berlin 
question, for instance, France refused to consider a text asking for "success" in the talks and 
only agreed to lend its support for the formulation calling for "progress, '. 57 On MBFR, the 
French position was even less compromising. Paris flatly refused any suggestion that might 
imply that these talks could be considered a pre-condition for a conference, and the French 
delegation even delayed agreement on the Declaration over this issue. 58 
In addition to difficulties in determining what pre-conditions should be set for Western 
agreement on a conference, what type of forums would be most appropriate for East-West 
discussions and the desirability of fresh overtures to the East, the content of any East-West 
prospective discussions was also beginning to be a source of disagreement at NATO. In his 
opening remarks to the December Ministerial Meeting, the French Foreign Minister, Maurice 
Schumann, noted that force reductions would not be an appropriate subject for an eventual 
conference. 59 In the absence of any call from the East for considering such a topic at the 
conference, the statement probably referred to internal discussions at NATO, and may have 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
sa Kissinger, White House Years, p. 416. 
ss Address by Secretary of State Rogers to the Belgo-American Association at Brussels, December 
6,1969", in Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 628-633. See also Stanley and Whitt, Detente 
Diplomacy, p. 35; and "U. S. Takes Hard Line on East-West Meeting", IHT, 5 December 1969. 
56 Acimovic, Problems of Security, pp. 88-89; and Vincineau, "La position beige", pp. 743-44. 
57 See Le Monde, 6 December 1969. 
58 "Nato Sets up its Warsaw Bloc Buster", The Sunday Times, 7 December 1969. "Les 
Occidentaux n'ont pas ferme la porte ä la reunion d'une conference sur la securite europeenne", 
Le Monde, 7-8 December 1969. 
59 See Le Monde, 6 December 1969. 
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been made public by the French in order to discourage any further consideration of the issue. 
5.1970: MORE SECURITY OR NATO'S INSECURITY? 
While NATO's first six months of deliberations on a prospective conference yielded few 
concrete decisions, in early 1970 important progress in East-West relations would help push 
the issue forward. 
In December 1969, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union began discussions 
on a bilateral agreement on the renunciation of force and similar talks with Poland opened in 
early February 1970. In March, Moscow joined the three Western powers having special 
responsibility for Germany for quadripartite talks on Berlin while, following an historic 
meeting between Willy Brandt and the East German Prime Minister, Willi Stoph, that same 
month, the FRG and the GDR initiated dialogue on the establishment of a modus operandi. 
Finally, in April, the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks between the superpowers officially 
opened and were expected to enter a more substantive phase. 
When the Allies met again for their semi-annual Ministerial Meeting in Rome, on 26-27 May 
1970, they could only express their "satisfaction over the launching or continuation of the 
whole range of talks and negotiations. " 60 The Ministers noted that "in so far as progress 
[was] recorded as a result of these talks and in the on-going talks --in particular on Germany 
and Berlin-- the Allied Governments would be ready to enter into multilateral contacts with 
"6 all interested governments. 1 As further explained in the fmal communique, "one of the 
main purposes of such contacts would be to explore when it [would] be possible to convene a 
conference, or a series of conferences on European security and co-operation. "62 
NATO's statement of readiness to enter into multilateral contacts once progress on Berlin and 
Germany was registered represented an important step forward. Yet, several issues remained 
unsettled. Indications that negotiations on force reductions were still linked to Western 
approval of a conference had not completely disappeared. In the following paragraph of the 
communique (not signed by France) the 14 Allies stated that they "attach[ed] particular 
importance to further exploration with other interested parties of the possibility of mutual and 
60 Rome, 26-27 May 1970. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 233-237. 61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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balanced force reductions. "63 Also, the 14 released a Declaration on Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reductions in which they renewed their invitation for the East to join them into 
negotiations. 64 
Another unresolved issue related to the framework in which multilateral talks could take place. 
In another section of the final communique, the Western governments suggested that "the 
establishment of a permanent body could be envisaged as one means, among others, of 
embarking upon multilateral negotiations in due course. "65 What NATO had in mind, or 
hoped to achieve, by suggesting the possibility of creating a permanent body as a vehicle to a 
conference was unclear. As for the reference made in the December communique to the 
possibility of having "one or more conferences", the suggestion appeared to have been the 
result of a compromise between divergent views, or a concession made to those who wanted a 
decision on a forum. In December 1969, the United Kingdom formally introduced the idea of 
creating a Standing Commission on East-West Relations. Although London's proposal for the 
establishment of such a Commission had not been retained at the time, British diplomats had 
nevertheless secured the approval of the Council to set up a special committee of the Alliance 
to look at the issue of modalities for negotiations with the East and to report at the next 
meeting in May. 66 In this intervening period, a number of proposals were advanced including 
one for the formation of a group of interested states, or preparatory committee, that would be 
responsible for determining a method of discussion and preparing an agenda, and one for a 
"salon ouvert" of ambassadors. 67 
In Rome, the British asserted that the Alliance should undertake a new initiative on East-West 
relations, arguing that the idea was not necessarily to accept the Eastern project for a 
63 Ibid. 
64 "Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions", Rome, 26-27 May 1970. NATO Final 
Communiques, pp. 237-238. 
65 Rome, 26-27 May 1970. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 233-237. 
66 See "NATO Wary on Security Talks", The Guardian, 6 December 1969; and Le Monde, 6 
December 1969. 
67 See "NATO Views Differ on Talks with East", The Times, 19 May 1970. Written a few days 
before the opening of the Rome meeting, the article reported that the proposals advanced included 
"a three member group --Poland, Finland and Belgium- to work out a method of discussion and an 
agenda, and a proposal that a similar multilateral group be formed from any Nato and Warsaw 
Pact country, wishing to be represented, and from neutrals with an interest in the questions 
involved". Another proposal made by the Belgian Government in December 1969 was to have a 
"salon ouvert", whereby Ambassadors of interested countries would meet in a neutral country for 
informal discussions to gradually work out an agenda. See Palmer, The Prospects, p. 47; and 
Walschap, "The Great European Jamboree", p. 42. The most comprehensive review of the 
proposals made at the time can be found in Palmer, The Prospects, pp. 46-50. 
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Conference "as is", but to begin multilateral exploratory talks that would not commit the Allies 
to any negotiation. This, as previously proposed in December, could take the form of a 
Standing Commission that would be given the task of identifying possible subjects for future 
negotiations and to work out modalities. 68 As in December, however, the British suggestion 
failed to secure sufficient support. 69 During the meeting, Denmark and Norway argued for a 
less structured approach to the process, 70 while the United States rejected the idea outright 
claiming that there was no need to create new institutions which, in the words of Henry 
Kissinger, would only "add their momentum to the already excessive pressures for a relaxation 
of tensions based on atmospherics". 71 
As clearly evidenced by Kissinger's comment, the NATO suggestion for the establishment of 
a permanent body was not fully endorsed by all partners. This issue underscored a much 
more serious problem at NATO, namely that in spite of a public commitment to move 
forward on East-West negotiations, the desirability of initiating multilateral discussions 
anytime soon was still not supported by all delegations. 
The United Kingdom pushed hard at the Rome session for the Alliance to make some form of 
a concrete commitment or firm proposal to the East. According to news reports, Britain and 
Belgium jointly proposed that multilateral exploratory talks should start right away, and a 
majority in NATO supported this view. 72 The United States and Germany, however, opposed 
the suggestion arguing that a new round of negotiations with the East could disrupt the 
discussions already under way. 73 Moreover, Bonn argued --as the United States had done 
before-- that the opening of negotiations on force reductions should be made a pre-condition 
for a conference. 74 But this too was not acceptable to all member states, most notably France 
68 See "Stewart Calls for Nato Talks with East Block", The Times, 27 May 1970; "NATO to Test 
East on Peace Talks", FT, 28 May 1970; and "Nato's New Approach to Warsaw Pact", The 
Guardian, 28 May 1970. See also, Vincineau, "La position beige", p. 745. 
69 "NATO Views Differ on Talks with East", The Times, 19 May 1970. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 534. 
72 See FT, 28 May 1970; and The Times, 27 May 1970. The Times noted that the suggestion to 
make a firm proposal to the East had "received the support of seven of the smaller NATO 
countries and some of the larger ones". For a discussion of the joint Belgian-UK proposal, see 
also Vincineau, "La position belge", pp. 745-747. 
73 See "NATO to Test East on Peace Talks", FT, 28 May 1970. 
74 Christopher Bluth, "The Origins of MBFR: West German Policy Priorities and Conventional 
Arms Control". Paper presented at the Ford Foundation Conventional Arms Control Project 
Workshop, The Brookings Institution, Washington D. C., 11 February 1992, (unpublished paper), 
p. 22 [Hereafter: Bluth, "The Origins of MBFR"]. Other countries may have supported the 
proposal. Just after the Rome meeting, for instance, Canada instructed its embassies in Moscow 
and other East European capitals that "the decision to move to multilateral talks would also rest on 
the reaction to NATO's precise invitation on MBFR. " Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 54. 
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who rejected it outright. 75 French opposition to the proposal was such that Paris only agreed 
to sign the final communique after having gained assurances that the MBFR would not be 
made a pre-condition for East-West talks. 76 
While the absence of a common position on pre-conditions, timing and appropriateness of 
fresh proposals, and the framework in which any future East-West discussions could be 
initiated continued to characterise NATO's approach to a conference, the content of any 
prospective talks with the East was also becoming a subject of growing internal dissent in 
Brussels. In the Rome final communique the Allies mentioned two possible topics for 
consideration: "the principles which should govern relations between states, including the 
renunciation of force", and "freer movement of people, ideas and information". NATO's 
presentation of its preferred "subjects of discussions" did not mean, however, that all details 
related to these two topics were agreed upon by all the members states, 77 nor that these two 
subjects exhausted the list of issues some partners wanted to see considered. In Rome, 
Germany proposed that a "tangible link be created between the CSCE and MBFR' ; 78 
something later described by Foreign Minister Scheel as including the political aspects of 
MBFR in the CSCE. 79 
How much was debated in Rome on the issue of incorporating certain elements of force 
reduction talks can not be readily assessed. However, indications that the issue was already 
creating difficulties at NATO can be found in a Canadian government document sharply 
criticising a draft study, produced by the Secretariat of NATO, analysing the results of the 
NATO Rome Ministerial Meeting with that of the Eastern reply to it, released one month later 
in Budapest. 80 
The Budapest Memorandum, adopted on 22 June at the conclusion of a meeting of the WTO 
Foreign Ministers, was of great interest to the Alliance. First, the document formally accepted 
75 See "A 1'issue de sa reunion de Rome. Le conseil atlantique va presenter de nouvelles 
propositions pour le dialogue avec 1'Est", Le Monde, 29 May 1970. 
76 See Vincineau, "La position beige", p. 747; and Acimovic, Problems of Security, p. 90. " Almost two years later, in March 1972, both France and Germany argued that the topic of 
"freedom of movement", aimed at providing the peoples of Eastern Europe more possibilities to 
travel freely outside the Soviet bloc, should not be an independent agenda item of the Conference 
because of fear of confrontation with the Soviets. For a discussion, see Bennett and Hamilton, 
The Conference, p. 19. 
78 Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, p. 429. 
79 See "M. Maurice Schumann a plaide pour une preparation rapide de la conference de securite", 
Le Monde, 11 December 1971. 
80 All forthcoming discussion of, and quotes from, the Canadian document is from Canada, DEA, 
24 July 1970. 
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the participation of the North American NATO member states in the conference, putting an 
end to a long-standing ambiguity in the Pact's proposals and a source of constant frustration 
for those more willing to move towards East-West discussions but would not do so because of 
this enduring ambiguity. Second, the Budapest Memorandum put forward a new agenda 
item, described in the document as "the setting up at the all-European conference of a body to 
deal with questions of security and co-operation in Europe. "8' Third, and of more immediate 
interest to many at NATO, the Memorandum provided the first indication that the Eastern 
states might endorse the idea of force reductions in Europe. As stated in the document: 
The governments which adopted the present memorandum believe that a study of the 
question of reducing foreign armed forces on the territory of European States would 
serve the interests of a detente and security in Europe. In order to create in the 
shortest possible period of time the most favourable conditions for the discussion of 
appropriate questions at the all-European conference and in the interests of securing 
fruitful results from the study of the question concerning the reduction of foreign 
armed forces, this question could be discussed in the body which it is proposed to set 
up at the all-European conference or in another manner acceptable to interested 
States. 82 
Even if this first positive indication that the WTO might consider MBFR fell short of 
NATO's expectations to have both national and stationed forces included in future 
negotiations, it represented a first step in this direction. At the same time, however, the Pact's 
Declaration also raised a number of important questions. For instance, was the reference to 
"another manner acceptable to interested States" indicative of a willingness to begin 
preliminary talks at an early date, devoted exclusively to MBFR? Were the "interested 
States" concerned only those nations that had troops in Central Europe? 83 
The thrust of the Canadian contention with the NATO Secretariat draft study analysing these 
questions, in the light of the Rome communique, was that it revealed a "tendency to treat 
MBFR on the same basis as such topics as cultural relations, environmental questions, freer 
movement of peoples, etc. " The Canadian paper contended that to mingle both sets of issues 
was a false reading of the Rome communique, which gave great significance to force 
reductions by a separate Declaration. Furthermore, according to the Canadians, paragraph 6 
of the Rome communique stipulating that NATO was exploring which issues would best lend 
themselves to fruitful negotiations in order "to reduce tensions and promote co-operations in 
81 For a text of the WTO's Communique and Memorandum, Budapest, 22 June 1970, see in 
WEU, The proposed conference, pp. 53-55. 
82 Ibid. 
83 See Canada, DEA, 24 July 1970. 
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Europe" was clearly meant to delineate two general areas for discussion: "`co-operation' 
which would include such topics as cultural relations, environment, economic and technical 
co-operation, and; `other means of reducing political tensions' to complement the effort to 
negotiate a reduction of the military confrontation through MBFR [emphasis added]. "84 
For Ottawa, the issue of MBFR had to be separated, as far as possible, from the general 
discussion of agenda topics for an eventual conference, in the hope that separating the two 
would ensure that force reductions "would not be buried in general aspects of co-operation ... 
or negotiations that treat less urgent or less essential aspects of NATO's security interests. " 
Failing to do so, the paper warned, could ultimately leave NATO no more knowledgeable 
about the Pact's desire for a genuine detente. As emphasised in the memorandum: 
Almost two years of intensive technical studies have been carried out in the 
preparation of the proposal for MBFR. These studies ... were predicated on the need for a concrete, specific initiative that NATO Ministers had decided to take in order to 
discover whether or not the WTO countries are interested in a European Security 
Conference for propaganda purposes, or whether they can be seriously interested in 
discussing a realistic approach to the most vital aspects of European security. 
For Canada, Eastern willingness to discuss force reductions in an "organ" or in any "other 
form suitable to interested states"85 indicated that the WTO envisaged some framework other 
than a European security conference for the discussion of MBFR. Ottawa argued that while 
the "organ" should be discarded, NATO should treat the any "other form suitable" as an open 
invitation to contemplate the possibility of negotiations taking place in a different forum and 
possibly at a different time, and that the Alliance should pursue this line more positively and 
aggressively. If the opportunity was lost and NATO did not clearly separate MBFR from the 
conference context, the paper concluded, "time may well see this NATO initiative frustrated 
through Soviet evasive tactics aimed at making MBFR part of an ESC [European Security 
Conference] package that would be unacceptable to NATO. " 
Whether the Canadian criticism of the NATO brief was primarily, or only, motivated by an 
apparent tendency emerging within the Alliance to give the same relative prominence to 
84 This point was not made as explicitly in the Rome communique. Paragraph 6 read: "At their 
April 1969 meeting in Washington, Ministers agreed to explore with the Soviet Union ... which 
concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiations in order to reduce tension and promote 
co-operations in Europe and to take constructive actions to this end. " See, NATO Final 
Communiques, pp. 233-238. 
85 The Canadian translation of the Budapest Memorandum read "any other form suitable to 
interested states ", and not to "another manner acceptable to interested States". 
84 
MBFR than to the other conference topics (as if the agenda of the conference could be 
broadened to include force reductions), is difficult to ascertain. Certainly, before the Budapest 
Declaration of June 1970, none of the policy statements put forward in the final communiques 
of the two military alliances suggested that NATO and the Warsaw Pact envisaged dealing 
with any military issue in the prospective conference. Since the military intervention in 
Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the WTO had completely abandoned such plans. In the 
West, however, as evidenced by the wide use of the title "European Security Conference", a 
strong presumption had remained that the prospective conference would involve some 
military matters. In fact, the idea had been raised before by some European NATO partners. 
When presenting its project for a Standing Commission on East-West Relations, the British 
Government had maintained that it envisaged military questions to be dealt with by its 
proposed Commission. As described by Prime Minister Harold Wilson, in January 1970, the 
project envisaged a "permanent machinery for dealing with all the problems in Europe that 
we could solve, economic as well as political and military and the rest". 86 In Rome, Britain 
had also contended that NATO should enlarge the conference agenda proposed by the East to 
incorporate topics such as force reductions. 87 Finally, as clearly implied by the statement of 
the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, in December 1969, that MBFR would not 
be an appropriate subject of discussion for an eventual conference, the issue had already 
surfaced at NATO. 88 
Regardless of the extent to which the idea of inserting a military content in the conference had 
already taken root at NATO, what the Canadian comments underscored was that one year 
into examining potential topics, the Allies were still without any definite policy on what they 
wanted to consider at the conference. Also, as implied in the idea that MBFR and the CSCE 
86 As quoted in Palmer, The Prospects, p. 47. A few months later, the Conservative government, 
headed by E. R. G. Heath, continued to advocate the idea. In July 1970, the new Foreign Secretary, 
Sir Alec Douglas-Holme (who replaced Mr. Stewart), "indicated that he thought the idea of 
establishing standing machinery concerned with force reductions in Europe merited careful 
study. " Later, in February 1972, the British Foreign Office advocated the creation of a 
Commission which could be used "to examine the security aspects of East/West relations during 
the Conference. " As envisaged, the function of this body could be "to serve as a forum for 
negotiating, and subsequently supervising, an MBFR agreement". Bennett and Hamilton, The 
Conference, p. 15 note 38. 
87 See "Stewart Calls for Nato Talks with East Block", The Times, 27 May 1970. The article 
reported that "Mr. Stewart [had] suggested that Nato should take up, with reservations, the two 
ideas put forward by the Warsaw Pact .... 
but [that] it should also add topics of its own, such as 
force reductions in Europe, freedom of movement, human relations, a code of conduct, and 
cultural exchanges. " 
88 See Le Monde, 6 December 1969. 
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negotiations could be combined in some way, the Allies were going backwards on the issue 
of forum. In short, while the Alliance had committed itself to defining subjects before 
determining forums, the Allies were without a clear policy on both issues and, immediately 
after Rome, this confused situation created great embarrassment for the West. 
As noted, the WTO Budapest Memorandum recommended that the conference establish a 
permanent body which could carry out the talks on force reductions. Having been a fixture of 
all initial Eastern conference proposals, the idea of a permanent body was certainly not new to 
Moscow. Yet, the Soviet Union had long abandoned this topic, and it was certainly not 
accidental that its reappearance surfaced in a Pact policy statement only after NATO 
mentioned it in its Rome communique. Similarly, it was no coincidence that the permanent 
body was presented as the potential negotiating forum for force reductions. The Soviet Union 
had no interest in MBFR but was under repeated pressure to provide a reply to the Western 
appeals for negotiations. Whether Moscow concluded that a positive response would enhance 
the prospect for a conference, 89 the permanent body, first proposed by the West in Rome, 
provided a unique opportunity to respond positively to the MBFR appeals, while, 
concurrently (by using the idea of a permanent body), also postponed their negotiations until 
after a conference was convened. 
In November 1970, NATO Secretary-General, Manlio Brosio, strongly criticised the Pact's 
proposal for a permanent body and warned about the fundamental differences between the 
Western proposal of Rome and the Soviet Budapest proposal. For Brosio, "the two bodies or 
committees or commissions may mean quite different things. "90 "The body suggested by the 
Warsaw Pact countries", according to Brosio, "may be understood as the first organ of a new 
security system in Europe, or of its beginning. "91 Furthermore, the WTO proposal "could 
lead to an acceptance of a European conference along the communist pattern, that is, a move 
"92 towards the dismantling of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Later in the month, the Secretary-General expanded upon his remarks by suggesting that 
NATO could accept a "permanent consultative machinery" which could consist "of a group 
89 In his analysis of the Soviet position toward MBFR, John Van Oudenaren argues that the move 
was "further evidence that Brezhnev viewed MBFR mainly as a way of advancing the European 
security conference". Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe, p. 212. 
90 Statement to the North Atlantic Assembly, The Hague, 9 November 1970, quoted in Palmer, 
The Prospects, p. 56. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., p. 57. 
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or commission responsible for preparing, promoting, and even beginning negotiations". 93 
This belated "clarification" of the Western suggestion for the establishment of a permanent 
body did little to rid the subject of confusion as few observers could really differentiate 
between the two proposals, or clearly understand Western policy on the matter. 94 
More problematic for NATO (and eventually also for Moscow) was that the proposal for the 
establishment of a permanent body, and the idea that MBFR could be part of the conference, 
were to remain well entrenched in all discussions leading up to the CSCE and well beyond the 
beginning of its preliminary deliberations in November 1972. Only one month after the 
Budapest meeting, these ideas were immediately endorsed by some European Neutral and 
Non-aligned nations, like Austria, who issued a declaration specifically requesting that MBFR 
be dealt with by the conference. 95 Furthermore, given the intricate nature of the subject 
matter, Austria also suggested that agreement be reached "to convene not only one but several 
conferences", and that any unresolved question arising from the first conference could be 
solved "by the formation of mutually-agreed organs or working parties in between 
conferences. , 96 The advocacy of numerous negotiating East-West bodies certainly alarmed 
those at NATO (and, especially, the US) who could not agree to holding one conference, or to 
the beginning of multilateral talks for that purpose. Not surprisingly, after Rome, NATO 
never reiterated the suggestion for the establishment of a permanent body. 97 
6. FROM ROME TO LISBON: 1970-1971 
While NATO remained on the defensive, divided over what its next step should be, the 
remainder of 1970 saw important East-West developments. The treaty on the renunciation of 
force between Bonn and Moscow was signed on 12 August; the initialing of a similar treaty 
with Poland took place on 18 November, and; the exchange of views between the FRG and 
the GDR on a negotiated settlement of their mutual relations was well on the way. Only on 
Berlin were obstacles noted, with a stiffening of the Soviet position and the harassment of 
93 Statement to the WEU Assembly, Paris, 17 November 1970, quoted in Palmer, The Prospects, 
p. 56. 
94 For a comprehensive treatment of the issue and review of the many proposals concerning 
possible framework for negotiations, see Palmer, The Prospects, pp. 45-55 and pp. 56-63. 
For a text of the Austrian government memorandum on the convening of a European security 
conference (23 July 1970), see WEU, The proposed conference, pp. 60-61. 
96 Ibid. 
97 According to Vincineau, the British push for consideration of its proposal on a permanent body 
may have been motivated by electoral purposes on the eve of elections in Britain. See Vincineau, 
"La position beige", p. 745. 
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traffic on the access route to the city. 98 
Disregarding these later difficulties, the Warsaw Pact meeting held in East-Berlin on 2 
December 1970 endorsed the position that there were "no reasons whatsoever for delaying the 
convocation of the conference or for putting forward any preliminary terms. "99 The Pact's 
final communique also accepted a Finnish invitation, sent to all interested governments on 24 
November 1970, to start multilateral consultations and to instruct their ambassadors a in 
Helsinki accordingly. ' 00 
Meeting in Ministerial session two days after the WTO, the Atlantic Alliance ended their 
December meeting affirming: 
the readiness of their governments, as soon as the talks on Berlin have reached a 
satisfactory conclusion and in so far as the other on-going talks are proceeding 
favourably, to enter into the multilateral contacts with all interested governments to 
explore when it would possible to convene a conference, or a series of conferences, 
on security and co-operation in Europe [emphasis added]. 101 
The change in NATO's position requesting "satisfactory conclusion" of the talks on Berlin (as 
opposed to the Rome formulation demanding "progress" in the talks) was not only motivated 
by the lack of progress encountered in the Berlin talks, but also by existing problems with the 
East German government, in particular, concerning access to Berlin and circulation within the 
City. 102 After the session, NATO Secretary-General Brosio contended that "there had been no 
change in NATO policy and that no new conditions had been added to those set in the 
past. "' 03 While formally true because NATO had never clearly formulated its pre-conditions, 
the statement glossed over a number of important issues. Internally, the Allies were at odds 
over what precise pre-conditions the East had to meet before the Alliance would give its clear 
assent for proceeding to multilateral preparations for a conference, and numerous issues 
related to its convening and content continued to divide the member states. 
98 See "East-West Conference Not Yet Justified --NATO", FT, 4 December 1970. 99 For a text, see WEU, The proposed conference, pp. 66-67. 
100 For a text of the Finnish memorandum, see WEU, The proposed conference, pp. 65-66. The 
Finnish invitation was sent to 34 nations, including the United States and Canada. For a 
discussion, see Walschap, "The Great European Jamboree", p. 37; and Acimovic, Problems of 
Security, p. 94. 
lo' Brussels, 3-4 December 1970. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 243-253. 
102 See Acimovic, Problems of Security, p. 91; and Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", pp. 56-59. 
103 As reported in "Nato Makes Berlin Settlement Condition for European Talks", The Times, 5 
December 1970. 
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During the December Ministerial Meeting, several governments asserted that the time had 
come for the Alliance to move toward accepting preparations for the conference104 arguing, 
like Denmark, that enough progress had been made to justify beginning a multilateral 
exploratory phase of the conference. 105 For others, however, including the United States, 
France, Britain and the FRG, the settlement of the German question was still a pre-condition 
for moving forward. 106 In this later group unanimity of views was far from absolute. 
Germany, the US, and Britain contended that a satisfactory solution meant both the Berlin 
question (which involved a Four-Power agreement, an intra-German agreement, and a fmal 
protocol), and the inner-German talks on the establishment of a modus operandi between East 
and West Germany. ' 07 France, however, held the view that there was no need to add the 
inner-German talks as a pre-condition for a conference since any arrangement on Berlin 
would presuppose serious improvement between East-West Germany, and that only one firm 
condition should be imposed before "active preparation" for a conference should take 
place. 108 
In addition to the German question, it was unclear whether SALT and MBFR were not also to 
be considered as pre-requisites for a conference. Asked about what the Allies had in mind 
when referring to favourable developments in the "other on-going talks", NATO Secretary- 
General Brosio stated that they were thinking of the talks between East and West Germany 
and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between Moscow and Washington. l 09 In contrast, 
the American Secretary of State, William Rogers, had emphasised during the session that 
agreement on MBFR would have to precede rather than follow a European conference; ' 10 a 
comment that caused France to argue again against any implication that would make force 
reductions a pre-condition for a conference. " Furthermore, if, as Rogers' comments 
suggested, the question of imposing some "linkage" between talks on force reductions and 
104 See "Les conferences de l'Est et de 1'Ouest. L'OTAN et le pacte de Varsovie souhaitent un 
arrangement sur Berlin", Le Monde, 5 December 1970; "Les ministres du Conseil atlantique 
s'interrogent sur 1'evolution des rapports Est-Ouest", Le Monde, 4 December 1970; and "Time for 
Russia to Make Concessions Says Sir Alec", The Daily Telegraph, 4 December 1970. 
105 See "East-West Conference Not Yet Justified -NATO", Financial Times, 4 December 1970; 
and "Allies Agree to Wait for Russian Move on Europe", The Guardian, 4 December 1970. 
Future references to the Financial Times may be identified as FT. 
106 See FT, 4 December 1970. 
107 See Le Monde, 5 December 1970. 
108 See Ibid.; and "NATO Allies Put Off Europe Security Talks", IHT, 4 December 1970. 
109 See The Times, 5 December 1970. As reported by the British FCO, the statement involved: "a 
satisfactory conclusion of the talks on Berlin ... and the favourable 
development of other "on- 
going talks" (i. e.: the inner-German talks)". UK, FCO, Selected Documents, p. 13. 
110 See Financial Times, 4 December 1970. 
111 See Le Monde, 5 December 1970. 
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convening a conference remained unsettled, the rather different question of establishing a 
"link" between the two sets or subjects of negotiations also remained unresolved as some 
countries advocated discussing MBFR in the preparatory phase of a conference. 112 This issue 
became especially important in early 1971 when NATO accelerated preparation for the 
prospective conference and requested the views of its member states on the following issues: 
1. Principles governing relations between states; 
2. Economic co-operation; 
3. Freer movement of peoples; 
4. MBFR --insofar as a conference would deal with it; 
5. Other issues (probably drawn from the 1969 List of Issues) and; 
6. Scope and nature of a possible machinery for dealing with East-West relations. 113 
As evidenced by the list of topics, few decisions were made in Brussels regarding the most 
basic aspects of a prospective conference, including what precise topics NATO wished to 
raise with the East. According to Western participants, the review was "very timely" because 
"NATO countries had not given much thought to the subjects to be discussed at a conference 
since the major exercise in 1969 devoted to the consideration of a "List of Issues for Possible 
Negotiations with the East. "' 14 
7 1971: MOVING FORWARD 
As the Allies accelerated their consultations, at a meeting held in Bucharest in mid-February 
1971, the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers intensified their criticism of delays in convening the 
conference and the decisions of the Brussels meeting. ll5 More importantly, at the end of 
March, Leonid Brezhnev gave a first serious indication that the East might be willing to 
accept the principle of MBFR negotiations. Addressing the 24th Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on 30 March, Brezhnev stated: "We stand for a reduction 
of armed forces and armaments in areas where the military confrontation is especially 
dangerous, above all, in Central Europe. " 116 This important declaration was followed in May 
by another major policy statement delivered by Brezhnev, in Tbilisi, where he challenged the 
West to reply to the 24th CPSU Congress and to start negotiations on force reductions. 117 
112 See Ibid. 
113 Canada, DEA, 26 January 1971. See also Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 61. 
114 Canada, DEA, 27 January 1971. 
"s For a text of the communique (Bucharest, 19 February 19710, see WEU, The proposed 
conference, pp. 75-76. For background and analysis of the content of the communique and its 
intent, see Povolny, "The Soviet Union" p. 218; and Acimovic, Problems of Security, p. 95. 116 As quoted in Keliher, The Negotiations on MBFR, p. 25. 
117 See Ibid., p. 26; and Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe, pp. 210-212. 
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Whether Brezhnev's endorsement of the Western proposal for negotiations on force 
reductions was primarily motivated by a desire to speed up the conference is unclear. Soviet 
timing for this action has often been interpreted as motivated by fears of a possible 
withdrawal of American forces from Europe in the face of an impending vote on the issue, 
which was to be taken in the US Senate five days after the Brezhnev's Tbilisi speech. "8 
According to this analysis, the timing of the Soviet appeal was to prevent a positive outcome 
of this vote. Whatever motivated Brezhnev at the Party Congress and in Tbilisi, it ensured 
that the main subject of Allied discussions at their next Ministerial Meeting, in early June 
1971, was on MBFR. 
8. LISBON: MORE DIVISION 
The meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Lisbon from 3-4 June, found the NATO 
partners at odds over how to respond to the Eastern overture on MBFR. 119 The United States 
argued that NATO should react positively to the new Soviet expression of interest for 
MBFR. 120 Other delegations asserted that caution was necessary. The positions of Great 
Britain and Germany were particularly noteworthy in this regard because they appeared to be 
much less supportive of the MBFR process than before. 121 One of Germany's misgiving 
about the proposal was that any formal meeting on MBFR would involve some recognition of 
East Germany, something Bonn was not willing to do while still engaged in talks on 
Berlin. 122 More significantly, the Germans were concerned that the Soviet Union was trying 
to avoid an agreement on Berlin and reports that the Americans might start the MBFR talks 
without waiting for the completion of a Berlin agreement added to this concern. 123 
18 Much debate took place over the meaning and, more importantly, the timing of the speech. For 
the view that the timing of the endorsement of the Western proposal was designed to help prevent 
a positive outcome on the vote in the US Senate, see Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 
115-116. For different assessments claiming that the Soviet intent was either to accelerate 
progress on the Four-Power negotiations on Berlin, or to advance the prospects of a European 
Security Conference see, respectively, Kissinger, White House Years, p. 947; and Van Oudenaren, 
Detente in Europe, pp. 210-212. For a comprehensive review of the debate in the Senate at the 
time, see Keliher, The Negotiations on MBFR, pp. 25-29. 
119 See "Les participants, ä 1'exception de la France ont decide de sonder les intentions sovietiques 
sur la reduction des forces en Europe", Le Monde, 6-7 June 1971. "NATO Split on Force 
Reductions", FT, 21 May 1971. "Divided NATO Ponders Reply to Russia on Arms Reductions", 
IHT, 1 June 1971. 
120 "NATO Approves Bilateral Talks on Forces Cuts", IHT, 5-6 June 1971; "Nato Call for Caution 
on Soviet Force Cuts Plea", The Times, 4 June 1971; See "Compromise by NATO on Approach to 
Russia", The Times, 5 June 1971; and Vincineau, "La position beige", p. 750. 
121 See The Times, 5 June 1971; and The Times, 4 June 1971. 
122 See "Berlin Still Blocks the Way", The Times, 5 June 1971. 
123 See "La session du Conseil atlantique sera dominee par les perspectives de negociation sur une 
reduction des forces en Europe", Le Monde, 3 June 1971; Vincineau, "La position beige", p. 750; 
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The caution of the British Government also reflected concerns that the United States might 
consider moving towards MBFR without waiting for the conclusion of the Berlin accords. 124 
Additionally, the British increasingly questioned the value of MBFR negotiations in light of 
continuous negative results coming out of the NATO studies on force reductions. 125 As 
acknowledged a few months later, London's net assessment was that "every model of an 
MBFR agreement so far constructed works to the military disadvantage of the Alliance. " 126 
Given the important gap in positions, the final communique of the Lisbon meeting did not 
reiterate the call for negotiations but simply suggested the continuation of bilateral contacts on 
the subject, with the recommendation that the results be reviewed later at a meeting of Deputy 
Foreign Ministers. Also, and perhaps as a means to gain time for the Berlin talks to 
proceed, 127 the Allies announced "their willingness to appoint, at the appropriate time, a 
representative or representatives who would be responsible . .. 
for conducting further 
exploratory talks with the Soviet Government and other interested governments. "128 
In addition to the divergence on MBFR, differences were also recorded on how to proceed 
toward a multilateral phase of a conference. The FRG believed that movement on the issue 
should be made only after the completion of the three-stage Berlin agreement and the inner- 
German talks which were expected to follow. 129 France remained opposed to adding new 
conditions and insisted that it should only be the Berlin settlement and no other pre- 
conditions. 130 Paris worked hard to secure the most favourable language on the future 
conference. 131 As eventually agreed, the final communique noted that the Ministers 
expressed the hope that "before their next meeting the negotiations on Berlin will have 
reached a successful conclusion and that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a 
conference on security and co-operation in Europe may then be undertaken. " 132 , In this 
IHT, 1 June 1971; "Nato to Consider Troop Cuts", The Times, 3 June 1971; and The Times, 4 June 
1971. 
124 The Times, 4 June 1971; IHT, 5-6 June 1971; and IHT, 1 June 1971. 125 For indications that the British and Germans were beginning to have reservations about MBFR, 
see "NATO Wary on Troops", The Guardian, 29 May 1971. 
126 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 17. 
127 See "Berlin Still Blocks the Way", The Times, 5 June 1971. 
128 Lisbon, 3-4 June 1971. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 258-263. 129 See "Le conseil ministeriel du pacte atlantique se preoccupe du probleme de Berlin et de la 
reduction des forces en Europe", Le Monde, 4 June 1971. 
130 Ibid.; and Le Monde, 6-7 June 1971. 
131 See Le Monde, 6-7 June 1971. 
132 Lisbon, 3-4 June 1971. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 258-263. 
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spirit, " the communique further noted that "they invited the Council in Permanent Session to 
continue ... 
its periodic review of the results achieved in all contacts and talks relative to 
security and co-operation in Europe so that it could without delay take a position on the 
opening of multilateral talks". 133 
While the Alliance's policy statement was noteworthy because it only referred to Berlin, 
without reiterating demands for progress in "other on-going negotiations", it was also 
significant because for the first time a NATO communique referred to the possibility of 
having only one conference. Discussion on the issue had focused on two proposals: one 
made by France for a single conference held in several stages, and one made by Italy for a 
series of conferences. 134 France strongly argued for only one conference held in stages, 
describing its proposal as a compromise between a single conference which would be too 
short and too general, and the Italian proposal for a series of conferences that could drag 
on. 135 
Despite some advancements on procedures, the question was not totally settled. As reported 
before Lisbon, an issue of particular importance was "the clarification by the Alliance of the 
relationship between a European security conference and MBFR. , 136 Progress on this 
question was not substantial in Lisbon. At the time of the meeting, Germany reiterated its 
interest in having "a political extension of the MBFR talks to establish concrete links between 
the MBFR process and the CSCE", 137 while France publicly re-stated, soon after the meeting, 
that force reductions should not be part of the agenda. 138 
9. DECEMBER 1971: INTRODUCING SECURITY INTO THE AGENDA 
With the Lisbon decision, committing NATO to move to a multilateral stage once the Berlin 
question was resolved, intensive work took place in Brussels in the autumn of 1971. In this 
process greater difficulties emerged. On the Berlin pre-condition, the initialling on 3 
September 1971 of the Quadripartite Agreement raised "fears that the West might find itself 
under pressure to initiate multilateral talks before the next two stages of the Berlin 
133 Ibid. 
134 See "M. Rogers suggere de poursuivre les contacts bilateraux avec I'Est", Le Monde, 5 June 
1971. See also Acimovic, Problems of Security, p. 96. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 61. 
137 See Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, p. 431. 
138 See Jean Klein, "Desarmement ou `arms control': la position francaise sous la Ve Republique, " 
Etudes Internationales, III: 3, September 1972, pp. 383. 
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arrangements --the supplementary intra-German agreements and the conclusion of the 
final 
four-power protocol-- were completed. 55139 
Difficulties were also noted with devising a policy on freer movement of people, the 
drafting of a declaration on principles to govern relations between states, and on future 
possible procedures. 140 Divergence also extended to the future co-ordination of Alliance 
policy with a majority of states favouring an agreed negotiating position, but with France 
contending that no Alliance papers could be collectively binding. 
141 Also noteworthy, 
problems were recorded on accepting a conference title. As one analyst explained: 
Over the years, a confusing variety of titles and initials had been used in referring to 
the projected conference. As it became increasingly clear that a conference might 
actually take place, both Canada and the United States insisted on a title which would 
not prejudice their right to full participation ... and eventually succeeded 
in securing 
the insertion into the NATO Lisbon communique ... of 
`Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe'. The problem thereafter was to make `CSCE' stick. The 
French persisted in references to `European', arguing that in a Europe which extended 
`from the Atlantic to the Urals' there was no room for United States or Canadian 
involvement in the `co-operative activity' which was emerging as the central focus of 
an exercise originally envisaged as dealing primarily with 'security'. 
142 
Another area of difficulty for the Allies related to MBFR, or more precisely, the 
appropriateness of launching a new initiative in this regard. In line with the Lisbon statement 
recommending sending an envoy to Moscow to carry out exploratory talks on MBFR, 
NATO's Deputy Foreign Ministers met, on 5-6 October, to appoint the then recently retired 
NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio. The decision to proceed with the appointment was, 
apparently, only pursued by Washington. 143 The opening statements by the European NATO 
139 Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 66. 
140 See Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
141 See Ibid., pp. 69. 
142 Ibid., p. 68. It can be noted that the December 1970 Brussels' final communique referred to "a 
conference, or a series of conferences, on security and co-operation in Europe". Previously, 
NATO's communiques described the project as "a conference on European security" (Brussels 
December 1969), and "a conference, or a series of conferences on European security and co- 
operation" (Rome, May 1970). The Eastern bloc almost invariably referred to the conference as 
"the all-European conference". Even after accepting North American participation at their June 
1970 Budapest meeting, reference to this title is found alongside that of "a European conference". 
Afterwards, it is again the "all-European conference" (Moscow, August 1970), and "an all- 
European conference on questions of security and co-operation" (East Berlin, December 1970). It 
is noteworthy that in the Finnish aide-memoire of 24 November 1970, the invitation was made for 
a "Conference on European Security" and, for many years after, Western commentators and 
officials almost invariably used this title (or its variant of European Security Conference --ESC) to 
describe the Soviet project. 
143 See "Views of NATO Allies Differ on Negotiating Cut in Troops", IHT, 6 October 1971. 
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countries suggested that "several of the allies regard[ed] MBFR as an American scheme to 
bring home U. S. troops, and that they [were] only going along with the idea because if mutual 
force reductions [were] not achieved greater pressure would build up within the U. S. 
Congress for unilateral reductions. " 144 British diplomats, in particular, suggested that they 
were "acting as the brakes" on the matter, admitting that any force reductions formula likely 
to be accepted by the East would be harmful to NATO. 
145 To complicate matters further, a 
few weeks after the meeting, newspapers reported that France, who never participated in any 
decision on force reductions and, for that matter, in Brosio's appointment, tried to convince 
the Soviet Union not to receive the former NATO Secretary-General and to postpone MBFR 
until after a CSCE. 146 
Finally, while little headway was made on MBFR, one of the most difficult issues in Brussels 
was "the relationship between the proposed conference and negotiations on force 
reductions. "] 47 In late September, the disagreement between France and Germany on this 
question was publicly acknowledged by Georges Pompidou. At a press conference, the 
French President noted that he could see "but one divergence in this matter between the 
German Government and ourselves and that is on the problem of what is called the balanced 
reduction of forces". 148 Moreover, Pompidou had also taken up the issue with Leonid 
Brezhnev during his visit to Paris in late October 1971, when he reiterated French opposition 
to having MBFR dealt with by the conference. 149 On this latter point, France was no longer 
alone at NATO in opposing force reductions in the conference. During the October meeting 
of the Deputy Foreign Ministers, the Americans tried to convince their NATO partners that 
the MBFR talks should be kept as separate and distinct as possible from the CSCE because 
the security conference would already be sufficiently complicated. 
150 As reported, however: 
The United States views clashed with those of both Britain and Italy, which suggested 
their general reluctance over MBFR by indicating that it should be tied into the 
security conference. Joseph Godber, the British representative, said that progress 
toward MBFR could be determined by the Warsaw Pact's attitude at the security 
conference. The Italian representative ... took the same view. 
151 
144 Ibid. 
145 See "Britain to be Brakes Rather than Engine in East-West Talks", The Guardian, 4 October 
1971. 
146 See "French May Scuttle NATO Approach on Force Reduction", The Guardian, 4 November 
1971; and Colard, "La Conference", pp. 545-546. 
147 Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 68. 
148 For a text of Pompidou's press conference (23 September 1971), see WEU, The proposed 
conference, pp. 96-97. 
149 See Colard, "La Conference", pp. 545-546. Also Povolny, "The Soviet Union", pp. 220-221. 
150 "Views of NATO Allies Differ on Negotiating Cut in Troops", IHT, 6 October 1971. 
151 Ibid. 
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Such a position contrasted sharply with the positions of other member states like Canada who, 
a few weeks after the October meeting, was advising its Mission at NATO to "take the view 
that the prospects for the success of an eventual conference would be determined by the 




"this could take the form of a commitment by the WTO to discuss matters of 
substance concerning force reductions in a specific forum --either in a separate negotiating 
body or in a select committee set up by the CSCE". 
153 
Given the important divisions on key issues related to both MBFR and the CSCE, no draft 
communique could be prepared in advance of the December Ministerial Meeting. 
154 In fact, 
as a result of NATO's difficulties with MBFR, the conclusion of the North Atlantic Council 
meeting, held in Brussels on 9-10 December, was to simply note with regret that the Soviet 
Union had not yet agreed to initiate talks with Brosio and to express the hope that he would 
"soon be able to go to MOSCOW.,, 155 
On the CSCE, which occupied most of the deliberations, 156 sharp discussions were reported 
over the Berlin question. France insisted that multilateral preparations for a conference 
should start as soon as the second stage of the Quadripartite Agreement (involving a series of 
intra-German agreements on transit traffic, travel and visits) were initialled. The United 
States and Germany, supported by Britain, argued that the condition for forward movement 
towards the initiation of multilateral discussions remained the Final Protocol --the third and 
last stage of the Berlin Agreement. '57 
As evidenced by the wording of the final communique, the only agreeable compromise 
formula was to retain the Lisbon formulation on pre-conditions. Hence, the December 
meeting simply reiterated the willingness of the Allies "to undertake multilateral 
conversations intended to lead to a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as 
soon as the negotiations on Berlin had reached a successful conclusion. , 
158 Obviously, given 
the persisting differences over what should constitute the "successful conclusion" of the 
negotiations on Berlin, the communique did not elaborate on the issue even if, ultimately, this 
would mean all three stages of the Agreement. Meanwhile, the Allies also acknowledged the 
152 Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 68. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., p. 70. 
155 Brussels, 9-10 December 1971. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 266-272. 
156 See Le Monde, 11 December 1971. 
157 See "Western Allies at Odds Over Security Talks", The Guardian, 11 December 1971. 
158 Brussels, 9-10 December 1971. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 266-272. 
96 
Finnish invitation of 24 November 1970 for the Heads of Mission accredited in Helsinki to 
start multilateral conversations, noting that the NATO governments appreciated the invitation 
and that they would keep in touch on this matter. With regard to potential agenda items, the 
December fmal communique noted the existence of a report prepared by the Council in 
Permanent Session, who had reviewed four areas of discussions: 
1. Questions of Security, including Principles Governing Relations between States 
and certain military aspects of security; 
2. Freer Movement of People, Information and Ideas, and Cultural Relations; 
3. Co-operation in the Fields of Economics, Applied Science and Technology, and 
Pure Science; and 
4. Co-operation to Improve the Human Environment. 159 
Of significance from this list was that under the general heading of "Questions of Security" 
the Allies were introducing an entirely new theme: "certain military aspects of security". 
Apart from the still unresolved issue of establishing a "link" between MBFR and CSCE 
nothing had transpired prior to the December meeting on any discussions at NATO 
concerning "certain military aspects of security". As the communique did not elaborate what 
the subject might entail, this new topic could have easily been understood as involving the 
inclusion of MBFR, or certain components of it, into the conference. In another part of the 
communique dealing exclusively with force reductions, the Ministers representing countries 
participating in the Alliance's integrated defence programme (which did not include France) 
appeared to back such a course of action when they emphasised "the importance they 
attach[ed] to measures which would reduce the dangers of military confrontation and thus 
enhance security in Europe", and "noted that a Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe should deal with these aspects in a suitable manner. "160 In addition, several official 
statements made after the Ministerial Meeting appeared to support the notion that the 14 
NATO states who had signed this part of the communique were now favouring having force 
reductions (or some aspects of it) dealt with by a conference. Responding to a question in the 
Canadian Parliament requesting clarification on the meaning of the Brussels final 
communique with regard to the relationship between MBFR and CSCE, Canada's Foreign 
Minister remarked in somewhat nebulous terms that: 
The Alliance [was] not making negotiations on MBFR a precondition to the holding 
of a conference, but ministers noted that if a conference was to address itself 




with measures to reduce the military confrontation. 
' 61 
More significantly, given previous opposition to the issue, the United States was also not 
completely discarding the possibility. Asked whether it would be possible to hold a CSCE 
without taking up the matter of troop reductions, the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, 
noted that the Allies "had a good deal of discussion" about the issue and that, in his opinion, it 
would be difficult: 
to imagine a conference on European security, labeled as such, which does not deal 
with security matters, and certainly the question of mutual and balanced reductions is 
a very important security matter. Whether that forum is the most appropriate forum to 
use to actually negotiate them --mutual and balanced force reductions-- or not 
I think 
is questionable. Whether there would be some reference to it in the conference or not 
we haven't really focussed [sic] on that. But I think any realistic negotiations 
involving mutual and balanced force reductions would have to be done in another 
forum., 6 
While Rogers' statement did not completely brush aside the possibility of discussing force 
reductions at the conference, his final comment clearly indicated that no agreement had been 
reached at NATO, suggesting that the vague language inserted in the communique by the 14 
NATO partners was perhaps only introduced as a means to maximise pressure on the East to 
provide a reply on MBFR. Since Lisbon, the Allies were committed to start preliminary talks 
on CSCE as soon as the Berlin question was resolved and while progress was being recorded 
on this front, Moscow remained silent on MBFR. The Soviet Union had not invited Manlio 
Brosio to Moscow to "initiate exploratory talks" on the issue, and the official position of the 
WTO remained, as stated in the Budapest Memorandum of June 1970, that these talks should 
be initiated in the permanent body to be created by the conference. The prospect of having 
MBFR conditional to the convening and, possibly also, the success of the CSCE deeply 
concerned some at NATO, especially the Americans who then considered the prospective 
conference as nothing more than a "mammoth" gathering. 
163 
If the main statement supported by the NATO 14 was simply meant to put pressure on the 
East to make a positive move toward MBFR, 164 it did not elucidate the reference to "certain 
161 Statement form the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the House of Commons on 13 
December 1971, quoted in Canada, DEA, 12 January 1973. 
162 "Text of Secretary Rogers' Press Conference, Brussels, December 10", London: United States 
Information Service, American Embassy, London, 13 December 1971, p. 2. 
163 As reported in "U. S. Takes Hard Line on East-West Meeting", IHT, 5 December 1969. 
164 According to a Canadian account of the December meeting based on official documentation, 
the main intent of the statement may indeed have been to encourage the Soviets to reply to 
NATO's invitation to start negotiations on force reductions. As explained by Robert Spencer: 
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military aspects of security" as a possible subject of discussion at the conference which, 
unlike the vague statement sponsored by them, was signed by France. 
According to official documentation, the subject referred to the issue of establishing a "link" 
between MBFR and the CSCE, and the vague title proposed by the Belgian Foreign Minister 
was simply a means "of getting around French reluctance to mention MBFR in the CSCE 
context. "165 In this later regard, the idea that the conference could also consider some 
confidence-building measures under this heading was apparently floated during the 
discussions in an attempt to appease French reluctance to the subject. 166 
Although no studies existed in Brussels for consideration of confidence-building measures in 
the framework of the prospective conference, these measures were not necessarily unfamiliar 
to the Allies. Similar proposals had been advanced in the disarmament negotiations of the 
1950s-1960s and, for this reason, had found their way on the list of possible subjects for 
discussion developed at NATO in the fall of 1969. Moreover, in December of that year, the 
14 NATO partners supporting MBFR agreed to study a number of measures, such as advance 
notification of manoeuvres and movements, exchange of observers at military manoeuvres, 
and the establishment of observation posts as potential useful means of verification. 
Notwithstanding this past record, the introduction of CBMs into the CSCE was not really 
discussed during the December meeting and, while the Western governments had just 
officially proposed that the conference should deal with "certain military aspects of security", 
they had no clear view what the subject might entail. 
"On MBFR the ministers were confronted with the `worst case' scenario. Despite Mr Brezhnev's 
assurances to the contrary given to Prime Minister Trudeau in October, the Soviet Union failed to 
respond to the Lisbon `explorer' proposal. None the less, Ottawa continued to stress the linkage 
between MBFR and the CSCE. `By one means or another', Mr Sharp argued, `talks on force 
levels will have to move in parallel with other steps towards detente. ' While MBFR should not be 
a precondition for multilateral preparatory talks, "we must avoid agreeing to a formal conference 
intended to deal with security problems, while allowing the most important security question from 
our point of view (namely MBFR) to be ignored. In the face of Soviet silence, the Brussels 
communique of 10 December 1971, whose relevant paragraphs were a slightly modified version 
of a Canadian text and were not as clear as Mr Sharp had wished, merely reaffirmed the Brosio 
mission and urged that a CSCE should deal with force reductions "in a suitable manner". " 
Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 71. 
165 Ibid., p. 76. 
166 Robert Spencer suggests that "the vague title expressed the alliance's interest in exploring the 
novel `so-called confidence-building measures'. " Spencer, Ibid. However, there is no indication 
that the topic had been considered by capitals before the meeting, or that the subject had been 
formally discussed at NATO. Indeed, even if the West had already looked at similar measures in 
the context of force reductions, official records clearly establish that, as far as the CSCE was 
concerned, the Alliance only took the issue under consideration after the December meeting. 
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10. FROM SECURITY TO CBMs: DECEMBER 1971-MAY 1972 
Evidence that "certain military aspects of security" was a hastily devised formula with no 
preparation can be found in the fact that it was only in mid-March 1972 that the NATO 
Senior Political Committee, in charge of the ongoing examination of potential agenda items 
for the conference, accepted it as a possible subject of discussion at the CSCE. 
167 More 
significantly, during the Committee's examination of the issue great confusion arose over 
what precisely the item was meant to describe, or what it should include, and it was only in 
mid-March that two subjects began to emerge: 
(1) MBFR or, more precisely, a general declaration on MBFR to which all 
Conference participants could appropriately subscribe, and; 
(2) `stabilization measures' to encompass a series of measures such as exchange of 
observers. 168 
A Canadian report covering the Committee's deliberations observed that it was only recently 
that several European Allies began to express the view that a security conference which did 
not deal "with some meaningful aspect of security could be counter-productive. "169 
However, while "the only significant security related issue they have been able to identify 
[was] MBFR ... they 
[had] really not thought the matter through very carefully", and the 
reasons why they were insisting on the fact that MBFR could only be pursued in the context 
of the conference were "often not very precise" while "varying a good deal". As depicted in 
the report, the Danes and Belgians were preoccupied with the idea that MBFR should "not be 
[the] exclusive preserve of NATO and [the] WPO" and, even though they were accepting that 
the actual negotiations on force reductions should be concluded by a small group of states, 
they felt "under some obligations to give the neutral and non-aligned countries `a piece of the 
action', and saw this being done by dealing with MBFR in [the] conference context". The 
Italians, who would not be part of the actual MBFR negotiations because they had no forces 
in the Central Region, expected that their participation in the drafting of a declaration would 
give them some degree of control over the negotiations. The Greeks and the Turks, who had 
never been keen supporters of MBFR, anticipated that if the subject would be taken up in the 
CSCE, progress would not be made in the foreseeable future. Finally, while the British had 
no strong opinion on the matter, the Germans were described as displaying the most complex 
position of all the NATO partners. 
167 Canada, DEA, 10 March 1972. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Unless cited otherwise, the following discussion on the Committee's deliberations and the 
different positions of the NATO partners on the issue is from Canada, DEA, 17 February 1972. 
100 
Although committed to the idea of MBFR, the Germans wanted the talks to be pursued via a 
step-by-step approach, whereby a declaration on MBFR principles would constitute the first 
step toward actual reductions, the fifth step. Furthermore, the Germans were arguing that a 
general declaration on principles and criteria for MBFR should constitute a "necessary link 
with CSCE" and that the process of developing such a declaration would constitute an 
"effective test of Soviet interest in MBFR and willingness to make concessions before there 
was a commitment to enter into negotiations. " The German position was difficult to 
understand for the other delegations because, as noted in the Canadian paper, it would only 
ensure that practical initiation of meaningful discussion of MBFR would be postponed for the 
foreseeable future. At the same time, however, it was also noted that the FRG appeared to be 
in no haste to start the difficult MBFR negotiations, because it wanted to see many issues 
resolved before getting into the tricky process of reductions. 
At German request, in mid-February, the Senior Political Committee started to look at the 
kind of declaration which might emerge from the CSCE. As soon as the examination began, 
however, it immediately became clear that the kind of declaration the Germans wanted to see 
emerging from the CSCE discussions included a number of considerations that could only be 
relevant for those states who would actually be involved in the force reductions negotiations. 
As later remarked by participants in the discussions: "We are at a loss to understand how ... 
countries such as Finland and San Marino could embrace any declaration calling for force 
reductions attuned to differences arising from geographic and other considerations". 
'7° 
In the light of these initial problems, the Germans agreed to recast their proposal in a form that 
could be produced at the CSCE. Endorsement by NATO, however, was very doubtful. 
France was rejecting the idea outright and the United States, although then willing to discuss 
the issue in theoretical terms, was "reluctant to see the matter addressed in specific terms of 
either a declaration for the CSCE or one which might be produced by potential participants in 
the actual force reductions. " 171 More troublesome yet, even those delegations supporting the 
idea of a declaration were "unable to come up with any clear argumentation on the matter", 
and their thinking on the issue was most notable "primarily for their lack of precision 
regarding what was desirable and why". As the Canadian report concluded, "the principal 
value of the discussions had been to demonstrate to those who have been supporting the idea 
of a draft declaration that they have really not thought the matter through carefully. " 
170 Canada, DEA, 8 June 1972. 
171 Information on France is from Canada, DEA, 26 May 1972. 
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In early March 1972, the Senior Political Committee began the review of a document tabled 
by Belgium suggesting the consideration of the following confidence-building measures: 
" the establishment of observation posts on each side of the demarcation line; 
" the notification and limitation on movement of forces of a certain size in zones to 
be determined; 
" aerial observation; 
" the exchange of observers at manoeuvres, and; 
" various surveillance measures. ' 72 
Significantly, this "endorsement" of CBMs by Belgium was made in the context of a paper 
dealing with the relationship between the conference and force reductions. In this paper, 
dated 29 February, Belgium argued that the first three of the following five topics on MBFR 
should be dealt with by the CSCE: 
1) definition of objectives and principles for force reductions; 
2) stabilization measures; 
3) establishment of force ceilings; 
4) balanced reduction of forces, and; 
5) establishment of new force ceilings after reductions. 173 
Despite the fact that Belgium's intent was clearly to lift-out several components from MBFR 
to move them to the CSCE, after examination of the paper, the Allies started to discuss the 
issue of "certain military aspects of security" as possibly including two elements: a 
declaration on force reductions, and confidence-building measures. More precisely, as the 
UK delegation to NATO reported to London on 5 April: "To meet French susceptibilities we 
have moved from speaking about a link between CSCE and MBFR and instead refer to 
confidence building measures and to general principles relating to force levels in Europe 
unconnected with any particular geographical area. "174 As further explained, the French were 
opposed to discussing any link between CSCE and MBFR, but "could probably agree to 
discuss confidence building measures". 175 According to the British diplomats, the argument 
which was "most likely to move" the French closer to their position on the `security' content 
of a CSCE was "the thought that it [would] be useful to put up some ideas as bargaining 
counters which would not be damaging to [the West] to withdraw in exchange for Soviet 
concessions. "176 A similar argument had been used with the American delegation which was 
then claiming in early April to have agreed that the security item of the CSCE should include 
172 Canada, DEA, 10 March 1972. The paper was dated 29 February 1972. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 38. 
"s Ibid., p. 38 note 4. 
176 Ibid., p. 38. 
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both a joint declaration relating to the level of armed forces in Europe and confidence- 
building measures, and that they would be pressing this view on Washington. 
'77 According 
to the British, the arguments which had been the most effective with the Americans were: 
1. that the Alliance needed bargaining counters; 
2. that if, surprisingly, there was an East/West agreement this would put the Allies in 
a favourable position at the outset of any subsequent MBFR talks, and; 
3. that discussion of security in a CSCE might help to hold off both Mansfield and 
real MBFR talks. The latter on the grounds that it would not be useful to get into 
more details until such time as comparatively simple things like a joint declaration 
and confidence-building measures have been agreed. 
178 
Interestingly, while the British delegation at NATO was pushing CBMs as a means to delay 
real negotiations on MBFR, or as bargaining chips that could be exchanged at some point 
during the CSCE, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, reminded his 
delegation that more studies were needed on CBMs "which often look better than they 
are". 179 Such a "review" of CBMs was in fact to be carried out at NATO by an Ad Hoc 
Committee set up to look at the Belgian proposals. ' 80 Perhaps as an indication of the overall 
lack of interest for the topic, the work of the Committee only consisted of ascertaining 
"advantages and disadvantages of various measures without coming to any definite 
conclusion. "181 Furthermore, as another indication of the absence of interest for CBMs, when 
the Senior Political Committee adopted a report including a section on CBMs based on the 
work of the Ad Hoc Committee, the United States recommended that the group reconvene, but 
most other states were not in favour, even though they agreed that more work needed to be 
done on the measures. 182 
Given NATO's inability to agree on a topic that could fill in the "security" aspects of the 
conference, the issue of the relationship between MBFR and the CSCE remained, through 
April and May, "one of the most complicated aspects of ... alliance preparation 
for a 
CSCE. "183 France continued to oppose the issue and, contrary to the belief of its delegation at 
NATO, the US Administration would also not compromise on this point. 
1" Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 39. 
179 Ibid., p. 38 note 5. 
180 Available information does not reveal precisely when the Ad Hoc Committee was set up; what 
was its mandate; or how many times it convened. However, it is known that the Committee 
presented its conclusions to the Senior Political Committee on 24 April. Canada, DEA, 24 April 
1972. 
181 Ibid., 9 May 1972. 
182 Ibid., 24 April 1972. 
183 Ibid., 21 April 1972. See also Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 37 note 1. 
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On 23 May, or one week before the opening of the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Bonn, 
the British reported that the Alliance was "much exercised with the problem of how far there 
should be a direct link" between the CSCE and MBFR. 
184 The British noted three different 
sets of considerations which led individual members of the Alliance to adopt differing 
positions. As described in an internal memorandum dated May 26: 
(a) The Americans do not want the rate of progress towards East/West exploration of 
MBFR to be impeded by any procedural complication, of the kind which a link 
between MBFR and the CSCE might entail. This is for well-known domestic 
political reasons. Nor do they want countries not directly concerned (and particularly 
neutrals) to exercise any jurisdiction over the course of negotiations; 
(b) Members of the Alliance who do not have troops or territory on NATO's Central 
Front (and whose claim to participate directly in the detailed negotiation of MBFR is 
therefore rather small) nevertheless fear that the negotiation would affect their 
interests. They evidently believe that a clear link between MBFR and the Security 
Conference (in which they would participate with full rights) would help to ensure 
that they could take some direct part in the negotiation of force reductions. The 
Italians, Norwegians, Greeks and Turks have all expressed firm views about the 
desirability of a clear link (so have the Germans, for reasons which are obscure); 
(c) We and the French fall into neither of the previous categories. We both dislike the 
idea of MBFR because of the military disadvantages. The French choose to opt out 
entirely. We believe that the domestic political pressures on both the Americans and 
the flank members of the Alliance (i. e. the countries motivated by the considerations 
in (b) above) are strong. In the interests of Alliance unity, both need to be taken into 
account. 185 
At the same time as the British were assessing the complexities raised by the issue of an 
MBFR-CSCE link, the United States distributed a paper on CBMs at NATO. In it, the 
Americans noted that "evidence [was] insufficient for a judgement as to whether or not the 
Soviets would agree to address [confidence-building] measures in a CSCE. "186 As explained 
in the document, the "Poles [had] discussed for possible negotiation at a CSCE such measures 
as exchanges of observers at manoeuvres and movements, advance notification of exercises 
and troop movements, and a limitation of maneuvers in borders areas". 
187 But, as the 
Americans maintained, "Moscow would probably prefer not to discuss any security issues 
beyond renunciation of force at the CSCE, and to leave confidence-building measures to be 
addressed --along with reductions-- in an organ to be created by the CSCE. " Furthermore, the 
paper concluded that if the West insisted on discussion of a security item, Moscow might 
184 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 43. 
185 Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
186 Canada, DEA, 23 May 1972. 
187 Ibid. 
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"accede rather than jeopardize or delay the CSCE", however NATO could expect the Soviets 
to "follow [the] Polish suggestion on limitation of exercise (e. g. an effort to restrict areas in 
which NATO conduct exercises), or raise some propagandistic proposals of their own, such 
as [the] non-use of nuclear weapons. "' 88 
In spite of this rather pessimistic assessment of the likely ramifications of introducing CBMs 
at the CSCE, three days after circulation of the US paper in Brussels, official reports noted 
that some Allies were beginning to see the "certain military aspects of security" as being the 
CBMs. 189 However, as further reported, "no country was committed to the item and, 
although many of the measures which had been suggested for inclusion were familiar to the 
Alliance, not much work had been done on them recently". 190 
11. ACCEPTING MULTILATERAL TALKS: DECEMBER 1971 -MAY 1972 
While NATO struggled over reaching agreement on a security content for the CSCE, a 
Warsaw Pact meeting held in Prague, in January 1972, made another appeal for an early 
convening. 19' More significantly for the Alliance, the WTO declaration noted the Eastern 
approval of the principle of including in a force reductions agreement all armed forces, both 
foreign and national; a proposal advocated by the Alliance ever since it put forward its call for 
MBFR negotiations. Less positively, the Pact's Declaration emphasised that the "ways 
toward solving the question of force reductions "should not be the prerogative of the existing 
military alliances in Europe". 192 The statement which might imply the participation of all 
CSCE nations, while not excluding the conference as the likely forum for the MBFR 
negotiations, was not a welcome proposal at NATO. Despite continued wrangling about 
introducing some elements of MBFR into the CSCE, no partner advocated the precise details 
of force reductions to be negotiated within the framework of the conference. Furthermore, the 
Pact's communique provided no firm commitment concerning the beginning of any 
negotiations on the question. 
As no progress was recorded on MBFR, events having a more direct impact on the 
advancement of the CSCE rapidly unfolded with the last obstacles toward a resolution of the 
188 Ibid. 
189 Canada, DEA, 26 May 1972. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Text of the Communique (Prague, 25-26 January 1972) can be found in Klaiber and others, 
Era of Negotiations, pp. 181-185. 
192 See Klaiber and others, Era of Negotiations, p. 36. 
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German question being quickly removed one after the other. On 17 May, the Bundestag 
approved the two renunciation of force treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, and 
ratification by the Bundesrat quickly followed. 193 A few days earlier, the last of the intra- 
German agreements and arrangements implementing and supplementing the provisions of the 
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin concluded, and an arrangement was made to sign its Final 
Protocol which would bring the entire Berlin Agreement into effect on 3 June. 194 
With the assurances of the "successful conclusion" of the entire Berlin Agreement, the NATO 
Ministers, meeting in Bonn on 30-31 May, could only stress the willingness of the Alliance 
"to enter into multilateral conversations concerned with preparations for a Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe". 195 The Ministers also accepted the proposal of the 
Finnish Government of November 1970 to hold such talks in Helsinki --though, significantly, 
provided no time-schedule for the opening of the multilateral talks. Regarding possible 
agenda items for the multilateral consultations, the Bonn communique only indirectly 
reiterated the validity of the four topics previously mentioned in the Alliance December 
communique by noting a report of the Council in Permanent Session which had examined the 
issues. Surprisingly, given the obvious lack of emphasis on potential agenda items and the 
absence of agreement in Brussels over what topic, or topics, could fill in the item of "certain 
military aspects of security", the final communique devoted one full paragraph to the latter 
issue stressing that: 
"Ministers considered that, in the interest of security, the examination at a CSCE of 
appropriate measures, including certain military measures, aimed at strengthening 
confidence and increasing stability would contribute to the process of reducing the 
dangers of military confrontation". 196 
Privately described by the British as another "formula ... to which the 
French could 
subscribe", and apparently meant "to distinguish military measures which would be accepted 
193 The Treaties recognised the frontiers of all states in Europe as inviolable, hence providing 
informal recognition of the post-war territorial changes and the geopolitical status quo in Europe. 
Only the recognition of East Germany remained unsettled, but negotiations between the FRG and 
the GDR, aimed at normalising their relations and opening the way for their mutual accession to 
the United Nations were already well on the way and, concluded five months after the entry into 
force of the Eastern treaties and the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. 
194 This was the same day the West German bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland 
entered into force. For background on the Soviet request to sign the Final Protocol at the same 
time, or before, the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties by the FRG, and a previous 
request by the West German government to wait for the conclusion of the Berlin Quadripartite 
Agreement, see Dean, "Berlin", pp. 99-100. 
195 Bonn, 30-31 May 1972. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 276-279. 
196 Ibid. 
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at the Conference itself (i. e. confidence building measures) and MBFR", 197 the vagueness of 
the NATO statement left doubts about what the Allies were trying to accomplish. With 
almost no work at hand on CBMs and, as reported only one week prior to the Ministerial 
Meeting, with no member state committed to the issue, NATO's emphasis on "certain 
military measures" could only have been made to satisfy the Alliance nations most committed 
to the establishment of a link with MBFR. The importance some countries, especially 
Germany, attached to this issue had become even more significant at the time of the Bonn 
Meeting. On 25 May, Chancellor Brandt told a press conference that the subject of force 
reductions must be included in the CSCE, and that this meant not only the stationing of troops 
on the territory of Allied countries, but comprehensive defence problems. 198 Three days later, 
the West German Defence Minister, Helmut Schmidt, contended in a radio interview that he 
could not "conceive of a conference about the security of Europe at which there was no 
discussion whatever about mutual troop reductions". 199 During the Ministerial Meeting itself, 
Walter Scheel, the West German Foreign Minister, argued that the link between the two sets 
of talks should be "optimum". 200 Hence, at the time when NATO was formally suggesting, 
once again, that some military issues should be considered at the conference, and was 
committing the Alliance to take the lead in this field, no agreement existed on what subjects 
should be proposed. 
Of more immediate concern for some member states during the Bonn meeting was the issue 
of timing between the multilateral preliminary talks on a conference and the opening of talks 
on force reductions. In this regard, the final communique of May 1972 included a statement, 
signed by the 14 NATO partners supporting MBFR, noting that "they regretted that the Soviet 
government [had] failed to respond to the Allied offer of October 1971 to enter into 
exploratory talks"201 and, therefore, were now proposing "that multilateral explorations on 
mutual and balanced force reductions be undertaken as soon as practicable, either before or in 
parallel with multilateral preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe". 202 The statement, opposed by France and only weakly supported by other countries 
like Denmark and Norway who did not wish any more delay in the convening of the 
preparatory talks on the conference, 203 followed Washington's preference for MBFR over 
197 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 43 note 2. 
198 "Brandt's hope for security talks", FT, 25 May 1972. 
'99 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 44 note 4. 
200 , U. S. and allies clash over date for MBFR talks", FT, 31 May 1972. 
201 Bonn, 30-31 May 1972. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 276-279. 
202 Ibid. 
203 "Rogers Reports to NATO on Summit", IHT, 31 May 1972. Also "NATO Ready for Europe 
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CSCE, and its insistence for two separate sets of negotiations to be held in parallel or, most 
preferably, for MBFR to start before the CSCE. 
One week prior to the Bonn Ministerial Meeting, President Nixon traveled to Moscow to sign 
the first SALT agreement. During his Summit meeting with Brezhnev, Nixon discussed the 
CSCE and MBFR. The communique issued at the conclusion of the visit noted a common 
agreement on the opening of the conference multilateral talks after the signature of the Final 
Protocol of the Berlin Agreement, as well as an understanding that a conference should be 
convened "at a time to be agreed by the countries concerned, but without undue delay. "204 
On MBFR, the two leaders agreed that "appropriate agreements should be reached as soon as 
practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in 
a special forum. , 205 
Despite initial reports suggesting that the Brezhnev-Nixon talks had reached agreement for 
two separate conferences to begin in parallel (probably in the fall of 1972), 
206 the details of 
such a deal were not agreed upon. During the meeting Brezhnev had apparently given no 
indication of the kind of talks Moscow would like on MBFR, 207 and had only reiterated the 
view of the Warsaw Pact, stated in Prague in January, that MBFR should not be a matter for 
the military alliances alone, while also explaining that Moscow had not received the NATO's 
emissary for MBFR, Manlio Brosio, because the Soviets did not want MBFR negotiations 
between blocs. 208 Moreover, although Kissinger claimed after his visit that the Soviets had 
agreed for the "immediate explorations on MBFR", 209 Moscow remained silent on the issue 
Security Parley", IHT, 1 June 1972. 
204 "Texts of Nixon-Brezhnev Declaration and of Joint Communique at End of Visit", reproduced 
in the New York Times, May 30,1972. [Future references to the New York Times are identified as 
NYT] 
205 Ibid. 
206 See IHT, 31 May 1972. Numerous accounts have been written about the results of the Nixon- 
Brezhnev discussion on CSCE and MBFR. Many observers, using the final communique of the 
Summit as the basis of their analysis, suggest a tentative deal on the issue. See, for instance, Dean, 
Watershed in Europe, p. 105; and Coit D Blacker, "The MBFR Experience", in Alexander L. 
George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds. ), U. S. -Soviet Security Cooperation. 
Achievements, Failures, Lessons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 126. Discarding 
press reports that a deal had been struck, see Keliher, The Negotiations on MBFR, pp. 31-32. 
Recognising that the issue has never been fully documented, Raymond Garthoff carefully 
concludes that "in neither of their memoirs do Kissinger or Nixon comment on the trade-off --the 
United States' acceptance of the European Security Conference in exchange for Soviet agreement 
to MBFR-- but there was such an understanding. " Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 304. 
207 FT, 31 May 1972; and IHT, 1 June 1972. 
208 FT, 31 May 1972; and "Nato ministers agree to Helsinki talks in autumn to prepare for 
European security conference", The Times, 1 June 1972. 
209 IHT 31 May 1972. 
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for several months after the Summit. In short, if Brezhnev had agreed on separate forums for 
the CSCE and MBFR, he had not indicated what would be the most appropriate framework 
for force reductions, nor had he committed to any date for them. Certainly the Americans 
wanted separate MBFR negotiations to start before the CSCE and largely publicised this view 
at the time of the Summit and the Ministerial Meeting, 210 but that Nixon had reached such a 
deal with Brezhnev was doubtful as evidenced by the US request in Bonn for including the 
statement calling on force reductions to start "before or in parallel" with the CSCE. 
211 
The Bonn statement on MBFR was the closest the Allies ever came to making negotiations 
on force reductions a pre-condition for the convening of the CSCE, and whether Washington 
then made it clear that its assent for convening conference preparatory talks was conditioned 
upon some firm Soviet reply on MBFR, all the NATO partners, including France, 
subsequently agreed not to move further on the CSCE. In mid-July 1972, the Finnish 
Government proposed that the exploratory talks on the CSCE should begin in Helsinki on 22 
November, 212 but the Alliance as a whole delayed replying to the Finnish government during 
the summer "while the Americans sought to persuade the Russians to agree to the start of 
MBFR explorations at roughly the same time". 13 
12. THE END GAME 
Final agreement on the CSCE and MBFR was only achieved in mid-September, when Henry 
Kissinger went to Moscow to meet with Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko to explain "that the 
two conferences need not run exactly together, but fairly close". 214 During the meeting, the 
Russians handed a paper to Kissinger suggesting that the multilateral talks on the CSCE 
should begin, as Finland had proposed, on 22 November, and that the conference itself could 
open in June 1973. The Soviet paper also proposed that the preparatory talks on MBFR could 
210 Reports on this issue can be found in the Financial Times, 31 May 1972; IHT, 31 May 1972; 
IHT, 1 June 1972; and The Times, 1 June 1972. 
211 Ibid. 
212 The Finnish invitation for the MPT to start on that date was only officially submitted to the 
Western countries on 9 November after the NATO governments informally conveyed they were 
ready to accept an invitation. See Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", pp. 80-81; and Bennett and 
Hamilton, The Conference, p. 58. 
213 Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 58. 
214 Ibid., p. 58 note 4. According to John J. Maresca, a senior member of the US delegation at the 
CSCE: "To force a positive response from the Kremlin, Kissinger linked U. S. acceptance of the 
opening date of the CSCE to Soviet acceptance of the opening of MBFR during his visit to 
Moscow in September 1972, and the Soviets finally accepted. " Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 11. 
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start in January 1973 "followed by negotiations `on a non-block basis' in October. "215 
With a provisional timetable in hand, the Allies were finally able to accept the Finnish 
invitation for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT) on the CSCE to open in Helsinki on 
22 November, but not before, and almost simultaneously, the seven NATO governments 
planning to take part in MBFR sent an invitation to five Warsaw Pact countries to begin 
exploratory talks on the matter on 31 January 1973.216 As Kissinger had noted on his return 
from Moscow: "Unless these two conferences take place in some related time frame ... 
it will 
"2 be very difficult for us to agree to ... the 
`Helsinki tea party'. 17 
13. CONCLUSION 
The final results of the three-year East-West discussions leading to agreement on the parallel 
beginning of MBFR and CSCE represented a remarkable turn of events for the West. A close 
associate of Henry Kissinger described the Western gains against the Soviet repeated attempts 
for the quick convening of a conference as follow: "First we sold it for the German-Soviet 
Treaty, then we sold it for the Berlin Agreement, and we sold it again for the opening of the 
MBFR. "218 The Alliance as whole, of course, never formally supported MBFR as a pre- 
condition for the CSCE, but the statement by Henry Sonnefeldt was not necessarily 
inaccurate. US agreement for the CSCE was always premised upon Eastern acceptance of 
MBFR, and this fact was eventually well understood by the Soviet Union and accepted by the 
Allies who, in the last few months before the opening of the preliminary talks on the CSCE, 
came to support the US request for separate MBFR negotiations held in parallel. 
In retrospect, the statement by Sonnefeldt was a good illustration of Western achievements, 
but it said nothing about how the Allies managed to achieve such results, nor did it say 
anything about where they were to go from there. The reality was that throughout the three- 
year period of East-West bargaining over future negotiations the Allies had always been on 
the defensive and greatly divided over every significant policy issue related to this matter. 
When the West first addressed subjects for future discussions it was initially only to `recycle' 
the Eastern proposals in a way more palatable to Western liking. When pre-conditions were 
215 Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 58 note 4; and Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 81. 
216 See Spencer, Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
217 United States, Department of State Bulletin 67,9 October 1972, p. 394, quoted in Spencer, 
"Canada and the Origins", p. 81. 
218 Comment from Helmut Sonnenfeld, Newsweek, 11 August 1975, quoted in Walschap, "The 
Great European Jamboree", p. 40. 
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put forward for participation in a conference, Allied capitals and NATO headquarters had to 
explain what they meant and almost invariably came up with different explanations. When 
discussions occurred on the "when", or "how", to move forward on the conference they 
invariably resulted in last-minute compromises quickly formulated on the eve of the 
conclusion of a Ministerial Meeting and, only too often, were later questioned or reformulated 
by one partner or another. Worse, as was the case of the Rome suggestion for the 
establishment of a permanent body (which was immediately adopted by Moscow to try to 
postpone MBFR to until after the convening of a conference), the Alliance, through its 
Secretary-General, had to embark on a public campaign to explain that what had been 
proposed by NATO was not really what had been proposed, and that, in any case, it was not 
what the other side had proposed. 
Overall, the Allies never developed a comprehensive strategy to deal with the conference 
project and never managed to do much more than to develop policies on an ad hoc basis and 
to hastily produce piecemeal compromise formulae never fully thought through by all the 
partners. Particularly telling in this regard, and of great significance for explaining NATO's 
initial interest for CBMs, was how the West came to propose that the conference should 
consider `certain military aspects of security'. As clearly established by official 
documentation, the decision to propose this topic in December 1971 was not accompanied by 
any agreement on what the subject might actually entail. The fact that such a proposal could 
be made public while the Allies did not even know what it precisely meant was not only 
characteristic of the way other important decisions regarding the CSCE were made at NATO, 
but can only be explained by the fact that a majority in Brussels could not find a reason to 
oppose it. At the time, the Allies were under pressure to move toward the CSCE while 
nothing was happening on MBFR and, if they could not agree to formally request a Soviet 
reply on the issue (for reasons that had more to do with increasing questioning of the 
desirability of MBFR than with the CSCE), they could all agree on a vague formulation 
asking for consideration of some aspects of security at the conference. For the Europeans, 
then wanting some elements of MBFR in the CSCE, the statement represented a way to get 
around French reluctance to MBFR while allowing the subject to be studied further at NATO. 
For the US and France, the countries most opposed to discussing any MBFR aspects in the 
CSCE, they could both find a reason to accept. 
France had been unsuccessful in discouraging the West Germans from raising the issue of 
MBFR in the CSCE and probably believed that the vague formula on "certain military aspects 
of security" --which could have meant anything-- might be the only way to get rid of the force 
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reductions. At the time of the December meeting, the French were also anxious to move 
toward the CSCE and, in this respect, probably only accepted the vague statement in order to 
remove any further obstacles to an early convening. 
For the United States, the main concern was just the opposite. The Americans were afraid that 
the CSCE might take place without MBFR, but they had had no success in convincing the 
Allies to support their views that force reductions should be made a pre-condition for the 
CSCE. Given the absence of Allied backing for their position, the US could certainly go 
along with a vague formula on certain "military" issues that could be used to convey to the 
Soviets that there would not be a conference without some movement on MBFR. 
Undoubtedly, the Americans (as well as the Canadians) used the vague statement afterwards 
to make this point. 
The paradox, which also explains how NATO first came to look at CBMs for the CSCE, was 
that the Europeans who proposed the vague formulation on "certain military aspects of 
security" at the December meeting did it to obtain agreement on the discussion of some 
elements of force reductions in the CSCE. The fact that the European partners had different 
motivations for wanting the establishment of a link between the two forum and that these 
reasons were not compatible certainly did not augur well for an agreement to be reached in 
Brussels, and it was only because of the enduring deadlock on these discussions that the 
Allies began to pay more attention to CBMs. 
Obviously, the fact that CBMs only began to be considered at NATO because of a persistent 
lack of agreement on how MBFR should be negotiated did not look very promising for any 
comprehensive policy to be developed on the subject. However, as things stood in May 1972, 
no one was too concerned about this. CBMs were only beginning to be discussed, and were 
only seen as a possible option which could allow the Alliance to enter the negotiations with 
one topic agreeable to all. Furthermore, CBMs was not the only conference issue on which 
the Allies had no clear policy and no forward vision. As noted in a memorandum from the 
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in February 1972: 
The Alliance has done a great deal of work in preparation for a Conference. 
Voluminous studies have been completed over the past three years: on `Issues for 
Possible Negotiations with the East'; on `Possible Procedures for Negotiations with 
the East', on the economic and cultural aspects of a Conference; on a possible 
document on principles governing the relations between states. This mountain of 
work has not, however, yet produced clear or agreed policy directives: a vast number 
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of possibilities has been analysed, but few conclusions drawn. 219 
As the Foreign Office concluded then, this situation was not surprising because "the Alliance 
[was] notoriously unable to make up its mind except under the extreme pressure of events. "220 
But, perhaps, more discouraging for the future development of CBMs was the general 
Western perspective on the CSCE. As remarked in another document of the Foreign Office 
of the same period: 
We believe that no really interesting points are likely to be negotiated in a conference 
of more than thirty states .... 
In three years of bureaucratic activity NATO has been 
unable to identify any serious issues which might yield to negotiation in such a forum. 
Nor have the Americans suggested any. If events were to prove us wrong, and a 
conference led to practical agreements of genuine value to the West, nobody would 
be more pleased than ourselves. 221 
Another aspect with, perhaps, more important long-term implications was that after obtaining 
satisfaction on all of their pre-conditions for a conference, the United States would find few 
reasons for the CSCE. In the view of Henry Kissinger and President Nixon, the United States 
never wanted a conference and, if they could have found the support of two or more 
Europeans states, they would have prevented it. 222 For Henry Kissinger, "such a meeting 
would only obscure the real issues, hamper the relationship between the Super-powers and 
"223 `clutter the stage with irrelevant demands by minor countries'. 
Hence in the period immediately preceding the opening of the Multilateral Preparatory Talks 
on the CSCE, the West still had no interest for a conference and, in the more specific field of 
security, the Allies were still without any firm agreement on what topic they should propose 
for negotiation. 
2'9 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 2-3. 
220 Ibid., p. 3. 
221 Ibid., p. 37. 
222 Ibid., p. 56. 
223 Walschap, "The Great European Jamboree", p. 40. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NATO'S PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE MPT: 
(MAY-NOVEMBER 1972) 
INTRODUCTION 
The events leading to NATO's proposal for consideration of "certain military aspects of 
security" in the CSCE revealed that the Alliance's decision to propose this issue at the 
Conference was not preceded by any serious consultations. As clearly evidenced by the 
discussions taking place in Brussels after the Ministerial Meeting, the Allies had no agreed 
position on which matters of European military security could be suitable for consideration at 
the CSCE. For several months, the item could best be described as involving a declaration on 
MBFR, CBMs, or both. 
By May 1972, reports suggested that a consensus was beginning to emerge on CBMs. I This 
consensus, however, was not a clear or unequivocal mandate in support of the negotiations of 
CBMs in the CSCE, but more of a weak understanding that, while the discussions on the 
establishment of a link with MBFR continued, CBMs could be looked at as a possible topic to 
be introduced at the Conference. Hence, during the Ministerial Meeting in Bonn, when the 
Allies officially announced their willingness to enter Multilateral Preparatory Talks on the 
CSCE and, at the same time, reiterated their interest in discussing military issues in this 
forum, no decision existed at NATO on what precise topic should be proposed. 
Discussions on the establishment of a link with MBFR continued in Brussels for months, 
though no consensus was ever reached to make this topic part of the NATO programme for 
the CSCE. 2 Meanwhile, NATO's preparations leading to the opening of the MPT in 
November 1972 increasingly focused on CBMs. However, because the main interest for the 
consideration of "military" issues in the CSCE remained directly related to the issue of a 
declaration on force reductions, work on the measures only belatedly started and progressed 
1 Canada, DEA, 26 May 1972. See also Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 77. 
2 Although never accepted as part of NATO's proposals for the CSCE, some European NATO partners 
individually argued in favour of the issue throughout the MPT and most of the CSCE. For an official 
reference noting the continuation of inconclusive discussions on the issue at Brussels, at the beginning 
of the MPT in November 1972, see Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 76 note 14. For Allied 
proposals and divisions on this issue at Helsinki during the months of February and May 1973, see 
Ibid., pp. 95-96 note 6, and p. 125. 
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very slowly. Moreover, significant differences over which measures should be presented in 
this forum, and how to present them, ensured that the Allies arrived ill prepared at the pre- 
conference talks. 
2. JULY: THE FIRST CONTRIBUTION 
Until the Bonn Ministerial Meeting in May 1972, very little work had been done at NATO on 
CBMs. Previously, the Allies had listed advantages and disadvantages for some measures but 
no substantive discussions took place and no effort was made to reach conclusions on any of 
the measures. 3 Almost two more months elapsed after the Bonn meeting before the United 
States introduced the first national contribution exclusively devoted to the inclusion of CBMs 
in the CSCE. 
Presented under the heading Draft Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs, the document noted 
that certain general objectives could be achieved by a discussion of confidence-building 
measures at the Multilateral Preparatory Talks. 4 In addition to providing a more balanced 
agenda for the Conference, discussion of CBMs in the CSCE could strengthen the Western 
posture by focusing discussion --and public opinion-- on one of the major sources of 
insecurity in Europe, namely Soviet willingness to exert military pressure on other states in 
Europe, including military intervention. Western proposals on CBMs, the paper also noted, 
could serve to challenge Soviet professions of interest in European security by requesting that 
the Eastern states match it with greater openness concerning their military activities. Finally, 
because the measures were of particular interest to a number of East European states, 
Washington noted that discussion of CBMs in the CSCE context could encourage a more 
active and independent participation of these states in the Conference. 
Although recognising certain advantages for having CBMs, the US paper also cautioned 
about a number of problems that could result from a discussion about them at the Conference. 
A declaration on CBMs, it was noted, could contribute to a false sense of security leading to 
the impression that the Alliance could reduce its defence effort. Also, the Soviet Union could 
use the discussions on CBMs to argue that agreement on the matter represented a sufficient 
3 As noted in the previous chapter, the only document prepared at NATO was made by an Ad Hoc 
Committee who submitted a paper to the Senior Political Committee on 24 April 1972. Canada, DEA, 
24 April and 9 May 1972. 
4 Unless cited otherwise, information on the US contribution of July 1972 is from Canada, DEA, 31 
July 1972. 
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substitute for negotiations on broader security issues. Furthermore, the Soviets could come up 
with their own propagandistic proposals, such as the non-use of nuclear weapons or the 
imposition of limitations on military exercises --the latter with a view to restrict areas where 
the Alliance might conduct exercises. 
Another concern noted by Washington was determining how the negotiation of CBMs in the 
CSCE could affect the concurrent negotiations of similar but more detailed and desirable 
measures in an MBFR forum. Avoiding actions in the CSCE that could reduce prospects for 
agreement in MBFR was an important consideration the Allies needed to keep in mind before 
proceeding with CBMs. Finally, when contemplating what measures the Allies might wish to 
consider for the Conference, Washington suggested that the following five criterion be used: 
1. The measures should be consistent with the principle of undiminished security for all 
Allies, taking into account where appropriate the disparities arising from geographic 
and other considerations; 
2. They should be consistent with actual measures the West might want to propose in 
the MBFR negotiations; 
3. They should be of general applicability to the whole of Europe and should not 
necessarily exclude the Western USSR, nor by their nature imply any reference to 
specific regions or forces within that area; 
4. They should not imply such protracted discussion as to render it impracticable to deal 
with them in a meaningful way at a CSCE, and; 
5. They should not be prejudicial to negotiations of constraints in an MBFR forums 
5 The reference to "constraints" in MBFR referred to the negotiation of measures calling for limitations 
on movements of forces within and toward the reduction area, as well as limits on the size, location, 
number and duration of major military exercises, that the West envisaged introducing in those talks. 
Information on the elaboration of NATO's policies on these measures is extremely sketchy. In the 
communique issued after the December 1969 NATO Ministerial Meeting, Ministers of the Alliance's 
integrated command (which did not include France) suggested that "further studies should be given to 
measures which could accompany or follow agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions", and 
that such measures "could include advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres, 
exchange of observers at military manoeuvres and possibly the establishment of observation posts. " 
Studies on the issue, however, only progressed slowly. According to Henry Kissinger, by the fall of 
1970, the Allies had "not been able to identify negotiable `collateral constraints' which would inhibit 
Pact mobilization and reinforcement without harming NATO at the same time. We have just scratched 
the surface in thinking about verification problems. " The most comprehensive account of NATO's 
discussion leading to the development of a first package of measures tabled in 1974 can be found in 
Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, especially pp. 440-441 and pp. 475-478. For 
background emphasising that the Allies experienced considerable difficulties in reaching agreement on 
the issue, before and after the tabling of a first package of proposals, see Dean, Watershed in Europe, 
pp. 157-158; Keliher, The Negotiations on MFR, p. 135; and US, House of Representatives, Status of 
the HBFR Negotiations, Report of the MBFR Panel of the Intelligence and Military Application of 
Nuclear Energy Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 
Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session, December 14,1978. Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1978, p. 6 and 
p. 9. The quotes from the NATO communique and from Henry Kissinger can be found, respectively, 
in NATO Final Communiques, pp. 229-232; and Kissinger, White House Years, p. 402. 
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The US paper went on to discuss two illustrative measures: 
1. Advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres, and; 
2. Exchange of observers at military exercises announced in advance. 
As suggested in the American "guidelines", the principal objective for the prior notification of 
military activities would be to obtain Soviet acknowledgement of the value of such a measure 
for strengthening stability and mutual communications in Europe. For the exchange of 
observers, the paper suggested that in addition to ensuring that the manoeuvres were only 
training exercises, the measure could help develop experience for other arms control efforts 
and provide opportunities to gain better insight into relative force capabilities. 
The procedures and modalities suggested by Washington for the application of the two 
measures were quite simple. For advance notification, Washington recommended that it 
could include only the general time-frame and the area of the movements or manoeuvres, and 
that each party could determine for itself what constitutes a "major" movement, what types of 
forces it would include in its notification, and what (if any) further details --such as unit 
designation, border crossing point or destination-- it would incorporate in the notification. For 
the exchange of observers, the paper suggested that it could be left to the parties to decide to 
which manoeuvres, and to whom, invitations would be issued. These exchanges, however, 
would have to be carried out "on a generally equitable basis" meaning that the number of 
observers would be kept within reasonable limits, equitable treatment would be given to all 
parties, and reciprocity would apply. 
Emphasising the value of adopting a general approach to the CSCE CBMs, the US paper 
concluded by noting two advantages for keeping the measures simple. First, such an 
approach would facilitate agreement at the Conference. Second, it would prevent the 
involvement of other CSCE participating States in the details of Allied military activities. 
In the absence of any forthcoming contribution by other member states, the Draft 
Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs, presented by Washington in July, became the basis for 
Allied discussions on CBMs. 6 However, initial reactions among the NATO partners were not 
all positive. 
6 By mid-August, no other national contribution was anticipated. Canada, DEA, 17 August 1972. 
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3. AUGUST: THE FIRST DISCUSSIONS 
In the first exchange of views on the US CBMs paper, a few weeks after its introduction at 
NATO, the discussions immediately showed that not all Allies shared Washington's views. 
Recognising that the American approach to CBMs probably derived from their concern to 
avoid including anything in the CSCE that would be considered more appropriate for MBFR, 
some Allies argued that in order to convince other CSCE participating States to accept CBMs, 
the case for the measures would have to be made much more meaningful.? With only two 
short paragraphs devoted to the rationale for the inclusion of the measures in the Conference 
and an overall contribution of less than five pages, the US treatment of the subject was 
considered so thin and brief that it was "neither attractive nor convincing". 
8 Moreover, the 
general approach recommended by the United States was considered risky because it could 
actually serve to encourage other states to propose their own CBMs which the West might not 
find attractive. 9 
At a more detailed level, the idea that each party could determine for itself what would 
constitute a "major" movement or manoeuvre and what it would include in its notification 
was considered an approach so vague and permissive that it was unlikely to generate any 
improvement of confidence. 1° Similarly, the modalities proposed by the Americans for the 
exchange of observers were treated in such cursory fashion that it was difficult to know what 
problems might be encountered, much less how they might be resolved. l l 
4. SEPTEMBER: WIDENING DIFFERENCES 
NATO's first discussions on CBMs yielded no concrete result. By September, reports 
indicated that the Allies were split into two groups with many delegations supporting the US 
position for adopting only general wording for the measures, while others argued that this 
would make the measures meaningless. In addition, some delegations expressed reservations 
about the usefulness of the two illustrative measures suggested by Washington. As argued, 
the development of a system of observers that would ensure equitable treatment for some 30 
parties or more (whether among large and smaller states, or between members of different 
' Ibid. The US contribution on CBMs was divided into two parts: a "Draft Agenda Paper" consisting of 






alliances or within the alliances) could be an unworkable proposal. 
12 Also, a system of 
exchange of observers without any precise ground rules (as would probably be the case in 
MBFR) could result in a destabilising rather than a confidence-building measure, especially in 
situations where permission to observe may not be granted. 13 Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact 
countries could use the establishment of such a system in the CSCE to argue against NATO 
proposals for the establishment of a verification regime in MBFR which would also involve 
the exchange of military observers. 14 
On the issue of notification, concerns were expressed that without any provisions allowing for 
challenge and response, non-notified military activities could be seen as tantamount to an 
escalation of threat. Also, the idea of trying to apply the measures to "the whole of Europe" 
was seen as unrealistic. Such a requirement would not only raise questions of resources 
needed to verify and monitor on such a large scale but, by suggesting such a large area of 
application for the CSCE CBMs, the Allies would probably prejudice their negotiating 
position on "movement constraints" in MBFR. The specific concern in this later regard 
related to NATO's plan to introduce in the force reductions talks a measure on movement 
constraints to be applied to both movements of troops taking place within the area of 
reduction (i. e. limited to parts of Central Europe) and on movements of troops toward the 
area. 15 Although the MBFR negotiations were not planned to begin for another two months 
after the opening of the CSCE, the concern was that if the Eastern states were to agree with 
the "all of Europe" concept as the area of application for the CSCE CBMs, they could use this 
as a pretext in the MBFR to refuse a constraints area larger than the reduction area. 16 
To complicate matters, while some delegations raised doubts about the feasibility and 
usefulness of the CBMs suggested by Washington, others argued that the two measures were 
not going far enough. Belgium, for instance, proposed that the NATO CBMs proposals 
should include the exchange of observers to all notified major military manoeuvres, and a 
limitation on the movement of forces of a certain size within and/or into a certain area. 17 The 
12 Canada, DEA, 20 September 1972. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 By June 1972 the Allies were considering the following measures: advance notice of military 
movements; calendar year list of planned movements, manoeuvres, and exercises; advance notice of 
changes in this calendar; exchange of observers at military exercises; notification and/or limitation of 
movements of forces in certain areas. Canada, DEA, 16 June 1972. 
16 Ibid., 20 September 1972. 
17 Ibid., 29 September 1972. 
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latter suggestion, of course, directly contradicted Washington's criteria for the CSCE CBMs 
to be of general applicability to the whole of Europe and to avoid any reference to specific 
regions. Also, the idea of placing limits on the number or size of military movements went 
far beyond the simple notification measures under discussion at NATO, as such measures 
were deemed by a majority of Allies to be more appropriate for the MBFR forum. 
OCTOBER: CONFUSION OVER DIFFERENCES 
Given the wide range of views on the confidence-building measures, the Allies decided to 
produce a new Draft Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs encompassing all the comments and 
suggestions on the issue in the previous months. 18 The paper, prepared in mid-October, 
included several modifications or additions to the original US document. In addition to the 
five criterion previously proposed by the Americans, some Allies also wanted to ensure that 
the measures: 
1) should help strengthen mutual confidence and stability, promote detente and improve 
relations among the CSCE participants; 
2) should not inhibit NATO's reinforcement plans, nor necessary exercises, such as 
Reforger; 
3) should be of such a nature that compliance with the agreement could be effectively 
ascertained without an onerous requirement for verification; 
4) should not necessitate the creation of a new permanent international body for their 
implementation, and; 
5) should be defined with sufficient precision so as not to create misunderstanding 
among the parties over the implementation of the agreement. 19 
On the procedures outlined by Washington for the application of the notification measure, 
18 Information on the NATO Draft Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs dated 12 October is from 
Canada, DEA, 12 October 1972. 
19 Ibid. This list circulated at NATO on 12 October presented a total of 12 criteria which included the 
original five proposed by the United States plus an additional seven, either new or variants of the same 
ones. After further discussion, the list finally agreed by NATO on 19 October contained only nine 
criteria identified as follow: "1) Undiminished security; 2) Strengthened confidence and stability, 
promotion of detente, improvement of relations among the CSCE participants; 3) Consistency with 
measures that may be agreed in MBFR; 4) Applicability to all of Europe, not selected areas; 5) 
Sufficiently simple to obviate lengthy negotiation; 6) Non-interference with NATO reinforcement 
plans and exercises; 7) Minimal verification requirement; 8) No follow-on machinery; 9) Clarity of 
wording to avoid misunderstanding. " Canada, DEA, 23 May 1973. Presentation of this list in the open 
literature can be found in Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, p. 479. However, it should be 
noted that the authors erroneously attributed the list of nine criteria as being part of the US paper of 31 
July 1972. The list of five additional criteria presented above are from the NATO list of 12 October 
and, apart from duplicate language which has been excluded, the only noteworthy difference with the 
final list of nine criteria agreed upon by the Allies on 19 October is the suggestion that the CBMs 
should "not be prejudicial to negotiation of measures such as collateral constraints, force reductions, or 
measures of verification in an MBFR forum". This language was not acceptable to France. 
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discussion of the Alliance's Draft Agenda/Guidelines indicated that some delegations 
strongly believed that the lack of clarity on questions such as the size of forces or the area of 
applicability of the measure could create misunderstanding over the implementation of the 
agreement. To prevent such an outcome, a suggestion was made that while negotiating 
CBMs at the Conference, NATO seek to reach an understanding on how a "major" 
movement and manoeuvre should be defined, how much advance notice should be given, and 
what information should be contained in the notification. To achieve such an understanding, 
some Allies suggested that the CSCE participating States could compare recent annual 
calendars of military activities to help illustrate the kind of information they would be willing 
to provide. Furthermore, the Allies could table "selective lists" of their own past force 
movements and manoeuvres and invite other participants to do the same. If the Warsaw Pact 
nations refused to provide similar information, the lists could then be withdrawn and, as 
previously suggested by Washington, each party would then determine for itself what 
constitutes a "major" movement, what types of forces it would include in its notification, and 
what (if any) other information it would provide in its notification. ° 
Finally, with regard to exchange of observers, the October paper noted only two additions to 
the original US proposal, namely that equal freedom of movement should be accorded to 
observers by all parties and that there should be an approximate balance between NATO and 
the WTO in the numbers and kinds of manoeuvres offered for observation. 
Although the principal aim of the Alliance's Draft Agenda/Guidelines was mainly to register 
the different views of the NATO countries and not to provide any definite answers, it revealed 
that the member states were far apart on CBMs and that few concrete results had arisen from 
the initial discussions. Some of the additional criterion advanced for judging CBMs proposals 
were either too vague to allow any informed decision as to whether any measure would fulfil 
their stated requirements, or contradicted other criterion already proposed. This was the case, 
for instance, for the new recommendation calling for precision in the definition of the 
measures, which went against the principle of generality previously suggested by the 
Americans. Also, concerning the two CBMs previously proposed by Washington, specific 
comments on how these measures could be presented at the Conference indicated that the 
20 As noted in the October Draft Agenda/Guidelines: "A general proposal such as this would avoid 
involvement by CSCE participants in the details of Allied military activities. It would be easier for 
participants in a CSCE to reach agreement on this general measure rather than on a more detailed 
measure of a type most suitably treated in MBFR". 
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discussions had not solved many issues. The same arguments against the US position were 
simply re-introduced while new comments, such as those concerning the exchange of 
observers, did not answer any of the doubts previously raised about the usefulness or the 
applicability of such a measure in the CSCE context. With regard to additional measures that 
NATO might wish to consider for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, the third and last section 
of the October paper listed three CBMs: 
1. the notification of movements of forces of a certain size within and/or into a certain 
area; 
2. the exchange of observers at any military manoeuvre that has been previously 
notified, and; 
3. the limitation of movements of forces of a certain size within and/or into a certain 
area. 
Although included in the Draft AgendalGuidelines, these measures were simply presented as 
additional measures "certain" delegations wished to see introduced in the CSCE and were not 
commented upon by other delegations. As noted in the October document, only the exchange 
of observers and the notification of manoeuvres were then acceptable to all delegations. 
While preparing the report, Allied thinking on negotiating approaches for CBMs was 
influenced by a number of considerations. First, informal discussions with the Soviet Union 
indicated that Moscow had no willingness to discuss CBMs at the CSCE. 21 Second, some of 
the additional measures suggested during Allied discussions were essentially similar to 
"movement constraints" envisaged for negotiation in the MBFR. Finally, "not all confidence- 
building measures contained in [the] guidelines paper [had] been fully studied from a military 
and technical point of view. " 
Although the Allies were in agreement on these basic facts, they drew different conclusions 
from them. Most delegations considered that by tabling simple measures, such as those 
proposed by the Americans, the Soviet Union could not argue that the CBMs would require 
the establishment of a new body for implementation, or that they could only be agreed after 
the CSCE. These delegations also considered that more detailed and far-reaching proposals 
(such as those on the limitation of movements) could make it more difficult to obtain Soviet 
agreement on any CSCE agenda item dealing with military aspects of security and that it 
could prejudice the negotiations of movement constraints in MBFR. These delegations also 
21 For the Soviet comments on the issue made on 15 and 18 September, see Bennett and Hamilton, The 
Conference, p. 61. 
122 
believed that by beginning with relatively permissible proposals, the possibility of suggesting 
broader proposals at a later time was not excluded. 
For other delegations, the absence of perfect parallelism in time between the CSCE 
preliminary talks and the MBFR explorations, and the uncertainty about the results of the 
latter, created the necessity to safeguard the possibility of increasing the substantive content of 
"certain military aspects of security" to be discussed at the Conference. These states believed 
that once minimal CBMs would be proposed it would be difficult to later introduce more 
comprehensive measures. Therefore, they argued for maintaining the option of putting 
forward broader measures at the preliminaries by introducing a proposal entitled "limitation 
of certain major military movements". 
Despite the continuing wide gap between the different positions, the opening of the 
Multilateral Preparatory Talks was approaching and, as the October paper noted, the only 
course of action which would allow the Western states to enter the preliminary consultations 
with a unified position was to confine themselves to the general identification of the two 
confidence-building measures acceptable to all. Such a course of action was sanctioned in 
Brussels in late October. 22 However, as previously experienced in NATO discussions on 
CBMs, confusion immediately surfaced over what exactly had been agreed upon. 
23 Indeed, 
the day the decision was taken, two opposing views were recorded. Countries including 
Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands spoke in favour of tabling precise definitions of the 
two measures; the United States, supported by France, Italy and Great Britain argued for a 
general approach. 24 
6. NOVEMBER: PATCHING-UP DIFFERENCES? 
Following this important setback in the preparations, Washington circulated a paper in early 
November warning about the serious difficulties which could arise from attempts at 
developing precise definitions of the terms "movements" or "manoeuvres", "especially if 
such definitions deal[t] with geographic area or size of forces". 25 Recognising that precision 
of these terms would be necessary for the measures envisaged for the MBFR talks, the 
22 Canada, DEA, 8 November 1972. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 31 October 1972. 
25 The paper was circulated at NATO on 8 November. Canada, DEA, 8 November 1972. 
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Americans warned that efforts to reach agreement on such details at the CSCE would only 
serve to open these issues to wider debate and could prejudice subsequent discussions of 
constraint measures in MBFR. Washington maintained that when introducing the notification 
measure in the Conference, the Allies should not try to define what constitutes a "major" 
military activity because the issue could be highly divisive. Washington argued that if 
protracted and detailed discussions of CBMs were anticipated, this could strengthen Eastern 
resolve to resist further discussions of the topic in the CSCE. Moreover, Washington was 
concerned that if the Warsaw Pact nations were to agree to such criteria they could use this in 
the MBFR to argue that the issue of constraints had already been adequately discussed in the 
CSCE. 26 
As recommended by Washington, one way to avoid these dangers would be for NATO and 
the WTO to engage in a dialogue on past military activities which have been, or could have 
been, announced in advance, as this could serve as indicators of what both sides understand 
the term "major" to mean in this context. Also, as first introduced in the October Alliance 
draft guidelines, the Allies could table their own illustrative lists of recent military activities 
and invite other participants to do the same. If the WTO refused, the West could then decide 
to provide a list of recent Eastern European military activities as examples of what the 
Western governments would expect them to notify in advance noting that all, or some, of 
these activities were announced by the Pact either immediately before, during, or upon 
completion of the events. 
7. A NEGOTIATING STRATEGY? 
Perhaps because of the non-conclusiveness of the discussions and the limited time before the 
opening of the Conference's preliminaries, the Allies agreed just before the opening of the 
MPT to develop "illustrative lists" of manoeuvres and movements to be pursued internally at 
NATO. 27 Each NATO member state participating in the CSCE would develop a list 
reflecting only its national contribution to recent NATO military activities. These lists would 
be tabled on an individual basis at an appropriate time during the negotiations. 
As argued by Washington earlier in the month, the primary rationale for developing such lists 
26 Another concern was that the issue could raise questions on the Baltic or the Mediterranean. Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 25 June 1973. The exact date of the decision to start developing illustrative lists is unknown. 
However, reference to completed national lists being studied at NATO in February 1973 can be found 
in Ibid., 15 March 1973. 
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was to try to reach an understanding during the negotiations on what should be notified, while 
avoiding long and complex discussions which many feared might ensue from efforts at 
reaching precise definitions. The main reason for trying to circumvent defining the measures 
in the CSCE was to avoid any development in this forum that could impact on MBFR. Such 
a consideration, of course, was based on a number of uncertainties. The MBFR explorations 
would not open for another two months after the CSCE, and no one could predict if anything 
of substance would emerge from these negotiations. Yet, on the eve of the opening of the 
MPT, Washington's concerns over MBFR prevailed and the Allies agreed to opt for caution 
in the Conference. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Almost one year after publicly suggesting the consideration of "certain military aspects of 
security" in the CSCE, the Western governments had finally found a topic that could fill in 
this agenda item. As noted in a Draft Brief prepared for the United Kingdom delegation on 
the eve of the MPT, no common understanding existed at NATO regarding "the nature or 
desirability of a joint declaration" on force reductions. 28 However, the Allies agreed that the 
NATO delegations at the CSCE should propose: "(1) the advance notification of manoeuvres 
and troop movements; and (2) the invitation on a generally equitable basis of observers to 
military exercises. "29 
Despite the fact that Alliance discussions on the security aspects of the Conference had finally 
yield one topic agreeable to all, no state was truly committed to CBMs and the Allies knew 
very little about the measures they were to sponsor at the MPT. Since the tabling of the US 
document on CBMs in July 1972, most of the discussions in Brussels had been spent on 
criticising its content with nothing of substance being thoroughly examined or firmly agreed 
upon. Measures including the notification and limitation of movements of a certain size 
within and/or into certain areas, the invitation of observers to any notified manoeuvres, as 
well as the installation of radar and sensors, and aerial observation had also been proposed but 
were rejected by a majority because they did not meet one, or more, of the criteria. 
30 At the 
end of this process only the notification of major manoeuvres and movements and the 
exchange of observers at manoeuvres gained the approval of all. But, the Allies had no clear 
28 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 76 note 14. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Canada, DEA, 23 May 1973 and 12 October 1972. 
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view on how they envisaged the operation of these two measures. No comprehensive study 
had been undertaken31 and while the criterion agreed upon may have been judged sufficient to 
determine the suitability of any measure, it was evident that their vagueness and many 
contradictions would make them of little use for defining objectives to be pursued during the 
negotiations or help in the development of a comprehensive NATO policy on CBMs. If 
anything, the consultations in Brussels also revealed an important split between the Allies, 
with one group of states favouring a more serious or comprehensive development of CBMs 
and another, the majority then, favouring keeping the measures to a minimum and very 
general. Furthermore, because of concerns that the CBMs might prejudice the development 
of parallel measures in MBFR, the only negotiating strategy formulated by the Allies to deal 
with the measures was to concentrate on developing illustrative lists of military activities and 
this strategy had the primary (if not only) purpose of avoiding defining the measures they 
were to propose. The net result of this decision was that the Allies arrived at the CSCE 
preliminary talks with no working definition of the terms "movements", "manoeuvres" or 
"exercises", nor did they have any agreement or clear understanding on what the expression 
"major" should describe in relation to these terms. 
Another striking feature of NATO's preparations for CBMs was that the United States had 
provided most of the preliminary work on the measures with little input from the Europeans. 
While this state of affairs may have been indicative of an overall lack of interest for the 
measures existing at NATO, it may not necessarily have been accidental. Indeed, it is 
plausible that the Europeans feared that by presenting anything on CBMs, this might diminish 
their chances to convince the United States and France, the two NATO countries clearly 
opposed to the establishment of a link with MBFR, to change their position on the issue. 
Incidentally, this may also have been the reason why, of all the NATO partners, the United 
States provided the first study on CBMs. From Washington's perspective, the advancement 
of Allied preparations on this issue may have been seen as the only means to ensure that the 
topic of "certain military aspects of security" would be filled in by something else than 
MBFR. But, regardless of the main reason for the absence of any substantial European 
contribution on CBMs, NATO's preparations for the pre-conference consultations had 
achieved very little to prepare the West to sponsor the measures in this forum. Apart from the 
fact that the measures should be kept simple and that they should not jeopardise MBFR, the 
NATO governments had no clear view of what they wanted to achieve with the CBMs. 
31 The October Alliance Draft Agenda/Guidelines was based on comments made in the course of only 
two meetings. Canada, DEA, 12 October 1972 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NEGOTIATION OF CBMS AT THE MPT 
(NOVEMBER 1972 - JUNE 1973) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Multilateral Preparatory Talks for the CSCE opened at the Technical Institute of Dipoli, 
near Helsinki, on 22 November 1972. At the invitation of the Finnish government, 
representatives from thirty-two European nations, the United States and Canada attended the 
consultations. ' Although the purpose of the talks was to address the many preparatory aspects 
related to the organisation of a full-scale Conference, the multilateral talks did not 
automatically entail the convocation of such a Conference. As clearly enunciated by NATO 
in the Bonn communique of May 1972, the Western states only agreed to enter multilateral 
consultations "to establish that enough common ground existed among the participants to 
warrant reasonable expectations that a Conference would produce satisfactory results. "2 
Concerned that the Soviet Union would use the CSCE "for propaganda of all kinds", 3 the 
Allies would not commit to attend a full-scale Conference unless the results of the 
consultations in Dipoli yielded sufficient evidence that issues of importance to them would be 
carefully reviewed at the Conference. 4 In line with this position, the Western states entered 
the MPT requesting a thorough preparation of the organisation of the CSCE and a clear 
formulation of all Conference agenda items, including agreed "terms of references" or 
mandates for their consideration. 5 
The approach of the Soviet Union to the Helsinki consultations was diametrically opposed. In 
the years immediately preceding the opening of the MPT, Moscow's predominant objectives 
1 Albania was the only European country to abstain from the CSCE, while the participation of the 
Principality of Monaco was decided during the MPT so that it could only take part in the Conference 
itself. Hence the 34 participating States of the MPT were: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the 
United States of America, and Yugoslavia. 
2 Bonn, 30-31 May 1972. NATO Final Communiques, pp. 276-279. 
3 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 59. 
4 See Ibid. pp. 73-74 and p. 79. For an official discussion of the Western aims for the MPT, Ibid., pp. 
70-80. 
5 See "La Roumanie demande que la conference europeenne traite le probleme de la reduction des 
forces", Le Monde, 3-4 December 1972; "Agenda Issue Next at Talks in Helsinki", IHT, 6 December 
1972; "Helsinki Plea for Free Movement of Ideas", The Times, 5 December 1972; and "U. S. Sees 
Hope for Amity in Europe Security Parley", NYT, 5 December 1972. 
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for a Conference was to obtain greater recognition of the postwar borders in Europe, 
legitimise Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and provide a general acquiescence of its 
hegemony in the region. 6 By November 1972 some of these objectives had been partially 
achieved.? West German treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland legitimised the territorial 
gains made by the Communists during World War II, and the conclusion of the Quadripartite 
Agreement on Berlin and the Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR conferred 
international respectability on East Germany. 8 Therefore, Moscow's main goal for the MPT 
was only to secure the early convening of a symbolic high-level meeting, which would 
endorse a general document furthering its objectives. 9 The Soviets were not interested in 
detailed agreements in the CSCE and did not wish its preparations to stall on details. 
Accordingly, the opening Soviet position in Dipoli was to request agreement only on the date 
and place of the main Conference and a broad definition of its agenda. ' 0 
Given the fundamental different objectives of NATO and the WTO, as soon as the MPT 
opened differences between East and West emerged on almost every aspect of the Conference 
and progress was very slow, requiring four rounds of talks which, including recesses, lasted 
more than six-months. I l 
2. MULTILATERAL PREPARATORY TALKS: A BRIEF HISTORY 
In the first round (22 November to 15 December 1972) the discussion focused on a number of 
procedural questions and concluded with a general debate in which the delegations presented 
their basic approaches to the CSCE. During the second round (15 January to 9 February 
1973) the participants formally submitted recommendations for the agenda of the Conference 
and began discussing some of the proposals. In the third round (26 February to 6 April 1973) 
6 This view was widely held by Western officials and governments. For a comprehensive review of 
the assessment of the British government relating to Moscow's main objectives for a Conference, see 
Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 4-5, pp. 24-25 and pp. 181-182. For a discussion by a 
senior member of the US delegation at Helsinki, see Maresca, To Helsinki, pp. 24-25. For similar 
opinions expressed at different times, see Palmer, "The Prospects", p. 18; Acimovic, Problems of 
Security, pp. 89-90; and Povolny, "The Soviet Union", p. 201. 
For a discussion, see. Maresca", To Helsinki, p. 24. See also, "Playing to win at Helsinki", The 
Times, 7 February 1973, and "Not Exactly a Meeting of Minds", NYT, 5 December 1972. 
8 The Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR was signed on 21 December 1972. However, it had 
been initialed on 8 November 1972, a few weeks before the opening of the MPT. 
9 See Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 169, and Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, especially p. 213. 
10 See Acimovic, Problems of Security, p. 117. 
11 For an overview of the first three rounds of negotiations, see Götz von Groll, "The Helsinki 
Consultations", Aussenpolitik, 24: 2,1973, pp. 123-129. 
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the work of the MPT shifted from plenary sessions to working groups and drafting 
committees where serious consideration was given to the agenda items and to the terms of 
reference within which the Committees and Sub-Committees would draft decisions. In the 
fourth and final round (25 April to 8 June 1973) efforts were made to settle all outstanding 
matters, allowing for the conclusion of the consultations on 8 June 1973. 
The results of the MPT were contained in a document entitled "Final Recommendations of 
the Helsinki Consultations" (FRHC). Often referred to as the Blue Book, for the colour of the 
cover chosen for its publication, the twenty-seven-page document contained 96 
recommendations on several organisational and procedural aspects of the Conference. 
Regarding the organisation of the CSCE, the Blue Book outlined the agreement of the parties 
for a Conference to be held in three stages. After the MPT, Stage I of the CSCE would 
convene in Helsinki at foreign minister level for a short meeting to adopt the work of the 
MPT and hear the views of the participants. Stage II, to be held in Geneva at the level of 
diplomats and experts, would carry the substantive negotiations in different Committees and 
Sub-Committees, and prepare draft decisions, recommendations, resolutions or any final 
documents. At Stage III, to be held again in Helsinki on a date and at a level (Foreign 
Ministers or Heads of Government) to be determined before the end of the second stage, the 
Conference would conclude by formally endorsing the work of Stage II and its final 
documents. 12 
With regard to rules of procedure, the Blue Book registered the desire of the participants to 
have most meetings of the CSCE closed to the public and to have all the decisions of the 
Conference (substantive and procedural) taken by consensus. 13 Concerning the agenda of the 
CSCE, the Dipoli consultations determined that four main issues, or "baskets" as they came to 
be known during the preliminaries, would be discussed: 
1. Questions relating to security in Europe: 
- principles of relations between participating States; 
- confidence-building measures; 
2. Co-operation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the 
environment; 
3. Co-operation in humanitarian and other fields; 
4. Follow-up to the Conference. 
12 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 14. 
13 As described in paragraph 69, this meant "the absence of any objection expressed by a 
Representative and submitted by him as constituting an obstacle to the taking of the decision in 
question". 
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With almost half of the 96 Final Recommendations (paragraphs 13 to 53) devoted to the 
mandates of the different agenda items and defining in relative detail the problems to be 
discussed at the Conference, the work of the MPT has been described as the "key to the entire 
subsequent negotiation". 14 In the field of CBMs, the Helsinki Final Recommendations 
consisted of only one short paragraph, but adoption of a programme in this field was one of 
the most difficult aspects of the pre-conference talks, with the parties starting with completely 
opposite views on the importance of addressing military issues in the negotiations. 
3. THE MPT DELIBERATIONS ON SECURITY AND CBMS 
3.1 First Session (22 November - 15 December 1972) 
Proposals for the consideration of confidence-building measures at the Conference were 
introduced very early on in the first round of the consultations during the general policy 
debate. Supporting previous interventions from the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark, 
15 
Canada took the floor on 1 December to suggest that the Conference "seek to reach 
agreement on certain military aspects of security, including, perhaps, advance notification of 
military movements and observations of manoeuvres as steps that would help to build 
confidence between countries and help to enhance stability. "16 This was followed, on 4 
December, by a similar statement made by the United States suggesting that the Conference 
consider unspecified "measures which could build confidence that military maneuvers 
[would] not create instability or misunderstanding. , 17 
The general low-key approach of the Western nations towards CBMs reflected the agreement 
reached at NATO, prior to the consultations, that the Allies would limit themselves to a broad 
description of the measures. With no Western government strongly committed to the issue, 
and with concerns about possible implications for the MBFR negotiations scheduled to start 
after the opening of the MPT, the overall objective of the Allies was only to provide "a 
cautious encouragement of CBMs". ' 8 Furthermore, the confidence-building measures were 
14 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 7. Members of other delegations agreed with this assessment. For 
commentaries from Soviet and Yugoslav delegates, see, respectively, Mendelevich, "Diplomat's 
Notes", p. 193; and Acimovic, Problems of Security, p. 117. 
15 See Francois Carle, "Les pourparlers exploratoires d'Helsinki (premiere partie)", Etudes 
internationales, IV: 3, September 1973, p. 339. [Hereafter: Carle, "Les pourparlers " (premiere 
partie)]. 
16 As quoted in Canada, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Statements and Speeches, No. 73/3. 
17 NYT, 10 December 1972. See also Carle, "Les pourparlers" (premiere partie), p. 340. 
18 Canada, DEA, 23 May 1973. 
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only one of many topics the West wished the Conference to address. In addition to the 
security questions (which included both the CBMs and the principles of inter-state relations), 
the Allies wanted to discuss human contacts, as well as co-operation in the field of economic 
exchange, science, technology, and the environment. 19 
The Soviet position on what subjects should be discussed at the Conference differed from the 
West. As presented by Ambassador Victor Maltsev, on the first day of the general debate, 
Moscow believed that the Conference should consider the following three topics: 
1. guarantees for European security and the establishment of principles governing 
relations between European states; 
2. the extension of economic, commercial, scientific and cultural links, and 
collaboration in protecting the environment; 
3. the establishment of a permanent organ to deal with the application of the 
Conference decisions. 20 
The absence of any provision on "human contacts" clearly underlined the Soviet opposition to 
discuss what the West conceived as an agenda point for the consideration of the "freer 
movement of people and ideas". Similarly, the absence of any reference to CBMs 
underscored that the Eastern states were not prepared to enlarge the discussion of "guarantees 
for European security" to any other topic than the consideration of "principles of inter-state 
relations" through which they hoped to achieve the general recognition of the political and 
territorial status quo in Europe by including provisions on the non-use of force and the 
inviolability of frontiers. 21 With the sole exception of Romania, who took a completely 
independent stand from the other Warsaw Pact nations, the position of Moscow and its close 
allies was that the Conference should not deal in any way with "military" issues. Such a 
position was widely publicised in a number of commentaries published in the East at the 
opening of the consultations, 22 and the view that CBMs belonged to the list of "military" 
subjects to be excluded from the CSCE was clearly underscored by criticism from the 
government-run Czech newspaper, Rude Pravo, of the opening speech of the Head of 
Delegation of the United Kingdom. 
19 Carle, "Les pourparlers" (premiere partie), p. 323. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 181 and p. 250. 
22 For a discussion, see J. P. Jain, "Romania and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe", India Quarterly, 29: 4, October-December 1973, pp. 331-332. [Hereafter, Jain, "Romania 
and the Conference"]. 
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In his opening statement to the preliminaries on 30 November, British Ambassador T. A. K. 
Elliot addressed the question of European security maintaining that, in his opinion, the issues 
related to SALT or MBFR were "rightly separated" from the Conference but that the CSCE -- 
being a Conference on Security in Europe-- should nevertheless not ignore the problem of 
military security and should consider measures "designed to increase mutual confidence. , 23 
Despite the Ambassador's unequivocal assertion that force reductions or nuclear issues would 
be better dealt with elsewhere, and that the Conference should limit itself to some CBMs, 
advocacy of this more modest recommendation was ill received in the East. As described in 
the Rude Pravo: 
This British stand [was] contrary to the spirit of the conference preparations, since to 
agree to negotiations on military matters means to complicate the preparation of the 
conference and, in effect, to delay the convening of the conference longer than a 
considerable number of delegations in Helsinki would like. 24 
The "considerable number of delegations in Helsinki" referred, of course, to the Warsaw Pact 
nations whom, with the exception of Romania, were the only delegations clearly opposed to 
considering any "military" aspects of security in the CSCE. All the NATO countries, with the 
backing of a majority of participating States, were endorsing the inclusion of CBMs, while 
many of the NNAs, supported by Romania, were also proposing that the Conference address 
several other subjects affecting European military security. 
Even before the Multilateral Preparatory Talks opened, the Romanian government stated that 
its delegation would underline the problem of military disengagement, the withdrawal of 
foreign troops and the dismantling of foreign bases. 25 In the opening days of the MPT, 
President Ceaucescu issued a statement in Bucharest declaring that his country was not 
opposed to MBFR provided the CSCE participants could ensure the desired outcome. 26 
Then, on 1 December, the Romanian Head of Delegation in Helsinki said that his country 
expected the CSCE to discuss "ways of negotiating the reduction of troops on foreign soil", 
23 See Statement by H. M. Ambassador in Helsinki, Mr. T. A. K. Elliot to the Multi-lateral Preparatory 
Talks on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 30 November 1972, in Verbatim 
Service 383/72,1st December 1972, London Press Service. 
24 "Rude Pravo Correspondent Rovensky Reports on Talks", Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0800 
GMT, 1 December 1972 L, in FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), Daily Report, Monday, 
4 December 1972, No. 234, p. A4. The Bulgarian, Polish and Soviet press made similar attacks on the 
West, linking their proposal on security with the force reductions talks. For the respective 
commentaries, see FBIS, Daily Report, 14 December 1972, No. 242, pp. Al-4; FBIS, Daily Report, 4 
December 1972, No. 234, p. A-8-9; and FBIS, Daily Report, 15 December 1972, No. 245, p. 11-2. 
25 Carle, "Les pourparlers" (premiere partie), p. 337. 
26 Ibid. 
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East-West troop reductions, and some disarmament issues. 27 As presented by the Romanian 
delegate: 
It would be necessary to discuss, within the European conference, the modalities and 
forms under which the negotiations would have to proceed for the reduction and 
withdrawal of those troops on the territory of other states, of the national troops and 
armaments, as well as other measures of military disengagement and disarmament in 
Europe. Since all the European states are interested in the achievement of such 
measures, they have the right and must have the actual possibility of directly 
participating, of having their say and of defending their legitimate interests within any 
disarmament negotiations referring to Europe, the reduction of the armed forces and 
armaments included. 28 
Romania's call for a thorough examination of military issues at the Conference was endorsed 
by a number of other participating States. When the general debate began in late November, 
Yugoslavia and Sweden, for instance, also requested that force reductions be taken under 
consideration by the CSCE. 29 Similarly, a number of NATO countries, including the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark advocated that the Conference be given a greater role in 
military matters. 30 Highlighting the fact that the debate within the Western Alliance regarding 
the establishment of a link between the CSCE and the MBFR was still unresolved, the 
Netherlands suggested that such a link be accepted by the Conference. 31 Norway supported 
this and proposed that the negotiations on force reductions be put on the agenda of the CSCE 
and that the Conference be entitled to adopt certain "guidelines" on MBFR. 32 
On confidence-building measures, the position of the leading neutral and non-aligned 
countries, Sweden and Yugoslavia, supported by Romania, was that the CSCE should try to 
reach conclusions on a large number of proposals. These states not only favoured the 
notification of military manoeuvres and force movements, but also constraints to be placed on 
the movement of troops. 33 Yugoslavia also envisaged that the Conference should consider 
27 See "Rumania Continues Jab at Russia", The Times, 2 December 1972, and Le Monde, 3-4 
December 1972. 
28 "Romanian Delegate Speaks in General Debate", Bucharest International Service in English, 1922 
GMT, 1 December 1972 L, reproduced in FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), Daily 
Report, Monday, 4 December 1972, No. 234, p. A-10. 
29 See "Three-stage Security Talks Idea Favoured", The Times, 1 December 1972; "La Norvege, le 
Danemark et la Yougoslavie approuvent le plan francais d'une conference europeenne en trois phases", 
Le Monde, 2 December 1972; and Carle, "Les pourparlers" (premiere partie), p. 337. 
30 See Le Monde, 2 December 1972; "More Than a Document on Security Needed --Britain", FT, 1 
December 1972; and "La Grande-Bretagne et la Yugoslavie exponent leurs vues sur la securite et la 
cooperation en Europe", Le Monde, 1 December 1972. 
31 See Le Monde, 1 December 1972. 
32 See FT, 1 December 1972. 
33 Canada, DEA, 25 June 1973. Among the various open sources discussing the proposals of the NNAs 
at the MPT, see Carle, "Les pourparlers" (premiere partie), pp. 338-341; Acimovic, Problems of 
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limitation on certain forms of military activities, such as the size of manoeuvres, 
demonstrations of armed forces, and escalation of the level of military forces on foreign soil. 34 
Endorsing these proposals, Romania further advocated the withdrawal of troops stationed on 
the territory of other states; the reduction of national troops; the dismantling of foreign 
military bases, and; the reduction of military budgets. 3' Finally, while Sweden indicated an 
interest for adopting military constraint measures for the Baltic region, 36 a number of other 
participating States supported the idea of applying CBMs in the Mediterranean region. 37 
By the time the first session of the MPT concluded for Christmas recess on 15 December, it 
was clear that the remainder of the talks related to the security aspects of the Conference 
would involve much more than the principles of inter-state relations and the two confidence- 
building measures proposals envisaged by NATO. 
3.2 Second Session (15 January -9 February 1973) 
When the talks resumed on 15 January, the Western states formally tabled their proposals for 
the agenda of the CSCE along with terms of reference for its working bodies. 38 The Western 
documents also dealt with procedural matters, suggesting that the Conference set up three 
main Committees and ten working Sub-Committees to consider the main topics previously 
suggested by them, as well as various sub-headings. With regard to the security aspects of the 
CSCE, Italy, who presented the Western document on this issue, proposed the creation of a 
Sub-Committee of the Committee on Security to study the question of the notification of 
military manoeuvres and movements, and the exchange of observers to manoeuvres. 39 
Soviet reaction to the Western agenda items and the formal proposal for consideration of two 
CBMs at the Conference was cool. Speaking on the same day, the Soviet Head of 
Security, pp. 216-217; Jain, "Romania and the Conference", pp. 330-332; and Ferraris, Report on a 
Negotiation, pp. 22-23. 
34 Canada, DEA, 25 June 1973. 
35 See Jain, "Romania and the Conference", pp. 330-332. 
36 Canada, DEA, 25 June 1973. 
37 See Ghebali, La diplomatie de la detente, p. 371; and Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, pp. 22-23. 
38 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 88 and pp. 78-79. See also "West's Proposals for 
Agenda of Security Conference", The Times, 19 January 1973, "Barriers Come Down as Helsinki 
Meetings Resume", The Guardian, 16 January 1973; "Community Presents Plans for Security at 
Helsinki", The Times, 16 January 1973; and "La preparation de la conference europeenne. Les Neuf 
ont depose ä Helsinki un projet d'ordre du jour", Le Monde, 17 January 1973. 
39 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 88; "Barriers Come Down as Helsinki Meetings 
Resume", The Guardian, 16 January 1973; and Carle, "Les pourparlers" (premiere partie), pp. 323- 
325. 
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Delegation, Ambassador Maltsev, made no reference to the Western propositions and, in the 
following few days, Moscow's close allies adopted a similar silence on the issue. 40 The 
absence of any reaction by the East European countries to the Western agenda items was soon 
explained by an unannounced meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the WTO countries in 
Moscow. 41 The meeting had reportedly been called to assess, in view of the tabling of the 
Western agenda, the Pact's strategy in Dipoli and to prepare for the upcoming MBFR talks 
which, according to the schedule proposed by the West, were to open on 31 January. 42 
Although Maltsev and the other East European representatives offered no official comment 
on CBMs at the plenary sessions of the MPT, 43 a commentary published by TASS, the same 
day Italy tabled the Western proposals on security matters, left no doubt about Moscow's 
position. Not only did the Soviets oppose the consideration of any "military" topics in the 
Conference and questioned the link between military security and CBMs, but they also 
concluded that the theme had been proposed only to complicate and delay the preparatory 
talks. 44 In the following few days a number of commentaries from the Eastern bloc countries 
echoed the Soviet opposition to having any military issues addressed at the CSCE and their 
resentment of proposing that they should discuss the question at the MPT. 45 
Interpreted as a hardening of the Eastern position, 46 the criticism of the WTO nations was 
probably not specifically, nor predominantly, in reaction to the formal inclusion of CBMs in 
the Western agenda items. Since the opening of the Dipoli consultations, appeals for the 
CSCE to deal with military security issues had become increasingly more numerous and 
significant. At the beginning of the consultations, several neutral and non-aligned states, 
supported by Romania and a number of NATO countries, had requested that the CSCE be 
given a greater say in military matters and that a link be established between the force 
reductions talks and the Conference. Yet, in spite of the initial strong Eastern opposition to 
these ideas, such proposals continued to be advocated at the start of the second round of talks 
40 See Le Monde, 17 January 1973; and Carle, Ibid., p. 325. 
4l Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 15; and Carle, Ibid. Carle also notes that many East Europeans 
delegates were not present at the Conference. 
42 See "East Europeans Begin Strategy Session", NTT, 16 January 1973. As reported in this article: 
"Western diplomats suggested that because of the complexity of the issues and the relatively limited 
preparations so far, the Warsaw Pact countries needed to agree upon a unified position for the first 
East-West talks on the reduction of military forces in Central Europe. " 
43 As a result of the lack of any reaction from the Eastern countries because many of their delegates 
were absent from the Conference room, a suspension of the meetings was called from 18 to 22 
January. See Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 15. 
44 See Carle, "Les pourparlers" (premiere partie), p. 340; and NYT, 16 January 1973. 
45 "East Hardens Line at Helsinki", FT, 18 January 1973. 
46 Ibid. 
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in Dipoli in mid-January 1973. On 17 January, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland proposed 
placing military security issues, including troop cuts, on the agenda of the Conference. 47 
Sweden and Switzerland also requested the establishment of a special Sub-Committee of the 
Committee on Security to study arms control and other military measures. 48 On 18 January, 
the Netherlands argued that the relation between the military and political aspects of security 
(which, in the MPT language, meant the link between the CSCE and MBFR) should be 
underlined by the Conference. 49 In addition, Belgium and Romania were still on record for 
requesting a link between the CSCE and the proposed negotiations on MBFR by demanding 
that the heading "military aspects of security" include a specific commitment by both military 
alliances to the principles of troop reductions. 50 In fact, even after the conclusion of the WTO 
meeting in Moscow, which had reportedly been arranged to get Bucharest in line with the 
Pact's position at Dipoli, Romania continued to advocate the consideration of military issues, 
including military disengagement and troop cuts. 51 
As evidenced by the Soviet and Eastern press during this first week of the second round of 
deliberations at Dipoli, the Kremlin and its close allies remained strongly opposed to any such 
consideration. For them, "all questions of military disengagement and disarmament should be 
dealt with at separate talks" and "no military matters at all should be linked with the Helsinki 
talks. "52 Furthermore, arms control and troop reductions were "separate, independent 
questions" which "should become the subject of talks between the states concerned elsewhere 
than at the all-European conference". 53 
Given Moscow's strong opposition to discussing any military aspects of security in the CSCE 
and particularly, it seems, those related to arms control and disarmament, it is most likely that 
the hardening of the Eastern position, apparent in January, was primarily due to the repeated 
and increasing number of appeals for consideration of these topics at the Conference, and 
47 See Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 15; "Long-term Security", The Guardian, 18 January 1973; 
"Europe's Neutrals Want Voice on Arms Cut at Security Talks", IHT, 18 January 1973; and FT, 18 
January 1973. 
48 Financial Times, 18 January 1973. 
49 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 15. 
so "Helsinki to Hear NATO View", The Guardian, 15 January 1973. 
51 See the FT of 18 January 1973: 
52 See Ibid., 18 January 1973. Commentaries from the Pravda editions of 4 and 9 February 1973 can 
be found, respectively, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press [CDSP], XXV: 5,28 February 1973, p. 
25; and CDSP, XXV: 6,7 March 1973, p. 18. 
53 As reported in the IHT, 18 January 1973. 
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especially those related to the establishment of an MBFR-CSCE link. 54 Indeed, in a complete 
reversal of position, when the Soviet Ambassador addressed the MPT for the first time after 
the WTO meeting, he put forward an amended agenda for the Conference, which included a 
reference to confidence-building measures. 55 As presented by Maltsev, on 22 January, the 
Soviet Union was now ready to consider adding to its first agenda item the consideration of 
"certain measures for strengthening stability and confidence". 56 Furthermore, although 
Maltsev did not describe the nature of these measures or elaborate further on the subject, 57 he 
emphasised in his speech that there was no longer any need to discuss military matters in 
Helsinki because the WTO had now officially proposed separate talks on force reductions, 
open to all interested states, where these issues could be discussed. 58 
Maltsev's comments on MBFR referred to the long-awaited reply of the Warsaw Pact nations 
to NATO's formal invitation to start exploratory talks on force reductions on 31 January. The 
WTO reply, released on 18 January after the conclusion of the Moscow meeting, noted that 
the talks should be held in Vienna, and not Geneva as proposed by the West, and that they 
should be opened to all interested nations. The Pact's suggestion for the MBFR to be opened 
to all interested states surprised many Western governments who believed that the issue of 
participation in the MBFR had previously been settled --during the visit of President Nixon to 
Moscow in May and that of Henry Kissinger in September 1972-- and that the talks would 
only involve those states who had troops in the Central Region. 59 
Several motivations were attributed to the Soviet announcement on the enlargement of 
participation in the MBFR. As many reports suggested, the decision had been "inspired by 
France and arranged during President Georges Pompidou's visit" to Minsk earlier in the 
month (10-12 January). 60 During the visit, Pompidou and Brezhnev discussed MBFR and, 
54 By February 1973,16 proposals on security issues had been advanced at the MPT, and seven of 
these had been made by neutral or non-aligned nations. See Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of 
Hope, p. 480, and pp. 623-624 note 18. Furthermore by 23 March 1973, no less than five texts had 
been submitted on the issue of MBFR. See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 92. 
55 See "Moscow Modifies Helsinki Proposals", The Guardian, 23 January 1973; and "Soviet Agenda 
Put Forward in Helsinki", The Times, 23 January 1973. The new agenda item proposed by Moscow 
related to the expansion of cultural co-operation and dissemination of information; a concession to the 
request of the NATO countries to address the issue of "human contacts". 
56 See Ibid. 
57 See "Russia Makes General Reply to West at Security Talks", IHT, 23 January 1973. 
58 See The Guardian, 23 January 1973; and "Soviet Union Proposes a Four-Point Agenda for Planned 
All-Europe Security Conference", NYT, 23 January 1973. 
59 "Les pays de l'Est proposeraient que la negociation sur les reductions de forces soit ouverte ä tous les 
Etats", Le Monde, 18 January 1973; and "Western Camp `Confused, Worried': Soviet Bid Rattles 
Security Talks", IHT, 20 January 1973. 
60 IHT, 20 January 1973; Klein, Securite et desarmement, p. 67; and Le Monde, 18 January 1973. 
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while Pompidou maintained French reservations to such negotiations, he had apparently 
hinted that he might reconsider his country's position on participation. Since France's main 
objection to MBFR was its bloc-to-bloc approach, many observers believed that the Soviet 
objective in proposing that the negotiations should be opened to all interested states (and not 
only to the members of both alliances) was simply to obtain French acquiescence to the 
talks. 61 
Another motivation suggested for the Soviet announcement on MBFR was that Moscow was 
trying to disrupt the harmony that was developing between the Western states and the neutrals 
at Dipoli by forcing the Allies to take a stand against the inclusion of the former in MBFR. 62 
Such interpretation would be consistent with the view held by many at the time that the Soviet 
move was mainly for propaganda purposes. 63 Indeed, most Western governments believed 
that the Soviet Union did not really want the MBFR negotiations to be held at some thirty-five 
nations, because the Warsaw Pact nations would find themselves in a minority and would be 
vulnerable to pressure from the NNAs. 64 
A third motivation attributed to the announcement was that the Soviet Union believed that by 
inviting all interested states to participate in MBFR it could avoid the consideration of all 
"military" issues in the CSCE. 65 Indeed, if all "interested nations" agreed to join the MBFR, 
Moscow could have argued that there was no longer any need to discuss such topics at the 
CSCE because negotiations of these issues were being held in another forum. Undoubtedly, 
and as clearly evidenced by Maltsev's comments in Dipoli on January 22, the Kremlin 
believed that its proposal on MBFR participation would completely close the debate on the 
introduction of military issues in the CSCE, and the fact that Maltsev had also accepted, in the 
same speech, the consideration of some unspecified measures to strengthen confidence would 
not necessarily be inconsistent with this goal. It is plausible that Moscow believed that if a 
number of "interested nations" agreed to join the MBFR it would be relatively easy to discard 
the modest CBMs from the CSCE on the grounds that similar measures were being dealt with 
in another forum. Meanwhile, probably waiting for reactions to their announcement, the 
61 For a discussion, see Klein, Securite et desarmement, p. 67. Also Le Monde, 18 January 1973, 
suggests that the reason why Pompidou left open the issue of participation in MBFR was that there 
were already rumours during his visit in Minsk on 12 January that the Soviets were considering 
opening the talks to all interested states. 
62 See Klein, Securite et desarmement, p. 67. 
63 See Maresca, To Helsinki, pp. 53-54. 
64 Canada, DEA, n. d. 
65 See Klein, Securite et desarmement, p. 67. 
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Soviets were reluctant to provide details on what their proposal on "certain measures for 
strengthening stability and confidence" really entailed. In fact, in an important speech 
delivered by Maltsev on 29 January, presenting the list of items Moscow would like to 
discuss under the heading `Security', he did not even mention CBMs. 66 
Whatever objectives the Kremlin had hoped to achieve with its announcement on the 
enlargement of MBFR participation and the vague statement on the consideration of certain 
unspecified measures to strengthen security, these proposals had no impact on the discussions 
in Dipoli. b7 The same day Maltsev delivered his speech on these questions, many delegations 
spoke to denounce the Soviet position, 68 and argumentation in favour of the consideration of 
military issues continued unabated until the conclusion of the second round of talks. 
On 24 January, the Netherlands, supported by Italy and later by Spain, argued for the CSCE 
to discuss the political aspects of disarmament, another reference to the link between MBFR 
and CSCE. 69 At the beginning of February, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Yugoslavia 
reiterated their demand for the CSCE to be given a greater say in military matters. 70 And, 
before the MPT adjourned for its second recess on 9 February, the question of the link 
between the CSCE and the MBFR continued to be argued by the Netherlands who, with the 
support of the neutrals and non-aligned, requested its consideration by the Conference. 71 
Meanwhile, perhaps having realised that the CSCE could not avoid dealing with some aspects 
of military security and that CBMs represented the most innocuous programme in this field, 
the East Germans provided the first clear indication that the WTO nations were ready to move 
forward on CBMs. In a document tabled by them on 5 February, reference was made to 
"certain measures for strengthening stability and confidence having in mind mutual 
notifications about large military manoeuvres in stipulated areas and the possibility of the 
exchange of observers according to an invitation at such manoeuvres. "72 
66 "La securite Europeenne. M. Maltsev (U. R. S. S. ) a aborde la discussion de fond", Le Monde, 31 
January 1973. Maltsev only mentioned two points: the principles governing relations between states, 
and measures to promote their implementation. 
67 In mid-February 1973, the British delegation at Helsinki noted that the neutrals had "resisted the 
Soviet suggestion that they should transfer their attention to Vienna". Bennett and Hamilton, The 
Conference, p. 95. 
68 See Carle, "Les pourparlers" (premiere partie), p. 340. 
69 Ibid., p. 338. 
70 The Guardian, 2 February 1973. 
71 See "Seule la securite europeenne a fait l'objet d'un examen approfondi", Le Monde, 9 February 
1973. 
72 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 92 note 5. The report also noted that by the end of the 
second session of the Dipoli consultations the Soviets "had still not given formal support to this 
formula. " 
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3.3 Third Session (26 February -6 April 1973) 
The third round of consultations opened with most delegations being concerned about the 
slow pace of progress registered in the first three months of talks, and France successfully 
proposed the creation of a Working Group to examine in greater detail the numerous 
proposals which, by then, had been grouped into four broad subject areas, or "baskets". 73 As 
conceived, the Working Group would discuss all proposals in each of the four baskets in turn, 
before proceeding to define mandates or agreeing on a title for each category. 74 Although the 
Soviet Union had initially opposed the development of terms of reference for the different 
agenda items (and still did not specifically agree to it), Moscow accepted the establishment of 
a Working Group, having complained during the second session that the plenary meetings 
were too burdensome. 75 
On 1 March, the Working Group convened at expert-level to study the principles of inter-state 
relations, the first item registered in Basket One. 76 By 14 March, sufficient progress had been 
made on the issue for the Working Group to begin discussing confidence-building 
measures. 77 Meanwhile, the delegations had agreed that unofficial drafting committees, or 
"Mini-Groups", could start recording texts on the most important points of the agenda78 and, 
following a Swiss proposal, a Mini-Group to consider only the military questions of Basket 
One had started under Swedish chairmanship. 79 
As soon as the delegations began their closer examination of the different proposals on 
military issues, it became evident that a very important part of their deliberations would have 
73 For background, see Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 13 and p. 16; and Bennett and Hamilton, 
The Conference, p. 89 and pp. 91-92. 
74 See "Le representant de la France a fait de nouvelles propositions sur la procedure", Le Monde, 28 
February 1973, "French Proposal for Helsinki", FT, 27 February 1973; and Bennett and Hamilton, 
Ibid., p. 104 and pp. 98-99. 
75 See Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 19; and Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 104. For a 
discussion of the evolution of the Soviet position on the issue, see Ferraris, p. 16; and Bennett and 
Hamilton, pp. 91-92 and p. 98. 
76 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 20; and "La Suisse propose de creer un sous-groupe sur les 
questions militaires", Le Monde, 4-5 March 1973. 
" See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 105. 
78 For a discussion of the working structure adopted in March, see Bennett and Hamilton, The 
Conference, pp. 104-105; Mendelevich, "Diplomat's Notes", pp. 96-97; "Major Step Forward at 
Helsinki Negotiations", The Times, 10 March 1973; "Helsinki Security Talks Make Further Progress", 
FT, 13 March 1973; "La redaction d'un ordre du jour de la conference europeenne a commence", Le 
Monde, 14 March 1973; and "Augury Silence", The Guardian, 14 March 1973. 
79 For background on the Swiss proposal, see Le Monde, 4-5 March 1973. For the beginning of the 
work of the Mini-Group on military issues, see "Les consultations d'Helsinki seront suspendues du 7 
au 25 avril", Le Monde, 18-19 March 1973. 
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to be devoted to what was then largely described as the question of the "indivisibility, or 
interdependence, between the political and military aspects of security". In concrete terms, 
this phrase provided a justification to the numerous proposals advanced by the NNAs and 
underlined the dissatisfaction of these states that military issues in Europe were being dealt 
with exclusively by the military alliances and carried out in parallel negotiations, such as 
MBFR and SALT, while such negotiations could impact on their security. 80 The ambitious 
aim of the NNAs in arguing for recognition of the interdependence between the political and 
military aspects of security remained, as before, that the Conference provide them a greater 
role in the decisions affecting the security of all states on the continent. In this regard, the 
NNAs wanted the CSCE to recognise their right to participate in defining guidelines for arms 
control and disarmament negotiations, to advance recommendations in these negotiations, and 
to be kept informed about their developments. As argued more forcefully than during the 
general policy debate, the NNAs believed that these objectives could be achieved by 
establishing some institutional connection between MBFR and CSCE whereby (perhaps as a 
form of a Sub-Conference to the CSCE) the MBFR would report to the Conference, or by the 
CSCE elaborating the principles for the pursuit of these negotiations as well as other 
disarmament talks in which they were not involved. 81 In line with this objective Sweden 
tabled, on 15 March, a document requesting that the mandate of the Committee on Security 
include the issue of "other aspects of security". 82 The proposal was immediately supported 
by the Yugoslav delegation who stated that it was necessary that the CSCE define the general 
principles of the MBFR negotiations. 83 
Until the opening of the third session and the beginning of drafting of mandates, opposition to 
the NNAs proposals had mainly been raised by the Eastern bloc countries. However, in early 
1973, a number of Western countries including France, the United States and, to a lesser 
extent, Great Britain also began to express their disapproval. 84 From then on, France became 
one of the most reluctant participants to accept any language on the subject, arguing that "the 
80 For a discussion of the relationship between the political and military aspects of security, see 
Acimovic, Problems of Security, pp. 226-227. 
81 See "Neutrals Seek a Military Detente", The Guardian, 16 March 1973; Ferraris, Report on a 
Negotiation, p. 24; Mendelevich, "Diplomat's Notes", p. 107; and Acimovic, Ibid., pp. 226-227. 
82 Ferraris, Ibid., p. 24. Ferraris notes that these aspects "were none other than the link of the MBFR 
with the CSCE. " 
83 Ibid., p. 24. 
84 See The Guardian, 16 March 1973; and Ferraris, Ibid., p. 24. For earlier reports on French 
disapproval of the issue, see "Seule la securite europeenne a fait 1'objet d'un examen approfondi", Le 
Monde, 9 February 1973; and Carle, "Les pourparlers" (premiere partie), pp. 337-338. Carle also notes 
a disapproving statement of the British Ambassador on 2 February in response to a Dutch intervention 
requesting the establishment of a link with MBFR. 
141 
Conference should, in no way, be pushed into facing a real debate on military problems or to 
promote a connection of a structural nature with the MBFR, even if only for the sake of 
information. , 85 
While the debate on "other aspects of security", or the "indivisibility of political and military 
detente", slowly came to a standstill, discussion on CBMs had to tackle a wide range of 
proposals reflecting different interests in the matter. In addition to the notification of major 
manoeuvres and movements, and the exchange of observers put forward by NATO, the 
Working Group had to consider the Romanian and NNAs' requests for a large number of 
measures, including establishing constraints on movement of troops, limiting demonstrations 
of armed forces, prohibiting manoeuvres near border areas as well as several proposals 
relating to nuclear-weapons-free zones. 
In spite of the wide range and number of proposals, the delegations made considerable 
progress by reaching agreement on a provisional draft text which, although containing several 
brackets indicating disagreements, represented a major step forward. The text, accepted ad 
referendum, on March 30, stipulated that: 
... appropriate proposals (of a preliminary nature) shall be submitted to the 
conference including measures such as the prior notification of major (movements 
and) manoeuvers on a basis to be specified by the conference (restraints on such 
movements and manoeuvers) and the exchange of observers at military manoeuvers 
under mutually acceptable conditions. 86 
As indicated by the absence of brackets, all participants had accepted the principle of prior 
notification of manoeuvres and the exchange of observers, but had not yet reached agreement 
on the issue of notification of movements, strongly opposed by the Warsaw Pact nations. 
Furthermore, judging by the overall content of the text (and its bracketed portions), most of 
the CBMs proposals put forward by the neutrals and non-aligned had either been greatly 
diluted in the overall discussions or had simply been ignored. This was the case, for instance, 
of the request made by Malta for the Conference to discuss aerial and naval manoeuvres 
taking place in the Mediterranean. 87 Similarly, Yugoslavia repeated suggestions for the 
consideration of measures to limit the number or size of manoeuvres, or prevent their holding 
near border zones were then reduced to a general discussion on "restraints". The same 
85 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 24. 
86 Canada, DEA, 23 May 1973. 
87 Proposals made in March. For background, see Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, pp. 22-23. 
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applied to the Romanian proposal for identifying the CBMs to be adopted at the Conference 
as preliminary measures that could be followed-up at a later stage. All these proposals were 
opposed by Moscow and its close allies and went far beyond what the majority at NATO was 
willing to discuss at the CSCE. The lack of details in the text further revealed that the 
participants had not tackled the substance of the CBMs and, in fact, the consultations were 
already moving towards deferring the discussion on the substance of the measures and their 
parameters to the Conference proper. 88 
3.4 Fourth Session (25 April -8 June 1973) 
The last session of the MPT opened with the unresolved questions of the "other military 
aspects of security" and, especially, the issue of a link between the CSCE and MBFR. 
Surprisingly, by mid-May, this latter question was mainly debated between two NATO 
countries, France and the Netherlands. 89 The Dutch delegation re-emphasised, with some 
neutral support, that the CSCE should "discuss the indivisibility of the military and political 
aspects of security and produce a declaration on force levels in Europe which would enable 
those not directly involved in MBFR to express their views". 90 France strongly argued 
against the proposal but was the only delegation to do so. Indeed, both the Soviets and the 
Americans had previously indicated willingness to accept some reference to disarmament and 
MBFR and, by May 12, the informal drafting group had even began to produce a compromise 
formula on the issue. 91 The French delegation, however, wanted no reference to any specific 
negotiations and remained adamant they could not accept "anything more than a passing 
reference to disarmament". 92 
One week later, "the difference between the Americans and Russians on the one hand and the 
Dutch, Yugoslav and Romanians on the other" was fairly narrow, and a possible compromise 
appeared in sight, but the French remained intransigent. 93 During discussions between the 
Soviets, the Americans, and a number of other delegations an agreement had almost been 
reached for adopting a text stipulating that the Conference was in favour of disarmament and 
of ending the arms race, and was in support of negotiations on these issues. 94 These 
88 See Ibid., p. 26. 
89 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 125. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 See Ibid.; and Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 34. 
93 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 129. 
94 Mendelevich, "Diplomat's Notes", pp. 107-108. 
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formulations, however, were not supported by the French, 95 and the question relating to the 
concept of the indivisibility of the political and military aspects of security turned out to be 
one of the last issues to be solved by the MPT. 
On June 7, following a compromise between France and Yugoslavia, acceptance was made 
for the Final Recommendations to note that "efforts aimed at disarmament complement 
political detente". 96 Agreement was also reached for the Blue Book to recognise the particular 
interest of the participating States to be informed about relevant developments from the point 
of view of their own security. 97 The phrase, which did not specifically refer to any 
negotiations or negotiating forums, was all that was left from the attempts of the NNAs and 
Romania, supported by a number of NATO countries, to link MBFR to the CSCE. 
On CBMs, the last session of the MPT opened with the same three outstanding issues 
recorded in the provisional text of March: 
1. Eastern opposition to accept the notification of military movements; 
2. a Romanian proposal that CBMs were `measures of a preliminary nature', 
and; 
3. a Yugoslav proposal for `restraints' on movements and manoeuvres. 98 
As in previous sessions at Dipoli, the issue of "restraints" on military activities (whether more 
generally defined or greatly diluted) continued to be rejected by a majority of NATO and 
WTO delegations and was eventually abandoned. Similarly, the Romanian suggestion for 
describing the measures to be adopted at the Conference as being only of a preliminary nature 
had to be considerably watered down mainly because of American, French and, to a lesser 
extent, Soviet opposition. 99 
95 Ibid., p. 108. 
96 See Ibid.; Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 129; Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 35; 
and "Two Compromises Clear Path for European Security Talks", XT, 10 June 1973. Paragraph 22 of 
the FHRC read in full: "The Committee/Sub-Committee shall have regard to the fact that the 
participating States are desirous of eliminating any causes of tension that may exist among them and of 
contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world, bearing in mind the fact that efforts 
aimed at disarmament complement political detente and are essential elements in a process in which all 
participating States have a vital interest. " 
Paragraph 24 of the FHRC read: "The Committee/Sub-Committee shall pay due attention to the 
views expressed by participating States on the various subjects mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, 
on the particular interest they attach thereto, especially from the point of view of their own security and 
of their desire to be informed about relevant developments. " 
98 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 116 note 2. 
99 Ibid., p. 116. The possibility of a further development of CBMs was left relatively vague in the 
Document. In the provisions dealing with "other confidence-building measures", for instance, the 
Document noted that the participating States recognised that "the experience gained by the 
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On 11 May, a new text emerged from the drafting committee, with the last main stumbling 
bloc being the Eastern opposition to the inclusion of "movements" in the draft Sub- 
Committee mandate covering the military aspects of security. 100 As later described by a 
leading member of the Soviet delegation, Moscow's opposition to the measure was mainly 
due to a lack of experience with CBMs: 
A number of delegations proposed to include in the assignment for the first agenda 
item a third --and quite important measures: namely, preliminary notification of large 
movements of troops not linked with military exercises. Neither the Soviet Union, 
nor any other country could have objections in principle against considering such a 
measure in the future, too. But it was clearly premature to tackle the problem at that 
particular time: no experience whatsoever had been yet accumulated in carrying out 
the first two confidence-building measures, and those measures had not yet been 
elaborated. 10 1 
Soviet arguments against the notification of movements were not shared by the other 
participating States and, with the NNAs gradually being denied all their proposals in the field 
of security, the issue took on greater significance in the Conference room. Clearly isolated on 
the question, Moscow eventually accepted a compromise formula whereby the notification of 
movements could be studied by the Conference. 102 At the same time, the Soviets insisted, as 
a last-minute request, that the text on the exchange of observers at major manoeuvres include 
the proviso that any exchange would be "by invitation". 103 
As finally registered in the Blue Book, the conclusions of the Helsinki consultations on CBMs 
consisted of only one short paragraph explaining the general purpose for discussing CBMs at 
the Conference and providing different instructions for the notification of manoeuvres, the 
exchange of observers, and the notification of movements. Paragraph 23 read in full: 
In order to strengthen confidence and to increase stability and security, the 
Committee/Sub-Committee shall submit to the Conference appropriate proposals on 
confidence-building measures such as the prior notification of major military 
manoeuvres on a basis to be specified by the Conference, and the exchange of 
observers by invitation at military manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions. 
The Committee/Sub-Committee will also study the question of prior notification of 
major military movements and submit its conclusions. 
implementation of the provisions set forth [in the Document], together with further efforts, could lead 
to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence. " 
... See Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 125. 
101 Mendelevich, "Diplomat's Notes", pp. 106-107. 
102 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 128-129. 
103 See Ibid.; Mendelevich, "Diplomat's Notes", p. 107; and Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 35. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
Despite the seemingly meagre results of the Helsinki consultations, the Multilateral 
Preparatory Talks of the CSCE had produced important accomplishments. When the 
consultations opened in November 1972 few could have expected that the discussions would 
result in a final document detailing all the problems to be considered at the Conference. In the 
field of security, the large gap in the opening positions of the parties regarding what issues of 
European military security should be introduced at the Conference (if any at all) raised serious 
doubts that consensus could emerge on this subject. 
Of all three main groupings represented at Helsinki, the Alliance was the most satisfied with 
the outcome of the consultations. Unlike the NNAs, who came with great expectations for 
the adoption of a large number of proposals in the military field, and the Eastern bloc nations 
who were determined not to accept any such issue in the CSCE, the West had entered the 
preliminaries with only two CBMs to advocate and, apart from the fact that the notification of 
movements and the notification of manoeuvres had been separated and given different 
mandates, the conclusions of the proceedings were virtually a complete endorsement of the 
Western programme. 
Whether this success could be repeated at the Conference and how the main negotiations 
would evolve was less certain. The six months of pre-conference talks left little doubt that 
even if the NATO CBMs programme had been accepted, the compromises reached did not 
necessarily satisfy the other participating States. The neutrals and non-aligned wanted more 
comprehensive measures and had failed to gain support for any of their other proposals in the 
field of security. The Eastern states did not want any CBMs and had conceded on the issue 
only to secure the beginning of the Conference. These considerations would certainly 
complicate the main negotiations, but they also presented clear opportunities for the West. 
Indeed, on the one hand, the Allies could count on the Warsaw Pact nations to reject any new 
or too demanding proposals put forward by the neutrals; on the other, they would also be able 
to count on the NNAs to put pressure on the East to accept CBMs. What was left for the 
Allies to decide was whether they would choose to take the lead for the development of 
concrete and effective measures, or whether they would be satisfied with only a general 
agreement on the issue. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ALLIANCE WORK ON CBMs DURING THE MPT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The preliminary consultations on the CSCE were a great success for the West. The two 
measures sponsored by the Allies were accepted by all participating States and a mandate 
closely following the Western programme had been drafted. These achievements were 
particularly noteworthy because the NATO delegations had arrived at the talks ill-prepared to 
discuss the measures, having given only minimal consideration to the issue beforehand. 
One important reason for the absence of any far-reaching preparations at NATO was 
uncertainty that the Soviets would accept CBMs at the CSCE. In the months preceding the 
opening of the Dipoli consultations, Moscow had warned the West that it would not accept 
any discussion of military issues at the Conference. Initially, in May, the Soviets had argued 
that the measures should be dealt with in the framework of a permanent body created by the 
CSCE. 1 Then, in September, they maintained that "if the military aspects of security were 
touched upon at a CSCE, even minimally, this would surely divert the Conference from its 
proper course and overload its agenda. "2 Soviet diplomats strongly argued that it would be 
"more expedient, logical and useful to discuss such confidence-building measures together 
with proposals for arms reductions", 3 and that the issue should "be lumped together with 
MBFR and dealt with separately". The repeated Soviet warnings against CBMs raised 
serious doubts that the Allied proposals would be accepted, which was not conducive to the 
development of a comprehensive policy at NATO. But this was not the only explanation for 
the absence of Western preparations. 
Another important reason was that no Allied government was truly committed to CBMs. 
Reflecting the different national interests of the NATO partners, initial discussion on the 
introduction of "certain military aspects of security" in the CSCE was monopolised by the 
debate over the establishment of a link between MBFR and CSCE. CBMs only surfaced as a 
bi-product of these discussions and as a clear second "best-choice" that no one conceived as a 
1 Canada, DEA, 26 May 1972.. 
2 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 61. The Soviets had also noted that they would oppose the 
discussion of CBMs at the CSCE because they should be dealt in a permanent body. Canada, Ibid., 30 
September 1972. 
3 Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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matter of primary importance. 
Another reason hampering detailed planning was that the early discussions on CBMs at 
NATO had revealed quite opposite views on what types of measures should be proposed and 
how the measures chosen should be presented. As a result, the Allies were able to agree 
hastily on the consideration of just two measures. Furthermore, Washington's concerns that 
the negotiations of CBMs in the CSCE could harm the introduction of similar measures in 
MBFR led to a general agreement that the measures to be presented at the Conference should 
be left largely undefined, and the policy dictated that no further effort be made at NATO to try 
to define specific modalities, or "parameters", for the CBMs. 
Certainly, the Allies had good reasons to enter the MPT with only a general understanding of 
their proposals, but it is less clear why this situation was not reviewed during the negotiations, 
especially after it became clear in early 1973 that their CBMs would likely be accepted for 
negotiation at the Conference. Indeed, inquiry into NATO's deliberations on CBMs, from the 
beginning of the preliminary talks in November 1972 to the opening of the Conference in July 
1973, shows that the Allies did not increase or expand the pace or scope of their work. In 
fact, in addition to a continuing lack of interest in the subject, the Allies also appeared 
unconcerned about a number of problems developing with regard to their initial approach to 
the negotiations. 
2. PROGRESS ON EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS? 
The suggestion for the CSCE participating States to exchange observers at major military 
manoeuvres was a Western idea. Yet, when the NATO delegations introduced the measure, 
they had no clear view on how such a system of exchange of observers could be equitably 
established for some thirty nations of different size and capability. Furthermore, even though 
the measure was one of the first to be informally accepted by all delegations, as early as 
March 1973, the Alliance did not accelerate examination of the measure nor undertake any 
study of future application. Throughout the six months of Multilateral Preparatory Talks, the 
Allies made only one decision concerning exchange of observers, and this decision was 
clearly precipitated by an ambiguous comment made in the East German media in early 1973 
which had raised questions about how the WTO nations might envisage application of the 
measure. 
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The East German media report, which followed the vague statement made by the Soviet 
Ambassador in Helsinki on January 22 indicating the possibility of discussing "certain 
measures to strengthen security", noted that Moscow's proposal included "the prior 
notification of major manoeuvres and the exchange of observers `on such occasions'. "5 Short 
of any official explanation in the Conference room, the latter formulation raised concern at 
NATO because it might imply that the East was thinking of establishing some sort of 
automatic link, or obligation, between the notification of a manoeuvre and the invitation of 
observers. Indeed, the suggestion that observers could be invited "on such occasions" could 
imply on "any occasion when a manoeuvre is notified", and this created problems for some 
Allies. 6 
Prior to the MPT, Belgium had made a similar proposal at NATO but the Alliance had not 
7 accepted it as a suitable measure for the CSCE. As argued in Brussels after the East German 
media report, such application of the measure could result in missed opportunities for the 
smaller states who may not have the resources to participate in all the exchanges. 8 More 
significantly, the suggestion could entail an obligation on the part of the NATO states to invite 
Eastern observers to manoeuvres the Alliance would rather not, especially those simulating 
chemical and nuclear warfare, or involving classified equipment. 9 
After further consideration of the issue, the Allies agreed they would reject any suggestion at 
Dipoli to create an obligation to invite observers to all notified military activities. 10 This 
constituted the first, and only, decision by the Alliance during the preliminary talks 
concerning exchange of observers. At the end of the Dipoli consultations in June 1973, no 
work was in progress on the measure in Brussels and the Alliance had no position on when 
observers should be invited, who should be invited, to what types of manoeuvres they should 
be accepted, or what conditions should govern the observation. l I 
5 Canada, DEA, 2 February 1973. See also Jain, "Romania and the Conference", p. 333, referring to 
an interview given by the GDR Ambassador on 23 January 1973. 6 As later described by the GDR representative in early February, the Eastern position was that there 
could be mutual notifications in "stipulated areas" and the possibility of exchange of observers 
according to an invitation at such manoeuvres. Canada, Ibid., 6 February 1973. 
The proposal to permit observers to attend any notified military manoeuvres was included in the 
original paper Belgium submitted at NATO on 29 February 1972. The proposal was also resubmitted 
on 29 September, and was mentioned in the October Alliance Draft/Agenda Guidelines on CBMs. 
See, respectively, Canada, DEA, 10 March, 29 September, and 12 October 1972. 8 Ibid., 21 February 1973. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Canada, DEA, n. d. (The document was drafted between the conclusion of the MPT on 8 June and 13 
July 1973). 
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3. PROBLEMS WITH NOTIFICATION 
Progress on the notification measure was equally unsatisfactory. When the Dipoli discussions 
concluded, only one paper was under development in NATO and no other studies were 
contemplated. 12 More significantly, the study, which dealt exclusively with the "illustrative 
lists" of military activities, raised more questions than answers concerning the potential scope 
and future application of the measure and cast doubts over the pertinence of the negotiating 
approach chosen by the Alliance. 
As originally conceived, the illustrative lists were meant to circumvent the need to provide 
precise definitions of several key-terms such as "movements", "manoeuvres", or "major", and 
avoid discussing other potential contentious issues like "area of application" or "level of 
troops" involved. 13 By tabling illustrative lists of Western military activities, the Allies 
wished to exemplify the scale and type of military activities they would be prepared to notify 
hoping that the WTO would reciprocate with similar lists and that this would be sufficient to 
reach agreement on the undertaking. As agreed before the consultations, each NATO 
member state was to develop a list reflecting only its national contribution to recent NATO 
military activities. However, initial efforts in Brussels to come up with an agreed package of 
national lists for presentation during the negotiations indicated important difficulties with the 
scheme. With no comprehensive study on CBMs, and no clear guidance as to what would be 
desirable to notify and why, the Allies found themselves locked in long discussions over how 
to proceed with finding proper examples agreeable to all. During the discussions, for 
instance, most European partners maintained that only large military activities should be 
notified, but could not agree, or define, what should qualify as a "major" activity. Some 
delegations then suggested that the military activities should be quantified and perhaps start at 
one or more divisions, but for another group of states, an attempt to evaluate "major 
activities" in terms of quantity would be difficult to do, and could be of little value. 14 These 
states argued that in addition to the strength of the forces involved there were a number of 
other concomitant factors, such as the purpose of the activity, the type of material involved 
and the level of opposing forces in the area in question, which would greatly impact on the 
significance of an activity. ' 5 
12 Ibid., 23 May 1973. 
13 Ibid., 8 November 1972. 
14 Ibid., 1 February 1973. 
15 Ibid., 9 February 1973. 
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As discussions on the lists continued, it became clear that more precision about the scope of 
the measure would be needed and that definition of some key-terms could probably not be 
avoided. This, however, was precisely the reason why the Alliance had opted to develop such 
lists and not all partners were willing to concede to having a greater definition of the CSCE 
CBMs. This latter issue was to take on particular significance when the Americans began to 
reconsider their position on the notification of movements, suggesting that the topic should be 
kept for the MBFR talks. 
4. CONFUSION OVER TERMS: MOVEMENTS, MANOEUVRES, OR EXERCISES? 
The first indication that the United States was reconsidering the notification of "movements" 
came in early March 1973 when the Americans told their Allies in Brussels that they were 
"prone" to agree with the Soviets that movements should be kept for the MBFR. 16 At that 
time, the discussions in Dipoli had clearly established that several CSCE participating nations 
were not only favouring the notification of movements, but also wanted the Conference to 
develop measures to place restrictive limits, or restraints, on them. Given Washington's early 
concern that the CSCE CBMs should not prejudice the negotiation of similar measures in the 
MBFR --and in particular those related to movement constraints-- such suggestions might 
have been sufficient to bring a reassessment of the US policy on the notification of 
movements. Yet, assuming that the attempt of the NNAs to enlarge the NATO proposal on 
the notification of movements also to include restraints on them was an important factor in 
triggering the reassessment of the initial US policy, this would not explain why Washington 
had proposed the notification of movements in the first place, nor would it explain why the 
Americans did not withdraw their proposal before the MPT began in November and, thus, 
possibly avoid any discussion of the issue at the preliminaries and prevent NATO from 
becoming the primary sponsor of such measure in the CSCE. Indeed, it is paradoxical that in 
their first contribution, tabled at NATO in July 1972, the Americans suggested the notification 
of movements, while also insisting that the CSCE measures should not interfere with 
movement constraints in MBFR. 17 More significantly, in September 1972, or two months 
before the opening of the MPT, Belgium argued that the Alliance's package of CBMs for the 
CSCE should include a measure on the limitation of all movements of a certain size within 
16 Ibid., 9 March 1973. 
" Of the five criteria listed by the Americans in July, two specifically related to MBFR. As noted in the 
paper, the measures to be presented at the MPT should be "consistent with actual measures the West 
will want to propose in the MBFR negotiations", and they should "not be prejudicial to negotiation of 
constraints in an MBFR forum. " Ibid., 31 July 1972. 
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and/or into a certain area. 18 Certainly, if such measures could be advocated by an Allied 
government, Washington should have expected that similar, if not more comprehensive, 
proposals would be advanced by other states at the MPT, especially in view of the well 
known aspiration of some of the NNAs to expand, as much as possible, the security content of 
the Conference. 
5. ERROR OR OVERSIGHT? 
It is plausible that in line with Washington's policy to adopt a general approach toward the 
CSCE CBMs, its initial description of the notification measure, which included the use of the 
terms "movements" and "manoeuvres", was not meant to underscore any precise type of 
military activities but to describe a general concept that would encompass most, if not all, of 
the "major" military activities in Europe. In their draft Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs 
presented at NATO in July 1972, the Americans clearly appeared to place emphasis on this 
aspect, more than on the specific activities themselves, by consistently placing the term 
"major" into quotation marks. 19 
This emphasis on the magnitude of the military activities to be notified, as opposed to their 
types, would also explain the numerous inconsistencies found in the initial US contribution on 
CBMs and in most other documents prepared, or submitted, at NATO during the next few 
months. Indeed, important confusion can be noted as to precisely what the notification 
measure should apply to, or what exactly was being described when using the terms 
"manoeuvres", "movements", or "exercises". Repeatedly, these terms and, in particular, 
"manoeuvres" and "exercises", were used inter-changeably. In their July paper, the 
Americans entitled their proposed notification measure the "Prior Announcement of Major 
Military Movements and Manoeuvres in Europe". In the accompanying description of the 
proposal, however, they never referred back to "manoeuvres", but used instead the term 
"exercises". Similarly, when the comments from all member states were gathered in Brussels 
18 Ibid., 29 September 1972. This proposal was also included in the first paper Belgium presented at 
NATO on the subject. Ibid., 10 March 1972. 
19 When recommending that each party determine for itself what constituted a "major" movement, the 
term "major" (in contrast to movement) was placed in quotation marks. Ibid., 31 July 1972. Also, in 
the paper submitted to NATO by Washington in November 1972 warning against lengthy discussions 
on definitions, the United States insisted that the illustrative lists of exercises to be prepared by the 
CSCE participants could serve "as indicators of what both sides understand `major' to mean in this 
context", clearly emphasising again that the main concern was more with the magnitude of the military 
activities than with their specific types. Quotation from the November paper is from Ibid., 8 November 
1972. 
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in October 1972 in a new Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs, the document referred to the 
notification measure as being a measure for movements and manoeuvres. 20 Yet, in the 
narrative of the problem, the Allies suggested that NATO should attempt to gain an 
understanding on how to define the terms "movement and exercise" by recommending that 
NATO table a selective list of its own "force movements and manoeuvres". 
As was established later on, "manoeuvres" have connotations that go beyond those of 
"exercises", 21 but while most of the confusion seemed to apply predominantly to the terms 
"manoeuvres" and "exercises", other problems could be noted. In their paper, the Americans 
suggested that the notification of "movements and manoeuvres" would strengthen stability 
because it would enhance the predictability of "movements". Yet, it is evident that if a 
manoeuvre is held in proximity to the area where the participating troops are already 
deployed, no significant "movement" of forces would be involved. Also, a "manoeuvre" 
does not necessarily describe all the activities that could be involved in a "movement" of 
troops, because movements are often conducted for reasons other than supporting 
manoeuvres. 22 
It is conceivable that in its paper Washington did not want to draw clear distinctions between 
the different military activities that took place in Europe but simply wanted to attract attention 
to the destabilising effects of large non-notified military activities. In this regard, the 
20 Information on the NATO draft report of October 1972 is from Ibid., 12 October 1972. 
21 The CSCE never adopted any definition of the terms. However, as suggested in the first Alliance 
Guidelines paper for the Geneva negotiations. 
"The words "manoeuvres" and "exercises" are not interchangeable since all manoeuvres are 
exercises but not all exercises are manoeuvres. Nor should the words "manoeuvres" and 
"exercises" be used automatically as including "movements". In general terms, the 
distinctions are that movements have many aspects --movement of troops, equipment, into, 
out of, or within areas, temporary or permanent, land, sea or air, etc.; manoeuvres are normally 
two-sided activities of real forces trained and equipped; exercises include manoeuvres but 
could also refer to exercises of contained or paper forces. In general, a movement need not be 
a manoeuvre but any manoeuvres imply movement of forces. " 
This paper was adopted at NATO on 15 October 1973. Ibid., 23 November 1979. In 1978, the British 
Government published the following definitions which it then suggested using in relation to the 
provisions of the Final Act: "manoeuvres involve the tactical deployment, for training purposes, of one 
or more formed military formations to oppose a hypothetical "enemy" within a specific area for a 
specific time. Movements differ from manoeuvres in that they are not primarily for training and do not 
necessarily involve tactical deployment. " United Kingdom, Fifth Report from the Expenditure 
Committee- Session 1976-1977. Progress Towards Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Observations by the Government, Miscellaneous No. 3 
(1978), Cmnd. 7112,1978, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1978, p. 4. 
22 A movement can simply be a redeployment of troops from one location to another. It can be noted, 
however, that most Western military commanders will often use some part of every military movement 
as an opportunity for a movement exercise. Troop movements towards a manoeuvre area therefore can 
take the form of an exercise. Canada, DEA, 15 March 1973. 
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imprecise use of the language could be explained as simply reflecting this approach. Yet, it is 
also possible that the confusing use of the language resulted from the fact that the distinction 
between the different terms was not recognised at the outset. Indeed, even if the United States 
provided many of the initial ideas on CBMs, 23 Washington's enthusiasm for the measures 
was never described as being more than simply "not noteworthy". 24 Moreover, given the fact 
that the Americans wanted to keep the CSCE discussion on confidence-building measures the 
least technical as possible, 25 not much consideration was given to the precise meaning of the 
terms. Judging by the superficial treatment of the subject in the July document, it seems very 
likely that no military or technical analysis had been made for its preparation. 26 In fact, the 
US paper was largely based on the spring report of the Alliance Ad Hoc Committee, which 
had simply reviewed advantages and disadvantages of the measures without arriving at any 
definite conclusions. 27 
Another consideration supporting the view that the full distinction between the different terms 
was not recognised at the outset is that during the early discussions on CBMs, it was 
apparently not uncommon within some Alliance circles to use the terms "manoeuvre" and 
"exercise" inter-changeably. 28 Presumably, before the CSCE began, there was no real need to 
use the terms with great precision. As such, the imprecise (though not inconsequential) use of 
the language in the July paper may not have been recognised at all. 
6. CHOOSING A (NEGATIVE) STRATEGY 
While Washington's initial suggestion for the notification of movements may have been the 
product of a roughly drafted policy aimed at emphasising "large" military activities, or the 
result of simple oversight, it is less clear why the proposal was not withdrawn before the MPT 
opened in November 1972. By that time, the consultations at NATO had clearly underscored 
23 As acknowledged by a senior member of the US delegation at the CSCE: "The U. S. position [on 
CBMs] 
... was 
lukewarm, despite the fact that many of the ideas originated with the United States", 
Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 169. 
24 Canada, DEA, 31 October 1972. 
25 Ibid., 9 March 1973. 
26 Ibid., 24 April 1972. 
27 This fact was noted in the covering page introducing the US paper on CBMs where it was stated that 
"the paper derived from the report of the Ad Hoc Committee". Ibid., 2 August 1972. The work of the 
Ad Hoc Committee, in turn, was probably based on an earlier paper drafted in Washington in early 
March 1972, at the time when the Allies began considering the meaning of the December 1971 
Ministerial decision to propose the consideration of "certain aspects of military security" in the CSCE. 
Mention of such a study being carried out in early March is made in Ibid., 10 March 1972. 
28 "The terms were often used to mean the same thing. " Ibid., 1 February 1973. 
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the possibility that any discussion of movements at the CSCE could become quite detailed 
and could be enlarged to include restraints. This was particularly evident from the 
recommendations of a number of NATO partners requesting more precise definitions for the 
CBMs, and from the September request by Belgium for the consideration of restraints to be 
included in the NATO CBMs package; a proposal the United States then objected to on 
substantive grounds. 29 Yet, rather than clarifying the issue or withdrawing the proposal, the 
strategy chosen to deal with the notification measure was to advocate the development of 
illustrative lists of military activities. 
Whether the United States was the first country to introduce the idea of illustrative lists in 
Brussels, in October, when it first appeared in the NATO Draft Agenda/Guidelines Paper on 
CBMs, cannot be assessed with certainty. Nevertheless, by November, the idea was strongly 
advocated by Washington as a means of getting around the contentious question of the 
definition of the terms "movement" and "manoeuvre". 30 
One of the most immediate results of this undertaking was increased confusion at NATO. 
Indeed, all throughout the preliminary talks, and even after the MPT concluded, reference to 
the illustrative lists by member states differed considerably with regard to exactly what the 
lists should be, and why they were being developed. As can be noted from different 
documents, the lists were believed to be either for "manoeuvres", 31 for "exercises"32 or, 
alternatively, "for exercises involving the major movement of troops". 33 The purpose for 
developing the lists was also given different interpretations, sometimes being described as a 
way to avoid determining what "movements" might be eligible for notification, 34 or what 
"major" should mean in the CSCE context. 35 
Probably because of this enduring and expanding confusion and the related difficulties in 
agreeing upon what the national lists should contain, an increasing number of governments 
began to reassess their previous stand on definition and demanded that NATO agree on exact 
definitions of the terms "movements", "manoeuvres", and "exercises". 36 This was the case 
29 Ibid., 29 September 1972. 
30 Ibid., 8 November 1972 and 3 July 1973. 
31 Ibid., 23 May 1973. 
32 Ibid., 21 February and 15 March 1973. 
33 Ibid., 25 June 1973. 
34 Ibid., 23 May 1973. 
35 Ibid., n. d. (The document was drafted between the conclusion of the MPT on 8 June and 13 July 
1973). 
36 Ibid., 15 March 1973. Canada was one of the nations requesting exact definition of the terms. 
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for Great Britain, who initially sided with the United States in arguing that the measures 
should be kept as general as possible but, by mid-March 1973, circulated definitions for the 
different terms suggesting, for instance, that manoeuvres were "large two-sided troop 
exercises"; an exercise could "be large or small and is often one-sided", and a movement was 
"simply a movement of troops from one place to another. , 
37 
Perhaps not accidentally, this is when the United States first indicated that it was 
reconsidering the notification of movements in the CSCE. 
38 The attempts by an increasing 
number of Allies to provide greater precision to the measure may have alarmed Washington 
over the way the discussions of CBMs in the CSCE could evolve and what impact this might 
have on MBFR. Furthermore, the definitions suggested by the United Kingdom, in March 
1973, would more clearly differentiate the different military activities taking place in Europe 
and would also (as described above) emphasise the issue of movement of troops not 
necessarily connected with any manoeuvre or exercise. As was later revealed, US concerns 
with "movements" being discussed in the CSCE were not only related to the possible 
implications for the MBFR negotiations, but also to the potential implications on its own 
troop movements. As one American negotiator explained, several reasons underscored US 
reluctance to include movements in the CSCE: 
First, maneuver notification seemed to satisfy the need for `military content' and 
anything more would have complicated things. Second, movement notification is a 
degree more serious and substantive than maneuver notification, and I believe there 
was a feeling that it was better to limit the negotiation in this unfamiliar and unwieldy 
group to the most elementary military subjects. Third, of course, was a reluctance 
among our military, and other U. S. officials, to enter into any obligations regarding 
movements. The feeling was that this could open the door to restrictions of some 
kind on our movements either to reinforce Europe in a crisis, or to transit Europe with 
forces in a Middle East crisis. This was without doubt a `material omission from the 
perspective of military significance, ' but you must remember that the military aspects 
were not our top priority in CSCE --the concept of `freer movement' was, that is to 
say the human rights aspects. We did not want the military component to dominate 
CSCE, because we believed that would shift its focus to the kind of European 
Security Conference which the Soviets wanted. 39 
Precisely at what moment Washington clearly formulated such specific concerns about the 
notification of movements in the CSCE is unclear. US preoccupation with the issue was not 
fully discussed among the Allies during the MPT. Whether this was because the Americans 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 9 March 1973. 
39 John Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals, London: Pergamon Brassey's, 1988, p. 13. 
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had not fully realised all the above implications, or because final acceptance of a mandate on 
the measure in the MPT remained uncertain until the very end of the Dipoli consultations, 
cannot be assessed with certainty. It is plausible that Washington, perhaps fully aware of the 
potential problems, wanted to wait for the final results of the MPT before deciding to pursue 
the issue further with its Allies. After all, any formal reconsideration of the proposal on 
movements would have serious implications for the Western states who had sponsored the 
measure at the very beginning of the preliminary talks. On the other hand, it is also plausible 
that Washington truly believed that the tabling of illustrative lists was a good strategy to 
ensure that the negotiations of the measure at the Conference would be kept very simple, 
especially if based primarily on Western examples. Yet, regardless of the extent to which 
Washington had then realised the potential difficulties with movements, no decision was 
made at NATO, during the MPT, to provide further precision to the measure. And, at the end 
of the multilateral talks, the Allies continued to try to develop selective lists of activities "as an 
alternative to grappling with the thornier issues of areas of applicability, details of notification, 
"4o what "movements" might be eligible for notification, etc. 
7. CONCLUSION 
Allied performance at the MPT never fully revealed the absence of serious preparations on 
the two CBMs sponsored by NATO, nor did it expose the growing difficulties in Brussels in 
advancing preparations for the main negotiations. The insistence of the neutral and non- 
aligned delegations for the CSCE to consider a wide-range of military issues ensured that a 
great part of the preliminary talks was devoted to this question. In addition, the large number 
of proposals on CBMs tabled during the consultations ensured that the delegations never had 
occasion for detailed discussions on any one of them. But, while the MPT provided more 
time for the Allies to prepare for the Conference, they made little progress. At the end of the 
preliminary talks the Alliance had not reviewed any possible terms and conditions for the 
exchange of observers. Similarly, none of the basic modalities, or "parameters", for the prior 
notification of manoeuvres and movements had been worked out. If anything, the Alliance 
only seemed to be going backwards in its preparation for the negotiations. The United States 
began to raise doubts about the inclusion of the notification of movements; a measure 
considered by many as the most important measure proposed by the West at the CSCE. Also, 
early attempts at devising illustrative lists of military activities, then NATO's only negotiating 
40 Canada, DEA, 23 May 1973. 
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strategy to deal with the notification measure, ran into difficulties. These difficulties were 
significant because they highlighted fundamental inherent problems with the approach. 
Indeed, if the main goal for developing the lists was that they could be used as a substitute for 
defining areas of application, working out details of notifications and various other matters 
related to the scope and the operation of the measure, initial work at NATO revealed, that 
short of a better and more precise formulation of these issues, no progress could really be 
made on them. But several Allies, and especially the United States, continued to favour only 
a vague formulation of the CBMs, and no decision was made to reconsider the viability of the 
approach and no further study on the measure was undertaken. 
Hence, while the MPT concluded with acceptance of the two measures sponsored by the 
Allies (which, by then, had become three measures because of the different mandates given to 
the issue of manoeuvres and movements), the West was no more knowledgeable about them 
than at the start of the consultations. Furthermore, resolution of the problems that had 
emerged during Allied consultations was simply postponed to the next stage of negotiations, 




THE NEGOTIATION OF CBMS AT THE CSCE 
(JULY 1973-AUGUST 1975) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When the CSCE officially opened, the thirty-five participating States had a mandate to 
consider only three confidence-building measures. As agreed during the Multilateral 
Preparatory Talks, the Conference was tasked to: 
(1) submit appropriate proposals on the prior notification of major military 
manoeuvres; 
(2) submit appropriate proposals on the exchange of observers by invitation at 
military manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions, and: 
(3) study the question of prior notification of major military movements and submit 
its conclusion. 
Although the six months of preliminary talks in Dipoli had successfully circumscribed the 
confidence-building measures to only these measures, the mandate laid down in the Final 
Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations was extremely vague. Examination of the 
wording suggested that the proposals that could be advanced at the Conference could be very 
detailed or very general, and could emphasise a thorough development of CBMs or, 
alternatively, important restrictions on their application. Concerning the measure on the prior 
notification of major military manoeuvres, for example, the mandate did not specify what 
"notifying" really meant or what it entailed. To whom, how, or when to notify was not 
addressed. The details the notification should contain had also not been included and the 
notification could be extensive or simply embracing a general announcement that the 
activities would be carried out. The question of what constituted a "major" manoeuvre was 
not defined and could be either large or small. Even the type of manoeuvres the parties 
should discuss was not specified: land, sea or air manoeuvre; single or combined; any; or all 
types? 
On the exchange of observers, the mandate only mentioned that the Sub-Committee should 
submit proposals "on the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres under 
mutually acceptable conditions". Who should be invited, what they should be allowed to see, 
how and for how long, were only a few of the many practicalities that had not been addressed 
in the mandate. Should the observation include predominantly large or small manoeuvres, 
large or small areas, large or small units, and what "mutually acceptable conditions" entailed 
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was also not defined. Certainly, no single CSCE state expected to observe all military 
manoeuvres of all 35 participating nations, and while some "system" would have to be 
devised either for the measure to be applied bilaterally or on a restrictive multilateral basis, 
proposals in this regard could aim at maximising or minimising exchanges. 
Finally, on the notification of movements, even though the Final Recommendations gave it 
some pre-eminence by separating it from the measure on the notification of major 
manoeuvres, the mandate only suggested that they be studied by the Conference. This 
formulation opened a range of options if the issue of "movements" remained throughout the 
negotiations. Proposals on movements could involve movements of forces, weapons and/or 
equipment; they could concern land, sea or air; they could be movements in specific areas or, 
again, they could simply be left undefined. 1 
Given the numerous unsettled points at the start of the negotiations, and the wide range of 
options available, it was clear that the Conference would have to decide the real meaning of 
the agreement reached during the MPT. But, while the delegations knew that the Conference, 
with its pre-agreed three-stage process, would be of considerable length, no one expected that 
two full years of negotiations would be necessary to reach a final document. 
2. STAGE I: HELSINKI (3 -7 JULY 1973) 
Stage I of the CSCE opened in Helsinki on 3 July 1973 at foreign minister level. The main 
purpose of the meeting was formally to approve the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki 
Consultations and to agree on a date for the opening of Stage II, at which time the real 
negotiations would take place. The gathering also provided an opportunity for the Foreign 
Ministers to present the views of their governments on the Conference and, in the field of 
CBMs, the statements immediately highlighted the wide gap in the opening position of the 
parties. 
One of the first speakers to address CBMs during Stage I was Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko. Speaking on behalf of the Soviet Union, Gromyko made it clear that Moscow had 
no interest in long discussions on CBMs. In just one sentence, also reproduced in a "General 
Declaration" outlining the Kremlin's views on what the final results of the CSCE should be, 
1 Canada, DEA, 23 May 1973. 
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Gromyko suggested that the Conference adopt the following text: 
The participating states deem it of great importance that the States concerned, in the 
interest of strengthening stability and confidence in Europe, should notify each other 
in advance on the basis of agreed procedures, of major military manoeuvres in 
specified areas and the exchan e observers by invitation at such manoeuvres under 
mutually acceptable conditions. 
Gromyko's submission on CBMs was almost identical to the original document tabled by the 
GDR during the preliminary talks and, for Western observers, "was written as though no 
agreement had been reached during the six months of the preparatory consultations. "3 
Disregarding the provisions of the Final Recommendations calling for the Committee and 
Sub-Committee of the Conference to study the question of the notification of movements and 
to submit conclusions, the Soviets totally ignored the topic. On the issue of exchange of 
observers, Moscow's opening position appeared to be that the undertaking should be 
restricted only to "major" manoeuvres, even though the Final Recommendations had left open 
the possibility to invite observers at "military" manoeuvres. Finally, the suggestion that the 
notification measure should apply in "specified areas" also disappointed Western delegates 
because the Helsinki Final Recommendations said nothing about the zone of application of 
the CBMs and Moscow's suggestion implied further restriction on the development and 
application of the measure. 4 
In sharp contrast with the short and dismissive Soviet presentation, the British Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Douglas-Home, provided extensive argumentation in favor of CBMs. 
Reproduced in a three-page document distributed to all delegations on 5 July, the British 
restated their general views on the problem of military security in Europe maintaining that 
even if more detailed aspects of military security were considered elsewhere, it was possible 
to identify measures of a more political character which could be dealt with by the CSCE. 5 
"Major military manoeuvres [were] obvious examples of such politically significant military 
Z Proposals by the Soviet Union, Agenda Item I, "General Declaration of the Foundations of 
European Security and the Principles of Relations between States in Europe", CSCE\I\3, 
Helsinki, 4 July 1973, in CSCE, Records and Documents - Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe, CSCE Stage 1, Helsinki, Verbatim Records, July 3-7,1973. See also 
Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 182; Acimovic, Problems of Security, p. 215; and Klein, 
Securite et desarmement, p. 13 8. 
3 Canada, DEA, 17 July 1973. 
4 See Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 182; and Acimovic, Problems of Security, p. 215. 
5 Proposal by the United Kingdom Delegation, Agenda Item 1- Questions Relating to Security in 
Europe - Confidence Building Measures, CSCE/I/18,5 July 1973, in CSCE, Records and 
Documents - Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, CSCE Stage 1, Helsinki, 
Verbatim Records, July 3-7,1973. [Hereafter: CSCE, Records and Documents, CSCE/I/18]. 
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activity" because, as the British asserted: 
They have no immediate relationship to military capacity or force levels but they can 
reflect political intentions or be deployed to achieve political objectives. A 
manoeuvre or exercise is designed to test the readiness of the country carrying it out 
to meet an assumed threat from outside or, in some cases, its ability to launch an 
offensive against another country. It can also be used as a warning. To a neighbour 
the objectives of the country carrying out the manoeuvres may often be unclear .... 
He may interpret a manoeuvre designed for a defensive situation as an offensive one. 
He may assume that it is a warning when it is not. Such ambiguity creates tension 
and possibly counter moves which can set in train an escalatory process. Effective 
prior notification of major military manoeuvres would greatly reduce the 
opportunities for misunderstanding and suspicion. 6 
Reviewing the other CBMs provisions of the Final Recommendations, the British argued that 
the notification of major military movements was even more important than the notification 
of manoeuvres because "a movement, even more than a manoeuvre, can in certain 
circumstances be interpreted as an indication of military activity of a potentially hostile 
nature. It is above all the unexplained military movement which creates tension. "7 
Finally, while noting that the CBMs would not require verification and would not be legally 
binding, the British emphasised that their application should nevertheless be considered 
carefully and that they should involve certain modalities. The content of the notification, for 
instance, should include: 
" the name or description of the manoeuvre or movement; 
" the number of personnel involved; 
" the time-frame; 
" the departure and destination of the participating units and; 
" the unit designation and the period of absence of participating units from their 
normal duty station. 8 
While the Soviet and British presentations underscored that agreement on the Final 
Recommendations had not closed the distance between East and West, the interventions of 
the European neutral and non-aligned nations (in particular Sweden and Yugoslavia) made it 
clear that they were not satisfied with the final results of Helsinki, nor of the opening positions 
of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Reiterating views previously expressed during the 
MPT, the NNAs, supported by Romania, maintained that the Conference should do more in 
the field of security. Sweden suggested that in addition to the three CBMs included in the 
6 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
8 For a text, see UK, FCO, Selected Documents, pp. 160-166. 
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Final Recommendations, the CSCE should consider restraints in the Baltic region and should 
create a Sub-Committee to examine questions of arms control in Europe. 9 Finland urged the 
participants to study the question of a "Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone" and "other ideas relating 
to nuclear-weapon-free zones". 10 Yugoslavia proposed that the Conference develop measures 
to apply restraints on movement of forces in border areas and limitations on military activities 
(including ceilings on the size of all manoeuvres held in Europe), " while further maintaining 
that the CSCE CBMs should be applied in the Mediterranean region. 12 Romania, taking the 
most ambitious stance of all, reintroduced its long list of arms control, disarmament and 
disengagement proposals, including a call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all 
European countries; an end to military manoeuvres; an end to military build-ups on the 
borders of other nations; an end to military blocs; a reduction of military budgets; a reduction 
of national military forces; a denuclearised zone in Europe, and; the renunciation of the use of 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. 13 
Another divisive issue raised during the MPT which resurfaced during Stage I was the 
establishment of a link between CSCE and MBFR. Several participating States, including 
Spain, Romania, Austria and Malta reiterated their interest in the idea. 14 From the NATO 
countries, Belgium openly favoured a link, while Turkey (slightly more in line with the weak 
and vague language agreed upon at the MPT) maintained that information on MBFR should 
be provided regularly to the CSCE. 15 Several delegations also mentioned the principles and 
the desirability of disarmament, with four countries (Norway, Belgium, Spain and Romania) 
expressing the view that the CSCE should hold a debate on the subject; 16 something that had 
been rejected during the MPT with a final compromise formula only suggesting that the 
Conference bear "in mind the fact that efforts aimed at disarmament complement political 
detente". 




13 See "Russia Lists Security Principles: Romania Seeks Demilitarization", IHT, 5 July 1973; 
and Canada, DEA, 17 July 1973. 
'a See Canada, DEA, 17 July 1973. See also "U. S., Britain Pressing Europe Talks to Act", IHT, 
6 July 1973; and "Britain Tells Europe: Act, Not Talk to Safeguard Security", The Guardian, 6 
July 1973. 
's Canada, DEA, 17 July 1973. 
16 Ibid. 
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Most of the proposals advanced by the NNAs went beyond the basic agreement reached 
during the pre-conference consultations and, when the Foreign Ministers concluded Stage I 
on July 7, it was clear that many of the compromises reached during the preliminary talks 
were only superficial and that a number of difficult issues would be re-opened during the 
main negotiations. 
3. STAGE II: GENEVA (18 September 1973 - 21 July 1975) 
Stage II of the CSCE opened in Geneva on 18 September 1973 and concluded only twenty- 
two months later, on 21 July 1975, when consensus was reached on a complete final 
document. As the long duration of the deliberations suggested, Stage II corresponded to the 
real negotiations of the CSCE where practical meaning had to be given to the Final 
Recommendations. Held at expert-level, the work was carried out in different Committees 
and Sub-Committees corresponding to the agenda items accepted by the parties during the 
preliminaries. The protracted period of negotiations did not mean, however, intense 
negotiations throughout. Slow progress followed by long phases of virtual deadlock 
characterised the proceedings, especially in the field of CBMs where the parties once again 
began with very differing views on what the Conference should achieve. 
3.1 General debate (18 September - 14 December 1973) 
The initial three months of work in the Sub-Committee on military matters started slowly 
with a generalised debate in which the participating States probed each other's intentions. 
This opening phase also saw the tabling of working papers from a number of countries, 
including Yugoslavia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Romania, Finland, the United 
Kingdom, Norway and Belgium outlining objectives in the field of CBMs. " 
As expected from the views expressed by the Foreign Ministers during the first stage of the 
Conference, several of the proposals put forward by the NNAs went beyond the Helsinki 
Final Recommendations. The working document submitted by Yugoslavia included an 
ambitious programme of measures to cover the military aspects of the CSCE. 18 In addition to 
the three confidence-building measures agreed upon in Helsinki, the Yugoslav government 
" Canada, DEA, 18 March 1974. Information on the different papers can be found in Ferraris, 
Report on a Negotiation, pp. 183-188 (passim). 
18 See Acimovic, Problems of Security, pp. 216-217, and p. 311 note 217; and Ferraris, Ibid., pp. 
182-183. 
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proposed that the Conference consider: 
1. a reduction in the number, size, and frequency of manoeuvres and their holding in 
border zones, the flying of fighter planes along frontiers, the movements of naval 
warship in proximity of the territorial waters of other states, and the testing of 
weapons in border zones; 
2. a restriction of military activities and military movements which might give rise 
to apprehension and tensions; 
3. a reduction of foreign military forces in Europe and in the Mediterranean, and; 
4. a general statement on the contribution to efforts to achieve general and complete 
disarmament. 19 
In addition to Yugoslavia, a number of other participating States also put forward specific 
measures outside the agreed framework of the Final Recommendations. Romania 
reintroduced its extensive list of proposals, which included the prohibition of stationing 
nuclear weapons on foreign territory, closing down foreign military bases, withdrawal of 
troops from foreign countries and establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. 20 Spain 
proposed the introduction of a new type of CBMs into the CSCE asking the participating 
States to engage in exchanges of military missions and exchanges of personnel between 
military teaching centres. 21 Similarly, Sweden also introduced a new proposal for CBMs 
suggesting that the Conference devise provisions for the wider publication and dissemination 
of information on annual defence spending. 22 
Interest in establishing some form of a link between MBFR and CSCE was also reaffirmed 
during the general debate with Yugoslavia, Norway and Spain suggesting that the final 
document of the Conference should include principles of force reductions. 23 Spain further 
maintained that the CSCE should develop principles of disarmament. 24 
In general, the Western governments recognised that the many issues on European security 
raised by the NNAs "reflected the fact that the CSCE was the only forum available to a 
number of them to express themselves publicly (and for home consumption) on military 
matters of concern to them. , 25 For the neutral and non-aligned states, the CSCE was also "the 
only public multilateral European forum to bring pressure to bear on participants in other 
19 Ibid. 
20 Acimovic, Ibid., p. 217, and p. 311 note 219. 
21 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 183. 
22 Ibid., p. 187. 




[arms control and disarmament] fora. , 26 Although the NATO states were generally 
sympathetic to the situation of the non-bloc countries, and some were even willing to endorse 
certain of their least contentious proposals and supported the issue of a link with MBFR, this 
was not the case with the Soviet Union who wanted the Conference to conclude as quickly as 
possible. 
The Soviet position on CBMs was re-emphasised at the very beginning of Stage II when, on 
19 September, the delegation re-submitted the same text tabled by Gromyko during the 
Foreign Ministers meeting. 27 In short, the Soviets did not want to discuss the notification of 
movements and were only willing to recognise the importance of notifying major military 
manoeuvres and the exchange of observers at some of these manoeuvres without any further 
elaboration or commitment. 
At the conclusion of the presentation of opening positions, the difficulties facing the Sub- 
Committee were obvious. Taking stock of the developments since the beginning of the 
negotiations, the British reported in early November that the work of the Sub-Committee on 
CBMs was already faltering "in the face of a restrictive and defensive Soviet line", while the 
neutral and non-aligned nations were "disenchanted and silent". 28 One month later, the 
British observed that although the Western ideas for CBMs "had got off to a promising start", 
the Soviets had since "adopted a thoroughly restrictive and defensive attitude", 29 and that "the 
prospects for useful results in this field" did not look bright unless the Soviets could be 
convinced "that some permanent and effective tests of their military intentions are an integral 
part of a successful Conference. "30 The Soviets were also showing "deep mistrust" of 
Western insistence to discuss CBMs and, as interpreted in London, "their main objectives 
appear to be to limit the amount of Soviet military activity to be included in the CBMs and to 
leave as many loopholes as possible. , 31 
On the eve of the first Christmas recess of the Conference, the general orientation of the three 
main groupings for the remaining of the negotiations appeared as follow: the West would 
mostly concentrate on the three measures included in the Final Recommendations; the East 
would try to exclude any formulation on the notification of movements and limit the 
Z6 Ibid. 
27 Ghebali, La diplomatie de la detente, p. 147. 
28 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 202. 
29 Ibid., pp. 216-217. 
30 Ibid., and p. 227. 
31 Ibid., pp. 226-227. 
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development of the other two measures to a minimum, and; the neutral and non-aligned 
would push for a comprehensive development of the measures agreed in Helsinki while also 
trying to have their own proposals accepted by the Conference. 
3.2. Winter 1974 (15 January -5 April) 
With nothing of substance achieved in the first three months of negotiations the West decided 
in early 1974 to present a comprehensive resolution on CBMs. The drafting stage would 
soon start in the Sub-Committee and, although the Allies and the NNAs had submitted several 
working papers, only Romania and the Soviet Union had tabled draft resolutions. 32 NATO 
did not want the drafting of decisions to start on the basis of both of these two documents and, 
on 4 February, the British delegation tabled a resolution on CBMs. 
Two weeks later, on 20 February, six neutral and non-aligned states followed the British 
initiative with a draft of their own. Co-sponsored by Sweden, Austria, Cyprus, Switzerland, 
Yugoslavia and Finland, the "Draft of the Six", as it became known, was immediately 
supported by Malta, Romania, and Spain. 33 The initiative of the NNAs was significant not 
only because the draft resolution excluded or significantly watered down their most ambitious 
proposals, but also because it was the first time that these states co-operated together in such a 
manner and the move was expected to force them to co-ordinate their positions and to make 
the proceedings of the Sub-Committee more structured. 34 
With the tabling of these two draft resolutions, the positions of what were now truly becoming 
three major groupings at the Conference (NATO, the WTO and the NNAs) became better 
defined, with important details emerging on each measure. For the West, as proposed in the 
British draft resolution, the notification measure should apply to all terrestrial or combined 
military manoeuvres and movements taking place anywhere in Europe when the level of 
participating troops reached the equivalent of one division. 35 All notifications should be 
given via diplomatic channels to all participating States, and should be transmitted at least 
sixty days before the start of the military activity or earlier in the case of military activities 
32 Ibid., pp. 226-229. 
33 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, pp. 191-192; and Acimovic, Problems of Security, p. 217. 
34 See Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 91; Acimovic, Ibid., p. 217; and Ferraris, Ibid., p. 192. 
35 For background on the proposal, see Ferraris, Ibid., p. 184; Maresca, Ibid., p. 171; Bennett 
and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 229; and Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals, p. 14. It 
is noteworthy that in his discussion of the British draft resolution, John J. Maresca, a senior 
member of the US delegation, omitted the proposal for the notification of movements. 
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organised at shorter notice. 36 The notifications should include: 
1. the name and general description of the manoeuvre and movement; 
2. the number of personnel involved; 
3. the nature of the units involved; 
4. the purpose of the activity; 
5. the geographical location; 
6. specific dates of manoeuvre or movement; 
7. the place of departure and destination of the participating units; 
8. the period of absence from normal duty station, and; 
9. "any other relevant information". 37 
On the exchange of observers, the British draft stipulated that it should be as widespread as 
possible and that it should not be restricted to major manoeuvres only. 38 Other confidence- 
building measures, such as those proposed by Spain for the exchange of military missions and 
exchanges of personnel between military teaching centres were considered worthwhile, and 
should be studied further by the Conference. 39 
The position of the Warsaw Pact nations (with the exception of Romania) was that only major 
military land manoeuvres should be notified and that the measure should apply only when the 
number of participating troops reached the equivalent of an army corps and when the 
manoeuvres take place in frontier areas not exceeding a zone of 50 kilometres within a 
national border. The notification should be given five days in advance and should be 
transmitted only to states adjoining the border area where the manoeuvre is taking place. 
Regarding the exchange of observers, the position of the Eastern states was that it should be 
limited to major manoeuvres and should be applied on a strict reciprocal basis. 40 Finally, in 
the absence of any experience with CBMs, the notification of military movements should not 
be considered at all, and should only be studied in the future (meaning probably after the 
CSCE). 41 
As expressed in the draft of the Six, the neutral and non-aligned nations wanted notification to 
be given for all military manoeuvres and movements taking place anywhere in Europe when 
18,000 troops or the equivalent of a reinforced division is involved. The notification measure 
36 Ferraris, Ibid., p. 184. 
37 Canada, DEA, 25 February and 18 March 1974. See also Borawski, From the Atlantic to the 
Urals, p. 14; and Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 229. 
38 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 184. 
39 Ibid. 
ao Ibid., pp. 184-185. 
41 Ibid., p. 185; Klein, Securite et desarmement, p. 140; and Bennett and Hamilton, The 
Conference, p. 228. 
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should apply to all military units (whether terrestrial, aerial or naval), and should cover all 
activities independent or combined (i. e. involving more than one service). 42 In the case of 
amphibious or airborne troop manoeuvres, the level of notification should be lower and start 
at one division for airborne forces, and one brigade for amphibious forces. 43 Also, all 
manoeuvres of combined multinational forces should be automatically notified at any level; 44 
all military activities that could give rise to apprehension or tension should be notified on a 
voluntary basis, and; all military activities should be subject to self-restraint. 45 The 
notification, to be given 30 days in advance, 46 should be transmitted via diplomatic channels 
to all participating States and should include most of the elements listed in the British draft. 47 
Regarding observers, they should be exchanged as widely as possible on the basis of 
reciprocity. 
The position of the West and the NNAs differed in several important areas. While NATO 
suggested the notification of major land manoeuvres with, when applicable, information on 
supporting air or naval forces, the neutral and non-aligned wanted separate notification of 
independent major air and naval manoeuvres. Also, while the Western states proposed only 
one overall troop level at which the notification measures should become applicable, the 
NNAs suggested sub-thresholds for amphibious and airborne troops, and added that all 
manoeuvres of combined multinational forces should be notified at any level. 
These provisions made the position of the Six more demanding than that of the West. 
However, on other parameters the Western position was more exacting. For instance, as 
proposed in the British draft resolution, the Allies wanted the number of days required for the 
prior notification set at sixty, while the neutrals and non-aligned only requested thirty days. 
On the overall level of troops at which major manoeuvres or movements would become 
notifiable, the Allies proposed one division (which, even if not quantified in the original 
42 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 185. 
43 Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974. 
as Ibid., 18 March 1974. 
' Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 185. 
46 Information on this point is contradictory. Some authors suggest that the proposal requested 
30 days advanced notice; others suggest that the number was 50. See for instance, Ferraris, 
Ibid.; Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals, p. 14;; Klein, Securite et desarmement, p. 141; 
Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 281; and Victor-Yves Ghebali, "Considerations sur 
certains aspects militaires de la detente: les `mesures de confiance' d'Helsinki", Defense 
nationale, April 1977, p. 28. [Hereafter: Ghebali, "Considerations"]. 
47 Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974. The Canadian document noted that draft of the Six omitted 
information on the unit name, the place of departure and destination of the participating units, as 
well as what the West considered to be a "catch-all" phrase, i. e. "any other relevant 
information". 
169 
British draft resolution was usually recognised as being approximately 10,000 troops), while 
the NNAs called for the notification measure to start at 18,000 troops. On the content of the 
notifications, the Western proposal was more comprehensive than the Six in that the latter did 
not request information on the name of the participating units, the place of departure and 
destination of the military activity, nor did it include what the Allies considered to be the 
"catch-all" phrase, i. e. "any other relevant information. , 48 
In spite of these differences, the proposals of these two groups were quite close and had 
almost nothing in common with that of the Warsaw Pact nations. Both NATO and the NNAs 
endorsed the notification of movements and judged the Eastern opening position regarding 
troop levels in manoeuvres requiring notification to be completely unacceptable. Indeed, 
even if the WTO delegations refused to quantify what they had in mind when using the 
formula of an army corps, Western estimates suggested that it could be anything between 
three to six divisions (or 30,000 to 60,000 troops), and NATO maintained that even at a level 
of three divisions the proposal was excessively restrictive. 49 The Allies argued in the Sub- 
Committee that with a level of 30,000 troops "only a very few manoeuvres within the Soviet 
Union and a few multinational manoeuvres by the NATO countries would be subject to 
notification each year. "50 In practice, the Soviet proposal would virtually exclude all the 
military activities of other participating States. 51 The Italian delegation pointed out that 
military manoeuvres with a participation of thirty thousand troops "had not been held in Italy 
for the last twenty years". 52 The Belgian delegate contended that the military manoeuvres of 
the armed forces of his country did not exceed two brigades and that accepting the Eastern 
proposal would mean that Belgium would be excluded from the notification regime. 53 Using 
much harsher words, the Dutch delegation accused the Soviet Union of trying to reduce the 
application of the notification measure to such an extent that the desired results would never 
be attained. 54 
48 Ibid. 
49 For various Western estimates, see Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 297; Borawski, 
From the Atlantic to the Urals, p. 14; and Klein, Securite et desarmement, p. 140. One problem 
in determining what the formulation might involve in terms of number of troops is that an army 
corps is not a unit but a command. For a discussion, see Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 
186. 






Closely linked to the above criticism of the high threshold at which notification (of 
manoeuvres only) should start was the Soviet request for the measure to apply only in 
"specified areas" related to frontiers. Initially, the Soviets refused to indicate how wide an 
area on each side of a border they had in mind55 but, for the West, any consideration of 
"border areas" or "zones" of application had to be discarded. As argued, "any width narrow 
or deep, would be unacceptable to one state or another either because it would be so narrow as 
to denigrate the value of notification, or so wide as to favour geographically larger nations by 
allowing them exemptions denied to smaller ones. "56 
In private, the Allies speculated about Moscow's motivations for such a proposal. Some 
believed that the Soviets wanted only frontier zones in order "to enable them to carry out 
manoeuvres with front line troops without providing notification of changes in 
deployment". 57 Others believed that the proposal underscored a desire to retain the possibility 
"to mass troops without notification sufficiently close to frontiers so as to be within a few 
hours of crossing a political boundary. , 58 Another possible reason for the proposal was that 
the Soviets were attempting "to protect the right to carry out training unannounced and 
without observers well back of their Western border or perhaps the Western borders of 
NSWP" (Non-Soviet Warsaw Pacts countries). 59 But, regardless of the precise motivation, 
the Allies believed that the prospect of carrying out a manoeuvre involving 30,000 troops in 
an area of 50 kilometres was very unlikely. 60 Furthermore, the Soviet idea of notifying only 
neighbouring countries implied that of all the NATO states only Turkey would possibly ever 
receive a notification from the Soviet Union. 61 In short, as one Italian delegate concluded, 
applying the Soviet proposal "would, in effect, have removed the obligation to notify any 
military activity. "62 
Criticisms of the Soviet position63 did not alter Moscow's opening stance and, when the 
drafting stage started at the end of March, 64 the situation looked grim as only minor points 





60 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 186. 
61 Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals, p. 14. 
62 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 186. The West feared that the Soviets might only need 
to notify their Allies of manoeuvres held on Soviet territory. See Bennett and Hamilton, The 
Conference, p. 281. 
63 Ferraris, Ibid., p. 187. 
64 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 270. 
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had been agreed upon since the beginning of the deliberations. For instance, the delegations 
had reached tacit agreement that the notification of manoeuvres might include information 
such as place, approximate dates and general purposes of the military activity, and that they 
would exclude sensitive matters such as communications and weaponry. 
65 A general 
understanding was also beginning to form that no restrictions on any military activities would 
come from the CSCE, although statements that self-restraint in frontier areas should be 
adhered to were expected to be made. 66 On the exchange of observers, it was agreed that the 
participating States would invite observers in good faith and on a reciprocal basis. 
67 Finally, it 
was commonly agreed that the language used in the final document to describe the "binding 
nature" or "level of obligation" of the CBMs should not convey the impression that they were 
legally binding. 68 
Even if these informal agreements, or understandings, could be recorded as progress, the basic 
positions of the parties remained unchanged since the opening of the Conference. More 
significantly, when the drafting stage began in March, the Soviet position was described as 
thoroughly restrictive in preventing any movement forward. 69 As observed by the British 
delegation, even if the Soviets were "truly isolated over CBMs" and "unable to provide 
convincing arguments for their restrictive position", they would not compromise on any 
issue. 70 In early April, the Soviets continued to be on the defensive and adamantly negative, 7' 
while their proposals indicated no advance since the opening of Stage IL72 The Soviets 
consistently argued for giving notification of manoeuvres only five days in advance and 
solely to neighbouring countries. 73 They refused to discuss movements and were also 
resisting the more moderate Spanish and Swedish proposals calling for military exchanges 
and greater openness in military budgets. 74 As a result, the Military Sub-Committee, which 
was already dragging behind others when the drafting started, made almost no progress. 75 
The Sub-Committee had started recording the different proposals on CBMs, but the process 
was long and time consuming because the delegations wanted to ensure that their proposals 
65 Canada, DEA, 13 February and 18 March 1974. 
66 Ibid., 18 March 1974. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid.; and Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 228-229. 
69 See Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 255. 
70 See Ibid., p. 269. 
71 Ibid., p. 266. 





were properly registered . 
76 Also, all alternative texts being developed contained so many 
brackets, emphasising language objectionable to one or more delegations --and especially to 
the East-- that only Soviet political willingness for compromise could "unblock" the 
negotiations. 77 By the time of the Easter recess Soviet non-cooperation on CBMs was such 
that, in the words of the Deputy Head of the German Delegation, one could speak of 
"mistrust-building". 78 
3.3. Spring-summer 1974 (23 April - 26 July) 
Eastern intransigence on CBMs continued well into the third session of Stage II until, on 12 
June, the Soviets suggested, at an informal meeting of Heads of Delegation, that Moscow 
could accept two changes to the notification of major manoeuvres. The Soviets would be 
prepared to accept a zone of application for the CBMs of 100 kilometres (which doubled the 
initial offer of 50 kilometres), and could accept seven days prior notice instead of the five 
days previously proposed. 79 One week after this first compromise, the Soviets made another 
small adjustment to their position by increasing the period for advance notification from seven 
to ten days. 80 
The concessions were of little consequences and, as the Alliance floor leader on CBMs, the 
British maintained that the Soviet proposals did nothing to alter the application of the 
measures to border zones that the NATO states strongly opposed. Also, from a purely 
national perspective, the British noted that the new proposal "had the particular disadvantage 
of covering virtually all the UK while imposing no comparable obligation on any of the other 
major European states. "81 Yet, despite the insignificance of the Soviet offer, several Western 
governments interpreted the move as suggesting "a willingness to negotiate on military 
subjects that the USSR had not previously displayed in the CSCE". 82 Also, even if the timing 
of the Soviet offer was clearly recognised as an attempt to help produce a more positive 
assessment of the negotiations on the eve of a NATO Ministerial Meeting, 83 most Western 
76 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, pp. 192-193. 
77 Ibid.; and Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 270. 
78 Götz von Groll, "The Geneva CSCE Negotiations", Aussenpolitik, 25: 2,1974, p. 162. 
79 Maresca, To Helsinki, pp. 99-100; Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 297; and Klein, 
Securite et desarmement, p. 141. 
80 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 100. 
81 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 297. 
82 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 100. 
83 Ibid. 
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delegations believed that they should try to find equivalent compromises. 84 
NATO's response came on 26 June. According to an American official, the Western 
proposals were "by degrees that were considered roughly proportional to the importance of 
the Soviet changes". 85 Instead of sixty days advance notice, the West proposed forty-nine 
days, and rather than one division (or roughly 10,000 troops), the West suggested the 
possibility of accepting a threshold of notification starting at 12,000 troops. 
86 Furthermore, 
speaking on behalf of the Alliance, the British representative hinted that the Allies might be 
willing to accept less details in the content of the notification and might consider making 
exceptions to the "all of Europe" concept for zones far away from other participating States. 
87 
NATO's counter-proposals were not well received by the Soviets. 88 In their opinion, they had 
made two concessions on timing and area, and "had gone as far as they [could] to meet 
Western demands" while "no comparable gesture [was] involved as far as the West [was] 
concerned. , 89 The Soviets also reiterated that the Western proposals on CBMs were designed 
"to provide other states with an unwarranted insight into the workings of the Soviet military 
apparatus". 90 They also argued that "for the Warsaw Pact, secrecy on matters which [were] 
open knowledge in the West [was] an essential element in the balance of power in Europe. "91 
Despite what appeared to be another important deadlock in the discussions, in the final week 
before adjournment for the summer recess in late July 1974, the Sub-Committee registered its 
first progress. A text on exchange of observers at major manoeuvres was mentally registered 
by the delegations, and the Spanish proposal calling for exchange of military personnel was 
accepted. The approval of the Spanish measure was noteworthy because this CBM was not 
included in the mandate of the Helsinki Final Recommendations. 92 Yet, no observer believed 
that acceptance of the measure was setting a precedent for additional CBMs to be introduced 
into the CSCE negotiations, because the proposal was of little consequence, only codifying a 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., p. 101. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 193. 
89 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 308. 
90 See Ibid., p. 320. 
91 See Ibid. 
92 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 103. 
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long-existing practice among many participating States. 
93 Also, the Soviets continued to 
refuse consideration of the Swedish proposal for the publication and wider diffusion of the 
annual military expenditures of participating States. , 
94 
Tacit agreement on exchange of observers was also not considered a breakthrough. As all 
other texts on CBMs under consideration at the time, the wording regarding the nature of the 
commitment of the measure (i. e. voluntary or otherwise) was still left undefined and in 
brackets and, more importantly, as one Western delegate observed, the real significance of the 
measure "would only take its full meaning when the provisions on notification of these 
maneuvers were agreed". 95 
By the time of the summer recess, the Committee had produced a fifteen-page document 
registering the different proposals on CBMs, but even after a second reading, in early July, 
most of the texts remained in brackets as only unnecessary expressions and phrases were 
removed. 
96 
3.4. Autumn 1974 (9 September - 20 December) 
When the Sub-Committee reconvened in early September, the negotiations were entering into 
their second year and the need to break the deadlock on CBMs, especially on the notification 
issue, became more pressing. Following lengthy discussions during the summer recess, the 
Allies officially indicated in Geneva that they could accept exceptions concerning the zone of 
application of the CBMs, and "hinted at further flexibility" on the number of days required for 
advance notification. 97 
The reversal of the Western position on the geographic application of the CBMs came out of 
the realisation that their opening proposal on the area of application calling for "all of Europe" 
was not only vague, but that it did not take into consideration that two countries, the Soviet 
93 Bernd A. Goetze, Security in Europe. A Crisis of Confidence, New York: Praeger, 1984, pp. 
79-80. [Hereafter: Goetze, Security in Europe. ] 
94 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 103. 
95 Ibid.; and Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 352. 
96 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, pp. 192-194. 
97 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 105. For background information on the issue, see Bennett and 
Hamilton, The Conference, p. 281 and pp. 330-331. Indication that the issue was already being 
considered by some NATO partners in early 1974 can be found in Canada, DEA, 25 February 
1974. 
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Union and Turkey, had territory that extended geographically beyond Europe. 
98 Although the 
Western governments did not want to give up the concept of "all of Europe" as the basis of 
definition for the area of application of the CBMs, they also recognised they were unlikely to 
gain all of the Soviet European territory. Moscow vehemently opposed the idea from the start 
and there was no sign that this would change. As described by one American negotiator, the 
"Soviets reasoned that the Soviet Union was an enormous country stretching into Asia, and it 
was therefore unfair to insist that maneuvers throughout the USSR's European territory be 
notified". 99 Furthermore, even though the Soviets would not make this argument publicly, 
they had a keen interest in trying to counter-balance the fact that the territory of both the 
United States and Canada would be exempted from the notification regime. '00 
Initially, the Soviets reacted negatively to the Western concessions, accusing the NATO 
delegations of seeking military intelligence with their proposals. 101 In early October, the 
Soviets softened their position by indicating informally that they could accept the "all of 
Europe" formula as the definition of the zone of application of CBMs provided, as the West 
had then formally offered, that exceptions could be made to them. 102 At the same time, the 
Soviet diplomats in Geneva urged their Western counterparts to demonstrate "greater realism 
about what was possible and acceptable in terms of national security" , 
103 noting that they 
could not improve on their existing position. 104 
This fact became obvious in the subsequent two months of negotiations. In November, the 
British reported that little had changed in the Eastern position. '°5 Apart from the fact that they 
were then willing to concede the application of CBMs to all participating States, 106 no 
progress on the notification of major military manoeuvres had been registered since the 
98 Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, p. 10. 
99 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 172. 
100 Ibid., and p. 105. According to Maresca, the Soviets were concerned about making this 
argument in public because they did not want to claim that they were not Europeans. 
'0' Ibid., pp. 105-106. 
102 Ibid., p. 107. 
103 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 333. 
104 See Ibid., p. 334. 
105 See Ibid., p. 345 and pp. 352-357. 
106 See Ibid., p. 345. Soviet agreement for the notification measure to be applied within 100 
kilometres from frontiers fell short of the Western objectives, and the Allies continued to be 
concerned that the Soviets were perhaps trying to exempt large parts of the territory of Poland 
and the GDR. The Soviets had previously indicated that they might have difficulties including 
all the territory of their allies, especially Poland and the GDR. The Allies also believed that the 
Soviet insistence on only a shallow zone along frontier areas might have been connected with 
the existence of secret training areas, possibly connected with chemical warfare. See Canada, 
DEA, 25 February 1974. 
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summer. 107 The proposed Soviet threshold for the notification measure (not yet quantified, 
but still believed to be between 30,000 and 60,000 troops) remained "so high" in Western 
views "that only a few exceptionally large exercises would qualify". 
108 The restriction to 
apply the measure only in frontier areas and to notify only neighbouring states still meant in 
practice that the Soviet Union would probably not have to notify any of its manoeuvres to the 
West. 109 Furthermore, opposition to discussing the notification of movements had remained 
completely unchanged. ll° The Warsaw Pact nations maintained, throughout 1974, that no 
experience existed with the CBMs and, hence, that it was premature for a measure of this kind 
to be considered at the Conference. l lI In line with this position, the only proposal advanced 
by the East was to suggest that the final conclusions of the CSCE read: 
The participating States have concluded that the consideration of the question of prior 
notification of major military movements can be resumed later when the climate of 
detente is reinforced in the European continent and the experience is accumulated of 
the exercises of the initial measures of strengthening confidence and stabilit , 
in 
particular of such a measure as prior notification of major military manoeuvres. I l 
By the end of 1974 the Eastern delegations noted that they would not discuss further drafting 
on the issue of movements until, in the words of one Western delegate, there was "a general 
willingness to accept their completely --and unchangingly-- negative attitude towards any 
such measure emerging from this Conference". 113 The only potential "concession" on this 
front, hinted in private by the Bulgarian delegation, was that they might agree to recognise the 
confidence-building value of the notification of movements providing "that they [could] limit 
the conclusions of the Sub-Committee to little more than that". 114 
3.5. The conclusion (20 January- 21 July 1975) 
January 1975 corresponded to the sixteen month of negotiations with no conclusion in sight. 
By that time, confidence-building measures, and especially the notification of manoeuvres, 
had taken on more importance for many delegations. No progress had been made, or was 
expected, on the "other military aspects of security". ' 15 An agreement on exchange of 
107 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 352. 
108 See Ibid., p. 353 and pp. 372-373. 
109 See Ibid. 
110 See Ibid. p. 352. 
111 Canada, DEA, 20 December 1974. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., 19 December 1974. 
114 Ibid. 
115 For an analysis of the state of play in late November 1974 and January 1975, see Bennett and 
Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 355-357 and pp. 372-374. 
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observers had been reached, but the measure was the least controversial of all and was to be 
of little value unless decent parameters could be accepted for the notification of major 
manoeuvres. Also, hope of achieving consensus on the notification of major military 
movements was becoming increasingly more remote. In this context, many Western 
Governments began to see the notification of manoeuvres as the only remaining security 
element of the CSCE. 116 More significantly, perhaps, the need to bring home some 
achievements in the field of security had increased during the Conference: "The Belgians, 
Dutch and Danes indicated that satisfactory measures were essential in the context of their 
domestic efforts to maintain public support for an adequate level of defence spending. "' 17 
As a means to inject fresh impetus into the discussions, in late January, the Western Alliance 
decided to add a new element in the negotiations by quantifying the area inside the Soviet 
territory that they wished the notification measure to apply, and suggested a zone of 700 
kilometres. 118 Since the Soviets had already suggested a 100-kilometre zone, the West 
believed that by also using a numerical formula this could greatly simplify the negotiations. "9 
The Eastern states, however, did not react, and the absence of results in the Sub-Committee 
on CBMs became "so disturbing" that several NATO and neutral delegations warned the 
Soviets that progress was necessary or the successful conclusion of the CSCE might be 
compromised. 120 To make their point stronger, the Western and neutral states even cancelled 
a meeting of the Sub-Committee, but the move had no impact. 121 
Another six weeks elapsed without any progress until, on 13 March, the Head of the Soviet 
Delegation, Ambassador Kovalev, suggested a number of elements which, in his view, could 
help break the impasse on CBMs. ' 22 First, Kovalev reiterated that the Soviets could accept 
that the notification of manoeuvres should be given to all participants and not only to 
neighbouring countries, and that the measure could cover both national and multinational 
manoeuvres. Second, the area of application of the CBMs could be described as "all of 
Europe" provided, as suggested before by the West, that exceptions were made for the Soviet 
Union (and Turkey) whose territory extended beyond Europe. Third, Kovalev asserted that 
116 For comments in the British House of Commons on this subject, see Ibid., p. 373. 
117 See Ibid., p. 373. 
118 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 134. 
19 Ibid. 
120 Ibid., p. 135. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Description of the proposals can be found in Ibid., p. 143; Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, 
p. 196; and Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 387. 
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Moscow would show further flexibility on the different parameters related to the scope of the 
notification of major manoeuvres noting, however, that this "overall solution" (or package of 
propositions) was conditional on the acceptance by the other delegations that the commitment 
to notify major manoeuvres would be of a voluntary nature only. 
The Soviet request to make the notification of manoeuvres a simple voluntary undertaking 
was initially not well received by the West and the neutral and non-aligned delegations. 123 
For the latter, in particular, who wanted a comprehensive development of the military aspects 
of the Conference and a firm commitment on the obligation of CBMs, the request was 
interpreted as an attempt to deprive the future system of notification of all its usefulness. ' 24 In 
the West, after an initial general reluctance to consider the proposal, many delegations 
concluded that since the final results of the Conference were not expected to be registered in a 
legally binding document and that, as such, all of its commitments would in fact only be 
voluntary by nature (i. e. based on a moral or political obligation), it was more important to try 
to secure appropriate language on a firm political commitment to notify. 125 After almost nine 
months of stalemate over the notification measure, many participating States were beginning 
to feel the need to quicken the pace of discussion and few saw any advantages in pursuing the 
matter further only to risk "more negative results". 126 Also, the idea that Moscow would 
come up with better parameters on the measure if its proposal on the voluntary nature of the 
undertaking was accepted had raised a keen interest in several Western capitals to explore the 
Soviet Offer. 127 
Not all neutral and non-aligned nations, nor all Western governments, were immediately 
convinced of the advisability to show flexibility. As NATO's floor leader on CBMs, the 
British delegation had to work hard to convince others to "seize the opportunity. " 128 After all, 
as the Americans were noting, "despite its shortcomings, the Soviet position was seen as 
evidence of a desire to get negotiations on military aspects moving. , 129 
As more delegations began to accept informally the voluntary nature of the notification 
measure, discussions in the Sub-Committee remained at a standstill. The Soviets took the line 
123 Reactions to the Soviet proposals can be found in Acimovic, Problems of Security, pp. 219- 
220; Ferraris, Ibid., p. 197; and Maresca, Ibid. 
124 See Ferraris, Ibid., pp. 196-197. 
125 See Ibid.; Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 143 and p. 172; and Bennett and Hamilton, The 
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that they could not discuss any of the new parameters promised by Kovalev until the 
voluntary nature of the commitment to notify manoeuvres was accepted. 
130 The West and the 
NNAs, on the other hand, wanted reassurance that there would be new parameters submitted 
to them before discussing the concept of "voluntary basis"! 31 
This uncertain situation continued until 11 April when a "gentleman's agreement" was 
reached that the Sub-Committee would discuss both the voluntary basis and the parameters in 
parallel, 132 and the Soviets promised to get further instructions from Moscow. 
133 Two weeks 
later, however, the Soviets were still insisting that they would not be specific about the 
concessions they had hinted at before until the West made a clear statement on their 
acceptance of the voluntary nature of the notification of major manoeuvres. 134 
Despite these wranglings, the month of April saw two positive developments. Early in the 
month, the Soviets formally stated in the Sub-Committee that they would accept the concept 
of "all of Europe" as previously offered with an exception for the Soviet Union. 
135 A few 
weeks later, the Czech delegation stated that the notification of major military manoeuvres 
could start at a level of 40,000 troops. 136 This was the first time any Eastern delegation 
provided a numerical figure for the notification threshold, which until then was discussed only 
in terms of an army corps. These moves, executed without any new Western concession, 
were seen as further indication that the Soviets were interested in winding up the work of the 
Sub-Committee. 137 They also presaged the real beginning of the negotiations starting, in 
early May, with Soviet willingness to negotiate a longer time period of thirteen or fourteen 
days for advance notification (instead of ten), 138 and a threshold of 35,000 troops. 139 Later, 
the Soviets adjusted their parameters again by suggesting that they could discuss a level of 
30,000 troops, a 150-kilometre zone (rather than their previous offer of 100 kilometres), and 
eighteen days advance notice. 140 In return, the NATO countries offered to reduce the size of 
the Soviet territory requiring notification from 700 to 500 kilometres, to reduce the amount of 
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time for notification from seven, to six, and then to five weeks, and to increase the threshold 
of notification from 12,000 to 15,000 troops. 141 
Although the negotiations were then truly engaged and were largely simplified by the use of 
numerical figures by all sides, the Soviet position remained unacceptable for the West and the 
NNAs. 142 On 5 June, in an effort to gain further concessions, the British offered a new set of 
parameters encompassing a zone of 450 kilometres, a notification threshold of 16,000 troops, 
and four to five weeks advance notice. 143 The following day, addressing the Sub-Committee 
on military matters, the Soviet Head of Delegation suggested a combination of three different 
options that, in his view, could solve the issue. 144 All three possibilities involved a time-frame 
of twenty-one days advance notice, but included trade-offs between the width of the territory 
to be covered by the application of the measure and the minimum number of troops at which 
a notification would have to be given. The figures proposed varied between 200 to 330 
kilometres, and between 20,000 to 30,000 troops. 145 The Western reply provided by the 
British Ambassador was that 300 kilometres was the minimum the West could accept for the 
Soviet exception, and that NATO would not go beyond a threshold of 20,000-22,000 
troops. 146 
These positions remained unchanged until June 20 when, in an attempt to bridge the gap, the 
NNAs put forward a compromise proposal on the parameters suggesting 25,000 troops, 300 
kilometres, and three weeks advance notice. 147 Subsequently, on 21-22 June, during informal 
discussions between the British and the Soviet Heads of Delegation, the latter suggested that 
Moscow could accept the neutrals' compromise, but with a zone of application of 250 
kilometres, 148 while promising to show flexibility on the text relating to the "voluntary 
basis". 149 During these same meetings, the Soviets also accepted a Swedish proposal, 
supported by the West, that the area of application of CBMs should not only be measured 
from frontiers shared with other participating States, but also from those facing other states. 150 
141 Maresca, Ibid., p. 149 and p. 172. 
142 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, pp. 198-199. 
143 Ibid., p. 199. 
144 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 414 note 3. 
145 See Ibid. Canadian reporting on these figures differed from the above by quoting the Soviet 
proposal as being "between 200 and 300 kilometres". Canada, DEA, 9 June 1974. 
146 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 414 note 3. 
147 See Ibid., p. 422. 
148 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 166. 
149 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 422-423. 
150 See Ibid., p. 423; and Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 166. 
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In practice, this meant that the Baltic and Black Sea coasts of the Soviet Union would also be 
considered zones subject to notification up to 200 kilometres or more. 
151 
While the positions between East and West had never been closer, several other elements 
required final agreement before full consensus could be reached on a final text. The NNAs 
were still insisting on a commitment to notify independent manoeuvres and wanted a lower 
threshold of 12,000 troops for amphibious and airborne manoeuvres. 152 The question of the 
notification of movements remained unresolved, while the "other military aspects of security" 
made little progress. In early March, a first text had been mentally registered on this latter 
issue, however, it only referred to "the complementary character of the political and military 
aspects of security, the possibility of information on the negotiations on disarmament or on 
the MBFR, but with very vague assurances". 153 Also, on the notification of manoeuvres, 
Turkey had not yet agreed on the width of the zone of application it would be willing to 
accept on its territory. Finally, on the last parameters for the notification of major manoeuvres 
offered by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom believed that even if the offer was 
reasonable, the West could get more territory inside the Soviet Union, and should continue to 
aim for 300 kilometres. 154 
Meanwhile, efforts at finding satisfactory language to describe the concept of "voluntary 
basis" for the notification measure continued with the tabling of several texts from all three 
sides. '55 For the West and the NNAs it was important that the final document of the 
Conference contain a clear indication that the undertaking to notify major military 
manoeuvres (although "voluntary" as requested by the Soviets) did not result in selective or 
discretionary implementation. The Western states had already tabled a text emphasising "the 
individual responsibility of each state in the realisation of their common objectives of 
strengthening confidence through prior notification of major military manoeuvres", 156 which 
they believed implied a strong moral obligation to notify. Other delegations, including 
Yugoslavia, were also working on the issue trying to ensure "a firm and unambiguous" 
commitment to notify. 157 
151 See Ibid. 
152 See Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 423. 
153 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 196. 
154 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 421-422. 
155 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 198. 
156 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 402. For the views of other delegations on the 
subject, see Ferraris, Ibid., p. 198. 
157 For a discussion on the Yugoslav position, see Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., pp. 402-403. 
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Discussions on the definition of the "voluntary basis" ran into difficulties when the Sub- 
Committee began reviewing a draft document tabled by the British delegation suggesting 
including in the preambular paragraphs of the notification measure a statement that the 
measure "derives from political decision and therefore rests upon a voluntary basis". 
' 58 The 
Romanians, the Dutch and the Turks strongly "argued against acceptance of the voluntary 
principle" pushing the Soviets to threaten to take away all their proposals on the parameters if 
the sentence was removed, and to argue strongly for the deletion of the word "therefore". 
159 
But time was running out. Work in the other Committees had progressed enough that, even if 
important issues remained, a general consensus was beginning to emerge among the 
participating States that these could be resolved quickly and in time for a Summit meeting in 
July. 160 Also, the Finnish host had warned the participants that in order to organise a Summit 
at such short notice, they quickly needed a decision on a date for the opening of Stage III, 
hence a swift conclusion of Stage 11.161 
On 3 July, following further unsuccessful attempts to gain a larger zone of territory inside the 
Soviet Union, 162 the Western delegations decided to accept that the final parameters for the 
notification measure could be set at 25,000 troops, 250 kilometres and twenty-one days 
notice. The following day, the Soviets confirmed their mutual acceptance of these 
parameters. 
1 63 
With assurances of acceptable parameters for all sides, the text on the definition of the 
"voluntary basis" could be quickly completed. As finally agreed, the text included, as the 
Soviets requested, a statement recognising that the notification measure "deriving from 
political decision rests upon a voluntary basis". This provision, however, only appeared in the 
preambular paragraphs introducing the measure. Furthermore, the text was preceded by two 
other sentences emphasising the "political importance of prior notification", and the 
"responsibility" of each of the participating States to implement the measure "in accordance 
with the accepted criteria and modalities". '64 For the Allies, these two phrases made it clear 
158 See Ibid., pp. 427-428. 
159 See Ibid., p. 428. 
160 See Ibid., pp. 426-427; and Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 165. 
161 See Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., pp. 426-427 and pp. 435-436; and Maresca, Ibid., p. 144, 
146, and pp. 165-167; 
162 See Maresca, Ibid., p. 166. 
163 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 428. 
164 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 199. For an explanation of the meaning of the different 
provisions, Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, pp. 7-8. 
183 
that accepting the "voluntary basis" did not entail accepting selective notification, and that the 
participating States were expected to abide by all the parameters described in the body of the 
document. 165 Moreover, the main text of the operative section of the document dealing with 
the prior notification of major manoeuvres clearly emphasised that the participating States 
"will notify; a phrase the Western states believed was "further insurance against too liberal 
an interpretation of the voluntary basis concept in the preamble". 166 
Following final agreement on the notification of major military manoeuvres, several other 
issues were quickly settled, including the NNAs demands relating to lower thresholds for 
amphibious and airborne manoeuvres, and the notification of major movements --a subject 
which the Soviets had until then firmly refused to consider beyond the fact that the question 
should be re-examined at a later date. Basically, the way to their resolution was to devise 
language that conveyed a different and lower level of commitment to the provisions than the 
one used for the notification of major manoeuvres. In the case of the prior notification of 
major movements, the agreement reached stipulated that the participating States "may, at their 
own discretion ... notify major military movements. 
" The use of the auxiliary verb "may", 
combined with the phrase "at their own discretion", clearly indicated that the application of 
this measure was purely optional and at the discretion of the parties. Concerning the NNAs 
request for sub-thresholds of notification for amphibious and airborne manoeuvres, the final 
agreed text did not even provide a specific threshold at which they should be notified. The 
provision, recorded under the measure for the "Prior Notification of Major Military 
Manoeuvres", simply gave recognition to the desirability of notifying combined land-air or 
land-sea manoeuvres below the 25,000 troops threshold, if significant numbers of the more 
mobile amphibious and airborne troops were involved. 167 The auxiliary verb "can" was used 
in the sentence to give it slightly more force that the purely discretionary texts under "major 
movements", but less force than for the notification of major military manoeuvres, for which 
the word "will" was used. ' 68 
Regarding the application of restraints on military activities that Yugoslavia, Romania and 
several other NNAs strongly favoured, the issue was resolved by acceptance of a very vague 
and non-committal formulation. The final text only suggested that when conducting their 
military activities, the participating States "will duly take into account and respect" their 
165 Canada, DEA, 25 July 1975. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid., 6 August 1974. 
168 Ibid. 
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common objective of building confidence. 169 
A similar minimal outcome was reached on the issue of arms control, disarmament and the 
"other military aspects of security". 170 The initial request for devising guiding principles for 
negotiations on arms control and disarmament in Europe were covered by a harmless 
recognition that the CSCE participating States favoured disarmament and were "convinced of 
the necessity to take effective measures" towards this end. 171 On the question of establishing 
some form of a link between MBFR and the CSCE, the final document did not mention any 
negotiating forum and simply recognised "the importance that participants in negotiating fora 
see to it that information about relevant developments, progress and results is provided on an 
appropriate basis to other States participating" in the CSCE. 
Finally, as previously agreed early on in the negotiations, the provisions on exchange of 
observers contained few specifics apart from the fact that "the inviting State will determine in 
each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and 
give other information which it may consider useful. " The provisions further noted that the 
participating States "will' invite other participating States, but the obligatory nature of this 
commitment was greatly diminished by the insertion of the phrase "voluntarily and on a 
bilateral basis". More positively, the text on exchange of observers did not limit the 
exchanges to "major" manoeuvres, but suggested the possibility of a greater exchange by 
mentioning at "military" manoeuvres. 
4. STAGE III: HELSINKI (30 JULY -1 AUGUST 1975) 
Stage III of the CSCE was held only nine days after the conclusion of the Geneva 
negotiations. Attended by Heads of State or Government from all thirty-five participating 
States, the three-day meeting consisted mainly of speeches. As all the decisions had been 
taken and the documents comprising the Final Act had been approved by all delegations, no 
further negotiations were necessary and the Summit only had to officially endorse the Final 
Act. 
169 See Maresca, To Helsinki, pp. 173-174; and Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, p. 14. 
170 The most comprehensive treatment of these issues can be found in Acimovic, Problems of 
Security, pp. 226-230; and Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, pp. 194-201. 
17 1 For an analysis of the provisions agreed upon, see Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, p. 15. 
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The last stage of the CSCE provided an occasion for the participating governments to air their 
views on the commitments undertaken in the Final Act and for the Western countries 
emphasis was on future implementation. In the field of CBMs, the thirty-five participating 
States were entering on a new uncharted course. As an integral part of the Final Act, the 
"Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and 
disarmament" set out new rules for the conduct of military activities in Europe, but no one 
knew exactly how these new procedures were to be applied. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Two years of difficult negotiations were necessary to achieve final results on CBMs. As for 
the MPT, only the NATO group could be truly satisfied with the outcome which, once again, 
basically followed their programme. Throughout the negotiations the NNAs continued to 
hope that the Conference would consider a wide-range of military issues. But, with both East 
and West seeing no interest in their ambitious proposals, the non-bloc countries had to accept 
that the CSCE was not the forum where they would obtain a greater role in determining 
questions affecting security in Europe. 
For the Soviets, the final results were even more disenchanting. If CBMs represented a 
continuing irritant in prolonging and complicating the Conference, they were also feared by 
the Eastern governments who admitted during the main negotiations having made a mistake 
by accepting terms of reference for them at the preliminaries. 172 CBMs went at the heart of 
military secrecy and concessions on this front were never easy. But, with the consensus rule 
prevailing and a majority of delegations favouring development of commitments in this field, 
the East had little choice but to concede. 
Undoubtedly, the Warsaw Pact nations did all they could to ensure that only a very vague and 
non-committal arrangement would come out of the CSCE, and the document finally accepted 
reflected this position. Most of the provisions on CBMs lacked precise and decisive 
formulation, and contained only vague language describing the obligations of states. Yet, 
while the Eastern bloc countries could be easily identified as the primary source responsible 
for the meagre results achieved by the CSCE, a closer look at the Western negotiating record, 
172 As recorded by the British Foreign Office, the Soviets "have admitted privately that they 
made a mistake in agreeing at Helsinki to draw up detailed confidence-building measures at all, 
even though this was an essential element in the bargain at the time. " Bennett and Hamilton, 
The Conference, p. 374. 
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presented next, reveals that apart from a few NATO partners the majority of Allied 




NATO'S NEGOTIATING RECORD: REVISITED 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the CSCE, the outcome of the negotiations on CBMs could be described 
as a diplomatic success for the West. The measures initially sponsored by the NATO 
delegations were accepted and many of the specific provisions defining their future 
application closely reflected the Western positions. But, if the Western governments could 
take credit for being the architect of the new set of rules affecting the future conduct of major 
military activities that would be applied throughout most of the European continent, away 
from the public light, Western success could be questioned as it was much less clear whether 
the final outcome of the CSCE was the best or the most the West could have attained. 
When the CSCE opened in 1973 the Allies were not prepared for detailed discussions on 
CBMs. Fears that the measures could interfere with MBFR had led to a general 
understanding among the NATO states that the CBMs to be negotiated should be kept simple 
and largely undefined. Accordingly, the Allies had not hammered out any of the details 
related to the eventual operation or application of the measures. 
The fact that the mandate agreed upon by the MPT left the door open for a wide range of 
proposals on the measures, emphasising either a comprehensive or minimal development of 
CBMs, apparently did not worry the Western delegations or was not judged sufficient to bring 
about a reassessment of their agreed negotiating position. Similarly, the possibility that the 
NNAs might wish to reintroduce many of their more comprehensive proposals, or argue for a 
thorough development of the Western measures, was not considered. Perhaps the 
superficiality of the initial discussions on CBMs at Dipoli led the Allies to believe that their 
negotiations in Geneva would follow a similar pattern and that the final results of the 
Conference might be only marginally more detailed than the Final Recommendations of the 
preliminary talks. But, regardless of the main reason for NATO's minimal planning, when 
the negotiations started in Geneva the Allies had no agreed position on many details related to 
their own proposals and were even less prepared to deal with any other suggestions in the 
field of CBMs. The absence of adequate preparations meant that several important questions 
on the nature, scope, or specific modalities of the CBMs had to be addressed at the same time 
that the negotiations were being pursued. 
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In this late start in the elaboration of a more comprehensive NATO policy on CBMs, the 
Allies often found themselves at odds on many issues. This situation, in turn, repeatedly 
prevented them from reaching agreement on a common negotiating stance, or resulted in the 
adoption of policies reflecting only the lowest common denominator, which was to simply 
ask for the minimum. In short, a closer look at NATO's positions at the CSCE indicates that 
they were often very similar to those advocated by the Eastern bloc. Furthermore, despite a 
public record suggesting a strong preference for obtaining effective stringent measures, the 
Allies never had this goal in mind, and never developed a negotiating strategy to support such 
a position. 
2. ABANDONING THE ONLY STRATEGY 
The only negotiating strategy devised by the Allies to deal with the negotiation of CBMs 
pertained to the issue of advanced notification. Based on agreement reached at NATO before 
the MPT started, the main tactic formulated by the Alliance to tackle the measures at the 
Conference was to table "illustrative lists" of military activities. When the main negotiations 
started in 1973, however, the Allies had no agreed "package" of lists. Initial efforts during 
the MPT to come up with a series of different national examples were problematic. With no 
precise formulation for the preferred scope of the measures, progress in determining what the 
national lists should contain was extremely slow, raising more questions than answers. With 
no clear guidance on what the lists should include, it soon became evident that what one state 
considered suitable for notification and, therefore, for inclusion on its list, was not necessarily 
agreeable to others. 
While these difficulties underscored the need to give minimum consideration to certain 
"parameters", such as precisely what type of military activities should be included, at what 
level troops should be notified, in what area NATO would benefit most from notification, or 
what details the notification should include, this was not accomplished. Furthermore, 
disagreement surfaced on a number of basic aspects. On the size of the military activities, for 
instance, Norway indicated early on in the Geneva phase of the Conference that it wanted 
small-scale military activities considered, ' but the general view in Brussels was to support 
only the notification of large scale activities. 2 Regarding the type of military activities that 
should be notified, the Americans noted during the MPT that they were beginning to have 
' Canada, DEA, 25 October 1973. 
2 Ibid., 26 March 1973. 
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second-thoughts about the notification of "movements" and, at the beginning of the main 
negotiations in Geneva, they formally notified their NATO partners that they did not wish to 
see "movements" discussed in the CSCE. 3 
Divergence of opinion on these, and other fundamental key aspects of the measures, made 
agreement on a suitable package of lists increasingly difficult, if not impossible. Yet, rather 
than discarding the lists, the Allies persisted in their elaboration. Too much preparation had 
gone into the development of the concept. By the time the MPT concluded, preparations in 
Brussels for discussion on the notification measures at the Conference had only concentrated 
on the development of illustrative lists. 4 Similarly, the first Alliance guidance paper for the 
Geneva negotiations also focused on this approach. s 
As the main negotiations entered a more intense working phase, the difficulties and 
inadequacies of the Western approach became more evident and significant. When the 
United Kingdom tabled its draft resolution on CBMs in early 1974, the Allies appeared to 
have come to grips with a number of important details on their proposals including, for 
instance, that the notification measures should apply mainly to a land context and that they 
should start at divisional level. These and many other details, however, were not firm 
agreements based on any military or technical studies supported by all the Allies, but more the 
result of loose general understandings backed by a majority. In fact, as will be discussed in the 
next section, the UK draft resolution on CBMs, perceived by most observers as representing 
the NATO position on the issue, 6 was only a national contribution because disagreement on 
some important aspects could not be resolved before tabling it in the Conference room. More 
worrisome for the successful pursuit of NATO's negotiating strategy were the proposals 
advanced by the NNAs a few weeks after the British document was tabled. In contrast to the 
3 Ibid., 1 October 1973. 
4 As recorded in official documentation, at the end of the MPT: "NATO HQ efforts have so far been 
devoted only to the development of illustrative lists". Canada, DEA, n. d. (The document was drafted 
between the conclusion of the preliminary talks on 8 June and 13 July 1973). As further noted in 
another Canadian document, dated 23 May 1973, NATO's only paper on this topic was "attempting to 
develop an illustrative list of NATO manoeuvres". Furthermore, as reported: "Surprisingly, only one 
paper is being developed at this time and there are no other studies under way or contemplated. " Ibid., 
23 May 1973. 
5 Commenting on the elaboration of the only NATO CBMs paper, the Canadians noted in October 
1973 that: "Central to the NATO paper [was] the proposal that `illustrative lists' of annual force 
movements and manoeuvres". Canada, DEA, 1 October 1973. A few months later, reporting 
continued to suggest that "NATO tactics relied principally on the tabling of illustrative lists. " Ibid., 
DEA, 18 March 1974. 
6 See, for instance, the record of the Italian negotiator Luigi Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 190. 
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UK draft resolution which envisaged that notification measures would be applied 
predominantly to land forces when these forces reached the level of one division, the 
document of the Six called for all major, single or combined, terrestrial, naval and aerial 
manoeuvres and movements to be notified at a level of 18,000 troops. Furthermore, the 
NNAs proposal also envisaged the adoption of sub-thresholds of notification to be applied 
when amphibious or airborne forces were included. 
The more precise and comprehensive scope of application of the CBMs suggested by the 
NNAs strongly underscored that their proposals would force more detailed discussions than 
the Allies had prepared for. 7 Indeed, it was doubtful that any Western illustrative lists 
consisting of mainly land manoeuvres, provided without any specific numerical threshold, 
could help address the particular requirements of the NNAs to have all military activities 
notified at a level of 18,000 troops and to apply sub-thresholds for the notification of 
amphibious and airborne forces. 
While the NNAs' proposals exposed the inadequacy of the lists as an effective means for 
negotiating the notification measures, the Allies were also discovering important flaws in their 
initial approach. Until the neutrals and non-aligned came up with a specific numerical 
threshold of 18,000 troops for the notification of major manoeuvres and movements, the 
delegations in Geneva were commonly discussing the notification measures in terms of 
formations at brigade, division, or army corps level. In these discussions the Western 
delegations, who had still not yet determined any numerical threshold for the measure, 
generally described their proposals in terms of divisions. 8 Yet, the Allies discovered during 
the first few months of discussions in Geneva that great disparities existed in the strength of 
divisions between countries (from 7,000 troops for a Soviet Airborne Division, to 20,000 men 
' It is noteworthy that the possibility that the neutrals might force the Allies to provide further 
definitions of their proposals was noted by some delegations as early as October 1973, i. e. one month 
into Stage II of the negotiations. Canada, DEA, 22 October 1973. Also, the possibility that the NNAs 
might request lower thresholds of notification was recognised as early as May 1973, even before the 
MPT concluded. Ibid., 23 May 1973. 
8 The suggestion that a specific threshold should be given to the measure was made at NATO as early 
as 22 October 1973. Ibid., 22 October 1973. Yet, it was only after the NNAs tabled their draft 
resolution on 20 February 1974 that the subject was more seriously discussed in Brussels. At that time, 
reports noted that "a view seemed to be developing among NATO delegations ... that a compromise 
at about 15,000 might be acceptable". Ibid., 25 February 1974. In mid-March 1974, further reporting 
noted that a compromise began to form for a figure of 10,000 troops because "it roughly accords with 
the size of a Soviet division and is the same level used in parallel measures in MBFR. " Ibid., 18 March 
1974. 
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for a US Marine Corps Division), 9 and that keeping such a provision would certainly 
seriously complicate the negotiations, while making agreement unlikely. 
As the elaboration of the lists grew more questionable and problematic, another important 
consideration for their development was the belief that tabling such lists at the Conference 
would force the Warsaw Pact to do the same. If the WTO nations refused to reciprocate, the 
Allies had envisaged providing lists of Eastern military activities they would want the Pact to 
notify. For reasons that remain unclear, but that were certainly closely linked to the fact that 
the Allies could not come up with their own selective lists, NATO discarded this idea even 
before the Geneva phase of negotiations started. ' 0 
With no agreed package of illustrative lists in hand and with little, if any, reason to pursue 
their development, the Western governments finally decided, in mid-March 1974, to abandon 
the idea. By that time, Stage II of the Conference was entering the drafting stage and even if 
attempts at developing the lists had provided the Allies with important insights into CBMs, 
the strategy had precluded them from thoroughly reviewing many crucial aspects of the future 
development and application of the measures. When confronted with specific proposals by 
other participating States, the Allies repeatedly found themselves at odds over the most 
appropriate position to advocate, or the most beneficial negotiating stance to put forward. 
Disagreements in at least five main areas deserve closer attention, not only because they 
concerned important aspects of CBMs, but also because some directly, and negatively, 
impacted on the final outcome of the Conference. 
3. MANOEUVRES AND/OR MOVEMENTS? 
The prior notification of major military movements was an integral and significant part of the 
NATO CBMs package for the CSCE. Yet, less than four months after the Allies had tabled 
their CBMs at the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, the Americans noted that they were 
beginning to reconsider their position on the issue. Because the extent of Washington's 
9 Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974. The Canadian document mentioned that these numbers were based 
on a table included in the "Military Balance"; a yearly publication produced by the London-based 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. The year of the publication was not given. According to 
Victor-Yves Ghebali, even though the East refused to discuss "numbers" in the Conference room for 
almost 18 months, they had informed the Allies at the start of the negotiations that their divisions were 
smaller than those of the Alliance. See Ghebali, "Considerations", p. 26. 
10 Canada, DEA, 16 July 1973. 
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opposition to the notification of movements was never thoroughly discussed at NATO during 
the MPT, the inherent difficulties deriving from such a position only surfaced as the main 
negotiations were already in progress. 
Signs of differences between the United States and the other members of the Alliance on the 
issue of movements arose at the very start during Stage I. Addressing the gathering of 
Foreign Ministers, the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, restricted his comments to a 
simple endorsement of the Helsinki Final Recommendations which, on the question of prior 
notification of major military movements, only called for the subject to be studied at the 
Conference and for conclusions to be submitted. l l In clear contrast to this minimal approach, 
the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Douglas-Home, emphasised the significance of notifying 
military movements. In the three-page proposal on CBMs submitted during Stage I, the 
British noted that: 
The arguments deployed [for the notification of major military manoeuvres] . 
.. are even more true of major military movements. Certain participants have 
voiced doubts about the need and feasibility of including prior notification of 
movements as well as manoeuvres. In our view a failure to provide prior 
notification of movements while providing such notification on manoeuvres 
would prejudice this opportunity to create a greater climate of confidence. 12 
This strong and unequivocal endorsement for the CSCE to consider fully the notification of 
movements certainly did not please the Americans, who had already indicated their general 
reluctance for the idea; and, just prior to the opening of Stage II, Washington clearly 
expressed its opposition to the measure. In mid-September 1973, the Americans argued at 
NATO that the confidence-building measures of the CSCE and the constraints measures 
envisaged in MBFR were different and that the Alliance should be concerned about the 
"possible effects the inclusion of movements [in the CSCE] might have on similar measures 
in MBFR". 13 An overlap between the CSCE measure calling for the advance notification of 
major military movements, and on movements envisaged as pre-reduction stabilising 
measures affecting movements of forces in MBFR, could create difficulties in persuading the 
Soviets to accept mandatory and more exacting provisions regarding movements in MBFR. I4 
11 See "U. S. Secretary of State, William Rogers, Addressing the Conference, 5 July 1973", 
CSCE/I/PV. 5, reproduced in CSCE, Records and Documents - Conference on Security and Co- 
oýeration in Europe, CSCE Stage 1, Helsinki, Verbatim Records, July 3-7,1973. 
' CSCE, Records and Documents, CSCE/I/18. 
13 Canada, DEA, 3 September 1973. 
14 Ibid., 1 October and 10 September 1973. 
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As viewed by Washington, the measures envisaged in the force reductions talks would be of 
greater political and military value for the Alliance because the "negotiation of an MBFR 
agreement and associated limitations on re-entry of Soviet forces into the guidelines area 
would impose movement limitation and notification where it [was] most valuable to 
NATO. "15 For this reason, Washington insisted on a distinction between manoeuvres and 
movements, and the removal of movements from the CSCE discussions. 16 
The European NATO partners, who had initially shared Washington's concerns about 
MBFR, did not agree with the US proposal17 and believed that the Alliance had gone too far 
on the path of movements to renounce the idea altogether at that late stage. 18 They 
maintained that the CSCE confidence-building measures were by their nature essentially 
different from the associated measures and they did not see how the inclusion of movements 
in the Conference could cause difficulties for MBFR. 19 To reassure Washington, the 
Europeans argued that if the CSCE made no attempt to reach a precise definition to 
distinguish between manoeuvres and movements, and if the measures and the terms were left 
vague and not rigidly defined, the question of overlap would not arise. 20 They further 
maintained that the NATO countries could "make abundantly clear that their position on the 
CBMs in the CSCE [were] without prejudice to collateral measures in MBFR. "21 
This European proposal on how movements could be dealt with at the CSCE did not reassure 
Washington and, with the negotiations already on their way, the need to reach an agreed 
Alliance policy on the issue became pressing. In late September, the British suggested that 
since the Soviets could be expected to oppose vigorously the notification of movements in the 
negotiations, "it would be tactically advisable to leave it to [them] to shoot down any 
reference to movements". 22 This, they observed, would place "the onus for rejection" upon 
the USSR, and would prevent the West from alienating the neutral and non-aligned 
delegations who strongly favoured the proposal. 23 
15 Ibid., 18 March 1974. 
16 Ibid., 14 September, 3 September, 13 September, and 1 October 1973. 
17 Ibid., 13 September 1973. 
18 Ibid., 10 September 1973. Canada also shared this position. See, Ibid., 1 October 1973. 
19 Ibid., 1 October 1973. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 The British suggestion was introduced in a document intended to provide guidance in developing a 
common Alliance position at the CSCE. The document was submitted to the NATO Senior Political 
Committee on 28 September and to the North Atlantic Council on 3 October. See Bennett and 
Hamilton, The Conference, p. 228. Canada, DEA, 14 September and 1 October 1973. 
23 Canada, Ibid., 14 September 1973. 
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On 6 October, or three weeks after the Geneva negotiations opened, the Americans finally 
accepted the British suggestion. 24 But the compromise formula, whereby the United States 
would not officially challenge the discussion of movements in the Conference and would 
leave it to the Soviets to argue against it, 25 did not solve all the difficulties. In early 
November the British were reporting that the discussions in the Sub-Committee on military 
matters were already "beginning to run out of steam". The reasons, they noted, were not only 
the stubbornness of the Soviet position, but also because the "NATO delegations had little 
scope to speak in great detail about the modalities of CBMs without entering into matters 
which were not fully agreed within the Alliance". 26 As reported by another Western 
delegation, one reason for the limited debate on movements in the Sub-Committee was that 
"the Warsaw Pact nations were awaiting the views of the demandeur on the issue, i. e. 
NATO", asking whether movements involved movements across the Atlantic, or if those in 
and out of Europe were also to be included; did movements include troops and equipment, or 
both? 27 
By mid-December the British reported further difficulties with the CBMs noting that their 
prospects did not look "bright". The Soviets were on the defensive and the Americans had 
"cold feet" about the measures because of their possible implications for the MBFR 
negotiations. 28 According to the British, there was a noticeable change in the US position on 
the issue. 29 Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State, made it clear in private discussions with 
British officials that he attached "no importance whatsoever to the CSCE" and, as interpreted 
in London, the Americans probably wanted to end the CSCE "more quickly and on easier 
terms" than they did. 30 
The split between the United States and the Europeans on the issue of the notification of 
movements grew more important just before the Christmas recess when the Americans were 
then being described by other NATO delegations as "going back on their previous 
24 The United States approved the suggestion on 6 October 1973. Canada, Ibid., 6 October 1973. 
25 Ibid., 14 September, and 6 October 1973. 
26 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 202 note 7. The document also noted that there was 
no "clear guidance from Brussels on many points on detail". 
27 Canada, DEA, 13 November 1973. One month earlier, the Canadians had observed that "NATO 
[had] still not arrived at a concerted view on the substance and tactics of the CBMs issue, in part 
because it [had] not ... clarified their relationship to similar MBFR pre-reduction measures. " Ibid., 13 September 1973. 
28 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 217. 
29 See Ibid. 
30 See Ibid. 
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positions". 31 At the time the United Kingdom was contemplating tabling a comprehensive 
draft resolution on CBMs. The move was considered important not only to retain Western 
initiative on the issue, but also because the drafting stage of the negotiations was approaching 
and the West had no formal draft resolution on the table at the Conference. 32 Also, according 
to the Canadian delegation in Geneva, NATO had not given much thought to what the 
military content of the final document of the Conference should include and, as the delegation 
noted, "a Western draft would be most useful, both as an exercise in its own right to try to 
identify common (and disputed) views among the 15, and as a tactically advantageous paper 
to be tabled". 33 "To state the obvious", the delegation reported to Ottawa, "the sub-committee 
will become involved in this exercise sooner or later, and, as yet, we have no idea as to what 
common position there may be among the 15 on most of the questions at issue. "34 
In mid-January 1974 the NATO caucus in Geneva discussed the British draft resolution. The 
proposal gained the support of all the Allies except the United States, who objected because it 
included the notification of movements. The Americans continued to argue that the measure 
would interfere with MBFR35 and maintained that it could inhibit their movement of forces 
within and into Europe and negatively affect "allied deployment in a crisis". 36 The argument, 
already made in previous discussions, 37 did not change the position of the other partners. 38 In 
private, some suggested that US opposition to the measure probably also stemmed from the 
fact that Washington was not interested in being tied-up with a commitment to notify its 
movements of troops to the flank countries and Spain. 39 
Despite strong American misgivings, the British draft resolution was tabled in Geneva on 4 
February. Because of US opposition, however, it could only be submitted as a national 
contribution. 40 While not endorsed officially by NATO, it was agreed that Alliance members 
31 See Ibid., p. 224. The split within NATO concerning the issue of movements is also noted in 
Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 89. 
32 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 226-229. 
33 Canada, DEA, 5 December 1973. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 23 January and 18 March 1974. See also Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 229 note 
7. 
36 Canada, Ibid., 23 January 1974. See also Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid. 
37 Such argumentation had been made as early as November 1973. See, for instance, Bennett and 
Hamilton, The Conference, p. 202. 
38 The existence of a British document refuting the American arguments on the issue of movements is 
mentioned in Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 229 note 7. 
39 Canada, DEA, 1 October 1973. 
40 Reference to "a rather difficult exchange with the Americans" is noted in Bennett and Hamilton, The 
Conference, p. 269. 
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would generally support the resolution and it was expected that the United States would 
remain silent on the issue of movements. 41 
The UK draft resolution was well received by a majority of CSCE participating States and, 
with a similar resolution tabled by the NNAs later in the month, was believed to have 
increased pressure on the Eastern nations to be more flexible on CBMs. 42 One month after its 
submission British diplomats were observing that despite all the difficulties at NATO, the 
West had the Soviets "on the run" on the issue of confidence-building measures and "should 
keep them there as long as possible. "43 This assessment of the state of play at the negotiations 
was shared by the other Western European governments and, reinforced by what they 
perceived to be a tactical advantage, the representatives of the nine countries of the European 
Community decided, on 19 April, to maintain their position on the notification of movements 
while the eight NATO members of the group would seek to persuade the Americans to 
agree. 44 Two weeks later, however, the American administration asked the United Kingdom 
to take another look at the draft resolution. According to a close associate of Henry Kissinger, 
the US Secretary of State thought "it would be a mistake to hold up successful completion of 
a CSCE on what were relatively minor points. "45 
The British were surprised and irritated by Kissinger's request. They did not consider CBMs 
as "relatively minor points"46 and believed that their draft resolution had been discussed at 
length at NATO and represented the results of "a hard fought balance between those in the 
Alliance who wanted more and those (in particular the Americans) who wanted less. "47 
Moreover, apart from the question of movements, the UK believed that the basics of their 
resolution was what most Western and neutral and non-aligned delegations wanted as a final 
result of the Conference. 48 The British further believed that if compromise would be 
tactically wise at some point to meet particular demands of the NNAs, or to get closer to the 
Eastern position, they did not see why the West should settle prematurely for less than they 
could achieve in the negotiations. 49 Finally, Kissinger's request was judged to be superfluous 
a' Canada, DEA, 18 March 1974. 
42 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 269-270. 
43 See Ibid., p. 269. 
44 See Ibid., pp. 272-273. 
45 Ibid., p. 279 note 1. The comment was made on 2 May by Mr. Sonnenfeldt, Counsellor in the State 
Department. 
46 See Ibid., pp. 279-280. 
47 See Ibid., p. 280. 
48 See Ibid. 
49 See Ibid., pp. 279-280. 
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because the main ideas of the UK draft resolution had already been incorporated into 
provisionally registered texts in Geneva and was no longer the basis of discussions in the Sub- 
Committee. so 
At the time of Kissinger's request, British diplomats observed that the American delegations 
in Brussels and Geneva had little flexibility in their instructions because it was apparently 
difficult for them to extract clear instructions from Washington where the Pentagon was 
taking a "very dim view" of CBMs. 5 ' Shortly after this observation, however, a member of 
the US delegation in Geneva told the British that the Pentagon was "in favour of the prior 
notification of military movements, and that opposition [laid] only in the White House". 52 
Notwithstanding the clarification, Kissinger's intervention had a chilling effect in London 
where some high officials began to suggest that the notification of movements should be 
dropped at the appropriate time. 53 
US disapproval of the British (or West European) negotiating position on CBMs grew more 
important as signs of impatience over the slow rate of progress in Geneva was felt in the 
spring of 1974. At that time, the Soviets were increasing calls for an early conclusion of 
Stage II and for a decision to hold Stage III at Summit level. 54 Within NATO, the United 
States was also beginning to entertain discussions about concluding the proceedings. 55 
In mid-June, during the semi-annual NATO Ministerial Meeting, Kissinger formally asked 
the Allies to undertake an examination of what they would consider necessary to quickly 
conclude Stage II and to hold Stage III at Summit level. 56 According to Kissinger, such a 
review of NATO's negotiating priorities was especially necessary in the field of confidence- 
building measures and in Basket III dealing with human rights and human contacts. 57 
Kissinger asserted that an overall assessment of NATO's minimum requirements for the 
CSCE would allow the Allies to concentrate on what was essential and that this would speed 
up the conclusions of the negotiations, helping to avoid an outcome that could advance the 
Soviet goal of setting up a new security system to replace the two military alliances. 58 
50 See Ibid., p. 280. 
51 See Ibid., pp. 281 note 5. 
52 See Ibid. [Emphasis added]. 
53 See Ibid., p. 280. 
sa See Ibid., pp. 277-279. 
ss See Ibid. 
56 See Ibid., pp. 304-306. 
57 See Ibid., pp. 304- 306 and pp. 311-315. 
58 See Ibid., pp. 304-306. 
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Kissinger further maintained that if the discussions in Geneva were to drag on, the Russians 
might take a harder line on East-West relations in order to try to extract benefits at the 
Conference. 59 Finally, while Kissinger denied that the United States had made any bilateral 
agreement with the Soviet Union to try to accelerate progress at Geneva, or that the two 
superpowers had already jointly decided to hold Stage III at Summit level, 60 Washington's 
NATO partners were reluctant to consider the request to reduce Western demands to a 
minimum, and were suspicious of the reasons behind it. 61 
Impatience over the length of the negotiations continued throughout the summer of 1974. In 
July, the United States reiterated its demand to drop the notification of movements from the 
CSCE and, in Allied consultations, the Americans demonstrated reluctance to "cooperate in 
developing a text on the subject which would be acceptable to all". 62 This exasperated the 
NATO partners who felt that the mandate of the Helsinki Final Recommendations required 
the Conference to come up with some text on the notification of movements and that the 
United States should co-operate in finding some. 63 As interpreted by the British, there had 
been a clear shift in US policy of late which was directly linked to the Nixon Administration's 
heightened interest in its relations with the Soviets. While Kissinger's interest in the CSCE 
had never been great, the British diplomats observed that: 
In recent months ... 
it appears that he has come to see the Conference as a positive 
obstacle to his task of developing Soviet-American co-operation carrying through his 
negotiations with the Russians to reduce the dangers and costs of the strategic 
balance. His fears may have been fed by the recurrent hints in Eastern capitals that 
slow Russian progress at least on MBFR and possibly on SALT are in some way 
related to the delays in completing the CSCE. At any rate, he had made it very clear 
that he concurs with the Soviet view that the Western negotiators in Geneva have 
become too stubbornly immersed in unnecessary detail; and that they need firm 
guidance from a higher level with the object of bringing the Conference to an early 
end. 64 
Soviet exploitation of the MBFR negotiations to persuade Kissinger to quickly conclude the 
59 See Ibid., p. 306. 
60 See Ibid., pp. 304-306. Press reports on this question had already surfaced in late April. See Ibid. p. 
278 note 4. 
61 See Ibid., pp. 304-306, pp. 311-315, and pp. 323-324. Earlier in April, the British had noted that the 
Summit was the only leverage the West had for better position on CBMs and Basket III, and that the 
results of the negotiations at that time did not justify one. Ibid., p. 268. In late April, the nine countries 
of the European Community had agreed that the results of the negotiations at that point did not warrant 
a Summit. See Ibid., p. 277. 
62 Canada, DEA, 18 July 1974. 
63 Ibid. This position was actively supported by Greece, Turkey, the nine members of the European 
Community, and Canada. 
64 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 323. 
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CSCE continued in the fall of 1974.65 In early September, Kissinger reiterated his request for 
the Allies to reach agreement on minimum Conference results, especially with regard to 
CBMs and Basket 111.66 
As 1974 drew to a close the outlook for the negotiation of a measure on movements was very 
bleak. Reviewing the general course of events since September, the British recognised that it 
was clear that the East was strongly opposed to the issue and that there was no indication that 
their position would change. Equally significant, the British noted that "as the Americans 
[were] unhappy about the original Western proposal (they wanted it dropped but reluctantly 
accepted the tactical arguments for maintaining it), it [was] clear that nothing of substance 
[would] emerge. "67 However, the majority in NATO still felt the need to find a formula to 
cover the requirements of the Final Recommendations. 68 At the same time, they recognised 
that given the opposition of both superpowers, only three options could be considered: 
1. to accept no reference to movements at all; 
2. to include a negative conclusion, or; 
3. to try to obtain some minimal conclusions. 69 
Most at NATO considered the first option completely unacceptable because it went against 
the letter and the spirit of the Final Recommendations of Helsinki, which clearly stated that 
the subject had to be studied by the Committee/Sub-Committee of the Conference and that 
some conclusions needed to be drafted in this regard. 70 Furthermore, a sentence had been 
provisionally agreed in the Sub-Committee that the issue had been studied by the 
Conference. 71 
The second option which, as proposed by the Soviets, could be expressed by the formulation 
that "the participating states have concluded that no arrangements for the prior notification of 
major movements was "at present practicable" created problems for two reasons. 72 First, it 
would not reflect the fact that most CSCE states were willing to implement the measure. 73 
Second, the formulation could be potentially more harmful than anything else, because it 
65 See Ibid., p. 340. 
66 See Ibid., p. 330. 
67 See Ibid., p. 352. 
68 See Ibid., pp. 352-353. 






would "tend to undercut alliance position in MBFR. "74 As argued in Allied discussions, if the 
West accepted such a formulation and agreed with the Soviets that detente had not developed 
to a point where CBMs on the prior notification of movements was feasible, or realistic, such 
an argument "could be used by the [WTO] in countering alliance demand for stabilizing 
measures governing notification and size of military movements in MBFR". 75 Finally, any 
other formulation suggesting, or implying, that "the participating states were unable to reach 
any common conclusion on the subject" was also judged unacceptable because it would 
represent a step backward from the Final Recommendations "which by implications at least 
accepted that the notification of movements was a confidence-building measure that could be 
discussed at the Conference". 76 
The third option calling for minimal conclusions was the only viable one. As discussed a few 
months earlier when the Allies were looking for an alternative position that could satisfy 
Washington, 77 this option could involve three elements: 
1. that the question had been studied; 
2. that some recognition be given to the value of the notification of movements, and; 
3. that it should be left to the discretion of the participating States to provide 
notification. 78 
Given the strong Soviet opposition to the notification of movements, and the inability of the 
NATO states to request more because of Washington's similar dislike of the measure, the 
most the CSCE could achieve on this issue was recognition of these three weak elements. 
Indeed, in early 1975, the United States was still reiterating to Allies clear opposition to the 
notification of movements and requested no further public statements linking better progress 
on CBMs with further progress elsewhere in other areas of the Conference. 79 The Soviets 
continued to resist any language on the issue beyond the fact that the question could be 
studied later. 
The fact that the Conference concluded by accepting any positive text on the notification of 
movements was because the superpowers found themselves completely isolated on this 
74 Ibid., 27 March 1975. 
's Ibid. 
76 Ibid., 19 December 1974. 
" References to such discussions can be traced as far back as April 1974. See Ibid., 24 April 1974. 
78 Canada, DEA, 19 December 1974. Similar recommendations had been made in August by the nine 
members of the European Community. Ibid., 20 August 1974. 
79 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 376-377. 
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question. A vast majority of Western and neutral and non-aligned states strongly favoured 
this kind of notification. Furthermore, the NNAs were denied anything of substance on their 
own security proposals, which placed the superpowers in an even more difficult position vis- 
a-vis these states. 
Interestingly, within NATO, the United States was not the only delegation to seek a minimum 
agreement on the notification of movements. While the Americans kept silent on the issue in 
the Conference room, towards the end of Stage II of the proceedings, the French began to 
openly challenge some of the compromises being discussed in the Sub-Committee. In one 
section of the text on the notification of movements dealing with the optional nature of the 
measure, one of the sentences under final consideration stipulated that: "the participating 
States may, at their own discretion ... notify their major military movements". The French 
delegation unsuccessfully argued in the Sub-Committee that the word "the" should be deleted 
from the sentence so that not all CSCE participating States would necessarily be covered by 
the provision. 80 Also, in one paragraph dealing with the possibility of developing the measure 
at a later date, the stipulation was made that further consideration would be given to the issue 
"bearing in mind, in particular, the experience gained by the implementation of the initial 
measures" set forth in the CBMs document . 
81 At the request of the French delegation, the 
word "initial" was deleted from the final version in order "to avoid any inference that there 
would necessarily be further CBMs". 82 
Obviously, the minimal results of the CSCE on the issue of notification of movements ensued 
not only from opposition by the Soviet Union. The repeated American demands for the issue 
to be dropped from the CSCE, or not to be used as a leverage in the negotiations, never 
allowed the West to present a strong united front, which might have yielded a better outcome. 
From an Allied perspective, this situation was unfortunate because a clear commitment on the 
issue could have been beneficial to NATO. As noted in a Canadian document a few months 
before the conclusion of the Conference when the issue was still being negotiated: 
The only substantive military measure envisaged in the CSCE on which there 
exists unanimous agreement within NATO (i. e. CBM relating to prior notification 
of military manoeuvres) would in itself be of little military value to the Alliance. 
Measures covering all forms of military activity which might constitute prelude to 
or part of concentration of ground forces (i. e. manoeuvres and movements) might 
under appropriate circumstances provide NATO with some additional warning 




time in event of impending WPO offensive. 83 
While the notification of movements was valuable to the NATO countries, the fact that the 
West had contributed to reduce the measure to a bare minimum without ever thoroughly 
examining all of its implications was regrettable. But, this was not the only case where the 
absence of comprehensive knowledge or proper preparations and a breakdown in Alliance 
unity impacted the final results of the CSCE. 
4. AREA OF APPLICABILITY 
Another important aspect of CBMs on which NATO failed to prepare adequately, and which 
resulted in tearing Alliance unity mid-way during the negotiations, was on the geographic 
area of application of the measures. As originally proposed by the West, the Allies wanted 
the notification measure to be applied to a single area of application described as "all of 
Europe". 
The Western position on the area of application for the CSCE CBMs was based on at least 
three considerations. First, the Allies were convinced that the introduction of any zone, large 
or small, would be discriminatory to one state or another. 84 Second, the issue of a single area 
of application (in effect, the establishment of a system that would cover all participating States 
in Europe) was of fundamental importance to some members states especially those who, like 
Germany, were to be singled out by the smaller area of application of the mutual force 
reductions. 85 Finally, the Allies wanted to ensure that all states in Europe and, especially, all 
Warsaw Pact countries, would be covered by the system of notification. 86 Indeed, a few 
months into the negotiations, the Soviets indicated in private that they might have difficulties 
including all the territories of their Allies, especially those of Poland and the GDR, and this 
had reinforced the Western view for insisting on a single area of applicability for the 
measures, which would apply to all states. 87 
83 Ibid., 16 January 1975. 
84 Ibid., 14 November 1973. 
85 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 281 and p. 373. As noted in the British archives: "For 
domestic political reasons [the Germans] needed arrangements which would, without discrimination, 
cover all the participating states in Europe as a counter-balance to the concentration in MBFR upon a 
particular part of Central Europe. " Ibid., p. 373. 
86 Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974. 
87 Ibid. The possibility that large parts of Poland and the GDR might be excluded from a final 
agreement continued to be of concern to the British. For such concerns raised in November 1974, see 
Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 345 note 4. 
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Although the Allies agreed on these general considerations, the implications of the 
formulation "all of Europe" used to describe the area of application of the CBMs had never 
been thoroughly reviewed by them. As for other important aspects of the general or specific 
scope of the CSCE CBMs, NATO had adopted the catch-phrase of "all of Europe" hoping to 
avoid long discussions on the definition of a specific area of application for the measures. 
But, as the Allies soon realised, the vagueness of the phrase created its own difficulties, 
especially for Malta and Cyprus who, with their geographic location in the Mediterranean, 
were concerned that the formulation could exclude them in some way. 88 Furthermore, the 
formulation was too vague to appropriately cover (or exclude as applicable) the territories and 
the overseas possessions of many participating States, including several NATO members. 89 
Finally, and more significantly for the development and the final outcome of the negotiations, 
the formulation did not take into consideration that two participating States, the Soviet Union 
and Turkey, had territory extending geographically beyond Europe into Asia. 
From the very beginning of the negotiations the Soviets argued against the proposal 
maintaining that they had an enormous territory extending into Asia and that it was unfair to 
ask them to notify "all the way to the Urals". 90 The Soviet position on the area of application 
of the CBMs remained intractable and, as early as February 1974, the Allies began to realise 
that they were unlikely to obtain all Soviet European territory and that some exceptions would 
have to be made for states having territory far away from other participants. 91 In the NATO 
caucus at Geneva, the Western delegations came to the conclusion that if a significant portion 
of the Soviet European territory would be covered and all the rest of Europe would be 
included, this would resolve the question satisfactorily. 92 In line with this conclusion, the 
Allies subsequently announced in September 1974 that they were willing to make an 
exception for the Soviet Union. 93 Difficulties for the NATO states began, however, when 
Turkey told its Western partners that it wanted a similar exception. 94 Although the Allies had 
already generally accepted the principle that some form of exception would have to be made 
for the Turkish territory bordering Iran, Iraq and Syria (all non-European non-participating 
CSCE States), the idea of giving Turkey the same exception as the USSR undermined "one of 
88 Canada, DEA, 24 July 1975. 
89 According to the interpretation given to the formulation, this had direct implications for the UK, 
Portugal, Denmark and France. See Ibid., 20 December 1974. 
90 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 105 and p. 172. 
91 Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974. 
92 Ibid. 
93 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 330-331. 
94 Canada, DEA, 25 October 1974. For a discussion, see Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 172. 
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the fundamental pillars of the NATO position". 95 Furthermore, as described by the British, 
the problem was that Ankara was insisting that large parts of Central Anatolia be excluded 
from the CBMs regime. 96 This not only made it "harder for the West to put pressure on the 
Russians to include a substantial portion of the European part of the Soviet Union"97 but, as 
London noted, it was regrettable that: 
The Turks wanted to have excluded that part of the coast from which they had 
invaded Cyprus; that they were trying to make notification along their Aegean and 
Mediterranean coastline dependent upon Soviet agreement to notify along the 
northern shore of the Black Sea; and that in determining the depth of the coastal strip, 
in which they might be prepared to make notification, they were insisting on a depth 
proportional to what the Russians would give and then defined by `some fairly 
arbitrary co-ordinates. '98 
As the Allies began work on language that would adequately define the Soviet exception, 
difficulties with the Turks increased because Ankara insisted on numerous changes in the text 
with a view to exempt much of Anatolia. 99 Concerned that the Turkish request might greatly 
complicate the course of the negotiations, the Allies suggested to the Turkish delegation in 
late December 1974 "to pattern themselves on the USA precedent for movement [and to] 
keep silent until the shape of the eventual agreement [was] more clear. "' 00 
NATO's plea to the Turks succeeded in keeping the issue dormant for awhile, but only as 
long as the question of area of application was not really touched upon in the Conference. 
Indeed, as soon as the Soviets began to show willingness to discuss the different parameters 
for the notification measure, the Turkish delegation asked that the issue be reopened 
immediately. On 3 June 1975, the Turks informed their NATO partners that they could only 
accept a zone of application of 100 kilometres from the borders of other participating 
States. '°' "This", as the British remarked, "seemed likely to damage Western chances of 
securing a `respectable width of Soviet territory agreed by the Russians"'. 102 Indeed, the 
Soviets had already proposed a zone of 100 kilometres one year earlier'03 and, in early June 
9' Canada, Ibid. 
96 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 353. 
9' See Ibid. 
98 See Ibid. Other Western countries believed that the area of Central Anatolia which the Turks wanted 
exempted was one in which there were many large lakes used by the military to practice amphibious 
manoeuvres. Canada, DEA, 4 July 1975. 
99 Ibid., 20 December 1974. 
ioo Ibid. 
101 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 423. 
102 See Ibid. 
103 See Ibid., p. 297; Maresca, To Helsinki; pp. 99-100, and Klein, Securite et desarmement, p. 141. 
205 
1975, were discussing an area of application of 150 kilometres. 104 Also, the official position 
of the NATO states had been, until the month of April, to ask for a zone of 700 kilometres, 
which they had subsequently reduced, in May, to only 500 kilometres. '°5 Furthermore, when, 
on 5 June, the West offered to reduce the zone to 450 kilometres, 106 the Soviets almost 
immediately indicated that they could discuss an area between 200 to 330 kilometres. 107 
Undoubtedly, any official Turkish request for a zone much smaller than what NATO was 
trying to negotiate, and more than half the size of what the Soviets were then willing to 
accept, would have seriously damaged the Western negotiating position, and the Turks were 
once again momentarily "dissuaded from proceeding with their formula"108 while the British 
delegation tried to find a compromise solution. 109 
At an informal meeting of the Sub-Committee, on 28 June, the British tabled a draft paper 
framed on similar lines as the Turks had given them earlier in the month, but without 
specifying any parameters. 110 The reaction in the Committee was truly negative. Three of the 
Mediterranean countries, Spain, Greece and Cyprus strongly objected, claiming that they did 
not see why Turkey should receive special treatment, or specific parameters, for its territory 
shared with European states. l ll Most delegations were also against the proposal, and even the 
Soviet Union opposed giving Ankara such special treatment. Aware of the Turkish request 
for a zone of only 100 kilometres, Moscow was also critical of the small area. 112 
Convinced that most CSCE participating States would agree to a special arrangement for the 
non-notification of manoeuvres taking place in proximity to non-CSCE participating States 
(which, for Turkey, would cover its manoeuvres close to Syria, Iran and Iraq), the British 
believed that making such an offer would also satisfy the Turks because it would exclude 
their "supply bases for Cyprus". 113 But Ankara refused to modify its position. And, even 
after the British and the Soviets confirmed, on 4 July, their mutual acceptance of a final 
parameter of application of 250 kilometres, 114 the Turks insisted that the zone of application 
104 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 198; Maresca, Ibid., p. 172; and Klein, Ibid., p. 147. 
105 Maresca, Ibid., p. 149 and p. 172. 
106 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 199; and Klein, Securite et desarmement, p. 147. 
107 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 414 note 3. 
108 See Ibid., p. 423; and Canada, DEA, 24 June 1975. 
109 Ibid. 
110 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 427-428. 
"' See Ibid., p. 428. 
112 See Ibid. 
113 See Ibid., p. 428. 
114 See Ibid. 
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of CBMs should be only 150 kilometres. 115 
Given the late stage in the negotiations it was clear that granting Turkey the same exception 
that had been drafted for the Soviet Union would be inevitable. But, as the Turks finally 
accepted the 250 kilometres exception zone negotiated by the Soviets because it excluded 
much of Anatolia, it did not exempt Ankara from having to notify its manoeuvres taking place 
close to Iran, Iraq and Syria. "6 For this, Turkey requested a further exception, "an exception 
to the exception", 117 whereby the obligation to notify would not apply when the area of 250 
kilometres was "also contiguous to the participating State's frontier facing or shared with a 
non-European non-participating State". 118 The proposal, which would have excluded 
Turkey's frontiers with Syria, Iran and Iraq, as well as Soviet areas contiguous with Iran, 
created difficulties for Cyprus because part of the Turkish coastline, which faced Syrian 
territory, included the two major ports of Mersina and Iskenderun which were used for the 
intervention in that country the previous year. ' 19 More specifically, the Cypriot delegation 
objected to the non-definition of the word "contiguous", as it could be subject to interpretation 
and could exempt Turkey from giving notification of the two major ports. 120 
After initially refusing to accept the exception, the Cypriot delegation then aimed at 
ameliorating the exception clause. 121 But both the Turks and the Cypriots maintained their 
position to the extent that many delegations believed that the conclusion of the negotiations 
was in jeopardy. 122 The Turkish-Cypriot disagreement was, in fact, the last issue to be settled 
by the participating States before the delegations adopted the Final Act and agreed upon the 
opening date of Stage 111.123 Cyprus did not want to be held responsible for delaying the 
Conference and finally conceded to the exception expressing, in a formal statement, the 
conviction that no participating State would abuse the exception and would normally notify 
their manoeuvres. 124 
115 See Ibid., p. 432. By July 16, the Turkish delegation was still awaiting instructions to approve a 
zone of 250 kilometres. See Ibid., p. 440. 
116 Ghebali, "Considerations", p. 28. 
11' Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975. 
118 See Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, p. 10. 
119 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. XXXII; and Ghebali, "Considerations", p. 28. 
120 Ghebali, "Considerations", p. 28. 
121 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 443; and Canada, DEA, 25 July 1975. 
122 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 201; and Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975. 
123 For a discussion of the Turkish-Cypriot difference in the final hours of the Geneva negotiations, see 
Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 435-443 and pp. 447-448 (passim). 
124 See Ibid., p. 443; Ghebali, "Considerations", p. 28; and Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, p. 10 
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The Cypriot concession saved NATO from further embarrassment over what was basically a 
lack of proper Alliance preparations and common agreement on a basic, but fundamental, 
aspect relating to the scope of application of the CBMs. Perhaps more significantly, Ankara's 
strong stance on the other exception for its European territory, asking for less than what had 
already been accepted by the Warsaw Pact nations, could have jeopardised many of the deals 
already struck with the East and could have resulted in a complete breakdown of the 
negotiations. But while Cyprus avoided a dangerous standstill at the very end of the CSCE, 
and Ankara's reluctant acceptance of the 250 kilometres exception zone only reinforced 
Moscow's position for a minimal area of application of the CBMs, other aspects of the 
negotiations on CBMs was more directly affected by a breakdown in Alliance unity. 
5. PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICATION 
Another important aspect of the discussions on which NATO could not maintain a unified 
position and which, in the views of many, negatively impacted the final outcome of the 
negotiations, concerned the parameters negotiated for the notification of major manoeuvres. 
As with the Turkish exceptions, the problem in this case did not necessarily only stem from 
NATO's crude preparations for CBMs, the absence of clear and firm agreed positions, or a 
lack of co-ordination, but from one partner breaking ranks. 
As reviewed in the negotiations, at the beginning of June 1975, the Western position on the 
notification of major military manoeuvres was to request a zone of application of 450 
kilometres, a threshold of 16,000 troops, and four to five weeks advance notice. 125 On 6 June, 
during discussions in the Military Sub-Committee, the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Kovalev, 
suggested the possibility of finding a final solution to the parameters issue by considering a 
combination of three options. All three options involved twenty-one days advance notice 
with related troop thresholds ranging from 20,000 to 30,000 men in an area between 200 to 
330 kilometres. 35126 These parameters, Kovalev later told the British, had been suggested to 
him by the US Head of Delegation in Geneva, Mr. Sherer. 127 What Sherer had apparently 
told the Soviets was that they could choose from three options involving twenty-one days 
advance notice with the following possible combinations: 330 kilometres and 30,000 troops; 
125 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 199; and Klein, Securite et desarmement, p. 147. 126 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 414; and Canada, DEA, 9 June 1975 127 See Ibid. 
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25,000 troops and 250 kilometres; or 200 kilometres and 20,000 troops. 128 
The following day, in Washington, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly 
Dobrynin called on Henry Kissinger and suggested figures of 250 kilometres, 30,000 troops 
and eighteen days, which Kissinger immediately accepted. 129 When Sherer later reported the 
Washington conversation to his British counterpart in Geneva, Sir David Hildyard, the 
reaction of the British was both "stupefaction and horror. "130 As NATO floor leader on 
CBMs, the British had been in difficult discussions with all parties for a compromise solution 
on the parameters for notification. 131 On 6 June, when Kovalev presented his three options, 
Sir David had argued that a zone of application of 300 kilometres and a threshold of 20,000 to 
22,000 troops would be the minimum the West would accept. 132 
British assessment of NATO's minimum fallback position was based on a number of 
considerations. First, the Germans had only very recently and very reluctantly accepted to 
decrease the exception zone to 300 kilometres133 and, while it was unclear that a further 
concession could be extracted from them, the Germans were not the only ones in NATO to 
consider the 300 kilometres parameter to be "a matter of vital importance". 134 Furthermore, 
the British strongly believed that they could extract such a parameter from the Soviets. 135 
Second, the Dutch had not yet agreed to the Soviet request to make the notification a 
voluntary undertaking136 and would certainly be against any further relaxation of the Western 
position on notification. Finally, a threshold of 30,000 troops worried the British who 
believed that mainly Soviet manoeuvres would eventually qualify for notification and, 
therefore, that the Soviets would take most of the credit for what remained a Western 
initiative. 137 
In the light of these considerations, the British were convinced that the "Washington 
parameters" (as they were dubbed) were unlikely to be accepted by the other Allies, and they 
128 Canada, DEA, 9 June 1975. 
129 Ibid.; and Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 163. 
130 The most comprehensive accounts of the events from a British and American perspective can be 
found, respectively, in Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, pp. 419-422; and Maresca, Ibid., pp. 
163-164. 
131 Maresca, Ibid., p. 164. 
132 Ibid.; and Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 414. 
133 See Bennett and Hamilton, ibid., p. 420. 
134 See Ibid., p. 421. 
135 For the position of the British Head of Delegation on 18 and 23 June, see Ibid., pp. 421- 422. 136 See Ibid., pp. 420-421. 
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complained in private that Kissinger's swift unilateral acceptance of lower parameters than 
what was then being discussed in Geneva had cut across the Alliance's negotiating 
position. 138 
On 9 June, the American Head of Delegation conveyed the British reactions to Washington 
where, according to a senior member of the US delegation in Geneva, the account "caused 
some concern in the upper reaches of the State Department". 
On June 10 we received telephone instructions to tell the allies that our acceptance of 
the `Washington parameters' had been conditional on acceptance by our allies. If 
they did not like the `Washington parameters, ' the United States would tell the 
Soviets flatly at a high level that these parameters would not sell. At a NATO caucus 
that afternoon, we repeated all this to our allies. The allies were strongly opposed to 
the `Washington parameters' and deeply resentful that their negotiating position had 
been undercut. 139 
Three days later, on 13 June, the Americans received new instructions. They had to disregard 
the "Washington parameters" and tell the Soviets that they should show flexibility by perhaps 
considering a compromise formula, then in preparation by the neutrals, calling for parameters 
of 25,000 troops, 300 kilometres, and twenty-one days. 140 
According to an American version of the events, after losing a few days, "the negotiation was 
back on track and the United States had recovered from a serious error, which could have 
developed into a major split with [their] allies". 141 Versions from other delegations suggest, 
however, that Washington's NATO partners were "very upset" by Kissinger's intervention, 142 
and that some seriously questioned whether the US Secretary of State had "merely indicated 
passive acceptance [of the parameters] or [if, in fact, he had] agreed to bring pressure to bear 
on [the] Allies. "143 "Certainly", as the Canadian delegation reported to Ottawa, "performance 
in the past two weeks by the US representative in the caucus indicate[d] his instructions 
[were] to speed conclusion of the problems, regardless of size of parameters. "] 44 As for the 
suggestion, as Sherer confessed to the British, that the parameters he gave Kovalev on June 6, 
138 See Ibid., pp. 419-420 note 4. Hildyard reported to London that "the Americans had cut the ground 
from under our feet". 
139 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 164. 
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141 Ibid. 
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had been taken "off top of his head", 145 the Canadians remarked that "such a practice would 
be totally out of character with Sherer and the US delegation performance to date. "146 
Later on, several Western negotiators concluded that the West could have obtained more if 
Kissinger had not basically foreclosed the debate by putting pressure on the Allies. 147 As the 
British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Jim Callaghan, wrote to Sir David on 19 June, it was clear that 
"while you were continuing to insist on 300 kms, 20/22,000 men and 21 days, the Soviet 
Union knew that certain Western countries supported their proposal for 250 kms, 30,000 men 
and 18 days. "148 As the British concluded at the end of the CSCE, "Dr. Kissinger's 
discussions on Confidence Building Measures were widely considered unhelpful, and may 
indeed have led to the West obtaining rather less than they could have expected on Prior 
Notification of Military Manoeuvres. "149 
6. BINDING NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION 
A fourth area of disagreement within NATO that complicated the development of a common 
negotiating position concerned the level of obligation and the binding nature of the CBMs. 
Before the drafting stage began in March 1974 the Sub-Committee on military matters 
reached verbal consensus that the obligation of the measures would be of a "moral and 
political nature, rather than juridical". 150 Defining language to reflect such a commitment, 
however, proved very difficult for the West. 
In the draft of the Six submitted on 20 February 1974, the sponsors suggested that the 
wording of the CSCE final document concerning the notification measures should be that the 
participating States "shall" notify their manoeuvres and movements. The British resolution 
tabled earlier in the same month proposed, in contrast, that the text read: "the participating 
States have decided that they will notify". 151 The problem within NATO arose when the 
United States announced, two weeks after the tabling of the UK resolution, that it could not 
accept the word "will" and that it favoured using other formulations, such as "the participating 
145 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 414; and Canada, DEA, 9 June 1975. 
146 Canada, Ibid. 
147 See Ghebali, "Considerations", p. 28. 
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States declare their intention to notify". 152 
The US position was rather startling for the NATO partners because the Americans had 
already accepted stronger wording in Western documents on Basket 111.153 Furthermore, the 
formulation advanced by the British had less binding force than the one suggested by the 
NNAs and, more significantly, had already been accepted by the Soviets who had indicated in 
the Sub-Committee that they considered "will" a suitable term. 154 Hence, the formula 
advocated by the Americans meant proposing language less binding than what the Soviets 
had already accepted. 155 As argued in the NATO caucus, "the substance of the CBMs that 
could eventually be agreed by the Conference would be so minimal that the US should not 
have problems accepting the language proposed in the British draft . 
"156 But the Americans 
maintained that the word "will" entailed a legal obligation and that if it appeared in the final 
document of the CSCE they would have to clear the document with Congress. '57 
In the following months, the Americans sustained their objection to the introduction of the 
word "will" and continued to press the Allies to adopt alternative language. ' 58 Most Western 
states argued in turn that while the exchange of observers, the exchanges of military missions 
and, eventually, if agreement could be reached, the notification of major movements of troops 
could only be conceived as a voluntary undertaking, the notification of major manoeuvres 
should be based on a more precise and constraining obligation exemplified, or depicted, by 
the use of the word "will". 159 
The NATO caucus returned to the question of the nature of obligation in December 1974. At 
that time, the majority in the Alliance continued to strongly favour the word "will", but the 
Americans maintained they could only accept it if it was preceded by some introductory 
language along the line that "the participating States `intend or `firmly intend .,, 
160 Given the 
impasse, many began to suggest that after almost ten months of stalemate on the issue the 
only possible compromise might be to accept `firmly intend as a fallback position. 161 
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Agreement on this matter, however, was far from complete. As the Canadians observed, "this 
was unrealistic because the Soviets [had] announced they could accept `will'. "162 
Furthermore, as Ottawa had argued a few months earlier, "we fail to see who at the 
Conference might take on the role of demandeur to fall back to anything less than `will' ... 
[or] what member of the Fifteen would wish to publicly indicate that he feels both the UK 
document and the Soviet position are too binding? "163 
Later in the month, with no resolution in sight, the French suggested taking the issue to the 
Sub-Committee early in the New Year. 164 Any such discussion carried out in the Conference 
room would have immediately exposed NATO's internal differences on the issue. More 
importantly, it could probably reopen Soviet acceptance of the wording "will", while creating 
serious difficulties with the neutrals and non-aligned who were asking for a stronger 
commitment to the measure. 
While the French were dissuaded from taking the issue to the Sub-Committee, 165 the 
discussion on the overall binding nature of the measure took a completely different turn in 
mid-March 1975 when the Soviets announced that agreement on the notification of major 
manoeuvres could only be possible if the commitment to notify was only "voluntary". After 
initial hesitation, most Western governments came to the conclusion that since any final 
document approved by the Conference would be, in any case, only voluntary, they could 
work on this basis. But not all Allies supported the move. In April, the British noted that 
while the NATO states found the Soviet proposal "generally acceptable", the Dutch were 
showing "some inflexibility". ' 66 Two months later, the Soviets complained to the British 
about the rigidity of their position on CBMs, but the British had to explain that, on this issue, 
only one member of the Alliance was holding back. 167 As explained in an internal 
memorandum, "the Dutch had `bolted', and had made it clear in one of the NATO 
coordination meetings that they could not be counted upon to go along with the voluntary 
basis. "' 68 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid., 25 February 1974. 
164 Ibid., 20 December 1974. 
165 Ibid. 
166 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 397. Acimovic, Problems of Security, p. 220, also 
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NATO's lack of an agreed policy on the issue came into the open during the last weeks of the 
negotiations when, on 1 July 1975, the Dutch and the Turks, opposed a British draft text on 
the voluntary basis of the measure supported by the Soviets. ' 69 In reaction, the Soviet 
delegation threatened to withdraw all of their proposals on the parameters if a solution was 
not found. 170 If carried through, such a threat could have brought the entire negotiations to a 
standstill, if not provoke their complete breakdown. As finally agreed by all delegations, the 
compromise was a package of weak provisions closely linked to one another. The verb "will" 
was used in almost all sentences of the operative text of the notification measure on major 
manoeuvres. But, in line with Washington's concern that this language might entail some 
sort of legal obligation, the United States tabled a formal statement at the end of the 
Conference stressing that the document on CBMs accepted by the CSCE was not legally 
binding. I7I The statement was rather unnecessary because, as the Americans conceded in an 
internal memorandum circulated at NATO, the "obligation to notify was not legal in nature, 
by virtue of the overall disclaimer in the CSCE Final Act". 172 Furthermore, as the Americans 
also conceded, the decision to notify was not even clear in the Final Act. 173 Indeed, although 
the West introduced language in the preambular text of the measure emphasising "the 
political importance of prior notification" and the "responsibility" of each participating State 
to implement the measure, the third and last preambular paragraph of the measure read that 
the "measure deriving from political decision rests upon a voluntary basis". As Washington 
recognised, this clause "may be understood to mean either that the decision to undertake the 
measure was voluntary, or freely made (Western view); or that the decision to implement the 
measure will be voluntary, or discretionary (Warsaw Pact view). 474 
Clearly, more detailed preparatory work on the part of the Western states could have avoided 
much of the internal wrangling over the description of the nature and the level of the 
commitment of the measure, which might have been useful in preventing such an ambiguous 
final result at the Conference for what remained the most important CBMs agreed upon by 
169 Romania also opposed the Soviet request. See Ibid., pp. 427-428 note 2. 170 Ibid., p. 428. 
171 See Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, p. 17 note 17; and Ghebali, "Considerations", p. 29 note 9. 172 Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975 (The US document was dated 5 August 1975). One of the most 
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text was "not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, with a 
view to its circulation to all members of the Organization as an official document of the United 
Nations". For a discussion on the legal character of the Final Act, see Ghebali, Diplomatie de la 
detente, pp. 57-59; and Arie Bloed (ed. ), From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki 
Process, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990, pp. 11-12. 




7. INDEPENDENT AND SMALL-SCALE MANOEUVRES 
Two other aspects of CBMs on which the Allies had no position before the Conference 
started and could not agree upon during the proceedings concerned the notification of 
independent naval and air manoeuvres, and the notification of airborne and amphibious forces 
at lower levels than those for land forces. 
During the general debate in Geneva in the autumn of 1973 several states expressed their 
interest for the separate notification of independent naval and air manoeuvres (i. e. 
manoeuvres not connected with any land exercises). 175 Virtually all the NNAs favoured this 
type of notification' 76 and, as formally proposed in the draft of the Six of late February 1974, 
wished to see these manoeuvres notified in the same way as those related to land forces. 
The NNAs proposal created difficulties for NATO who, as an Alliance, had entered the 
negotiations without a position. Having concentrated on keeping the measures simple, the 
Allies never reviewed the implications of such type of notifications and only belatedly started 
looking into the issue. 
When the NATO caucus in Geneva discussed the British draft resolution on CBMs in January 
1974 before being tabled in the Conference, the Norwegians advocated that reference should 
be made to the notification of "major independent air and naval manoeuvres". 177 However, 
no mention of these manoeuvres was incorporated in the draft because the United Kingdom 
was opposed to such notification. 178 Surprisingly, but as a clear indication of the lack of 
thorough preparation that also existed in different capitals, the British delegation in Geneva 
did not even know the rationale behind London's rejection of the proposal. 179 
By mid-March the British reported to London that they were beginning to be "isolated on the 
issue. "180 Soon after the NNAs formally made their proposal, a number of NATO countries, 
175 Canada, DEA, 13 February 1974. 
176 Ibid., and 25 February 1974. 
177 Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 229. 
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including Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey and Greece indicated interest for such 
notification. 181 In another report to London in early April, the British delegation was noting 
that despite playing "an unexpectedly prominent role" in the discussions on CBMs, their 
position could be damaged if they could not try to address the concerns of some of the NATO 
flank countries and the neutral and non-aligned delegations, and show flexibility on the 
issue. 182 
Finally, in late April 1974, the British received new instructions. Although still not accepting 
any commitment to separate notification, the British informed their NATO colleagues that 
they could go along with a clause encouraging the participating States to notify such 
manoeuvres if they so wished. 183 But, as the British finally came on board on the issue of 
separate notification, Italy, in a reversal of its previous position, stated that it could not accept 
such a proposition. ' 84 
In the spring and summer 1974, Norway took the lead within NATO in trying to seek 
Alliance backing for separate notification, but with little success. ' 85 By late August, the 
Allies had still not reached an agreed position, however, as the Belgians noted, the NATO 
delegations had in practice already opted for the smallest common denominator, which was to 
exclude this type of notification. ' 86 This position was unfortunate because the Military 
Committee of the Alliance, who had been belatedly instructed in January 1974 to look into 
the issue of separate notification of independent naval and air manoeuvres, was then agreeing 
on the usefulness of such notification for all zones, except the Mediterranean. 187 
Trying to improve NATO's negotiating position, the Belgians argued that given the positive 
conclusions of the Military Committee and the fact that it would be in the West's interest to 
remain on the side of the NNAs on this issue, the Allies should try to reach a common 
agreement based on two points. First, the Alliance should admit to the principle of the 
notification of all types of manoeuvres. 188 Second, it should decide that these notifications 
181 Ibid., p. 270; and Canada, DEA, 13 and 25 February 1974. 
182 Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 270. 
183 Canada, DEA, 13 August 1974. 
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would be made essentially on a voluntary basis. 189 By late December 1974 all the NATO 
member states could accept some compromise text along these lines, except Italy who 
remained adamantly opposed. 190 
With only six months remaining in the negotiations, the Allies never came to fully support the 
NNAs' proposal for separate notification of independent air and naval manoeuvres, and the 
final outcome of the negotiations was less than satisfactory. The Document on confidence- 
building measures of the Final Act only indirectly referred to the idea, noting that "the 
participating States also recognise that they may notify other military manoeuvres conducted 
by them". 
Another aspect of the final results of the Conference, which was weakened by NATO's late 
start and indecisiveness on CBMs, concerned the notification of amphibious and airborne 
forces at lower levels than land forces. The question of amphibious and airborne forces 
differed from separate notification of naval and air manoeuvres because of the potential to 
seize and occupy territory. As maintained by several delegations during the negotiations, "the 
presence (or absence) of a significant number of ground troops in aircraft or ships has a direct 
effect on the extent to which the ships or aircraft pose a threat to sovereignty". 191 Reflecting 
concerns over such threats, the main objective of the NNAs in submitting their proposal for 
lower thresholds of notification was to cover "amphibious and airborne forces that might not 
otherwise fall within an agreement covering land forces only". 192 
Within NATO the issue was also of importance to the flank countries. At the very beginning 
of Stage II, Greece and Turkey expressed the fear that more than two amphibious brigades in 
the Black Sea constituted destabilising factors. 193 Because of its particular geographic 
location, Norway also expressed concerns for its Northern region and had requested that the 
Alliance solicit the notification of smaller-scale exercises with as many details as for the 
major manoeuvres. 194 Several NATO partners recognised the legitimate concerns of the flank 
states with regard to amphibious and airborne exercises and believed that attempts should be 
1 89 Ibid. 
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made to meet their concerns. 195 But, as in the case of the separate notification of naval and air 
manoeuvres, the British draft resolution of February 1974 made no mention of these forces 
because London did not concede on this point. 196 
Attempts to modify the Alliance's opening position proved very difficult. Norway again took 
the lead in NATO in pressing the other partners to accept, at a minimum, to "recognise the 
desirability" of such notification. ' 97 But, by August 1974, or one year into the negotiations, 
the idea of supporting such notification at sub-threshold levels, even on a voluntary basis, was 
still not acceptable to all. 198 As for the separate notification of independent air and naval 
manoeuvres, the Allies never fully supported the NNAs initiative and the final results of the 
negotiations were equally weak on this question. The issue was covered by a sub-clause 
inserted in the provisions for the measure on major military manoeuvres stipulating that in the 
case of combined manoeuvres which did not reach the 25,000-troop threshold "but which 
involve land forces together with significant numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, 
or both, notification can also be given". The meaning of the word "significant" was not 
defined, and the sentence did not even specifically apply only to amphibious and airborne 
forces, but to combined manoeuvres that include land forces. 199 
8. OTHER ISSUES 
In addition to the above issues, several other aspects of CBMs found the Allies unprepared, 
unable or unwilling to present the most far-reaching position. One case in point concerned 
the amount of information NATO should request in the notifications. Early on during the 
Geneva negotiations the United States contended that information should only be minimal. zoo 
The Americans argued that the CBMs were political and psychological not military and, 
accordingly, should not have details. 201 The US maintained this position throughout the 
negotiations and, when the NATO caucus discussed the UK draft resolution prior to tabling it 
in the Sub-Committee, the Americans contended that fewer details should be requested for the 
'95 Ibid., 18 March 1974. 
196 Suggestions to reference these forces in the UK document were rejected by the British delegation. 
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notifications. 202 The United States also initially refused to consider the Spanish proposal 
calling for exchange of military personnel arguing that there was no advantage in discussing 
the issue at the CSCE203 
Clearly, the above positions reflected a desire to limit the number and scope of the CSCE 
measures, and the United States was not the only NATO member state having reservations 
about the overall value of CBMs. France was equally uninterested in a thorough development 
of the measures and was often much more outspoken about its reservations. On the NNAs' 
request for adopting restrictions on a number of military activities, France played a key-role in 
having the Conference accept only a vague reference to "self-limitation". 204 Furthermore, the 
final text, which simply noted that when conducting their military activities the participating 
States would "duly take into account and respect" their common objective of building 
confidence, was still too maximal for the French and, in order to diminish even more the 
significance of the statement, France strongly argued against any title being given to this 
portion of the document, making it the only section of the Final Act introducing a new topic 
without a title. Similarly, while all thirty-four participating States would have preferred the 
main title of the "Document on confidence-building measures" to also include the phrase 
"and military aspects of security and disarmament", France adamantly refused any 
formulation that included the word "military", 205 claiming that the CSCE had not really dealt 
with this kind of issue. 206 At French insistence the word "military" was replaced by 
"certain", and the only part of the Final Act dealing with "military" issues was simply entitled 
"Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and 
disarmament. "207 
Finally and, by far, the most surprising aspect of NATO's preparations for the negotiation of 
CBMs was that the delegations in Geneva had no information concerning the size and 
frequency of Soviet manoeuvres until the beginning of 1975, i. e. more than two years after 
they had tabled their proposals on CBMs, and less than five months before the conclusion of 
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the CSCE. 208 Indeed, the first study undertaken on this subject was only commissioned in 
December 1974, and the first results reached the delegations in Geneva in mid-February 
1975.209 
If this single fact leaves no doubt that the West never conceived the CSCE CBMs to have any 
military significance, it also underscores that the different parameters put forward by the 
Allies for the notification measure were developed without thorough knowledge of the level, 
the frequency and, even, the precise area where the Warsaw Pact nations were conducting 
their military manoeuvres. Certainly, the different national delegations had their own data 
and analysis on the subject, but the NATO caucus in Geneva never developed its negotiating 
positions based on an Alliance-wide comprehensive assessment of these issues. In fact, the 
primary reason for undertaking the study in Brussels was not even prompted by a recognition 
of the usefulness or necessity of such critical knowledge, but by the fact that the discussions 
on CBMs had been in a logjam for several months and that a better understanding of the 
ramifications of the parameters submitted by the Allies could perhaps help to develop fallback 
positions which could unlock the negotiations. 210 
Understandingly, the reactions of the Western negotiators in Geneva, who acknowledged 
being ill-informed about the precise purpose of the study undertaken by the Military 
Committee, were that "the study would have been most useful many months, or years, ago", 
and that they wished the "subject had never arisen". 211 Fortunately, and to the surprise of 
most, the conclusions of the military study were rather positive for the Alliance. As noted in 
an internal document of the Canadian government at the end of the negotiations, "the original 
NATO position calling for notification at a level of one division might justifiably [have been] 
criticized as having been unrealistic, and the outcome as agreed [was] all that could 
reasonably have been demanded of the Soviets". 212 Indeed, as further noted, the "information 
rather clearly indicated that the normal level of activity of Soviet troops for exercises [was] 
two divisions, and most manoeuvres [were taken] place near frontiers". 213 
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9. WESTERN SUCCESS REASSESSED 
The image that the Western states did everything they could in Geneva to obtain the most 
comprehensive outcome possible on CBMs at the Conference, and that the Soviets were 
principally, if not only, to blame for the meagre results of the CSCE is considerably tarnished 
by a review of NATO's negotiating stance. As clearly established, on a number of occasions, 
one or more of the Allies shared, if not backed, the same restrictive approach as the Soviets. 
In some cases, they argued for less than was acceptable or already accepted by the Eastern 
bloc. In one clear case, outside unilateral interference by one Ally directly undercut the 
Western bargaining position, resulting in less than could have been expected. 
Undoubtedly, many of the numerous breakdowns in Alliance unity arose because one state 
defended purely national interests. But while it is evident that any complex negotiations in 
which fifteen nations have to agree on objectives, strategy and tactics would invariably see the 
national interests of the different states surface at one point or another, this factor alone does 
not explain all of NATO's shortcomings at the CSCE. A strong case can be made that many 
of the poor performances and difficulties experienced by the West during the negotiations 
could have been avoided with better preparations. As the sponsor of the CBMs, one might 
have expected that the Allies would have at least developed a comprehensive common 
position on their own proposals. But this was not done. On significant basic points proposed 
by the NATO states themselves, they opened the negotiations with a position they could not 
sustain. This was the case of the geographic area of application of CBMs and the notification 
of major military movements which, although supported by all at the onset, were later 
repudiated by one partner to the detriment of a unified Western front. 
Arguably, both Ankara's demand to obtain an exception for its territory shared with other 
European participating States and US repeated requests to its Allies to drop movements from 
the negotiations can be seen as simple changes of national positions of the respective parties. 
Yet, this does not change the fact that the Allies had only superficially prepared for these 
issues and only subsequently, and belatedly, discovered problems in their own proposals. 
On the area of application of the measures, for instance, the NATO governments never 
recognised that their catch-all phrase of "all of Europe" not only posed problems for Turkey 
but also for other member states having overseas possessions or territories. Similarly, on the 
type or size of the military activities to be notified, the Alliance never studied what precisely 
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would be desirable to notify, at what level, or in what area. While the US alone can be 
blamed for backtracking on the issue of movements, it is worth emphasising that other 
member states raised equally strong objections on other aspects of the general policy line 
initially put forward by a majority of partners. Norway and others, for instance, strongly 
disagreed with the non-inclusion of independent naval and air manoeuvres in the UK draft 
resolution, clearly highlighting that, as for most basic elements of the "Western" policy on 
CBMs, these subjects had never been thoroughly discussed or researched in Brussels. 
While it is evident that the Allies arrived ill-prepared for the negotiations, it is also clear that 
their lack of a unified comprehensive policy was not the result of an oversight, or a lack of 
time or resources to develop agreed positions. Indeed, even if the NATO governments 
initially had no interest in CBMs and had been pressed to choose the topic in order to ensure 
that they would have a security proposal to present at the start of the Conference, they also 
made the decision at a later stage not to develop the measures. Certainly, several member 
states changed their views on CBMs in the course of the negotiations and would have been 
willing to develop a more detailed agreement on a number of more exacting measures, but 
this never became the policy of the Alliance as a whole. As noted during the final months of 
negotiations, the views of the Allies varied greatly: 
Norway regards the CSCE-CBMs as having military value and as a means of 
improving its security. The UK and the FRG see CBMs as politically important, but 
they do not attach much significance to their military value. Finally, for the USA, they 
seem to have no positive interest and their only concern seems to be that the CBM 
regime not inhibit their present freedom to move forces to and from Europe. 214 
Given such varied and conflicting approaches, it is understandable that the Allies never 
managed to develop any common comprehensive policy on CBMs. Yet, another important 
consideration which always prevented them from arguing for far-reaching CBMs was the 
opposition of France and, especially, the United States to any stringent measures coming out 
of the CSCE. As reported in Canadian documentation, "a further complication which 
impeded NATO from going beyond the illustrative list concept was the strong opposition on 
the part of the USA to any obligation arising out of CSCE which would require notification of 
the movement of forces within and into Europe. "215 
214 Ibid., 27 March 1975. 
215 Ibid., 18 March 1974. 
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10. FAILURE OR SUCCESS? THE POLITICAL USE OF CBMs 
If the positions defended by the NATO governments during the negotiations were much less 
commendable than usually believed, and never aimed at developing measures that would be 
useful in the military field, introduction of the CBMs in the CSCE nevertheless served a 
number of other purposes for the Allies. Generally speaking, CBMs helped the West to keep 
the upper-hand throughout the entire negotiations by providing a tool to prevent Soviet 
propaganda on "European security"; please Western public opinion, and; gain the invaluable 
support of the NNAs while also avoiding their criticism and the consideration of their most 
demanding proposals. 
Long before the CSCE got on the way, the Allies feared that the Soviets would use the 
Conference for all kinds of propaganda they would have difficulties countering. As described 
in a memorandum of the British Foreign Office, in early 1972, Western public opinion was 
not receptive to any warnings about potential military threats from the East and was not 
responsive to any arguments for an effective defence. "So strong is the prevailing current of 
opinion", the FCO document remarked, "that few Ministers in the West make speeches about 
the nature of the threat or the need to counter it. "216 The main problem, as argued in the 
document, was that after twenty-five years of peace in Europe and a general background of 
warming in East-West relations, people wanted to hear that the Cold War was coming to an 
end and strongly believed that time had come for East and West to "kiss and make friends. "217 
Such views, the British contended, were difficult to influence and few NATO partners were 
willing to try it. As noted, the Western governments did not want to "admit that a European 
security conference would probably turn out to be a jamboree of propaganda, whose result 
could strengthen the Russian grip on Eastern Europe while weakening the cohesion of 
Western Europe. , 218 
At the start of the negotiations, the Allies feared that the Soviets might successfully maintain 
that agreement on a declaration on the non-use of force would solve the military problems in 
Europe, and that Western public opinion would "buy" this, resulting in even more pressure to 
216 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 17. 
217 For the assessment of the British Foreign Office regarding the views of Western public opinion and 
influence on the development of policies, see Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
218 Ibid., p. 16. 
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lower their defence. Fearing a propaganda war they believed they might not win, 219 Western 
governments needed concrete proposals to present at the Conference. In this regard, CBMs 
represented a useful tool to help focus the CSCE debate on security on more concrete issues 
than on a grand declaration on the non-use of force, which the West believed would basically 
only repeat similar commitments undertaken at the United Nations or in other fora. As 
suggested in a Canadian document on the eve of the Conference, CBMs could help "translate 
any broad principles of security which will be forthcoming into specific military measures 
which would be a clear demonstration and reinforcement of the common desire to promote 
mutual confidence and security in Europe. , 22° 
In addition to helping move the debate away from broad sweeping statements on security, 
CBMs were also seen as providing a practical "test" of the political will of the Warsaw Pact 
on arms control. This goal, acknowledged very early on in NATO's discussions, 221 continued 
to be of importance to some delegations throughout the negotiations. In 1975, for instance, 
the West Germans "continued to attach primary importance to obtaining arrangements which 
would show that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were in principle ready to be 
included in arrangements in the military field. "222 In short, as suggested in a paper produced 
by Belgium in late 1973, CBMs were "designed to promote common sense and practical 
arrangements in an area which provides, in a way understandable to public opinion, a test of 
the goodwill of the Warsaw Pact and of their desire to promote confidence in their military 
"223 intentions. 
Another important way in which CBMs played a useful role for the Alliance was in ensuring 
that the East "paid a price" for the CSCE. Already in 1969, at the time when the Allies were 
219 References to the propaganda aspect of the Conference abounded in Western assessments of the 
time. As noted by the British Foreign Office in 1972: "They [the Soviets] see the Conference as an 
occasion for declarations, statements of principles and propaganda of all kinds designed better to 
establish their hold on the East and weaken the coherence of the West". Other views of the Soviet 
objectives at the Conference included that they were "mainly interested in propaganda and 
atmosphere". See Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 59, and p. 61 note 2. 
220 Canada, DEA, 13 September 1973. 
221 As noted in a Canadian document at the beginning of the main negotiations: "CBMs were 
introduced into the CSCE largely as a means of testing the political will of the WPO on arms control 
measures in Europe, and of drawing public attention to the disparity between military forces in East 
and West. It was thought that it would be valuable to inject into CSCE more substantive measures than 
simple declarations on the non-use of force". Ibid. 
222 See Bennett and Hamilton, The Conference, p. 373. 
223 Ibid., p. 227. The British concurred with this assessment noting that this was "an area where we can 
put Soviet good intentions to the test in a way understandable to public opinion. " Ibid., p. 223. 
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forced to start considering the Conference project, NATO had adopted this approach by 
requesting that the East fulfil a number of pre-conditions before the CSCE could take place. 
Once the negotiations started, the Allies still believed that the Conference would only be 
advantageous to the East and, as acknowledged by the British Foreign Office, Western 
strategy at the start of the CSCE was "to minimise the undesirable political results of the 
Conference while forcing the Russians to pay a substantial price for those results. "224 "In this 
overall strategy", as the document further noted, the West advocated some CBMs in the 
military field "as a test of Eastern good intentions". 225 
Given the nature of CBMs, and their implications for attacking the strong veil of secrecy that 
had always prevailed in the conduct of the military affairs of the Communist countries, it was 
clear that the measures would be strongly objected to by the East and, in this sense, would 
represent good bargaining chips for the West. Acknowledgement that CBMs could be good 
bargaining chips was made even before the Allies agreed to introduce such measures in the 
Conference. As early as April 1972, at the time when the UK was trying to "sell" CBMs to 
the French and the Americans, the British had argued that they could be exchanged for 
concessions in other fields. 226 Later, during the negotiations, CBMs continued to be seen as 
having important trade-off value. In December 1973, for instance, the British delegation was 
reporting to London that the three Western CBMs had "so far paid a useful dividend"227 and, 
even if recognising that the issue of movements may never be negotiated at the CSCE, the 
British delegation was arguing that the Allies should continue to push for the measure 
because, as they noted, "if, later, we have to drop it, we should expect concessions in 
return. , 228 
When pressure began to build during the negotiations for a quick conclusion of the 
proceedings at Summit level, CBMs became even more useful especially in helping to hold 
off a Summit meeting most Western delegations (apart from the US perhaps) believed was 
premature and not justified. The UK made no secret of this view. As publicly stated in the 
British Parliament in January 1975: "We see confidence-building measures as an essential 
part of a conference which we hope will produce results of sufficient content and value to 
224 See Ibid., p. 214. 
225 See Ibid. 
226 See Ibid., p. 39. 
227 See Ibid., p. 226. 
228 See Ibid., p. 228. 
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justify a summit Stage III. "229 
By that time CBMs had also taken on political currency. Being the only tangible security 
aspect discussed at the CSCE, the Western governments noted the "significance which public 
opinion attache[d] to these measures, which were the only real security element left in the 
Conference". 230 Undoubtedly, public opinion did not pay much attention to CBMs, but the 
Western governments knew that, without them, they would probably have to accept 
discussions on other aspects of military security and this was never a Western consideration 
for the CSCE. 
Lastly, another use of CBMs which could not be fully appreciated at the start of the 
negotiations but which, arguably, proved to be of great significance for the Allies was that 
they provided a good platform to meet the NNAs "half-way". Indeed, by proposing a few 
modest measures in the field of security, the West could gain NNA support for their 
programme while avoiding strong criticism on their refusal to consider any of their proposals. 
As argued at the start of the negotiations: 
Tactically, it would ... seem wise to put the 
USSR (or France) in the position at 
CSCE of having to reject the proposals which the neutrals and non-aligned are 
expected to raise. For this reason, it would be wise not to indicate to the Soviets our 
fears about CBMs jeopardizing MBFR, but rather to indicate our strong support for 
CBMs. In this way we may be able to avoid having the Soviets believe that they have 
a common interest with us in limiting the stringency of the CBMs which will be 
proposed by the neutrals and non-aligned. 231 
This objective was certainly fulfilled at the CSCE because the Soviets took the brunt of the 
blame for rejecting the proposals sponsored by the neutrals, even if the Allies had no more 
interest in seeing any of their proposals realised. At the same time, the Western governments 
gained the unconditional support of the NNAs for their modest measures, hence putting even 
more pressure on the East to concede on this front. 
229 See Ibid., p. 373. 
230 See Ibid., p. 232. 
231 Canada, DEA, 13 September 1973. 
226 
11. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that the advocacy of CBMs served a number of useful political purposes for 
the West throughout the negotiations, but this is not the same as saying that the negotiating 
positions of the NATO countries reflected a desire to obtain stringent and effective measures 
that would be useful in their own right. Basically, as long as the measures remained simple 
and undefined, the West had no interest in the specific content of any agreement emerging 
from the CSCE. NATO came to CBMs because of a lack of agreement on MBFR and later 
aimed at restricting their development mainly because of MBFR. 
The irony, which was to become more obvious as years passed by, was that MBFR never 
reached any agreement in the more than 19 years of unsuccessful negotiations, while CBMs 
were to remain in effect for more than a decade, only to be replaced by another set of similar 
but more demanding measures. In 1975, of course, no one could have predicted such a 
development and, while the West had never been prepared for their negotiations, the NATO 
countries were also unprepared for their application. As noted by the Canadian government 
in late July 1975, little time was left before implementation and it was advisable that "NATO 
[did] a study on many points of detail in the implementation of CBMs". 232 
232 Ibid., 21 July 1975. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CBMS IMPLEMENTATION: A REVEALING RECORD 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When the CSCE participating States negotiated the CBMs of the Final Act, no one knew they 
were introducing new rules for the conduct of military activities in Europe which would 
remain in force for more than a decade. Throughout most of the negotiations in Geneva, the 
question of the continuation of the CSCE remained uncertain, and what would subsequently 
happen with the commitments being developed there was even less clear. 
At the start of the Conference, the Soviets had insisted on the creation of a permanent body by 
the CSCE and had even successfully introduced an agenda item in this regard. ' But, the more 
the negotiations progressed, with inclusion of obligations in the field of human rights and 
CBMs, the more the East became disenchanted with the idea and the less they insisted on it. 
On the Western side, initial views on any continuation of the CSCE, and the creation of any 
organ or institution to pursue the process, were very negative. For the Allies, the idea was 
always associated with the permanent body the Soviets sought to set up since the 1950s for 
establishing a new collective security regime in Europe, and they only reluctantly agreed to 
consider the issue. Like the East, however, though for opposite reasons, the Western position 
gradually changed during the course of the negotiations. The more their demands were being 
considered and approved by the Conference, the more the Allies developed an interest in 
having some follow-up meetings to review implementation of the CSCE commitments. 
With the NNAs always strongly supporting the continuation of the Conference, the parties 
agreed to a compromise calling for one Follow-Up Meeting to be held two years after the 
conclusion of the CSCE. As further agreed, though never fully discussed at the Conference, 
the meeting would review progress of the implementation of the commitments of the Final 
Act, discuss further steps or proposals to enhance the objectives of the Document and decide 
on further meetings. 
1 For background on the issue of continuation of the Conference and the evolving positions of all 
three main groupings at the CSCE, see Maresca, To Helsinki, pp. 201-204. For a more complete 
and detailed account, see the archival material of the British government, as presented by Bennett 
and Hamilton in The Conference. 
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The meeting, held in Belgrade from 4 October 1977 to 9 March 1978, took place against a 
background of degradation in East-West relations. 2 More significantly, following the 
election of US President Jimmy Carter and his commitment to human rights, the proceedings 
were dominated by heated exchanges on human rights issues by the United States and the 
Soviet Union, with the former strongly criticising the poor Eastern record of implementation 
in this field. Discussion on CBMs was much less controversial, but despite a number of 
proposals advanced by all three major groupings, no new initiative could be agreed upon. 3 
The Soviets negatively reacted to the virulent attacks of the human rights record of the 
Eastern states and opposed having a final document that would make reference to 
shortcomings in implementation or include any proposals aimed at improving 
implementation. As a result, the Belgrade Meeting barely managed to reaffirm the validity of 
the Final Act, though, on a more positive note, the participants agreed on another Follow-up 
Meeting to be held in Madrid two years later. 
The Madrid Follow-Up Meeting (11 November 1980 to 9 September 1983) also took place at 
a difficult time in East-West relations with the deployment of Soviet SS-20 intermediate- 
range ballistic missiles aimed at Europe; the non-ratification of SALT II; the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan; the suppression of the Solidarity movement and the imposition of martial law 
in Poland; and the downing of a South Korean civilian jetliner by a Soviet fighter plane. 
Despite long intermissions in the negotiations and Western questioning about their 
continuation, the Meeting concluded by calling for a Conference on Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) to be held in Stockholm. As 
drafted in Madrid, the mandate of the CDE was to develop a second-set of CBMs, renamed 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, or CSBMs. As conceived, the new measures 
were to improve on the Helsinki regime and were to be militarily significant, politically 
2 In contrast to the CSCE itself, documentation on Follow-Up Meetings (including those held in 
Belgrade, Madrid, and Stockholm which most relevant here) is abundant. For a comprehensive 
overview emphasising the negotiations on CBMs, see Ghebali, Diplomatie de la detente, pp. 160- 
193; Klein, Securite et desarmement, pp. 125-227; Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals, pp. 16- 
33; and Carl C. Krehbiel, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe. The Stockholm 
Conference, New York: Praeger, 1989, pp. 7-11. [Hereafter: Krehbiel, Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures in Europe. 
3 In addition to the literature mentioned above, see The Belgrade Followup Meeting to the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Report and Appraisal, Report by the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe transmitted to the Committee on International 
Relations, 17 May 1978, US House of Representatives, 95th Congress, Ist Session, Washington, 
D. C.: GPO, 1978,105 pages. See also John D. Toogood, "Military Aspects of the Belgrade 
Review Meeting", Survival, XX: 4, July-August 1978, pp. 155-158. [Hereafter: Toogood, "Military 
Aspects"]. Toogood was the Chairman of the NATO caucus on security matters dealing with 
CBMs at Belgrade. 
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binding, adequately verifiable and applicable to all of Europe, including the entire European 
Soviet territory. 4 
The Stockholm Conference (17 January 1984 to 19 September 1986) successfully negotiated 
improvement on the original Helsinki measures and, after formal approval of its final 
document at the start of the third CSCE Follow-Up Meeting held in Vienna, (4 November 
1986 to 19 January 1989), the CSBMs replaced the Helsinki measures on 1 January, 1987. 
Hence, for almost twelve years, the original measures embodied in the Final Act remained in 
effect. But, as suggested, the continuation of the CBMs (like that of the Conference itself) 
was never fully anticipated by the CSCE participating States and even less concretely planned 
for. When the CSCE concluded in 1975, all 35 participants had signed on to commitments in 
this field, but probably an equal number of views existed on how these should be carried out. 
The Final Act provided little specificity on the matter, leaving the participating States with a 
wide array of interpretations. Before assessing the implementation record of the parties, a 
more comprehensive review of the provisions of the CBMs Document is necessary. 
2. THE FINAL ACT CBMS PROVISIONS 
The Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and 
disarmament consisted of twelve preambular paragraphs followed by three main sections. 
Part II and III, respectively entitled "Questions Relating to Disarmament" and "General 
Considerations", dealt very briefly and in general terms with questions of security in Europe. 
The text of these sections arose from the demands of the NNAs and Romania for a wider 
range of security issues to be considered by the Conference, but the other nations did not 
accept their proposals and the provisions agreed upon contained no firm commitment to 
undertake any particular action. 
Only Part I of the Document (untitled) contained recommendations on CBMs. It was divided 
into five main sections: 1) Prior notification of major military manoeuvres; 2) Prior 
notification of other military manoeuvres; 3) Exchange of observers; 4) Prior notification of 
military movements and; 5) Other confidence-building measures. Two paragraphs, separated 
4 For a discussion focusing on the new character of these measures see, for instance, Adam-Daniel 
Rotfeld, "Developing a Confidence-Building System in East-West Relations: Europe and the 
CSCE", pp., 92-119; and Rolf, Berg, "Military Confidence-Building in Europe", pp. 31-49 
published in Allen Lynch (ed. ), Building Security in Europe, East-West Monograph Series Number 
Two, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1986. 
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from the above sections, concluded the provisions of the Helsinki CBMs regime. 
2.1 Prior notification of major military manoeuvres 
The prior notification of major military manoeuvres was the only measure of the CBMs 
Document containing specific stipulations. The notification of major military manoeuvres 
was also considered the only "mandatory" measure of the Helsinki regime. Although the 
Final Act was not a treaty but a political commitment, it was widely recognised 
(predominantly in the West) that the Helsinki CBMs Document carried different levels of 
obligations stemming from the usage of qualifying language throughout the text. The 
employment of different formulae like the participating States "will notify" (when referring to 
major military manoeuvres), or that they "may notify" (when referring to smaller-scale 
manoeuvres) created different levels of obligations described by most analysts as obligatory 
and permissive, or mandatory and voluntary. 5 Since the CSCE participating States agreed 
that they "will notify" their major military manoeuvres, this measure was usually considered 
as carrying a higher degree of obligation than the other CBMs. 
What constituted a "major military manoeuvre" was not defined in the Document. It 
followed from the text, however, that they were "manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 
troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components". In this 
context, the word "troops" not only referred to land forces but also included amphibious and 
airborne troops. Following from the above, one could identify four types of major 
manoeuvres falling under the cover of "mandatory" notification: independent manoeuvres of 
land troops, independent manoeuvres of amphibious troops, independent manoeuvres of 
airborne troops, and combined manoeuvres. 6 
In the case of combined manoeuvres, the Document contained a specific provision noting that 
"combined manoeuvres which do not reach the above total but which involve land forces 
together with significant numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, 
notification can also be given" [emphasis added]. This sentence gave recognition to the 
desirability of notification of combined land-air or land-sea manoeuvres below the 25,000- 
troop threshold if there were "significant" numbers of amphibious or airborne troops. 
However, the meaning of the word "significant" was not given and, as clearly expressed by 
5 See, for instance, Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, p. 8. 
6 See Ibid., p. 9. 
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the use of the verb "can", the commitment to notify such manoeuvres was discretionary. 
Naval and air force manoeuvres conducted independently or combined with each other was 
not covered by any of the above provisions. 
The type of major manoeuvres to be notified was further qualified as being those "which take 
place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the 
adjoining sea area and air space. " While it followed from this provision that the territory of 
the United States, Canada and the overseas possessions of the European states were not 
covered by the notification regime, at the express request of the Soviet Union and Turkey, an 
explicit exception was made for States whose territory "extends beyond Europe". 8 In these 
cases, "notification need be given only of manoeuvres which take place in the area within 250 
kilometres from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating States". 
The Document further stressed (at the insistence of Turkey) that these States "need not give .. 
. notification 
in cases in which that area is also contiguous to the participating State's frontier 
facing or shared with a non-European non-participating State. "9 No definition of the meaning 
of "contiguous" was provided. 
The time parameter for giving notification of major manoeuvres was established at twenty- 
one days in advance of the start of the activities, or "in the case of a manoeuvre arranged at 
shorter notice at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date". Although it was 
recognised as extremely unlikely that any manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops 
would be arranged at shorter notice than 21 days, except during a crisis, it was felt desirable to 
leave it open to states to notify after the deadline had passed. ' ° The statement, however, 
represented an important "escape clause" from the obligations of the provision and, for this 
reason, all participants solemnly avowed that it should not and would not be used to 
circumvent the 21 days provision. ' l 
Concerning the notifications, the Document determined that they would be made "to all other 
participating States through usual diplomatic channels". Until the very end of the 
negotiations, Warsaw Pact representatives resisted the provision concerning "usual diplomatic 
7 Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975. 
8 Ibid. 
9 For a discussion see Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, p. 10. See also Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1976, Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976, pp. 324-235. [Hereafter: SIPRI Yearbook 1976]. 
10 Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975. 
11 Ibid., 24 July 1975. 
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channels" arguing that they did not have diplomatic relations or representations with all 
CSCE States. 12 However, on the understanding that the formulation could include 
communications through UN representatives, protecting powers, as well as direct exchanges 
of notes in capitals, the Soviets and others ultimately withdrew their objections. 13 According 
to Western interpretations, "diplomatic channels" ensured that notices would be government 
to government, rather than by other means such as press releases as was espoused by the 
WTO nations during the negotiations. '4 
For the content of the notification, the Document stressed that information "will" be given on 
the following items: 
1. the designation, if any, of the manoeuvre; 
2. the general purpose of and the countries involved in the manoeuvre; 
3. the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged; 
4. the area and the estimated time-frame of its conduct. 
Additionally, and in clear contrast to the high degree of obligation given to the above 
notifiable items, the CSCE participants further agreed that they "will also, if possible, provide 
additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces 
engaged and the period of involvement of these forces". The meaning of all these items was 
not defined in the Document, but background information on their negotiations provides 
useful insights as to the reasons for their inclusion, and what the West expected from them. 
The "designation", for instance, was nothing more than the usual administrative tool of giving 
a manoeuvre a name so that references back and forth could be made. 15 The Warsaw Pact 
nations were initially very suspicious that this statement concealed an attempt to determine 
code-names of manoeuvres. However, by the end of the negotiations, they finally realised 
that the requirement was rather innocuous, and agreed to its inclusion. ' 6 
"The general purpose of a manoeuvre" referred to the main objectives for the conduct of the 
activity. The degree of precision to give in this regard was not discussed in the negotiations 
and, thus, it was left to the discretion of each participant to determine how vague or specific to 
'2 Ibid., 6 August 1975. 
13 The USSR had no diplomatic relations with Spain and no representation in Monaco. Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 25 July 1975; and Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, p. 8. 
15 Canada, DEA, 21 July 1975. 
16 Ibid. 
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be in this regard. 17 
The item requiring the notification of the "states involved" in a manoeuvre was included to 
cover multinational manoeuvres. In this case, the participating State providing the 
notification would also indicate what other countries were involved in the manoeuvre. 
However, even if the provision was meant to ensure that the receiver of the notification would 
be aware of what countries were involved in any manoeuvre, the Document did not discuss 
who would actually transmit the notification. 18 
The phrase "type or types of forces" was intended to encourage a breakdown of the 
components of the forces engaged rather than merely saying "land forces", for example. 19 
Once again, in the absence of any further precision on the issue, states could determine the 
extent to which they wished to be precise when providing this information. 
"Numerical strength" referred to a general numerical figure of the troops involved. Although 
attempts were made during the negotiations to have this term read plural to encourage even 
further a breakdown of the components of the forces in the manoeuvre, this could not be 
agreed. Accordingly, the participating States could either provide only a single overall 
number, or breakdowns if they wished. 20 
The item concerning "the area" where the manoeuvre was conducted could not be defined 
more closely to make it specific as to what area was being utilised. Consequently, the 
signatories were free to decide how specific they wished to be when giving this information. 
21 
"Estimated time-frame". The word "estimated" was included to ensure that in the event of a 
slippage of planning dates a notifying state would not have to abrogate the Final Act. 
According to NATO's interpretative texts circulated in Brussels at the conclusion of the 
CSCE, it was clear that "time-frame" was not a magic word and that it was "intended only to 








Until the final days of the Conference, the text ended with the provision on "additional 
relevant information", and the phrase was intended only to open the way for any other 
practical information that a state might wish to offer. This could have been a simple warning 
that dates were not firm or that additional units might be added, etc. At the end of the CSCE, 
the phrase was still understood by the West as having that meaning, despite the fact that the 
sentence continued with "the period of involvement of these forces. "23 This later stipulation 
was enclosed to encourage further information on the dates of involvement beyond merely the 
dates of the manoeuvre itself and was thus directly related to information on the movement of 
troops before or after a manoeuvre. 24 
2.2 Prior notification of other military manoeuvres 
This section contained provisions on smaller-scale military manoeuvres and "other" 
manoeuvres. Unlike the stipulations for the prior notification of major military manoeuvres, 
no parameter (i. e. time, size, area, etc. ) was established for the notification of those 
manoeuvres, and the undertakings were entirely voluntary. 
The first paragraph of this section simply suggested that to contribute further to the building 
of confidence, the participating States "may also notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to 
other participating States, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres". 
No procedure of any kind was included regarding what information such notification should 
contain, or when it should be delivered. In fact, the only procedure included, or implied, with 
respect to the notification of smaller-scale manoeuvres related to the recipients of the 
notification. In this respect, the phrase "other participating States" established that, unlike the 
notification of major manoeuvres which needed to be given to all other CSCE participants, 
the notification in this case could be given to selected recipients. 
What constituted a "smaller-scale manoeuvre" was not defined and one could only assume 
that following the stipulations on major military manoeuvres, smaller-scale manoeuvres were 
those falling below the agreed parameter set for the "mandatory" notification of major 
manoeuvres, i. e. 25,000 troops. Whether one could further assume that the smaller-scale 
manoeuvres that "may" be notified were those of the same type as the major military 
manoeuvres was unclear, but became irrelevant by the subsequent following provisions. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.; and Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, p. 11. 
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Indeed, the second and last paragraph of this section stipulated that the signatories "may 
notify other military manoeuvres conducted by them". In the absence of definition of this 
phrase, one could assume that "other military manoeuvres" referred to all those manoeuvres 
not covered by the other provisions of the CBMs Document: independent air and/or naval 
manoeuvres; airborne and/or amphibious manoeuvres; combined manoeuvres in which the 
total of troops was less than 25,000, and; manoeuvres taking place outside the geographic area 
defined in the Document. 25 Recognising the ambiguity created by the lack of any reference to 
geographic limits in the above provisions, the United States issued a statement at the end of 
the Conference that neither paragraph should be considered as applying outside the zone of 
application agreed for the measures on the prior notification of major manoeuvres. 26 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the provisions on "other manoeuvres" were even more lacking in 
detail than the provisions for smaller-scale manoeuvres, as they did not mention who should 
be notified. The phrase "other military manoeuvres" was all that remained of the idea 
expressed by the neutral and non-aligned and some NATO states (Netherlands, Denmark, 
Belgium, Turkey and Greece) for notification of separate naval and air manoeuvres, which 
was strongly opposed by a number of participating States. 27 
2.3. The exchange of observers 
With the prior notification of major military manoeuvres, the invitation of observers to attend 
military manoeuvres was generally considered as the most important measure of the Helsinki 
CBMs regime. Unlike the notification measure, however, this provision was not mandatory. 
Indeed, even if the text indicated that the participating States "will" invite observers, the 
binding force of this provision was completely lost by the stipulation that the invitations were 
to be done "voluntarily", "on a bilateral basis", and "in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill". 
With regard to the type of military manoeuvres to which observers could be invited, the 
Document did not list any. In this regard, the Helsinki CBMs regime did not recognise any 
link (or obligation) between a "mandatory" notification of major manoeuvres and the 
invitation of observers. 28 However, the provisions did not limit the invitation of observers 
exclusively to these (major) manoeuvres. In fact, the only type of military activities covered 
25 See Ghebali, Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
26 Ibid., p. 17 note 24. 
27 Canada, DEA, 24 July 1975. 
28 See Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, p. 12. 
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by the Helsinki regime which seemed to be excluded from this provision related to the 
movement of troops, because the text only referred to the possibility of sending observers to 
attend "military manoeuvres". 
Finally, it should be noted that the CBMs Document was very explicit in relation to the fact 
that the "inviting" States had all the latitude concerning the procedures and conditions in 
which an observation was to take place: "The inviting State will determine in each case the 
number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other 
information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and 
hospitality. " 
2.4. Prior notification of major military movements 
The section on the prior notification of major military movements emphasised that the 
participating States had studied the question and that the signatories "may at their own 
discretion", notify their major military movements. The limited character of the text 
emphasised the fact that both superpowers were unwilling to provide notification of their 
movements, and constituted a double protection against any firm commitment to provide such 
notification. The statement, inserted at the request of a majority of CSCE delegations, 
enabled the participating States to decide the extent to which they wished to volunteer 
notification. No procedure was included to define how this should be done, what such a 
notification might contain or, even, what constituted a military movement. It can be noted, 
however, that the word "major" always preceded the word "movement' suggesting that the 
level at which notification might start was the same as that for "major military manoeuvres', 
and that smaller-scale movements were not covered by the agreement. Yet, in the absence of 
definition, the provision enabled each state to determine for itself how low it might wish to 
go. 
This section concluded by mentioning that further consideration would be given to this 
question "bearing in mind, in particular, the experience gained by the implementation of the 
measures" which were set in the Document, hence opening the way for a later development. 
2.5. Other confidence-building measures 
While indirectly recognising that the Helsinki regime did not exhaust the list of CBMs that 
could be undertaken by the participating States, this section of the Document only 
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recommended the promotion of exchanges among military personnel, including visits by 
military delegations. Apart from mentioning that this should be done with a view to better 
mutual understanding and with due regard to reciprocity, no other indication was provided as 
to when or how these exchanges should take place. Introduced at the request of Spain, no 
discussion on its implementation was held during the negotiations, and the undertaking was 
seen as a purely bilateral effort. 
Finally, the last two paragraphs of Part I of the CBMs Document dealt with the concept of 
"self-restraint" in military activities, and the further development of CBMs. The first 
paragraph simply recognised that to make a fuller contribution to the objective of confidence- 
building, the participating States would take account and respect this objective when 
conducting their military activities in the area covered by the provisions for the prior 
notification of major military manoeuvres. The paragraph stemmed from a much more 
detailed Yugoslav proposal concerning the application of certain restraints on military 
activities, but with both East and West opposed to such a consideration, the result was this 
generalised formulation on self-restraint with no description of the meaning of the 
commitment involved. 
The second and final paragraph left open the possibility of a further development of CBMs at 
a later stage, but simply noted in this regard that the participating States recognised that "the 
experience gained by the implementation of the provisions set forth [in the Document], 
together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at 
strengthening confidence. " 
As illustrated by the review of the CBMs regime, most of the measures were strictly 
voluntary in character and the procedures describing how they should be implemented were 
often very vaguely defined or simply non-existent. Soon after the conclusion of the Final Act, 
some analysts argued that because most provisions of the Document were "so vague and non- 
committal" it would be "difficult to ascertain whether they [were] actually being fulfilled. "29 
In contrast, the NATO governments who sponsored the measures took the view that "while 
no part of the Final Act [was] legally binding and CBM's [sic] were explicitly "voluntary", 
the political commitment was clear and the implementation record, involving as it [did] 
specific events and numbers, lend[ed] itself to objective assessment" [emphasis added]. 30 The 
29 SIPRI Yearbook 1976, p. 327. 
30 US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, First Semiannual Report by the 
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Warsaw Pact nations never really engaged in comparison of compliance behaviour. During 
the Belgrade and Madrid Meetings, the Eastern states criticised some of the manoeuvres 
conducted by NATO as being contrary to the spirit of the agreement but, beyond such general 
remarks, the Eastern bloc nations never entertained any detailed discussions on compliance. 
Therefore, the following review of the record of implementation of the CSCE CBMs is based 
predominantly on Western sources. 
THE MIXED RECORD OF COMPLIANCE 31 
As illustrated in Appendix I, and in the table below depicting the overall record of 
implementation of the Helsinki CBMs regime (from the signing of the Final Act on 1 August 
1975 to 1 January 1987 when the Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures entered into force), the CSCE participating States gave prior notification 
of 135 military manoeuvres and invited other signatories to send observers on 73 occasions. 32 
NOTIFICATIONS INVITATION OF 
OBSERVERS 
NATO 80 48 
NNAs 23 14 
WARSAW PACT 32 11 
TOTAL 135 73 
All three major groups of states represented at the CSCE (NATO, NNAs and WTO) took part 
in implementing the "mandatory" provisions of the CBMs Document and made some use of 
President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the 
Helsinki Final Act, Report submitted to the Committee on International Relations, US Congress, 
94th Congress, 2d Session, December 1976, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1976, p. 18. [Hereafter: US, 
Commission on Security and Cooperation, First Semiannual Report]. 
31 Unless specified otherwise, all data, figures and estimates in this section are based on the 
information used to produce the tables presented in Appendix I. 
32 There are no definite accepted figures in open literature on the number of notifications or 
invitations of observers provided under the Helsinki regime. More troublesome, it appears that even 
the CSCE participating States had different accounts of their number. "According to the figures of 
the Polish delegation to the Madrid Meeting, in the period between the Helsinki Conference and 
October 1980, CSCE states notified a total of 63 maneuvers (35 in the major category). According 
to the figures of the Finnish delegation ... there were 
in the same period 59 notifications (28 
maneuvers involving over 25,000 troops) .... 
Other sources also indicate certain differences which 
may be due either to counting the same maneuvers notified by different countries separately or to 
misunderstandings arising out of the simultaneous organization in a single country (e. g., West 
Germany) of several major maneuvers. " Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, "CBMs Between Helsinki and 
Madrid: Theory and Experience", in F. Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe, Confidence-Building 
Measures in Europe, East-West Monograph Number One, New York: Institute for East-West 
Security Studies, 1983, p. 129 note 30. [Hereafter: Rotfeld, "CBMs Between Helsinki and 
Madrid"]. The figures presented here are based on the information used to produce the tables 
presented in Appendix I. 
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its discretionary clauses. No state, however, gave voluntary notification of military 
movements, or of any "other" military manoeuvres, such as independent naval or air 
manoeuvres. On the other hand, countries representing the interests of all three groups 
participated in exchanges of military personnel as called for in the Document under the 
provision "other confidence-building measures". Review of the implementation record of this 
measure, however, will not be considered here. Available information on this CBM is very 
scarce and does not allow the compilation of sufficient data to present an overall record of 
implementation. 33 While unfortunate, it can be noted that this type of measure was not new 
or unique to the CSCE process. Exchanges of military personnel and military delegations 
occurred long before the CSCE came into being. Furthermore, because the CBMs Document 
only required the "promotion" of such undertakings, a thorough analysis of the compliance 
record would necessitate information on previous exchanges in order to assess the degree to 
which the Final Act objective to "promote" such exchanges was fulfilled. Information on 
these exchanges is also not readily available. As a general assessment of the overall 
usefulness of the measure, however, one Western participant to the Madrid Follow-Up 
Meeting noted in 1984 that: 
[t]here appears to have been a considerable increase in such bilateral exchanges 
between Eastern and Western countries immediately following the signing of the 
Final Act in 1975... suggesting that the inclusion of this CBM in the Final Act was 
successful in giving further impetus to a long-standing practice in East-West relations. 
At the same time, however, reports suggest that this increase may have been reversed 
in subsequent years, and that this decline reflected periods of tension in broader issues 
affecting East-West relations. 34 
Beyond these general considerations, the compliance behaviour of each of the three groups 
involved in the CSCE requires a more detailed analysis. 
33 For partial information on the implementation of this measure principally covering American 
activities, see the first thirteen semiannual reports on implementation prepared by the US 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (complete references are provided in the 
bibliography). See also by the Commission, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, 
Report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, August 1,1980,96th Congress, 
2d Session, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1980, pp. 294-296 [Hereafter: US, Commission on Security 
and Cooperation, Findings and Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki]; and Fulfilling our 
Promises. The United States and the Helsinki Final Act. A Status Report, Washington D. C.: GPO, 
November 1979, pp. 315-316. For a partial list of military exchanges between the US and the 
Warsaw Pact countries between 1975 and 1979, see Hans Gunther Brauch, "CBMs and the CSCE", 
Arms Control Today, 10: 10 November 1980, p. 3. 
34 Goetze, Security in Europe, pp. 79-80. 
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3.1. NATO 
Of the three main groups represented at the CSCE, the Western states accounted for the 
highest recurrence of prior notifications of manoeuvres and invitations to observers. During 
the period under review, the countries of the Atlantic Alliance notified 37 major manoeuvres 
involving between 25,000 and 132,000 troops. In all cases, the required 21 days advance 
notice was observed and in 18 instances the period was longer -- up to 34 days in one case. 
With regard to the content of notifications, the Western states almost always provided the 
information required by the Helsinki Document, which is to say: the designation of the 
manoeuvre (if any); the general purpose of the exercise; the countries involved; the category 
of troops engaged; the numerical strength of forces engaged; the area of the manoeuvre; and 
the estimated time-frame of its conduct. 35 Furthermore, the countries of the Atlantic Alliance 
often supplemented the required information with further details on the activities. In addition 
to the total number of troops, for example, several Western notices provided information on 
the breakdown of the units, their type, and even in many cases their designation. 36 On several 
occasions, the Western notifications included, "as appropriate", details on "any direct link 
with other allied maneuvers" as well as "any air or naval support. "37 Also, the NATO states 
often supplemented information on the time-frame of the conduct of the manoeuvres with 
disclosures on the period of transition of troops to and from the exercise. Although not 
considered as implementation of the voluntary Helsinki CBMs provisions on the prior 
notification of major military movements, these voluntary disclosures were in keeping with a 
section of the CBMs provisions on the prior notification of major military manoeuvres calling 
upon participating States to provide "if possible ... additional relevant 
information, 
particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of 
involvement of these forces. " Finally, it is noteworthy that most large-scale manoeuvres held 
by NATO were often notified by more than one ally, and it was not uncommon for the 
different participating nations to issue separate but identical notifications or, alternatively, to 
35 This information is noted by Goetze in Security in Europe, p. 80. In contrast, Victor-Yves 
Ghebali contends that, on three occasions, Western notifications failed to provide the precise dates 
for the beginning and end of the manoeuvre. According to Ghebali, the 1975 US notification of the 
Reforger exercise indicated only "October-November 1975", and the 1982 FRG notifications of the 
Carbine Fortress and Starke Wehr exercises reported the information on the time-frame for the 
conduct of the manoeuvres as "September 1982". Ghebali, Diplomatie de la detente, p. 159 note 1. 
36 Toogood, "Military Aspects",. p. 155. 
37 Goetze, Security in Europe, p. 80. Since Goetze was writing in 1982, this information should be 
considered valid only until that year. However, there is no indication that the reporting changed at 
a later date. 
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detail further the participation of national troops. 38 
In addition to the above notifications, the countries of the Atlantic Alliance issued 43 notices 
of smaller-scale manoeuvres involving troops numbering between 4,000 and 24,000. In the 
vast majority of cases, the notices were given 21 days or more before the start of the 
manoeuvres, even though the Final Act did not specify any time-frame for reporting these 
activities. With regard to the content of these notifications, the Western states reportedly 
applied the same criteria as for reporting their major military manoeuvres, "although the 
information provided was sometimes less detailed". 39 
As regards foreign observation of their manoeuvres, the NATO countries extended invitations 
to other states to send observers to 32 of their 37 notified major manoeuvres and to 16 of the 
43 notified smaller-scale manoeuvres. 40 Invitations were extended either to all CSCE 
participating States or to a large number representing the interest of each of the three main 
CSCE groupings. Observers at Western military activities were given ample facilities to 
follow properly the manoeuvres. 41 As a general rule, observers were provided with detailed 
briefings, means of transportation, experienced escorts, fixed and mobile observation posts, 
telephone liaison with their embassies, and binoculars. Observers were also authorised to visit 
the actual exercise area and make contacts with officers and/or troops. 
Looking at the overall implementation record of the Western states over the twelve years of 
the Helsinki regime, it appears that the Allies held an average of three major manoeuvres each 
year (from two in 1977 and 1984, to four in 1978,1983 and 1984), with a somewhat higher 
38 As observed by Johan-Jorgen Hölst, the Western authorities often separately notified different 
phases of their multinational manoeuvres: "They follow the practice ... of announcing separately 
various phases of co-ordinated Alliance exercises which involve the territories of several NATO 
countries". Johan-Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework", 
Survival, XXV: 1, January-February 1983, p. 7. [Hereafter: Holst, "Confidence-building 
Measures"]. 
39 Goetze, Security in Europe, p. 80. On NATO's reporting of smaller-scale manoeuvres, Ghebali 
notes that the notifications of Red Claymore (UK, 1981), Farfadet (France, 1981) and Langres 
(France, 1982), only provided the month as information on the time-frame for the conduct of the 
manoeuvres. Ghebali, Diplomatie de la detente, p. 159 note 1. 
ao The total number of invitations may have been higher. Information on three manoeuvres is either 
contradictory or not available. See Appendix tables. 
41 See Goetze, Security in Europe, p. 81. See also US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 
Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki, Report by the Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, November 1982,97th Congress, 2d Session, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 
November 1982, p. 29. [Hereafter: US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, Findings and 
Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki]. 
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average of smaller-scale exercises though, in this case, the difference between years varied 
more greatly (ranging from one to six). Almost all of NATO's major manoeuvres, and two- 
thirds of its smaller activities, took place in the autumn. Thirty of the 37 notified major 
manoeuvres, for example, were held in September alone. 
With the exception of the year 1975, when a total of six notifications were issued but 
observers were invited to attend only one manoeuvre, the Western states extended a minimum 
of three invitations each year. More significantly, with one possible exception (Eternal 
Triangle, for which available information is inconclusive), the NATO states invited observers 
to all their major manoeuvres held between 1979 and 1986. 
Interestingly, while the treatment of observers was described through the entire period as 
being very satisfactory, it was reported in 1977 that "as NATO states have gained experience 
in accommodating the needs of observers, the quality and frequency of the opportunities 
extended for observation ... 
have been markedly enhanced. '-A2 No indication suggests that 
similar improvements may have taken place in regard to their notifications. This, however, 
may be due to the fact that, as early as 1976, "NATO allies have worked closely together to 
insure that the Alliance follow[ed] common modalities for CBMs", 43 and it is plausible that 
these modalities were considered sufficiently satisfactory not to require changes. 
3.2. Neutral and Non-aligned 
The compliance record of the Neutral and Non-aligned nations with the Helsinki regime was 
comparable to that of NATO. Although states associated with this group did not co-operate 
as closely as the other two major CSCE groupings, they had a keen interest in the Helsinki 
agreement and implemented the CBMs provisions in a forthcoming and liberal fashion. 
Between 1975 and 1986, the NNAs notified ten major manoeuvres varying in size from 
25,000 to 40,000 troops. Seven of these manoeuvres were carried out by Switzerland, two by 
Austria, and one by Spain. 44 In addition, the NNAs announced thirteen manoeuvres 
42 US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Third Semiannual Report to the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. June 1- December 1,1977, Special Report 
No. 39, December 1977, Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office 
of Media Services, p. 6. 
43 US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, First Semiannual Report, p. 18. 
as Spain has been included in this group because the notification of its participation in the two 
exercises was made before it officially joined the integrated command of NATO in May 1982. 
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involving less than 25,000 troops (six by Sweden, three by Yugoslavia, three by Austria, and 
one by Spain). For all 23 manoeuvres, the advance notices were never less than 21 days 
(varying, in fact, between 21 and 53 days). 
As for the content of the NNAs notifications, it was generally considered satisfactory 
although, in some cases, the reporting could have been improved. In six notifications, for 
example, the designation was omitted and, in another two instances, the time-frame for the 
conduct of the manoeuvre was reported without beginning and end dates. 45 It can be noted, 
however, that in most cases detailed information was included on the other notifiable items. It 
is worth mentioning as an example that the Swiss notification of November 1975 (provided 
without a designation) was issued 31 days before the start of the manoeuvre and contained 
data on the participating units and equipment even including the number of horses. 46 It is also 
noteworthy that, like the NATO states, the NNAs on several occasions supplemented the 
information on the time-frame for the conduct of a manoeuvre with details on the movement 
of the participating troops. 
The NNAs invited observers to attend eight of their ten notified major manoeuvres and six of 
their thirteen smaller ones. The invitations were extended to a substantial number of countries 
representing all three CSCE groupings, and observers were granted the opportunity to carry 
out their tasks effectively. 47 
Finally, given the fact that the NNAs did not hold bilateral or multinational exercises, 48 a 
review of their overall record of implementation assessing, for example, patterns of military 
practice is irrelevant. As a general remark on their implementation relating to the invitation of 
foreign observers, however, it can noted, that while the states associated with this group 
issued less notifications than NATO or the WTO states, in proportion, they invited more 
observers than the Eastern states. 
45 According to Ghebali, the Swiss notification of the Cresta manoeuvre only quoted "October 
1981", and the Swedish notification of Sydfront, "September 1982". Ghebali, Diplomatie de la 
detente, p. 159 note 1. 
46 See J. D. Toogood, "From Helsinki to Belgrade: What Happened to the Confidence Building 
Measures? ", Canadian Defence Review, 8: 2, Fall 1978, p. 13. [Hereafter: Toogood, "From 
Helsinki to Belgrade"]. 
47 See, Goetze, Security in Europe, p. 90. 
48 The only exception is Spain, who conducted a bilateral manoeuvre with the United States 
(Crisex-81) just before joining NATO in 1982. 
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3.3. Warsaw Pact 
In contrast to the other two groups represented at the CSCE, the Warsaw Pact's 
implementation of the Helsinki CBMs was poor. In general, the Eastern states did the 
minimum to stay in compliance with the provisions of the Final Act and, on two occasions, 
they were charged with breaching its provisions. 
During the period under review, WTO member states issued notifications for twenty-seven 
major military manoeuvres. The vast majority of these manouevres involved less than 30,000 
troops, although the number of participating troops reached, on one occasion, 100,000 men 
and varied, in five instances, between 40,000 and 60,000. Until 1984, notifications were 
issued precisely twenty-one days before the start of the manoeuvres --the minimum time- 
frame required by the Final Act. Later, the notifying period was prolonged on several 
occasions --up to 28 days in two cases. 
The content of the WTO notifications was never thorough. In contrast to the Western and 
non-bloc countries, who frequently provided details on the breakdown of units, their type, or 
name, the Eastern notifications only indicated the gross number of the forces engaged. 49 In at 
least 14 cases (or more than half the total number of the major manoeuvres notified), no 
designation was provided. In three instances, the time-frame for the conduct of the 
manoeuvre was reported without precise dates. 50 In two notifications, the participating 
countries were not named. 51 In seven instances, the information relating to the geographic 
area of the manoeuvre was worthless: the notifications of Brotherhood in Arms (GDR, 1980), 
Shield-82 (Bulgaria), Shield-84 and Druzba-86 (Czechoslovakia), for example, reported only 
the name of the country. 52 
49 See Toogood, "Military Aspects", p. 155. 
50 The notification of Tarcza- 76 by Poland reported only "Early September", and the notification of 
Shield-84 by Czechoslovakia, the "Beginning of September". See Ghebali, Diplomatie de la 
detente, p. 159. The GDR notification of the 1980 Brotherhood in Arms exercise reported only: 
"First-half of September". See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments 
and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1981, London: Taylor and Francis, 1981, p. 495, Appendix 17 
A. [Hereafter: SIPRI Yearbook 1981]. 
51 According to Ghebali, the notifications of Shield-82 and Shield-84 only mentioned "with forces 
from the Warsaw Pact". See Ghebali, Diplomatie de la detente, pp. 158-159. 
52 The information on Brotherhood in Arms is from SIPRI Yearbook 1981, Appendix 17A, p. 495. 
Information on the other manoeuvres is from Ghebali, Diplomatie de la detente, p. 159. Ghebali 
also notes that the two "unnamed" Soviet exercises of June-July 1983 and June-July 1984 reported 
zones of, respectively, 90,000 and 50,000 square miles. The notification of Zapad-81 which did 
not include a designation or the number of participating troops identified a manoeuvre area 
comparable in size to three times the territory of Czechoslovakia, or some 150,000 square miles. 
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As noted, imprecision of this type occurred in some of the notifications given by other 
participating States. Unlike the WTO practice, however, these imprecisions were never 
frequent, they did not concern numerous notifiable items for the same manoeuvre, and they 
did not necessarily occur in the notifications for the largest military activities, as was 
frequently the case for the Eastern notifications. It is noteworthy that six of the seven vague 
reportings of the WTO relating to the geographic area of the manoeuvre were found in the 
notifications for the exercises involving the largest number of troops. In addition, the 
notifications for the two largest multinational manoeuvres, held by Pact nations between 1975 
and 1986 (Shield-82 and Shield-84), not only failed to specify precise locations but also the 
countries involved and the beginning and end dates for their conduct. 53 In the notification of 
another large-scale WTO multinational manoeuvre (Brotherhood in Arms, 40,000 troops), the 
time-frame was simply identified as "first-half of September", and its location described as 
"the GDR and adjacent territory". 54 
Foreign observation of WTO manoeuvres was a rare event. Observers were invited to attend 
only nine of the twenty-seven notified major manoeuvres and the invitations were never 
addressed to all the CSCE participants. Until 1977 the invitations were extended only to a 
select number of states in geographical proximity to the manoeuvre area, or to neutral or non- 
aligned countries. In July 1977 (for the Karpatia manoeuvre), the geographical distribution of 
observers was broadened but did not include all the CSCE participants. From the completion 
of the 1979 Neman exercise to the 1985 Kavkaz manoeuvre, no CSCE observers apart from 
Pact nations were invited to attend any of the eleven notified large-scale Soviet/Pact 
manoeuvres held during this period. Finally, for the last manoeuvre observed under the 
Helsinki regime (Druzba-86), invitations were extended to states representing all three CSCE 
groupings but, again, not to all participants. 
The opportunities and facilities extended for observation at Warsaw Pact military activities 
were never satisfactory. For the first three manoeuvres observed by other CSCE states, 
"observers had been given the opportunity to see very little" and what they reported was thus 
"of minimal interest". 55 At the fourth observed manoeuvre (Karpatia), the quality of maps 
and briefings was poor, the provision of mobile observation posts and opportunities to make 
53 Ibid., pp. 158-159. 
sa See SIPRI Yearbook 1981, p. 495 Appendix 17A. 
55 Toogood, "Military Aspects", p. 156. 
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contact with the troops still non-existent. 56 Observation time for the February 1978 Berezina 
exercise was limited and the observers were not allowed to use their own equipment and were 
provided with faulty binoculars. 57 Reports of the Neman manoeuvre held in July 1979 noted 
that observers "were shown demonstration rather than actual exercise activity. "58 Finally, as 
can be noted by an official US report on the 1986 Czech Druzba manoeuvre (the last one for 
which observers had been invited under the Helsinki regime), the opportunities were still 
"severely restricted": 59 
The US and a number of other signatories were invited to send two observers .... 
Czechoslovak authorities limited actual observation time during the three-day period 
to a total of about three hours. In addition to this general restriction, specific 
limitations on the use of personal binoculars, tape recorders, and cameras existed, 
affecting the ability of observers to judge the nature of the activity. After discussions, 
the Czechoslovak authorities relented somewhat and permitted some use of recorders. 
They also supplied high-quality binoculars but remained adamant in their prohibition 
of photography. In spite of assurances to the contrary, the Czechoslovak hosts did not 
permit access to troops, unit commanders, or command posts. Western observers 
reported information gaps in briefings about the exercise. Unbriefed subjects 
included, but were not limited to, the location, size, and origin of participating units as 
well as basic questions of deployed equipment. Observers had at their disposal neither 
an overall printed scenario nor a list of attendees by country. 60 
The Eastern states' implementation of the voluntary provisions of the Helsinki Document 
concerning the notification of small-scale manoeuvres did not detract from the uniformly poor 
record of compliance with the other confidence-building measures. Even when applying very 
loose criteria as to what should constitute a proper notification under the Helsinki regime, a 
total of only five notifications of small-scale manoeuvres were recorded: four by Hungary and 
one by the Soviet Union. It remains questionable, however, whether the four notifications 
issued by Hungary could be considered as fulfilment of the Helsinki voluntary provisions. 
According to available information, the first two "unnamed" small-scale manoeuvres carried 
56 J D. Toogood, "From Helsinki to Belgrade", p. 13. Toogood notes, however, some 
improvements in the permission granted to observers to use binoculars. 
57 See Ghebali, Diplomatie de la detente, p. 158. See also Aurel Braun, "Confidence-Building 
Measures, Security, and Disarmament", in Robert Spencer (ed. ), Canada and the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for International 
Studies, 1984, p. 226 note 21. This was the first Eastern manoeuvre for which the United States 
was invited to send observers. 
58 US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, Findings and Recommendations Five Years After 
Helsinki, p. 26. Although invited, the United States did not send any observers to the Neman 
manoeuvre because it was held in Lithuania. 
59 Ibid. 
60 US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Twenty-first Semiannual Report. 
Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. April 1,1986 - October 1,1986, Special Report No. 154, n. 
d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, pp. 31-32. [Hereafter: US, 
Commission on Security and Cooperation, Twenty-first Semiannual Report]. 
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out by Hungary in April and October 1976 were announced, in the first case, the day before 
the commencement of the exercise and, in the second instance, on the same day. These two 
"notifications" were not given in writing but orally to accredited attaches in Budapest. 61 The 
notification of Dyna 1980 was also verbal and, like the two 1976 manoeuvres, the advance 
warning was very short, in this case, the day before the beginning of the exercise. 62 All three 
notifications of smaller-scale manoeuvres provided "very limited details about the nature and 
scope of the activities taking place". 63 Finally, the notification of the 1979 "unnamed" 
manoeuvre (referred to in the West as Shield-79) was slightly better. 64 The announcement 
was reportedly made on May 3, and the time-frame for the manoeuvre identified as "Mid- 
May". 65 The number of troops involved was disclosed as amounting to "fewer than 25,000", 
but the notification was again made orally. 66 
As previously discussed, the Final Act did not specify any parameter for reporting smaller- 
scale manoeuvres. While the Hungarian announcements of incoming manoeuvres may have 
been considered by Budapest as fulfilment of the voluntary CBMs provisions, the Western 
countries held a different view on the matter. During the Belgrade Follow-Up Meeting, the 
NATO states did not acknowledge the first two smaller-scale notifications given by Hungary 
before the meeting. Apparently, "the Hungarian delegation drew attention to two other 
smaller-scale `notices', but did not press the point when Western participants pointed out that 
a brief, oral announcement given without specific details on the same day that the manoeuvre 
began was not really in the same category as the written, detailed advance notices given by 
others. "67 
The only other effort made by WTO nations to implement the voluntary provisions of the 
Final Act on the prior notification of small manoeuvres was made by the Soviet Union in 
1983.68 Issued precisely twenty-one days before the start of the manoeuvre, the notification 
61 See Goetze, Security in Europe, p. 89; and Toogood, "From Helsinki to Belgrade", p. 13, Table 
A note 3. 
62 Goetze, Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Observers were apparently invited. However, no available information indicates whether the 
invitations were extended to other CSCE participating States or only to Warsaw Pact nations. 
65 Holst, Johan Jörgen, "Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework", Survival, 
XXV: 1, January-February 1983, p. 10, Table 1 note (b). [Hereafter: Holst, "Confidence-building 
Measures"]. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Toogood, "Military Aspects", p. 155. 
68 For the views of the United States on the reporting of small-scale manoeuvres by the Warsaw 
Pact nations, and background on their notifications see US, Commission on Security and 
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of the Dniestr exercise was similar in style to the Soviet reporting on large-scale manoeuvres. 
It is worth mentioning, however, that NATO and NNA observers were invited to attend this 
exercise, which for the Western countries represented the only occasion to observe an East 
European manoeuvre between 1979 and 1985.69 
Undoubtedly, the most disturbing aspect of the Soviet/Pact record of implementation of the 
Helsinki agreement came in 1981 when important military activities taking place during the 
internal political crisis in Poland were either improperly notified or not notified at all. Indeed, 
in March of that year, the Soviet Union failed to announce several important military 
activities taking place in Poland claiming that these operations, code-name Soyuz-81, were 
either a command/staff exercise, or that they did not involve more than 25,000 troops. 70 
Ambassador Max Kampelman, the US representative at the Madrid Conference, dismissed 
both explanations suggesting that a review of texts of Warsaw Pact radio broadcasts clearly 
indicated that: 
9 four armies were involved 
" concurrent activities took place in three different military districts in Poland .... 
" there was at least a partial mobilization of reservists in both Poland and the GDR .... 
" virtually every branch of the ground forces of the GDR and Poland were exercised at the 
unit or sub-unit level. 7' 
These reports strongly suggested the involvement of a number of troops, exceeding the CSCE 
notifiable numerical threshold. Furthermore, as Kampelman asserted, Eastern reports on the 
use of napalm were very difficult to reconcile with the explanation that the military activities 
of Soyuz-81 were only a command/staff exercise. 72 
Cooperation in Europe, Fourteenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. 
December 1,1982 - May 31,1983, Special Report No. 109, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of 
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 14; Fifteenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of the Helsinki 
Final Act. June 1,1983 - November 30,1983, Special Report No. 113, n. d., Washington, D. C.: 
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 17; and. Basket I -- Implementation of the Final 
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings Eleven Years After 
Helsinki, Report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe submitted to Congress, 
November 1986,99th Congress, 2d Session, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1987, p. 38. [Hereafter: US, 
Commission on Security and Cooperation, Basket 1]. 
69 Ghebali, Diplomatie de la detente, p. 158. 
70 Three Years at the East-West Divide. The Words of U. S. Ambassador Max M Kampelman at the 
Madrid Conference on Security and Human Rights, edited by Leonard R. Sussman, New York: 
Freedom House, 1983, p. 54. [Hereafter: Three Years at the East-West Divide]. 
71 Ibid., p. 55. 
72 Ibid., p. 54. 
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In the fall of 1981, the Soviet Union openly violated the provisions of the Final Act by failing 
to properly notify the largest military activity held by any CSCE state since the signing of the 
Final Act. The notification for the manoeuvre code-name Zapad-81, held between 4-12 
September in the Byelorussian and Baltic military districts and on the Baltic Sea, did not 
include the number of troops and the type of forces engaged as specifically required by the 
Final Act, nor did it contain "information on the designation (if any). "73 On September 5th, 
the second day of the manoeuvre, the Soviet news agency TASS identified the designation of 
the manoeuvre as "Zapad-81", and revealed that "approximately 100,000 troops" were 
involved. 74 Interestingly, the Soviet state-controlled newspaper Izvestiya had reported two 
days before the start of the manoeuvre that it would involve only "a very limited" number of 
troops. 75 
Looking at the overall Eastern states' record of implementation of the Helsinki CBMs regime, 
it appears that the yearly occurrence of WTO manoeuvres varied much more greatly than that 
of NATO. While no notification of any kind was made in the second half of 1975 
(immediately after the signing of the Final Act in August), that was followed by five 
notifications in 1976 and continued to vary significantly with, for example, only one 
notification in 1981 and four in 1986. 
Of the 27 large-scale military manoeuvres notified, about half (13) were national Soviet 
exercises; seven were multinational manoeuvres involving some, or all, Pact members; four 
were joint exercises with the participation of the Soviet Union and another WTO ally and; 
three were Soviet exercises in the GDR with no apparent involvement of East German troops. 
The recurrence of the different types of manoeuvres did not indicate any pattern in Eastern 
military practice. Multinational manoeuvres of Pact forces, for example, occurred once in 
1976,1980 and 1986, and twice in 1982 and 1984. As another example, the Soviet Union 
held one or two national exercises every year, but reported none in 1975,1980,1982 and 
1984. 
The size of all the manoeuvres also varied distinctively. With the exception of three Soviet 
73 See Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
74 See US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Eleventh Semiannual Report. 
Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. June 1,1981 - November 30,1981, Special Report No. 89, n. 
d., Washington D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 14. 
75 See Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals, p. 29. 
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national exercises, 76 all the largest manoeuvres held by the Eastern states77 were multinational 
in character, though not all the multinational exercises involved large numbers of troops. 78 In 
addition, while no manoeuvres with more than 35,000 troops took place before 1980, 
activities involving or exceeding a total of 40,000 troops were carried out every year after that 
--with the sole exception of 1985 when the three notified large-scale manoeuvres reported that 
year did not exceed 25,000 troops. More than half (14) of the 27 major manoeuvres held by 
the East reportedly involved 25,000 troops which corresponded exactly to the Final Act 
numerical threshold for "mandatory" notification. 
Looking at the overall record for the invitation of observers, it appears that while WTO states 
notified at least one manoeuvre every year, no observers were invited in 1980,1982 and 
1984. More importantly (with the sole exception of the 1983 small-scale Soviet Dniestr 
manoeuvre), 79 no Western observers were invited between 1979 and 1985.80 Also, while the 
NATO states were invited to only nine of the 32 manoeuvres notified by the East under the 
Helsinki regime, with the exception of the two multinational WTO manoeuvres Tarcza-76 
and Druzba-86, all invitations were for national Soviet exercises taking place on Soviet 
territory. It is also noteworthy that the largest manoeuvre attended by Western observers 
(Tarcza-76) only involved 35,000 troops. 
With regard to the notification of the manoeuvres, Soviet/Pact practice differed from the other 
CSCE participants in that they "were not sent --as laid down by the Helsinki Final Act-- 
through `usual diplomatic channels', in other words from Foreign Ministry to Foreign 
Ministry, but through the Ministry of Defence to the military attaches of the CSCE 
"8 countries. I 
Finally, with regard to Eastern states' observation of foreign manoeuvres, it is worth 
mentioning that until the second half of 1977, all the WTO countries declined NATO's 
invitations to attend their manoeuvres. Furthermore, while Moscow accepted its first Western 
invitation in September 1977, it was reported that, with only one exception (Tayfun-77), the 
76 Zapad-81 (100,000 troops); the June-July 1983 unnamed manoeuvre (50,000 troops); and Zapad- 
86 (50,000 troops). 
" Eight manoeuvres involved the participation of 40,000 troops or more. 
78 The multinational exercises Druzba-82 and Druzba-86 held in Czechoslovakia numbered only 
25,000 troops. 
79 The United States, along with other NATO and NNA counties, were invited to send observers. 
80 Ghebali, Diplomatie de la detente, p. 158. 
81 Ghebali, Ibid., p. 159; and Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, p. 21. 
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Soviet Union was the only WTO nation to attend any NATO manoeuvre until at least 1982 -- 
the last year for which information is available. 82 
4. THE PURPOSE OF CBMs 
As illustrated above, the compliance behaviour of all three groups varied greatly. In general, 
however, the CSCE participating States expressed satisfaction with the way the system was 
being implemented and the progress recorded over the years. Even the Soviets asserted at 
times that the CBMs were contributing "to promote the strengthening of confidence and 
military detente". 83 But, precisely what the Helsinki CBMs system was supposed to achieve 
in the first place remains unclear. 
The Final Act ascribed three objectives to the CBMs provisions: 
(1) eliminate the causes of tension; 
(2) strengthen confidence and to contribute to increase stability and security, and; 
(3) reduce the danger of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of 
military activities, particularly in a situation where a state lacks clear and timely 
information about the nature of such activities. 
The incongruence between these lofty objectives and the reality of the Final Act's provisions 
had more to do with conference rhetoric than with any specific objectives for CBMs 
advocated by the Western governments at the CSCE. Apart from a number of general 
statements, made on the margins of the negotiations, the Alliance never provided a 
comprehensive written explanation on the precise meaning of these objectives or how the 
measures could attain them. 84 Western officials, in fact, were quick to play down the military 
value of CBMs, suggesting instead that they were political and psychological in nature. 85 
Perhaps because of the absence of any clear policy statement on their purpose, numerous 
interpretations of the goals and objectives of CBMs emerged after the Conference. 
82 See Goetze, Security in Europe, p. 89. 
83 As noted by Brauch in "CBMs and the CSCE", p. 2, the Soviets accepted the rationale that such 
measures could prevent misperceptions and thus reduce tensions. 
84 This is particularly striking if one compares the well-documented positions of the West during 
the 1958 Conference on Surprise Attack. Though many of the favourable arguments used by the 
West in the CSCE can be found in this earlier documentation, no similar effort was undertaken, at 
the time of the CSCE to explain what the measures were to achieve. For the documents issued 
during the 1958 Conference, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, pp. 1213-1319. 
85 Such views were widely held by Western negotiators. See, for instance, J. D. Toogood, 
"Helsinki 1975: What Was Achieved in the Field of Confidence-Building Measures? ", Canadian 
Defence Quarterly, 5: 2, Winter 1975, p. 29. For a similar observation almost ten years later by a 
participant to the Stockholm Conference, see Goetze, Security in Europe, p. 78. 
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Eventually, in the late-1970s, a "theory" took hold in the West. In essence, it argued that 
because military exercises in Europe were conducted in secrecy, they could be mistaken for 
potentially hostile actions and could trigger responses that might lead to confrontation or 
armed conflict. Observance of "traffic rules" for routine activities could reduce such risks86 
as they could "help separate unambiguous signals of hostile intent from the random noise of 
continuous military activity. "87 Any major deviations from the agreed parameters could 
provide time to clarify the situation or take appropriate actions. 
Implicit from the above reasoning on the role of CBMs was that the ultimate goal of the 
measures was to reduce the risk of surprise attack. 88 Indeed, even though the prevention of 
conflicts arising from misunderstanding or miscalculations were the only contingencies 
described in the Final Act, the underlying assumption was that a benign activity would be 
misinterpreted and trigger an undesirable reaction out of fear of surprise attack: the worst-case 
scenario from a Western perspective. 
Also implicit from the "theory" was that information and knowledge about military activities 
could clarify their true nature, including any underlying intentions. 89 The Final Act 
recognised that the danger of misinterpretation was particularly significant "in a situation 
where a state lacks clear and timely information about the nature of such activities. " 
Another goal ascribed to the measures was to inhibit the threat, or use of force, for coercion 
purposes. According to Bernd Goetze, a participant at the Madrid Follow-Up Meeting: 
"When Western preparations for the military security aspects of the CSCE began in 1972, the 
NATO states decided that it was essential to focus attention on the major sources of instability 
in Europe (as, for example, the Soviet tendency to exert military pressure on other European 
states)". 90 A beneficial role of CBMs in this regard was to deter the display of large military 
86 See Berg, "Military Confidence-Building in Europe", p. 50. 87 Jonathan Alford, "The Usefulness and Limitations of CBMs", in William Epstein and Bernard T. 
Feld (eds. ), New Directions in Disarmament, New York: Praeger, 1981, p. 135. 88 That surprise attack was central to Western support for the development of the Helsinki CBMs 
and an important element of the thinking on the issue is evidenced in the statement made by the US 
Secretary of State, William Rogers, to the Helsinki opening talks in 1973: "We have given support 
to these measures because we believe greater confidence can result from sharing such military 
information in order that the margin for surprise can be substantially reproduced. ", in: CSCE, 
Records and Documents, CSCE/I/PV. 5. 
89 According to Jonathan Alford: "What CBMs should do ... 
is permit both sides to differentiate 
clearly between actions intended to be seen as hostile and those that are not. " Alford, "The 
Usefulness and Limitations of CBMs", p. 134. 90 Goetze, Security in Europe, p. 78. 
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forces for political intimidation, or raising the political cost of any Soviet-led intervention in 
Eastern Europe. 
This somewhat idealised conception of what confidence-building measures could and should 
accomplish was, of course, developed in the West. NATO had more to gain from 
transparency than the Warsaw Pact because of the extreme secrecy in which the WTO 
operated. Surprise attack was the foremost threat to the Atlantic Alliance during its first forty 
years of existence, hence its prominence in a developing theory based on measures devised to 
make sudden, large military operations more difficult to initiate or conceal. The Soviet Union 
had a long history of intervening in the domestic affairs of its "allies" when they strayed from 
Moscow's orthodoxy. Sudden military "exercises" were a convenient way for the Kremlin to 
intimidate the Eastern European states and discourage any nascent tendencies to depart from 
its orbit. Hence, by forcing the Soviet Union to announce its "exercises" in advance, CBMs 
could constrain Moscow's ability to resort to threat, or use of force, to dominate its 
neighbours. 
It is doubtful that any of these goals were attained, even partially. 
4.1. Surprise attack 
For many years, the possibility of a conventional surprise attack by Warsaw Pact forces was 
considered as the most likely contingency for a military conflict in Europe and a key issue in 
NATO's defence planning. Yet what the CSCE CBMs could have done to prevent such a 
scenario from unfolding, or even simply to disrupt offensive preparations, remains extremely 
difficult to ascertain. In theory, the prior notification of exercises could help create patterns of 
military activities that would make abnormalities stand out, providing, as a result, valuable 
warning time for clarifying the situation or building up defence. In practice, however, there 
were a number of ways in which plans for surprise attack could have been carried out and in 
which CBMs would have been of little help if not simply counter-productive. It is interesting 
to note in this regard that at the time when the Helsinki CBMs were being negotiated, serious 
concerns were raised over the possibility that with improved Soviet military strength the East 
could launch an unreinforced standing-start attack on the West, with estimated warning time 
as short as two days. 91 By 1983, one could read that: 
91 See Richard K. Betts, "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability", International Security, 
5: 4, Spring 1981, pp. 140-141. Betts also points out that this estimate was later changed for an alert 
time of between 8 to 15 days. 
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Soviet forces in being are already sufficiently large and of such a character that they 
do not need to move into exercise areas to launch a surprise attack. In fact, nowadays 
the very attempt to do so is a warning indicator in itself. Soviet forces can mobilize 
within their barracks, and most barracks in the German Democratic Republic are no 
more than 120 miles from the inner-German border. 92 
Given the above assessments, 93 there is little doubt that if an unreinforced attack had been 
planned the system of prior notification of military manoeuvres would have been of no use in 
providing additional warning time to NATO. Indeed, in such a scenario, the potential 
assailant would have had no need to notify any manoeuvre, except maybe, to divert attention 
to other activities. But even assuming that the above estimates were incorrect, or that the 
preferred choice of the Eastern states would have been that of a more traditional scenario 
calling for a large number of troops to move westward, there were still many reasons to 
question any role for CBMs in such a situation. 
First, as a result of superpower opposition during the CSCE negotiations, the CBMs regime 
authorised the largest concentration of troops not to be notified. Indeed, movement of troops 
was only a voluntary provision in the Final Act and the practice of all three main groups (and 
particularly that of the Warsaw Pact nations which never provided information on the absence 
of troops from garrison) never allowed any regular pattern to develop in this regard. 
Furthermore, since the CBMs document recognised that manoeuvres arranged at shorter time 
than the mandatory twenty-one days advance notice only had to be notified at "the earliest 
possible opportunity" before the start of the event, it legitimised the notification of 
manoeuvres at very short notice. These two loopholes in the Final Act Document sanctioned 
the non-notification of very large concentrations of troops and short warning time that could 
have been easily exploited by a potential assailant. 
Still, even contemplating a scenario of proper notification of all military activities, an 
important element often downplayed in Western literature, and non-existent in official 
pronouncements, related to the possibility of deception. As one military analyst rightly 
pointed out: 
92 Berg, "Military Confidence-Building in Europe", p. 52. 93 It should be mentioned that much debate surrounded the question of Soviet capability to launch a 
surprise attack and the amount of warning time NATO could expect to have before the outbreak of hostilities. The debate, largely fuelled by a report submitted to the US Armed Services Committee 
by Senator Sam Nunn in the mid- 1970s, divided Western defence analysts over the seriousness of 
the threat and NATO's preparedness to meet a conventional attack in Europe. For a sample of the 
writings suggesting that the threat was overrated, see the article by House Representative, Les 
Aspin, "A Surprise Attack on NATO - Refocusing the Debate", in NATO Review, 25: 4, August 
1977, pp. 6-13. 
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It goes without saying that a surprise attack [would] be accompanied by a deception 
plan. The military planner [might] be annoyed by the necessity to avoid responses 
triggered by CBMs. On the other hand, a good planner [would] be delighted by the 
opportunity to manipulate standardized procedures. He might cover some preparation 
steps by providing notice of out-of garrison or alert activities. He could attempt to 
calm the opposing Alliance by inviting observers in accordance with the agreement, if 
necessary permitting observation of specially staged exercises designed to give a 
normal peacetime appearance. Reinforcements might be moved surreptitiously under 
the cover of such maneuvers. 94 
Manipulations of the CBMs Helsinki regime could have been numerous. Even when in strict 
adherence with the provisions for notification and observation, the system could have been 
easily exploited. As described in the review of the WTO treatment of observers under the 
Helsinki regime, it is doubtful that a typical observation of an Eastern manoeuvre would have 
ever demonstrated anything unusual. On the contrary, it was common that Western observers 
were allowed only a few hours of observation, were transported and accompanied at all time 
by Soviet personnel, were unable to go to the actual site of the manoeuvre, were not provided 
with proper equipment or good briefings. All this, in the observation of an Eastern 
manoeuvre, would only have confirmed normal practice, not offensive preparations. 
Finally, as Richard K. Betts noted, the main problem with surprise attack was not necessarily 
the absence of warning but the absence of response to warning: "If history teaches anything, . 
.. 
it is that warning in itself is often not sufficient to protect a victim from surprise. There are 
powerful psychological and political incentives for decision-makers to misinterpret warning 
or delay the necessary response". 95 Short of clear and unambiguous indications of hostile 
intent, differing assessments of different "signals" will always occur and decision-makers 
would most likely want to avoid or delay moves that could be perceived as provocative or 
escalatory. It is noteworthy in this regard that during the crisis leading up to the 1968 Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, Western officials reacted differently to the large military 
activities held in and around the country: "While some officials in Europe and the United 
States were alarmed by these ... movements of 
forces, others did not consider them so 
worrisome because the Soviet Union did not try to conceal them; indeed they were fully 
announced. , 96 Moreover, despite these unambiguous "warnings", NATO did nothing to 
increase its military readiness, reportedly because intelligence assessments indicated that the 
94 Jim E. Hinds, "The Limits of Confidence", in John Borawski (ed. ) Avoiding War in the Nuclear 
Age. Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, p. 
192. 
95 Betts, "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability", p. 117. 
96 Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack, Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982, p. 82. 
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Soviet preparations were directed against the Czechs, not against the West. 97 In fact, the 
Allied response at the time was to avoid any moves that could have been seen as provocative, 
including redeploying a pre-planned Western exercise near the Czech border. 98 Undoubtedly, 
the absence of response to warning in this case was most likely due to the fact that Western 
decision-makers believed Soviet reassurances that the action was directed only at 
Czechoslovakia but, as Betts further argued, "this ... would 
[have been] a natural part of the 
deception plan if the Soviets [intended] to wheel westward. "99 
Whatever lessons may be drawn from the Soviet intervention in Prague in 1968, what the 
crisis underscores is that ambiguity about intentions may never be removed, and what the 
Helsinki measures could have done in this regard, or in any situation of planned surprise 
attack, only seems to be working in one direction: increased ambiguity. As noted, Eastern 
states' implementation of the CBMs provisions never allowed the emergence of a clear 
pattern of military activities from which anomalies could really stand out. Also, because the 
CBMs requirements left open the possibility of short notice and non-notification of 
movements of troops, it served to legitimise such practice. Furthermore, even assuming a 
scenario with prior notification, no unambiguous signal would have ever emerged from an 
Eastern notification that did not include a precise location or time-frame for a large-scale 
manoeuvre. The invitation of observers, on the other hand, if not used to communicate false 
signals of non-hostile intent, might not have clarified the situation at all. Recognised as a 
gesture of goodwill under the regime, it could probably only have created more uncertainty 
about a given situation. Moreover, as one observer noted: "It is quite certain ... that groups of 
multinational observers, trained to varying degrees and armed with national information 
perhaps not fully shared, will arrive at differing conclusions. Some of the conclusions are 
bound to be misleading, and findings are likely to be ambiguous unless there is very clear 
violation. "loo In such a case: "One can imagine a situation in which response to warning 
would be delayed because of disagreement within the Alliance as to whether a CBM had been 
violated. The debate would be particularly difficult if a proper response to warning would 
9' See Betts, "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability", p. 117. 
98 See Betts, Surprise Attack, p. 85. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Hinds, "The Limits of Confidence", p. 193. Ambiguous findings can relate to numerous aspects 
of the observation, including ascertaining the number of troops taking part in a manoeuvre. Writing 
in 1978, Graham Turbiville observes that: "As trained observers will attest determining the number 
of troops and units participating in as fluid and complex an event as a military exercise spread over 
many square miles of terrain can be as difficult as counting beans in a jar --and sometimes no more 
accurate. " Graham H. Turbiville Jr., "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers: Recent Exercise Patterns and Their 
Implications for European Security", Military Review, LVIII: 8, August 1978, pp. 32-33. 
[Hereafter: Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers"]. 
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itself require violation or abrogation of an agreement". 10' 
If anything, the above considerations only pointed to a counter-productive role of the Helsinki 
measures in relation to warning or to disruption of planned surprise attack. As demonstrated, 
the idea that CBMs could have any role in relation to surprise attack should be discarded. 
4.2. Openness; transparency; predictability; stability 
A manoeuvre or exercise is designed to test the readiness of the country carrying it out 
to meet an assumed threat from outside or, in some cases, its ability to launch an 
offensive against another country. It can also be used as a warning. To a neighbour 
the objectives of the country carrying out the manoeuvre may often be unclear. He 
may interpret a manoeuvre designed for a defensive situation as an offensive one. He 
may assume that it is a warning when it is not. Such ambiguity creates tension and 
possibly counter moves which can set in train an escalatory process. Effective prior 
notification of major military manoeuvres would greatly reduce the opportunities for 
misunderstanding and suspicion. 102 
This view, expressed in the British proposal submitted at the opening of the CSCE in July 
1973, and representing one of the most developed Western official explanations given at the 
time for CBMs, suggested a number of roles or objectives for the measures. Among the 
several propositions that have evolved from such expositions was that the provision of more 
information about military activities could correct the problem of ambiguity, because it would 
reduce the danger that a benign exercise was misinterpreted for a belligerent act or, 
alternatively, that a hostile activity was perceived as a routine phenomenon. In short, 
notification would establish patterns from which abnormal (or hostile) activities could stand 
out and would, in fact, show the exercises for what they were. In this sense more 
"transparency" and "openness" would make these military activities more predictable, bring 
stability which, in turn, would help build confidence. 
But, if more information was seen as the obvious remedy to clarify the nature of military 
activities in Europe, remove ambiguities and build confidence, it had to be balanced with the 
following considerations which suggested that, at best, the information provided by the 
Warsaw Pact nations under the CBMs regime was irrelevant and, at worse, deceiving. 
Evidence suggested, for example, that at the beginning of the CSCE process, the Soviet 
Union actually reduced the amount of information it had previously made public about its 
101 Hinds, "The Limits of Confidence", p. 193. 
102 Text in CSCE, Records and Documents, CSCE/I/18. 
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military activities. Indeed, at the time when the CBMs regime was being negotiated at 
Helsinki, "a sharp reduction in the publication of all information on the system of [WTO] 
joint exercises" took place in the East. 103 For an attentive observer of Eastern manoeuvres, 
this contrasted sharply with past practice, particularly since in addition to military training, 
multinational WTO exercises had an important political function of displaying solidarity 
amongst Socialist states and were often widely publicised for that purpose. 104 
In addition to curtailment of publicity on the system of joint Warsaw Pact exercises, Graham 
Turbiville noted a decrease in publicity related to all Soviet and Pact manoeuvres beginning 
as early as 1972, when CBMs were first brought up in the CSCE discussions. Turbiville 
observed that "beginning in the early 1960s and continuing to 1972, the USSR --either 
unilaterally or jointly with other Warsaw Pact states-- carried out at least one well-publicized 
military maneuver a year". 105 According to the US Army intelligence officer, the completion 
of Shield-72 "marked the last of those widely publicized `traditional joint exercises' and of 
well publicized, large-scale Soviet/pact exercises generally for several years. " 106 
Furthermore, "the next three years saw an uncustomary silence on the part of the Warsaw 
Pact nations regarding their maneuvers". 107 By way of explanation, Turbiville suggested that: 
It seems likely .. that the 
Soviets --greatly desirous of the CSCE-- decided sometime 
in late 1972 to curtail publicity sharply on their exercises and to present, as much as 
possible, a picture of relative military inactivity throughout Eastern Europe. Also, the 
Soviets were apparently unenthusiastic over the prospect of exercise prenotification 
provisions becoming a part of any agreement, and may well have wished to down- 
play their continued importance in order to negotiate the most favorable --and least 
specific-- arrangement for the confidence-building measure provisions under the 
CSCE. 108 
103 Christopher Jones, "The Warsaw Pact: Military Exercises and Military Interventions", Armed 
Forces and Society, 7: 1, Fall 1980, p. 7. [Hereafter: Jones, "The Warsaw Pact"]. 
104 According to Malcolm Macintosh: "From 1961 onwards the Pact organized a series of multi- 
lateral military exercises, many of which were well publicized ... most of them amounting 
in 
practice to large-scale politico-military demonstrations emphasizing the enthusiasm, interalliance 
solidarity and friendship of the component national armies". Malcolm Macintosh, "The Warsaw 
Pact Today", Survival, May-June 1974, p. 122, quoted in Jones, Ibid., p. 30 note 70. 
105 Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers", p. 20. Commenting on the three most publicised Soviet or 
Soviet/Pact exercises conducted prior to 1971, P. H. Vigor remarks that the Soviet radio and 
television carried out very comprehensive coverage of the manoeuvres and that books were 
published on them. According to Vigor, the publicity element was so important that during the 
1967 Dnieper exercise, for instance, "operations were stopped for hours at a time to allow the 
proper photographs to be taken". P. H. Vigor, "Soviet Military Exercises", (A lecture given at the 
R. U. S. I. on 31st March 1971), RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence 
Studies, No. 663, September 1971, p. 27. [Hereafter: Vigor, "Soviet Military Exercises"]. 
106 Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers", p. 26. According to Turbiville, the subsequent Vertes-73 
and Lato-74 exercises were given only very limited review in Eastern media. 
'°7 Ibid. 
108 Ibid., p. 27. 
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Eastern publicity surrounding Soviet/Pact manoeuvres re-appeared with the first notifications 
made under the Helsinki regime. Kavkaz-76 and Sever-76 (both involving 25,000 troops) 
were not considered large manoeuvres by Soviet standards and "several years earlier, they 
would not have attracted much attention if indeed the Soviets would have mentioned them in 
the media at all. " For Turbiville, "the implication was that these maneuvers were the largest 
that the Soviets had held since August 1975". 1 09 But, while this was probably the case, the 
fact remains that this developing "pattern" of military activities under the Helsinki regime did 
not correspond to past practice. 
The exact size of the Soviet/Pact manoeuvres prior to the Helsinki regime was not well 
documented. Available information suggests, however, that at least one very large-scale 
manoeuvre was carried out every year between 1966 and 1972. Western estimates of the 
number of troops involved in the Shield-72 Pact manoeuvre, for example, were as high as 
100,000.110 The summer 1971 Soviet Yug exercise, taking place close to the Romanian 
border, reportedly involved an estimated 10 divisions. " In the spring of 1970, the Soviet 
Dvina exercise was registered at ten to eleven divisions. 112 The 1969 Oder-Niesse Pact 
manoeuvre, described in Soviet literature published in 1975 as the largest WTO exercise ever 
held, was thus bigger than the Shield-72 exercise totalling more than 100,000 troops. 113 
Finally, notwithstanding the exercises that preceded the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
which was estimated to have involved 200,000 to 500,000 troops, 114 the 1967 Dnieper 
exercise numbered seven divisions, 115 while the 1966 Vltava manoeuvre was reported to have 
been of the same scale than Shield-72.116 
With the exception of Zapad-81, Eastern manoeuvres of this size were never held under the 
109 Ibid., p. 29. Turbiville also notes that the following manoeuvre Shield-76 (or Tarcza-76) was 
the first widely publicised in four years. 
110 B. J. Erickson, "`Shield-72': Warsaw Pact Military Exercises", RUSI, Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute for Defence Studies, December 1972, p. 32. 
111 Major John F. Meehan III, "Soviet Maneuvers. Summer 1971 ", Military Review, LII: 4, April 
1972, p. 17. 
112 Vigor, "Soviet Military Exercises", p. 24. It can be noted that while John Meehan gave a figure 
of 10 divisions for the 1971 Yug manoeuvre, the author also suggests that in 1971 (hence including 
the Yug manoeuvre), "there were no large-scale maneuvers such as Dnepr (fall 1967) or Dvina 
(spring 1970)". Meehan III, Ibid., p. 14. 
" See Jones, "The Warsaw Pact", p. 18. Jones refers here to a volume on the WTO edited by the 
Pact Commander, Marshall I. I. Iakubovskii, published in Moscow in 1975. 
114 See Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul. The Soviet Style of Invasion", International Security, 
5: 2, Fall 1980, p. 135. 
115 Vigor, "Soviet Military Exercises", p. 24. 
116 Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers", p. 28. 
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Helsinki regime. Moreover, in the first five years of application of the CBMs regime (i. e. 
before the events in Poland), the largest exercise held in the East only involved 35,000 troops 
(Tarcza-76). What this clearly suggested was that in addition to the curtailment of publicity 
given to the manoeuvres, Moscow had diminished the size of its exercises. ' 17 As maintained 
by Christopher Jones: "Whatever the intentions of those who drafted the sections on 
confidence-building measures, the result [was] the Soviet reduction of the size of most tactical 
and operational-strategic exercises to a figure below 25,000". 118 It is worth noting in this 
regard that from the introduction of the system of joint exercises in 1961 to 1975, a minimum 
of 62 large-scale SovietIWTO exercises were reported. ' 19 By contrast, during the twelve 
years of the Helsinki regime, only 32 (major and small) manoeuvres were notified and, of this 
total, more than half were exercises involving 25,000 troops or less. 
In addition to the curtailment of publicity and the reduction in the size and the number of 
exercises, two other changes were noted in Eastern exercise practices following the 
introduction of the CBMs Document. For the fourteen years prior to the Final Act for which 
information is available, the Soviet Union held only three national manoeuvres on its 
territory. 120 In contrast, during the twelve years of the Helsinki regime almost half (13) of all 
the notified large-scale manoeuvres (27) were of this same type and held exclusively on 
Soviet territory. While this implied that fewer manoeuvres were held on Pact nations territory 
(as opposed to Soviet territory), it also pointed to a decrease in the number of combined 
exercises. In fact, in the first five years of the Helsinki regime only one manoeuvre involving 
more than two Pact nations was held (Tarcza-76). One cannot discard, of course, that some, 
11' Official documentation suggests that while there was "no confirmed evidence that the Soviets or 
other Pact countries may have deliberately shaved their exercises to put them just below the 25,000 
mark ... there appears to 
have been a trend in the last several years toward smaller maneuvers. " 
Canada, DEA, 29 October 1975. 
118 Jones, "The Warsaw Pact", p. 7. 
119 This figure is taken from the list of 71 Pact exercises held between 1961 and 1979 compiled by 
Christopher Jones, based on several Soviet and East European sources as well as an original list of 
45 exercises catalogued by Graham Turbiville covering the period 1961-1977. The number of 62 
manoeuvres quoted above excludes the exercises taking place after 1975 as well as naval exercises, 
since such manoeuvres were not covered by the CBMs regime of notification, and are not included 
in the figure of 32 notified manoeuvres used as a comparison here. It can be noted that Turbiville 
emphasised that his list "should in no sense be regarded as a complete listing of those Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact maneuvers held from 1961-77 and discussed in the Soviet/Pact media, but only as a 
compilation of some of the more prominent ones. " Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers", p. 23 note 
1. Similarly, Jones suggested that his list of 71 exercises was "probably short of the true total of the 
larger tactical, operational, and strategic exercises". Jones, "The Warsaw Pact", p. 7. Jones's 
complete list can be found in Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, New York: 
Praeger, 1981, pp. 301-309, Table 1. 
120 Figure taken from the list compiled by Turbiville, Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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or all of the changes noted in the size, number, character or location of Soviet or Soviet/Pact 
manoeuvres may have been implemented for reasons not related to the CBMs regime. Yet, it 
is difficult to completely discard any link between the numerous (and almost concurrent) 
changes and the beginning of the Helsinki regime. At the same time, it appears very difficult 
to entertain the idea that the Helsinki provisions may have had a positive impact on stability 
or openness. Indeed, in terms of stability, predictability and confidence-building, one can 
wonder what was really achieved when, for the first five years of the regime, the East 
European states gave the impression of carrying out only relatively small-scale exercises, only 
to come out in 1981 with an unannounced manoeuvre involving some 100,000 troops. 
The same can be said about openness. In this case, of course, one could note that the Eastern 
states had announced their incoming manoeuvres for the first time. But in terms of the nature 
of the information given under the regime, one can really question the value of some 
estimated time-frame, vague location or gross number of participating troops for an incoming 
large manoeuvre. Even when observers were invited, the restrictions for the observation of 
Warsaw Pact manoeuvres "not only prevented observers from gaining a clear understanding 
of the purpose of the maneuvers, but made it impossible to formulate any realistic 
appreciation of the tactical capabilities or operational readiness of the troops involved. , 121 
The Final Act encouraged states to provide a wide range of information regarding their 
impending exercises. When expectations and practice do not correspond, anxiety is the result, 
and in this way a poor or irregular pattern of compliance can actually create mistrust and 
increase tension. In this regard, it is significant to note that while the Warsaw Pact did not 
report any military exercises for five months following the signing of the Final Act, "reports 
abounded in the West European press that the Soviets were, in fact, carrying out exercises in 
excess of 25,000 troops and simply not announcing them. , 122 Also, as clearly expressed by 
the US Ambassador Kampelman following the improper notification of Zapad-81: 
The maneuver notification ... was ... unduly vague and unrevealing, not at all 
consistent with the very purpose of the CBM concept, which is to build mutual 
confidence among states. Rather than build confidence, the apparent Soviet disdain 
121 Goetze, Security in Europe, p. 89. 
122 Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers", p. 28. In December 1975, NATO Secretary-General 
Joseph Luns indicated that the Soviet Union had not given notification of recent troop manoeuvres. 
See International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1975, Boulder, Col.: Westview 
Press, 1976, p. 120. A few months earlier, in Copenhagen, Luns had complained that the East had 
failed to live up to their obligations concerning CBMs. For this and complaints from West German 
officials, see European Cooperation Research Group (EUCORG), "Helsinki Plus Four Months", 
Report 8, London, November 1975, p. 14. 
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for the notification requirement generated suspicion and mistrust. ' 23 
4.3. Coercive potential; intervention 
Large-scale military manoeuvres and movements of troops have always constituted important 
means for exerting political pressure on a weaker neighbour and have been used in the past to 
cover plans for intervention. Because CBMs required the prior notification of manoeuvres 
before they began, many Western analysts held the view that they lessened the opportunity of 
sudden activation of military forces during a crisis. CBMs, it was argued, could raise the 
threshold against military intervention because "transgression would constitute a challenge to 
the integrity and purpose of the arrangements themselves. , 124 
Hence, in theory, the role of CBMs in inhibiting the use of military exercises to exert political 
pressure or cover plans of military intervention was a deterrent one. Few would argue, 
however, that the Final Act deterred Moscow from trying to influence and bully its allies 
during the Helsinki CBMs regime. At the Madrid Meeting, US Ambassador Max 
Kampelman made it clear that the non-notified Soyuz-81 exercise held at a peak point during 
the internal crisis in Poland "had as one of its purposes the intimidation of a neighbouring 
state". 125 
But what exactly the Soviets intended to achieve with their pattern of notification and non- 
notification during the 1980-1981 Polish crisis remains unclear. It was sometimes argued 
before the events in Poland, that because preparations for manoeuvres took longer than the 
twenty-one days required by the Final Act, it was possible that "notification according to 
CSCE rules could in some circumstances serve to amplify threatening or warning signals, 
thus enabling pressure to be exerted more quickly than in the absence of the system of prior 
notification". 126 In fact, the Soviets were apparently making the case then that "advance 
notification of exercises could be used to threaten or coerce even without the exercises taking 
place, provided that the warning period was sufficiently long. The signal conveyed would be 
made more convincing because it would be made under the CSCE arrangements. 427 
123 Three Years at the East-West Divide, p. 54. 
124 Holst, "Confidence-building Measures", p. 3. 
125 Three Years at the East-West Divide, p. 54. 
126 Johan-Jörgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, "European Security and Confidence-building 
Measures", Survival, XIX: 4, July-August 1977, p. 148. 
127 Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects", in Jonathan 
Alford (ed. ), The Future of Arms Control: Part III. Confidence-Building Measures, Adelphi Papers 
No. 149, London: IISS, 1979, p. 8. 
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The first military exercise usually considered in the West as having been staged in reaction to 
the developments in Poland was the September 1980 Brotherhood in Arms exercise, 
announced the day after the beginning of the strike in the city of Gdansk which gave birth to 
the Solidarity movement. 128 The exercise, involving some 40,000 troops, was properly 
notified by the GDR, although as noted in the review of implementation, with only vague 
information on a number of notifiable items. 
In March 1981, Moscow decided not to notify the Soyuz manoeuvre. At the same time, 
however, the Eastern-controlled media gave the exercise unusually wide publicity with more 
than 50 reports over the course of the three-week exercise. 129 When questioned about the 
military activity, the Kremlin offered two different explanations. Both reasons were in clear 
contradiction to the comprehensive and numerous Eastern broadcasts of the events. 
For the September Zapad-81 exercise, Moscow decided to give notification to other CSCE 
participants (and thus comply with the Helsinki agreement), but provided an incomplete 
notification and was immediately accused of breaching the agreement. The notification did 
not include information on the number of participating troops, but included precise 
information on the time-frame for the conduct of the manoeuvre as well as information on its 
location which, although vague enough to raise complaints by the other CSCE states, was not 
too vague as to point out that the exercise would take place in the vicinity of Poland. The day 
after the manoeuvre had started, TASS reported that it involved 100,000 men. This, however, 
was not until another state-controlled Soviet media, Izvestiya, had reported that it would 
involve only "very limited" forces. ' 30 
Was the non-notification of Soyuz meant to emphasise to the other CSCE participating States 
that this was an internal affair, and the publicity surrounding the operations only to amplify 
threatening signals to the Polish people? Then why notify Zapad? Because the large number 
of troops involved could not have been concealed? If so, why not include the information in 
the notification itself? Was the information on the timing and the area for the conduct of the 
manoeuvre considered sufficient enough (particularly after the Soyuz activities) to provide a 
warning to the Poles while avoiding what would certainly have been an outcry in the West if 
the large number of troops had been revealed before the start of the manoeuvre? Was Zapad 
128 US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, Findings and Recommendations Seven Years 
After Helsinki, p. 19. 
129 Three Years at the East-West Divide, p. 55. 
130 See Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals, p. 29. 
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initially planned for an intervention, or a rehearsal for an action to come at a later date if 
things did not cool down? As one observer noted, `whatever the intent, the effect was to 
introduce an unnecessary note of East-West uncertainty into what had otherwise been a 
relatively unambiguous situation. , 131 Indeed, what the events in Poland clearly emphasised 
was that the Eastern pattern of notification of Brotherhood-in-Arms, non-notification of 
Soyuz-81, and incomplete notice of Zapad-81 did not deter Moscow from displaying military 
force as a means of intimidation, and did not result in less ambiguity about Soviet intentions. 
In fact, it was later reported that "the combination of Soviet military actions and harsh 
rhetoric, plus an inadequate grasp of what was actually taking place in the border regions 
around Poland, resulted in U. S. military intelligence issuing an `alert memorandum' 
contending that the Soviet invasion had already begun. , 132 As argued by one analyst: "For 
those who stress[ed] the `miscalculation avoidance' aspect of confidence- and security- 
building measures, this [was] a classic example of how a lack of clear and timely information 
about military activities [could] lead to worst-case analysis, with the potential for incalculable 
consequences. " 133 
5. FAILING PROMISES 
As clearly illustrated above, the implementation of confidence-building measures never 
matched up with the expectations raised with regard to the benefits ascribed to them. In view 
of the apparent changes in the exercise pattern of the Eastern states and their limited supply of 
information under the CBMs provisions, it is highly questionable that openness or 
transparency in this case brought more predictability or stability. Indeed, to start with, the 
WTO's record of implementation pointed to some sort of false, or deceiving, openness. 
Scenarios for planned surprise attack have obviously never provided a test for the measures, 
but it appears evident from the above analysis that the potential role of CBMs in this regard 
could only have been counter-productive. Finally, as demonstrated during the Polish crisis, 
the CBMs regime did nothing to inhibit Moscow from using military exercises to exert 
pressure on another CSCE participating State in a manner inconsistent with the principles set 
forth in the Final Act and, as recognised by several Western officials, the misuse of CBMs 
131 Richard E. Darilek, "Reducing the Risks of Miscalculation: The Promise of the Helsinki 
CBMs", in F. Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds. ), Confidence-Building Measures in 
Europe, East-West Monograph Number One, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 
1983, pp. 80-8 1. 
132 Krehbiel, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, p. 38. See also US, Commission on 
Security and Cooperation, Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki. 133 Ibid. 
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only contributed to more uncertainties and ambiguities than would have been the case without 
the measures. 
While it is difficult to understand why CBMs raised so many great expectations over the 
years, it can be emphasised that these were not necessarily advocated by the NATO 
governments, who never really spelled-out any specific goals for the CBMs and who, overall, 
remained satisfied to simply equate implementation of the measures with success. 
6. WESTERN ASSESSMENT 
In general, Western appreciation of CBMs has always been rather positive. The initial five 
month silence from the Warsaw Pact nations, regarding the conduct of their manoeuvres, 
raised fears that the Eastern countries would not co-operate with the Helsinki provisions, 
which could bring about the collapse of the new CBMs regime. 134 Once implementation 
started, however, all states could begin to look forward and, for the West, the evaluation of the 
system boiled down to comparing degrees of co-operation, which were perceived as reflecting 
different levels of attachment to the regime. Until the Madrid Follow-Up Meeting, for 
instance, it was common to describe the WTO states' compliance record by the formula of 
strict adherence to the "letter" of the provisions rather than to its "spirit". Improvements, it 
was felt, could obviously take place but, as best described by the Chairman of the NATO 
caucus on security matters dealing with CBMs at Belgrade, "the system was working". 135 
Even after the Soviet violations during the Polish crisis, one could still read in official 
documentation that the Eastern states were showing some improvements regarding their 
notifications (presumably simply because it was taking place); 136 that no return to past 
unacceptable practice was noted (there were no other so blatant violations of the agreement 
after 1981); 13 7 or that the Eastern record of compliance continued to be largely limited to the 
"letter" of the Final Act, and rarely to its "spirit". 138 
134 See Toogood, "From Helsinki to Belgrade", p. 12. 
135 Ibid. 
136 US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Sixteenth Semiannual Report. 
Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. December 1,1983 - May 31,1984, Special Report No. 117, 
n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 15. 
137 See US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Seventeenth Semiannual Report. 
Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. April 1,1984 - October 1,1984, Special Report No. 119, 
n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 15. 
138 US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, Twenty-first Semiannual Report, p. 31. 
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Throughout the decade of implementation of the Helsinki Document, there was in fact a clear 
tendency in the West to avoid offending the Eastern countries over their poor and deceiving 
record of implementation. As noted by one US government official, the Americans were the 
only NATO partners to openly challenge the Soviets on their violations during the Polish 
crisis: 
The U. S. State Department issued a statement accusing the Soviet Union of violating 
the Helsinki Final Act.... But the `concern' of the other signatories of the Final Act 
was not very deep. One mere statement was all the West had to offer to counter the 
huge Soviet military maneuver, and the Soviets were able to control the situation by 
having the Polish government impose martial law. ... Although the threatening Soviet military maneuvers and imposition of martial law --both gross violations of the 
Helsinki Final Act-- took place during the Madrid CSCE Review Conference, which 
eventually produced the Mandate for the CDE, not even these actions could affect the 
`see-no-evil' mindset of the Western Europeans. 139 
The Americans were also the only ones to openly question the general value of the regime 
and to recognise that the system was not working. In this regard, the words of Kampelman in 
Madrid were unequivocal: 
[I]t is clear that there is something wrong with a system under which military 
activities ... are either not reported or not required to be reported by technical definitions.... The threat or possible use of military force in a surprise military attack 
in Europe is of direct concern to all of us.... Our goal is to diminish the danger that 
armed conflict might result from misunderstanding or misinterpretation of military 
activities. The record of ZAPAD-81 and SOYUZ-81 is not encouraging in that 
regard. We cannot accept a result which has most of us believing that the notification 
provisions are requirements, while the Soviet Union dismisses them as mere 
guidelines. We cannot and should not accept a result under which a state can define 
the presence of 100,000 troops in the field as an `extremely limited' number not 
worthy of proper disclosure in a notification. We cannot support a result where 
widespread and intense combined-arms military activity involving all military 
branches and specialists, during a period of political tension, falls through the cracks 
of a CBM system because it can be billed as a `command and staff exercise. ' 140 
But, while the Americans strongly denounced the CBMs violations during the political crisis 
in Poland, Washington did not necessarily always adopt such a critical attitude throughout the 
entire period of the Helsinki regime. As noted by Carl C. Krehbiel, a US government 
participant in the negotiations of the CSBMs in Stockholm, there was clear Western 
reluctance to point out the deficiencies of the Eastern record. Discussing how the Warsaw 
Pact nations used the many loopholes and vague provisions of the Helsinki CBMs Document 
139 Krehbiel, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, p. 39. 140 Three Years at the East West Divide, p. 56. 
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to circumvent proper implementation, Krehbiel gave the following example with regard to the 
notification of major military manoeuvres. As stipulated in the Final Act: "The participating 
States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to 
the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces. " 
According to Krehbiel, this commitment called for few ambiguities in the compliance 
behaviour of the participants: 
Obviously the nation that stages the maneuver knows which components of forces are 
engaged, and the period in which the maneuver is scheduled to take place. Major 
troop units do not stage `major military maneuvres' on a whim. And of course it is 
possible to provide this information.... But the Warsaw Pact members seldom, if 
ever, provided this information in their notifications. 141 
For Krehbiel, the West preferred to ignore this type of issue. Commenting on how such 
questions have been handled by the "politicians", Krehbiel observed that: 
Since providing this information certainly was possible in every case, it would [have 
been] perfectly reasonable to label each instance in which the information was not 
provided a violation of the Helsinki Final Act. Unfortunately, Western governments 
chose instead to look the other way. For example, repeated efforts by certain U. S. 
government officials to have the State Department office responsible for compiling 
the series of semiannual reports on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act call 
attention to these violations were invariably met with the excuse that the phrase `if 
possible' meant that the Warsaw Pact members really were not required to provide 
the information. Of course they were, because it was `possible'. But the imprecise 
terminology of the Final Act CBM enabled those Western officials who choose to 
`see no evil' when Soviet violations of arms control agreements [were involved to 
pretend that the Soviets were complying with the letter of the agreement. 
ý42 
The frankness of the comments by this US military officer are particularly interesting not only 
because they described how many issues like this may have been handled at the political level 
and how, from a military viewpoint, this only made the CBMs useless, but also because they 
highlight one of the many flaws in the Document which the Western states had accepted as 
the final results of the CSCE. Understandably, perhaps, the NATO governments were never 
inclined to strongly denounce or condemn Eastern disregard for the CBMs provisions. 
Exception to this, as noted, was the US criticism of Soviet behaviour during the Polish crisis. 
But, even in this case, the West was on shaky grounds to persuasively argue for the CSCE 
CBMs. One example clearly illustrating this fact can be found in a comment made by 
Kampelman in Madrid which was widely used afterwards to criticise the Eastern approach to 
CBMs. Relating Western attempts to obtain from the Soviets further information concerning 
141 Krehbiel, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, pp. 49-50. 142 Ibid., p. 50. 
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Zapad-81, Kampelman forcefully remarked at the Conference that it was unacceptable that 
the West was "told that the provisions of the Act on notification of major maneuvers were, 
after all, only `guidelines, ' not requirements! "143 Yet, despite the Ambassador's obvious 
discontent with the Eastern reply, the fact remained that the Americans had privately 
conceded this point at the conclusion of the CSCE negotiations when they acknowledged that 
the obligation to notify was far from having been clearly established in the Final Act. In their 
interpretative paper on the CSCE CBMs distributed to all NATO countries in August 1975, 
the Americans noted that the last preambular paragraph of the notification measure, which 
read that the "measure deriving from political decision rests upon a voluntary basis", could be 
understood "to mean either that the decision to undertake the measure was voluntary, or freely 
made (Western view); or that the decision to implement the measure [was to be] voluntary, or 
discretionary (Warsaw Pact view). 144 The other Western delegations also shared this view by 
noting that the paragraph completely failed to state "whether it [was] the undertaking of the 
commitment that [was] voluntary, or the implementation of it. "145 
Given such obvious ambiguity in the agreement, well known by the Western governments 
and accepted by them at the signature of the Final Act, it may not be surprising that the Allies 
always avoided harsh criticism of the Eastern record, preferring instead to start arguing, from 
the early 1980s, for a new set of measures that would be politically binding, adequately 
verifiable, militarily significant and applicable to all of Europe. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The record of implementation of the CSCE CBMs leaves no doubt about the fact that the 
most prominent goals ascribed to the measures were never met in practice. As noted, 
however, Western governments had little to do with the many promises that were widely 
attributed to the regime after the signature of the Final Act, and which evolved mainly in the 
world of non-practitioners. Also, to their credit, the NATO delegations never knew during 
the main negotiations that they were devising procedures that were to remain in force for so 
long. From the drafting of general mandates in Helsinki to the negotiations of the main 
provisions in Geneva, the future of the measures (like that of the CSCE) was always uncertain 
because no decision on the continuation of the Conference process was made until very late in 
143 Three Years at the East-West Divide, p. 54. 
144 Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975. (The US document was dated 5 August 1975). 
145 Ibid., 25 July 1975. 
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the proceedings, and no one could anticipate how such a process would eventually evolve. 
As John J. Maresca observed in 1985: "It is clear now, ten years after the Helsinki Summit, 
that the Final Act would have had little lasting significance had it not included follow-up 
provisions of some kind. " 146 As explained by this senior American negotiator at the CSCE: 
"Immediately after the Helsinki Summit, no one was interested in the CSCE. Administration 
policy officials considered it as an event that had provoked a hostile domestic reaction and 
was best forgotten. This attitude infected the entire bureaucracy, though a thorough working- 
level effort was made to monitor compliance with the Helsinki commitments". 147 Yet, as 
further acknowledged by Maresca: "Public attitudes toward Helsinki underwent a slow 
evolution. Gradually, the Final Act came to be less seen as a Western confirmation of the 
status quo in Europe and more as a potentially useful weapon for supporting human rights in 
the communist countries. The CSCE increasingly appeared as a unique basis for raising 
human-rights-related issues with the USSR and the East European governments and a unique 
forum for discussion of these issues. " 148 
Although Maresca's comments on the initial (official and public) reactions toward the CSCE 
process and the signing of the Final Act relates more specifically to the views and attitudes of 
the American Administration and American public opinion, it nevertheless generally 
describes the outlook of the other NATO governments, as well as the primary reasons 
explaining their subsequent change of perspective on its potential value. As suggested by 
Maresca, the main reason explaining the interest of the Western states in the process came in 
reaction to public opinion which began to focus on the human rights provisions of the Final 
Act after the Communist regimes started a series of crackdowns on dissident groups and 
individuals who were using the Document to promote their programme of reforms. 149 
146 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 201. 
147 Ibid., p. 207. 
148 Ibid. 
lag As best described by a high-level American official: 
"When the long negotiations ended at the Helsinki summit, most Western observers thought and 
said that the Soviets had gotten the best of the bargain. The West acceded to the legitimacy of 
Communist conquest in Europe. In return, the East made undertakings to respect human rights and 
dignity but without the expectation that it could be held to the promises it made. What happened, 
instead, was a remarkable turning of the tables. It was accomplished not by any brilliant strategists 
in Washington or at NATO but by a small band of intrepid Soviets citizens who began to say out 
loud --so that the rest of the world could hear-- that the Soviet Union must make good on its own 
laws and its Helsinki commitments. Their demands made us respond. It was they ... who made 
the West aware of the value of Helsinki. " 
Dante B. Fascell, Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, reproduced in "Human 
Rights: The United States at Belgrade", Department of State Bulletin, May 1978, pp. 39-41. 
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This fact alone goes a long way in explaining the general attitude of the Western governments 
toward implementation of the CBMs regime. Indeed, for the NATO governments, who never 
chose the measures in recognition of any potential contribution to European security and who 
contributed to limit their development during the Conference, their implementation was of 
little interest, especially after the conclusion of the CSCE when all aspects of the process rated 
very low in Western policy priorities. 
Later on, as it became clear that the CSCE was to continue with Follow-Up Meetings, interest 
increased but, again, not because of any expectations related to the possible enhancement of 
the security of the participating States. The Western governments, who had endorsed the 
weak Document on CBMs and who were fully aware of the many deficiencies of the 
measures, could do nothing to change them. At best, as the NATO states chose to do from 
the early 1980s, they could start arguing for a new set of measures to replace the Helsinki- 
CBMs provisions. Whether this represented a belated recognition of the potential value of 
confidence-building measures is yet to be fully ascertained. What is clear, however, is that in 
sharp contrast to a widespread belief that the Western governments may have had a keen 
interest in the application of CBMs, their continuation remained, for the longest time, of no 
more significance than their initial negotiations. 
Congressman Fascell was Deputy Chairman of the US Delegation to the Belgrade Meeting and 
Chairman of the Joint Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe). For a 
comprehensive background discussion on the evolution of the US attitude towards the CSCE, see 
Davy, "The United States", pp. 3-15. For general background, including the views of other NATO 
partners and their subsequent discontent over the strong approach taken by the United States during 
the Belgrade Follow-Up meeting with regard to the human rights abuse in the East, see Edwards, 
"Quo Vadis? ", especially p. 462 and p. 470; Davy -"No progress at Belgrade", pp. 128-135 




A comprehensive examination of the development and application of the CSCE Confidence- 
Building Measures highlights a number of important aspects that have frequently been 
overlooked in assessments of this endeavour. It is common to portray this first ever 
multinational experience with CBMs as very positive, and to credit this success to the 
Western states who originally proposed their negotiations at the Conference. Yet, while it is 
undeniable that the introduction of CBMs into Europe was significant, a thorough 
examination of the origins, negotiations and implementation of the Helsinki CBMs shows that 
the positive assessments of the experience, as well as Western contributions to it, are 
overrated and based on a number of generalisations or assumptions not necessarily confirmed 
by systematic analysis. 
A closer look at the background of the introduction of CBMs into the CSCE reveals that the 
Western states had no genuine interest in the measures and found little intrinsic value in them. 
Moreover, the negotiating record indicates several instances where the positions of the 
Western governments were neither the most comprehensive nor the most inclined to reach the 
best possible agreement. Finally, the implementation record of the Warsaw Pact nations 
clearly points to a general pattern of failure rather than success, with several important and 
potentially dangerous breaches of the most basic provisions. 
The way the NATO governments came to accept the Conference and select CBMs as a topic 
for negotiation goes a long way in explaining their later resistance to push for a 
comprehensive agreement on the measures. From the first Soviet appeals for a Conference in 
1954, the West concluded that the project was designed to further Soviet interests at the 
expense of Western security and, despite a more conciliatory offer from Budapest in 1969, the 
Allies never seriously entertained the proposal. With improving East-West relations, 
however, strict opposition or simple indifference to the project could no longer be NATO's 
only response and, facing the prospect of being accused of rejecting detente in Europe, the 
Allies eventually agreed to a cautious reply. 
The problem for the NATO governments was that they saw no benefit in a Conference, and 
simply did not want one. Their reply from Washington, in April 1969, had been "imposed" 
and, in fact, this was all they knew for certain. Soon after the Washington Ministerial 
Meeting committing the West to start looking at potential issues of discussions, the Allies 
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began formulating pre-conditions for their participation in a Conference, but this did not alter 
the fact that there was no long-term view concerning the project, and no strategy on how to 
move forward towards East-West negotiations. Not surprisingly, in the three-year dialogue 
with the Warsaw Pact, which began with the Washington reply, every aspect of the 
Conference became a subject of dissent in Brussels and divergent views became more 
pronounced as national positions evolved. As months and years elapsed, more European 
governments began to question the purely negative position of the US towards the 
Conference, but without necessarily developing an agreed policy of their own. Consistently, 
Allied decisions on the CSCE were last-minute compromises barely supported by all. 
The decision to propose "certain military aspects of security" as a suitable topic for discussion 
at the Conference certainly fit the pattern of half-supported, half-understood, and last minute 
policy decisions on the CSCE. As the record clearly establishes, the proposal advanced 
during the December 1971 Ministerial Meeting was adopted without common agreement on 
what that subject might entail. Certainly, the issue underscored the strong desire of a majority 
of Western European partners (and especially of Germany at that time) to introduce certain 
elements of MBFR into the Conference, but the MBFR-CSCE link was neither then, nor 
afterwards, accepted by the whole of NATO. From the beginning of 1972, however, the 
Allies were committed to introducing military issues into the Conference, and with the 
preliminaries approaching, the need to agree on a topic became more pressing. CBMs, first 
only mentioned as a means to get around French reluctance to accept "certain aspects of 
military security", soon became the only option that could allow the Allies to fulfil their 
public commitment to take the lead on military issues at the CSCE. However, as highlighted 
by the historical record, no NATO member state was sincerely interested in the measures, and 
the fact that the US subsequently took the lead on the issue does not detract from this, though 
the decision was certainly not accidental. 
MBFR was of great importance to the Americans and they were not ready to see these talks 
derailed or retarded by the involvement of some thirty participants --as was implied by the 
proposal to introduce elements of force reductions into the CSCE. By advancing a subject on 
which all partners could eventually agree upon, Washington certainly hoped to sidetrack 
discussions on linkage between the two negotiations and solve NATO's predicament 
regarding its public commitment to "certain aspects of military security". The long-term 
implications of this move were significant. 
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The document tabled by the Americans in July 1972 was neither an in-depth analysis of 
CBMs, nor an endorsement for the development of concrete and meaningful measures that 
could increase security. More or less a rehash of a general overview of the subject prepared 
by NATO a few months earlier, the US paper was extremely general, lacking technical and 
military details, and presenting and mixing, in less than five pages, objectives, rationale, 
criteria and caution for only two illustrative measures. 
Despite its obvious deficiencies (or perhaps because of it), the Allies spent the remaining three 
months before the opening of the MPT reviewing the document, focusing on its weaknesses. 
This exercise resulted in a composite Alliance Draft Agenda/Guidelines on CBMs for the 
CSCE which, contrary to what its title suggested, provided no real guidelines. Questions such 
as why the West should propose CBMs in the CSCE, what could be gained, what objectives 
should be pursued, or how these could be attained during the negotiations were not further 
explained or elaborated in the document. 
On the eve of the opening of the multilateral talks in November, the Western governments 
hastily agreed that only the notification of major military manoeuvres and movements, and 
the exchange of observers (the two measures initially suggested by Washington), should be 
proposed for negotiations. However, as a direct result of the absence of detailed discussion on 
the issue, the Allies immediately disagreed on how these measures should be presented. 
Furthermore, the view that the measures should only be broadly defined prevailed. Strongly 
favoured by the Americans, and more or less unchallenged by a majority, the predominant (if 
not only) reason for wanting to keep the CSCE CBMs simple and undefined was to avoid 
problems in MBFR. Ever since the tabling of the US paper in July, the Americans had 
warned that negotiations of CBMs in the CSCE could jeopardise the negotiations of 
associated measures in MBFR and, without much consideration of the full implications of this 
position, the Alliance accepted it as the basis of their CBMs policy. 
On the eve of the MPT, the Allies further agreed that the only strategy that could reconcile the 
need to avoid comprehensive development and definition of the CSCE CBMs, while at the 
same time trying to reach agreement on them at the Conference, was to develop illustrative 
lists of Western military activities that could be compared with similar lists, provided by the 
East, in hopes of reaching a general agreement on the issue. 
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In short, from the moment the Western governments began developing their policy and 
negotiating strategy for the CSCE CBMs, they were less concerned with the actual content of 
any agreement reached at the Conference, than with avoiding difficulties with MBFR. 
Therefore, when the Allies entered the multilateral preparatory negotiations they were unable, 
and unwilling, to precisely define what they wanted, having only one goal in mind: keeping 
the measures meaningless. 
Acceptance of the confidence-building measures sponsored by the Western governments 
during the Multilateral Preparatory Talks of the CSCE was mainly due to the fact that Allied 
proposals in the field of military security constituted the "middle of the road" position of all 
the programmes presented by the different participants. Indeed, the role of the NNAs in 
getting CBMs on the agenda of the Conference was of much greater significance not only 
because these states forcefully argued for a number of comprehensive measures (and, by 
implication, supported the Western proposals), but because this left the Eastern states 
completely isolated on this issue. The Warsaw Pact nations came to the Conference with no 
proposals of their own in the field of military security and found themselves in an untenable 
position. With no counter-proposal, they had no bargaining chip and it proved impossible to 
systematically argue against every proposal put forward by other participating States. Being 
the demandeur of the Conference and wanting the preliminary discussion to proceed to the 
next stage of negotiations where they hoped for approval of a Summit meeting, the Soviet 
Union, and its closest allies, could not sustain their purely negative attitude throughout the 
consultations without risking the collapse of the negotiations even before they had actually 
started. The Soviets realised they had to accept something in the military field and (not unlike 
the Americans before them) ultimately concluded that confidence-building measures was the 
most innocuous item to negotiate. 
The significance the top Soviet leadership attached to the Conference and the Summit cannot 
be overstated. Judging by the important concessions made by the East at Helsinki, not only 
by agreeing to consider CBMs but also human rights issues, agreement on a Conference 
ranked very high on Moscow's priorities. From this perspective, the question can be asked 
whether the West had not lost an important opportunity to argue for more comprehensive 
measures and much tighter terms of reference for the negotiations, especially on the 
notification of movements, an issue which enjoyed the unconditional support of the NNAs. 
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Unfortunately, the Allies did not have such priorities at the MPT. In the field of military 
security, the Helsinki Consultations accepted their programme and the NATO states did not 
have to concede on the more demanding proposals tabled by the NNAs. Most Allies were 
satisfied with this result which fulfilled the existing Alliance policy on CBMs; a policy still 
strongly influenced by concerns about MBFR and one that called for only a cautious 
endorsement for some general measures. In fact, almost at the same time as the Soviet Union 
agreed to consider confidence-building measures in early 1973, the United States began to 
argue in Brussels that the West's package of CBMs was too comprehensive and that the 
Soviets were correct by refusing the notification of movements. 
Why the United States repudiated its own proposal, formulated only eight months earlier, 
remains unclear except for the possible explanation of simple oversight. As discussed, the 
original US paper on CBMs presented at NATO in July 1972 did not examine the measures 
in-depth and did not differentiate between the terms movements, manoeuvres, and exercises. 
Without any technical or military analysis supporting the elaboration of the document, the 
implications of the proposal for the notification of movements were probably not discerned at 
the time. 
Nevertheless, from the moment the United States realised the full ramifications of their 
proposal they became extremely concerned that obligations in this field would hinder 
movement of troops to Europe and adopted the position that movements should be stripped 
from CSCE discussions and NATO proposals. 
The implications for the development of any far-reaching Alliance policy on CBMs were 
significant. The Americans would not agree to go beyond the concept of illustrative lists and 
refused precise definitions or specific parameters for the measures. As a result, from the 
moment the Allies needed to accelerate work on illustrative lists, until March 1974 when the 
strategy had been clearly overtaken by events in the Conference room and was finally 
abandoned, the Alliance struggled to find examples agreeable to all. Yet, with no common 
guidelines or extensive research identifying what would be desirable to notify or what should 
be negotiated, the exercise proved futile and NATO never managed to adopt any lists that 
could be tabled in the CSCE. 
More significant for the final outcome of the Conference and the future application of CBMs, 
the Allies never succeeded in developing a comprehensive policy on CBMs. In this regard, 
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the greatest impact of NATO's early decision to keep the CSCE measures simple and 
undefined was that Allies never even determined for themselves what this meant. From this 
perspective, the most important failure of the Alliance was not necessarily to have adopted a 
negative policy towards CBMs whereby the main goal was to limit their development, but not 
to have elaborated a common negotiating strategy that would have upheld the minimum they 
wanted to achieve. No debate, research, comprehensive technical or military study was ever 
undertaken to fully assess the implications of their own proposals, and even less those of the 
other participating States. Not surprisingly, in several instances during the main negotiations, 
the Allies found themselves at odds over many basic issues which could have been avoided 
with better preparation. 
Better preparation could have also helped the Western delegations to present a more 
forthcoming position and unified front on several important issues. One of the most 
disconcerting aspect of NATO's negotiating position was their inability to support the NNAs' 
proposal for the notification of independent air and naval manoeuvres since the only Alliance 
study on the issue resulted in a positive conclusion but came too late to alter their long- 
standing negative position. 
Closer co-ordination on CBMs might have also avoided embarrassing situations such as the 
last minute bilateral dealings between the Soviets and Americans on the final parameters of 
notifications of major military manoeuvres. A fact, the British later acknowledged, resulted in 
the West achieving less than they could have. 
Clearly, many of the breakdowns in Alliance unity during the main negotiations resulted from 
purely national interests. In this regard, complex negotiations involving 15 partners, each 
with separate national interests, will never see absolute commonality of views. Yet, in the 
case of the negotiation of the CSCE CBMs regime, it is obvious that if greater interest had 
been placed in the measures, the Allies could have developed a more coherent and articulated 
negotiating position that might have produced a better outcome. 
One may wonder how much the Soviets were aware of the divisions within the Alliance and 
how this might have reinforced their views that they could maintain their negative attitude and 
that, by "hard-bargaining", all participants would agree to only the strict minimum. The fact 
that the Eastern bloc never wanted confidence-building measures is undeniable. The Soviets 
acknowledged having made a mistake by accepting the drafting of terms of reference at 
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Helsinki, and throughout the negotiations in Geneva continuously attempted to limit the 
development of the measures to the lowest common denominator. Whether Moscow could 
have been persuaded to accept more stringent CBMs in the Final Act cannot, retrospectively, 
be answered with any certainty. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Soviets wanted a successful 
conclusion to the proceedings at Summit level and compromised greatly to achieve this goal. 
Furthermore, from a Western perspective, it is evident that the Allies could have tabled almost 
any proposal on CBMs and would have been fully supported by the neutrals and non-aligned. 
As for the multilateral talks, however, the Alliance's major objective throughout the main 
negotiations was not to obtain agreement on numerous exacting measures with detailed, 
demanding applications. Although a number of Allies argued for more concrete and effective 
CBMs, this view never became Alliance policy. 
Many of the weaknesses and shortcomings which found their way into the Final Act were 
either unchallenged by the majority in NATO or, alternatively, as in the case of weak 
provisions adopted for the notification of movements and independent manoeuvres, were 
fully supported by some, or many of the Allies. Understandably, perhaps, Western evaluation 
of the application of the CBMs regime was never to be too harsh or too negative. The initial 
silence of the Warsaw Pact raised concerns at the beginning about what might be expected 
next, if anything at all. But, once the East began reporting manoeuvres, everyone could claim 
the system was working. How the system was working and for what purpose, however, is 
less clear. 
From the beginning the Eastern bloc demonstrated little interest for the CSCE commitments. 
Eastern states notified major manoeuvres, but always in a manner that raised more questions 
than provided answers. The measure on exchange of observers was implemented but also 
only in a manner to their liking and in a way that suited their purposes: sometimes by inviting 
only countries in border areas; frequently by excluding Western countries; and, very often by 
ignoring Western invitations to observe NATO manoeuvres. Furthermore, access given to 
foreign observers was always restricted and limited to viewing only well-orchestrated, well- 
rehearsed exercises of no value. 
While one can argue that the East did participate in the CBMs regime and that the system was 
working, beyond this general observation reality was a completely different matter and an 
equally compelling argument can be made that the regime resulted in few concrete benefits. 
In terms of increased transparency or stability, it is questionable that anything was gained by 
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the notification of upcoming major manoeuvres that provided only the name of a country and 
an approximate time-frame. Similarly, what was truly achieved, at a time of increased tension 
and uncertainty during the Polish crises, when the East decided either to simply provide 
incomplete notifications or not to notify at all? From a Western perspective, deception and 
manipulation characterised the experiences with the regime. 
The reasons why the Allies argued for a new set of measures rather than strongly challenge 
the East over their poor, deceptive, and manipulative record of implementation certainly 
ensued from a number of motivations though, perhaps, the West had few other options 
available. The provisions of the Final Act were extremely vague, filled with loopholes and 
very often simply lacking any explanations about what was expected from the participating 
States, leaving open the possibility for differing interpretations or applications. If the East 
took the view that the provisions of the document were merely guidelines and that 
implementation of the measures was voluntary, the NATO governments could register their 
disapproval, but that was about all they could do, knowing very well that this could be a 
"legitimate" interpretation of the Document. The West had contributed to this final outcome 
and, in this sense, any claims that the NATO states should be praised for their important role 
in the making of CBMs should not be exaggerated. 
In fact, most of the "success" attributed to the NATO partners was simply achieved by default 
and not by design. This is true of the decision to propose that the Conference deal with 
"certain military aspects of security", which was primarily motivated by increasing questions 
about how MBFR negotiations should be carried out. This is also true of the decision to 
propose CBMs at the CSCE, which only came about as a by-product of the inconclusive 
debate on the establishment of a link with MBFR. 
The fact that CBMs were chosen only as a second "best-choice" to fill in the military security 
aspects of the CSCE might not have been so unfortunate, except that their future development 
was also to be curtailed, again because of preoccupations with MBFR The irony, of course, 
was that the MBFR negotiations never produced any agreement, while the CSCE CBMs were 
to remain in force for more than a decade. 
While the development of effective and substantive CBMs was never of significance to the 
Western states, the importance they attached to their later application was equally 
insignificant. As acknowledged by Western officials, interest in the implementation of the. 
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Final Act's commitments only emerged after public opinion focused on its human rights 
provisions. In this regard, any claims of "significant" Allied interest for a thorough 
application of the measures should be considered with caution. Western appreciation of the 
CBMs developed primarily because of a recognition that the measures were to stay and not 
because they were viewed as meaningful tools that could improve the East-West security 
environment. 
Arguably, the main achievement of the CSCE CBMs was that they remained in operation for 
so long, but this cannot be considered an indicator of success, nor can it be credited solely to 
the West. From the start, NATO never gave much consideration to confidence-building 
measures and, in this regard, any contention that the Allies were always strong advocates of 
effective measures should be more carefully assessed in view of the historical record, which 
clearly establishes that their interest was at best, minimal, and at worst, non-existent. In many 
ways, CBMs rarely attracted the attention of governments who, from the start, had only 
adopted the topic to fulfil a public commitment too hastily made and then opted to confine 
themselves to only a general endorsement for their negotiations. 
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APPENDIX I 
Notifications of Military Manoeuvres in Compliance 
with the CSCE Final Act : 1975-1987 


















15-19 Sept 75 FRG\USA\CA\FR Grosse Rochade* 68,000 23* N 
Early Oct- 
Late Nov 75 
USA Reforger 75 53,0001 21 N 
14-23 Oct 75 FRG\USA\CA Certain Trek 57,000 34* Y 
6-10 Sept 76 FRG\USA Grosser Bär* 50,000 21 Y 
7-11 Sept 76 USA\FRG Gordian Shield 30,000* 21 N 
13-17 Sept 76 USA\FRG\CA Lares Team 44,000 21 Y 
12-15 Sept 77* FRG Standhafte 
Shatten* 
38,000 21 Y 
13-23 Sept 77 USA\FRG Carbon Edge 58,700* 21* Y 
17-21 Sept 78 FRG\USA Blaue Donau* 46,000 24* Y 
18-28 Sept 78 USA\FRG Certain Shield 56,000 24* Y 
18-29 Sept 78 USA\FRG\NL Saxon Drive 32,500* 24* Y 
19-22 Sept 78 FRG\DA Bold Guard 78 65,000 32* N 
30 Jan-6 Feb 79* USA\FRG Certain Sentinel 66,000 26* Y 
10-21 Sept 79 FRG\USA\CA Constant Enforcer* 29,000 21* Y 
17-21 Sept 79 FRG Harte Faust* 60,000 21 Y 
15-19 Sept 80* FRG St. Georg* 44,000* 24 Y 
15-24 Sept 80 USA\FRG\CA Certain Rampart 40,000 21* Y 
15-25 Sept 80* UK\FRG Spearpoint* 90,000* 24 Y 
14-18 Sept 81 FRG\CA Scharfe Klinge* 48,000 21* Y 
14-23 Sept 81 FRG\USA Certain Encounter* 70,000 24* Y 
13-17 Sept 82** FRG Starke Wehr* 45,000* 24* Y 
13-23 Sept 82** USA\FRG\CA Carbine Fortress* 73,000 24* Y 
20-24 Sept 82 FRG\DA Bold Guard 82* 47,200* 24* Y 
19-21 Sept 83* FRG Wehrhafte Löwen 50,000 21 Y 





62,000 21 Y 
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20-29 Sept 83 FRG\NL Atlantic Lion 41,000 21 Y 
27 Oct-2 Nov 83 FRG\UK Eternal Triangle 25,000 21 Y\N 
16-21 March 84* Norway Avalanche Express 25,000 28* Y 
3-29 Sept 84 FRG\UK Lion Heart 132,000 24 Y 
13-20 Sept 84 FRG Flinker Igel 55,000 22 Y 
17-28 Sept 84 USA\FRG Certain Fury 50,000 21 Y 
21-31 Jan 85 USA\FRG Central Guardian 72,000 21 Y 
2-13 Sept 85 UK Brave Defender 65,000 28 Y 
12-21 Sept 85 FRG Trutzige Sachsen 60,000 21 Y 
20-30 Jan 86 USA\FRG Certain Sentinel 73,000 27 Y 
22-25 Sept 86* FRG Fränkischer Schild 58,000* 21* Y 
22-26 Sept 86 FRG Bold Guard 86 65,000 21 Y 


















10-18 Nov 75 Switzerland ---- 40,000 31* Y 
5-9 March 79 Switzerland Nutcracker 34,000* 28* Y 
1-6 Oct 79 Switzerland Forte 27,000 31* Y 
19-22 Nov 79 Austria ---- (Area Defence 
Exercise 79)* 
27,500 42* Y 
12-22 Oct 81** Switzerland Cresta* 25,000 33 N 
26 Oct-4 Nov 81 Spain Crisex-81 32,200* 21* Y 
15-19 Nov 82 Switzerland Panzerjagd 30,000 38 Y 
7-17 Oct 85 Switzerland Tornado 25,000 42 N 
9-17 Oct 86 Austria Raumverteidigung 
Herbstübung 86 
30,000 43 Y 
3-21 Nov 86 Switzerland Dreizack 86 40,000 43 Y 
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25 Jan-6 Feb 76* USSR Kavkaz 25,000 21* Y 
14-18 June 76 USSR Sever 25,000 21 Y 
9-16 Sept 76** Poland Tarcza-76 35,000 21 Y 
31 March-5 April 77 USSR ---- 25,000 21* N 
11-16 July 77 USSR Karpatia 27,000* 21 Y 
6-10 Feb 78 USSR Berezina 25,000 21* Y 
3-8 July 78 USSR\GDR ---- (Tarcza-78) 30,000 21 N 
5-12 Sept 78* USSR ---- (Kavkaz II) 25,000 21 N 
2-7 Feb 79 USSR\CZ Druzba-79 26,000 21* N 
2-7 April 79 USSR ---- 25,000 21 N 
23-27 July 79 USSR Neman 25,000 21 Y 
10- 16 July 80 USSR ---- 30,000 21 N 
4-12 Sept 80** GDR Brotherhood in Arms 40,000 21* N 
4-12 Sept 81 USSR --- 
2 
---s 21 Y 
25-30 Jan 82 USSR\CZ Druzba-82 25,000 21 N 
25 Sept-1 Oct 82 Bulgaria Shield-82 60,000 21 N 
29 June-4 July 83* USSR ----- 50,000 21* N 
25-30 July 83 USSR ---- 26,000 21 N 
28 June-5 July 84* USSR --- 
4 60,000 22* N 
9-14 Sept 84** CZ\PL Shield-84 60,000 21* N 
25-31 May 85 USSR\CZ ---- 25,000 25 N 
6-14 July 85 USSR\GDR ---- 25,000 23 N 
15-21 July 85 USSR Kavkaz-85 25,000 21 Y 
10-17 Feb 86 USSR --- (Zapad-86) 50,000 24 N 
17-21 Feb 86 USSR --- (Kavkaz-86) 25,000 21 N 
8-12 Sept 86 CZ Druzba-86 25,000 28 Y 
8-13 Sept 86 USSR\GDR -- 25,000 24 N 
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12-28 Sept 75 Turkey\UK Deep Express* 18,000 21* N 
3-7 Oct 75 Norway Batten Bolt 75* 8,000 21* N 
28 Oct-6 Nov 75 Netherlands Pantser Sprong* 10,000 14 N 
24 Feb-23 March 76* Norway Atlas Express* 17,000 21* N 
20-24 Sept 76* Norway Team Work 76 13,500* 21* Y 
4-5 Oct 76 Turkey Tayfun 76 15,000 ? ? 
11-21 Oct 76* DA\FRG\USA Bonded Item* 11,000* 21* N 
2-11 Nov 76* UK Spearpoint 18,000 21* Y 
1-8 May 77 USA Certain Fighter 24,000 23* N 
12-23 Sept 77* Belgium Blue Fox 24,000* 21 N 
19-23 Sept 77 Denmark Arrow Express 77 16,000 21* Y 
24 Sept-1 Oct 77 Netherlands Interaction 12,000 21* Y 
13-14 Oct 77 Turkey Tayfun 77 15,000 30 Y 
1-6 March 78 Norway Arctic Express* 15,300 30 Y 
22-26 Sept 78 Norway Black Bear 8,200 30 N 
17-22 March 79 Norway Cold Winter 79* 10,000 30 N 
28 Sept-14 Oct 79 Turkey Display 
Determination 79 
18,000 22* N 
1-7 Oct 79** France Sa6ne-79 16,000* 21 Y 
15-27 Oct 79 UK Keystone* 18,000 21 N 
14-19 March 80 Norway Anorak Express* 18,200 30* N 
18-24 Sept 80 Norway Team Work 80* 16,800 28 Y 
6-10 Oct 80 France Marne 80 17,000 11 * N 
13-18 March 81 Norway Cold Winter 81 11,000 22* N 
18-23 Sept 81 Norway Barfost 81 9,000 21 N 
20-25 Sept 81 Denmark Amber Express 81 * 22,000 23* Y 
October 81 France Farfadet 4,000 14 N 
1-23 Oct 81** FRG\UK Red Claymore* 22,500* 21* N 
12-24 Oct 81 * FRG\BE Cross Fire* 21,000 21* N 
12-17 March 82 Norway Alloy Express* 14,200 28* N 
19-20 Sept 82** France Langres 82 17,000 3* N 
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11-17 March 83 Norway Cold Winter 83 10,000 21 N6 
16- 24 Sept 83* France Moselle 83 22,000 24* Y 
20-24 Sept 83* Denmark Ample Express 10,000 20* Y 
24 Oct-5 Nov 83 UK\FRG Eternal Triangle 21,000 21 N7 
8-14 Sept 84 France Doubs-84 20,000 31* Y 
14 Sept 84 France Damocles 7,500 ? Y 
15-20 Sept 84 Denmark Bold Gannett 21,000 22 N 
15-21 March 85* Norway Cold Winter 85 10,000 21 Y 
11 June 85 France Jourdan 5,000 ? Y 
6-12 March 86 Norway Anchor Express 20,000 28 Y\N 
9-15 Sept 86 Norway Express Barfost 11,000 50 N 
9-15 Sept 86 Norway Blue Fox 86 23,0008 9 Y 


















21-25 Oct 75 Yugoslavia ---- (Division in Action)* 18,000 22* N 
20-23 Sept 76 Yugoslavia Golija-76* 24,000 34* Y 
2-6 Oct 76 Sweden Poseidon 12,000 30* N 
5-9 March 77* Sweden Vönn 77 10,000 30* Y 
8-15 Oct 77 Spain Podenco 8,000 53 Y 
11-19 Nov 77 Austria ---(Herbstübung 77) 12,000 38* N 
13-17 Nov 78 Austria ---- 5,000 21* N 
28 Feb-11 March 82* Sweden Norrsken * 23,000 30* Y 
23-29 Sept 82** Sweden Sydfront*9 24,000* 34* N 
15-22 Oct 82 Austria ---- (Area Defence 
Exercise 82) 
14,000 46 N 
13-15 Sept 83 Yugoslavia Unity 83 22,000 39* Y 
25 Sept-5 Oct 83* Sweden Ostkult 20,000 31 N 
18 Feb-5 March 85 Sweden Västgräns 22,000 42 Y 
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6-9 April 76 Hungary ---- 10,000* 110 N 
18-23 Oct 76 Hungary ---- 15,000* 011 N 
Mid-May 79 Hungary ---- (Shield-79) 25,000 
12 13 Y 
23-30 Aug 80 Hungary Dyna 80 18,000 114 N 
5-10 Sept 83 USSR Dniestr 23,000 21 Y 
KEY 
BE = Belgium 
BU = Bulgaria 
CA = Canada. 
CZ = Czechoslovakia 
DA = Denmark 
FR = France 
FRG = Federal Republic of Germany 
GDR = German Democratic Republic 
NL = Netherlands 
PL = Poland 
UK = United Kingdom 
USA = United States 
USSR= Soviet Union 
METHODLOGY AND SYMBOLS USED 
A cautionary word: The tables provided above can by no means be considered as definitive 
because the national notifications issued by the CSCE participating States are not in the public 
domain. Unless specified otherwise, the data used to compile the tables are from three main 
sources: the first twenty-two Semiannual Reports on Implementation of the US Congressional 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; various SIPRI World Armaments and 
Disarmament Yearbooks; and the study from Victor-Yves Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph. 
(Complete references are provided in the bibliography and have been marked by an *). 
The use of several sources was necessary because none of the above references indicated whether 
the original national notifications issued by the CSCE participants were their primary source of 
information, and none provided a complete coverage of the Helsinki CBMs regime. If 
combination of all the data was the only way to offer the most comprehensive record of 
implementation, this highlighted numerous discrepancies between the sources which could not 
always be easily explained. This problem was compounded by the fact that none of the 
references explained their reporting procedures. To ensure accuracy, as much as possible, each 
source has been confirmed by a separate source of information. In some cases, however, all 
sources provided different information and, in other instances, only one source was available. 
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Explanation of the methodology for the compilation of the tables as well as the different symbols 
used to highlight discrepancies between the sources follows. 
DURATION OF MANOEUVRE 
One "*" after a quoted figure indicates different reporting in the sources consulted. In most cases, 
the difference was only of a few days. 
Two "**" following a given date, indicates that one or more of the sources reported an imprecise 
time-frame for the duration of the manoeuvre only quoting, for instance, "early September". 
Whenever a precise date was available it has been used in order to facilitate the calculation of the 
number of days of prior notice. 
NOTIFYING COUNTRY\COUNTRIES 
All available information on notifying states has been included, though no specific order of 
presentation has been used. Accordingly, the first country listed should not be regarded as 
reflecting its status as a sponsoring state, nor do the entries in the column "Duration of 
Manoeuvres" necessarily correspond to the dates given by that state. Indeed, it can be noted that 
the NATO member states have often separately announced various phases of their multinational 
exercises, and that several member states have sometimes provided separate notification for the 
participation of their national troops only. Hence, discrepancies between sources can be 
numerous. 
DESIGNATION OF MANOEUVRE 
One "*" after a given designation indicates that details on the movement of troops to and/or from 
the manoeuvre have been included, but consistent reporting on this item, has only been done by 
SIPRI, and only until 1982. 
When a designation appears in parenthesis after this symbol "--- ", it indicates different reporting 
between the sources. In this case, it is unclear whether the designation listed was indeed 
provided, or if the name reported in one or more sources only referred to the way the manoeuvre 
subsequently became known. This later point is particularly relevant for the Warsaw Pact 
manoeuvres which often omitted official designation, while Western experts, when referring to 
those manoeuvres, used the "likely" designation. 
NUMBER OF TROOPS 
One "*" after a quoted figure indicates discrepancies between sources. In most cases, the 
difference was less than 2,000 troops. In some instances, however, the difference was quite 
significant. The Swiss exercise Nutcracker, for example, was reported as involving 34,000, 
47,000 and 51,000 troops. Yet, in only one case (the Sydfront exercise held by Sweden in 1982), 
the difference affected the possible classification of the manoeuvre and, in this case, the smallest 
figure has been retained and the exercise is listed under small-scale manoeuvres. 
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ADVANCE NOTICE 
One "*" after a quoted figure indicates non-congruence between sources, or the possibility for a 
different reporting of the data. 
The calculation of the number of days for advance notice is inclusive of the date the notification 
was issued, but exclusive of the start of the manoeuvre as recorded under 'Duration of 
Manoeuvre". In most cases where the issuance of the notification was unknown, the figure 
quoted is from Ghebali. 
INVITATION OF OBSERVERS 
"Y/N" (YES/NO) indicates contradictory reporting. 
"? " indicates that no information was available. 
NOTES 
' SIRPRI Yearbook 1976 reports only the involvement of 10,000 troops. Although not specified as such, it 
is possible that this number refers to the contribution of forces by the United States only. It is to be noted, 
however, that the First Semiannual Report on Implementation of the US Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe does not mention the Reforger exercise as part of its review of the implementation 
record of the Helsinki CBMs for this period. Since the designation Reforger itself refers to the annual 
return of continental US based forces to the Federal Republic of Germany for the fall season exercises, the 
information provided here (and only reported by Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph) may be misleading as 
it could actually duplicate the number of troops participating in other NATO exercises taking place during 
the same period in the FRG. It was not uncommon for NATO to have the same troops participated in more 
than one manoeuvre. 
'Unnamed in the notification but designated as ZAPAD-81. TASS, 5 September 1981. 
3 Number of troops not provided in the notification but reported by TASS, 5 September 1981 as involving 
"approximately 100,000 troops". 
4 Unnamed manoeuvre; referred to in the West as ZAPAD-84. 




9 This exercise has been reported by Ghebali, Paragraph-by-Paragraph, as involving 25,000 troops. It has 
been listed here under the small-scale exercise because the other two sources consulted reported it at 
23,000 and 24,000 troops. 
'o Notification made orally. See Goetze, Security in Europe, p. 89. 
" Notification made orally. See Ibid. 
12 Although the number of troops is indicated as being 25,000 troops, this manoeuvre has been included in 
this section because all the sources consulted reported that the notification indicated "fewer than 25,000 
troops", thus qualifying it as a smaller-scale exercise. 
13 Notification given orally on May 3,1979. See Holst, "Confidence-building Measures", pp. 8-10. 
14 Notification given orally. See Goetze, Security in Europe, p. 89. 
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289 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Twenty-Eight Session, 1976-1977, Documents, 
Volume II, Report on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and 
disarmament presented by the Political Affairs Committee, by Mr. De Koster, Rapporteur, 22 
April 1976, Document 3768,1977, Strasbourg, pp. 1-12. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session, 25-29 April 
1977, Records, Documents, Working Papers, Volume 1, No. 3936-3959, Report on 
confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament presented by 
the Political Affairs Committee, by Mr. De Koster, Rapporteur, 28 March 1977, Document 
3952,1977, Strasbourg, pp. 1-21. 
2.3 NATO 
NATO, NATO Final Communiques, 1949-1974, Brussels: NATO Information Service, n. d., 
329 pages. 
NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures, Brussels: NATO 
Information Service, 1989,380 pages. 
NATO, NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1985,368 
pages. 
2.4 UNITED KINGDOM 
Bennett, G., and K. A. Hamilton (eds. ), The Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, 1972-75", Series III, Volume II of Documents on British Policy Overseas, London: 
The Stationery Office, 1997,506 pages. 
United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Selected Documents Relating to 
Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1954-77, Miscellaneous No. 17 (1977), 
Cmnd. 6932, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1977,366 pages. 
United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Meeting held at Belgrade from 4 
October 1977 to 9 March 1978 to follow up the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, Miscellaneous No. 8 (1978), Cmnd. 7126, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1978,53 pages. 
United Kingdom, Fifth Report from the Expenditure Committee-- Session 1976-1977. 
Progress Towards Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe. Observations by the Government, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1978), Cmnd. 
7112,1978, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1978,32 pages. 
2.5 UNITED NATIONS 
United Nations, Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures, Study Series 7, 
New York: United Nations, 1982,42 pages. 
United Nations, Confidence-building Measures, Disarmament Fact Sheet 57, New York: 
United Nations, 1989,18 pages. 
290 
United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Report of the Secretary-General, Study on 
Defensive Security Concepts and Policies, Study Series 26, New York: United Nations, 1993, 
64 pages. 
2.6 UNITED STATES 
2.6.1 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
2.6.1.1 Semiannual Reports on Implementation 
* First Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Report submitted to the 
Committee on International Relations, US Congress, 94th Congress, 2d Session, December 
1976, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1976,22 pages. 
* Second Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Report submitted to the Committee on International Relations, US, 
Congress, 95th Congress, 1st Session, June 1977, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1977,11pages. 
* Third Semiannual Report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. June 
1- December 1,1977, Special Report No. 39, December 1977, Washington, D. C.: 
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services. 
* Fourth Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. December 1,1977- June 1,1978, Special Report No. 45, June 1978, 
Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public 
Communication. 
* Fifth Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. June 1- December 1,1978, 
Special Report No. 51, December 1978, Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication. 
* Implementation of the Helsinki Accord. Sixth Semiannual Report. December 1,1978 - May 
31,1979, Special Report No. 54, July 1979, Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau 
of Public Affairs. 
* Seventh Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Accord. June 1- November 30, 
1979, Special Report No. 62, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public 
Affairs. 
* Eighth Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Accord. December 1,1979 - May 
31,1980, Special Report No. 73, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of 
Public Affairs. 
* Ninth Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Accord. June 1- November 30,1980, 
Special Report No. 77, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public 
Affairs. 
* Tenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. December 1,1980 - May 
31,1981, Special Report No. 85, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of 
Public Affairs. 
291 
* Eleventh Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. June 1,1981 - 
November 30,1981, Special Report No. 89, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. 
* Twelfth Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. December 1,1981- May 
31,1982, Special Report No. 100, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of 
Public Affairs. 
* Thirteen Semiannual Report. Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. June 1,1982 - 
November 30,1982, Special Report No. 105, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. 
* Fourteenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. December 1,1982 - 
May 31,1983, Special Report No. 109, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau 
of Public Affairs. 
* Fifteenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. June 1,1983 - 
November 30,1983, Special Report No. 113, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. 
* Sixteenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. December 1,1983 - 
May 31,1984, Special Report No. 117, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau 
of Public Affairs. 
* Seventeenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. April 1,1984 - 
October 1,1984, Special Report No. 119, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. 
* Eighteenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. October 1,1984 - 
April 1,1984, Special Report No. 130, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau 
of Public Affairs. 
* Nineteenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. April 1,1985 - 
October 1,1985, Special Report No. 134, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. 
* Twentieth Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. October 1,1985 April 
1,1986, Special Report No. 146, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Bureau of 
Public Affairs. 
* Twenty-first Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. April 1,1986 - 
October 1,1986, Special Report No. 154, n. d., Washington, D. C.: Department of State, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. 
* Twenty-second Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. October 1,1986 
- April 1,1987, Special Report No. 168, n. d., Washington, 
D. C.: Department of State, Bureau 
of Public Affairs. 
292 
2.6.1.2 Reports to Conte 
* Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 
Findings and Recommendations Two Years After Helsinki, Report by the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe transmitted to the Committee on International Relations, 
US, House of Representatives, September 23,1977,95th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 
D. C.: GPO, 1977,194 pages. 
* Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 
Findings and Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki, Report by the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe submitted to Congress, August 1,1980,96th Congress, 
2d Session, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1980,341 pages. 
* Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 
Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki, Report by the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe submitted to Congress, November 1982,97th Congress, 
2d Session, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1982,258 pages. 
* Basket I -- Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe: Findings Eleven Years After Helsinki, Report by the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe submitted to Congress, November 1986,99th Congress, 2d Session, 
Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1987,419 pages. 
The Belgrade Followup Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A 
Report and Appraisal, Report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
transmitted to the Committee on International Relations, 17 May 1978, US House of 
Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1978,105 pages. 
2.6.1.3 Others 
* US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Fu filling our Promises: The 
United States and the Helsinki Final Act. A Status Report, Washington D. C.: GPO, November 
1979,382 pages. 
2.6.2 Congress, House 
US, House of Representatives, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the Committee on 
International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session, 
May 6,1975, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1975. 
US, House of Representatives, Conference on European Security, Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
Ninety-Second Congress, Second Session, April 25; May 10; August 10,17; September 7, 
27,1972, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1972. 
US, House of Representatives, Status of the MBFR Negotiations, Report of the MBFR Panel 
of the Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second 
Session, December 14,1978. Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1978,10 pages. 
293 
US, House of Representatives, East-West Troop Reductions in Europe: Is Agreement 
Possible?, Report prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, for the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, House of 
Representatives, 98th Congress, 1'` Session, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1983,42 pages. 
2.6.3 D partment of State 
"The Potential of the Helsinki Dialogue", by Matthew Nimetz, Department of State Bulletin, 
October 1978, pp. 29-33. 
"Belgrade Review Meeting Concludes", Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg, Chairman of the 
US Delegation, Department of State Bulletin, April 1978, pp. 40-44. 
"CDE Measures to Reduce Tension in Europe", by James E. Goodby, Department of State 
Bulletin, August 1985, pp. 39-43. 
"Challenge for Progress on the Helsinki Final Act", by Ambassador Max Kampelman, 
Department of State Bulletin, September 1981, pp. 37-40. 
"Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe", Department of State Bulletin, 
September 1977, pp. 404-410. 
"Continuity and Commitment", by Matthew Nimetz, Department of State Bulletin, January 
1980, pp. 20-24. 
"CSCE and East-West Relations", by Matthew Nimetz, Department of State Bulletin, April 
1980, pp. 44-45. 
"CSCE Followup Meeting Concludes in Madrid", Department of State Bulletin, October 
1983, pp. 51-60. 
"European Security Conference Discussed by President Ford", Department of State Bulletin, 
August 1975, pp. 204-206. 
"President Ford Attends Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe", Department of 
State Bulletin, September 1975, pp. 289-311. 
"Review Meeting of the CSCE Opens at Belgrade", Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg, 
Chairman of the US Delegation made at the Opening Plenary Session on October 6,1977, 
Department of State Bulletin, November 1977, pp. 674-680. 
"Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Helsinki July 30 and 31", Department of State 
Bulletin, September 1975, pp. 312-323. 
"Preparations for Madrid. CSCE Review Meeting", by Rozanne L. Ridgway, Current Policy, 
No. 227, September 16,1980,3 pages. 
"Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe", Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents, 16, August 4,1980, pp. 1434-1439. 
294 
"An Assessment of the Madrid CSCE Followup Meeting", by M. M. Kampelman, 
Department of State Bulletin, September 1983, pp. 59-63. 
"Belgrade Review Meeting Concludes", by A. J. Goldberg, Department of State Bulletin, 
April 1978, pp. 40-44. 
"CDE: Measures to Reduce Tension in Europe", by James E. Goodby -- Address before the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science in Los Angeles on May 30,1985, 
Department of State Bulletin, August 1985, pp. 39-43. 
"Challenge for Progress on the Helsinki Final Act", by M. M. Kampelman, Department of 
State Bulletin, September 1981, pp. 37-40. 
"Continuing the CSCE Process", by Jimmy Carter and Edmund Muskie, Department of State 
Bulletin, September 1980, pp. 49-52. 
"Continuity and Commitment", by Matthew Nimetz, Department of State Bulletin, January 
1980, pp. 20-24. 
"CSCE Review Meeting in Madrid", by R. L. Ridgway, Department of State Bulletin, 
November 1980, pp. 49-51. 
"Current State of the CSCE Process", by Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Department of State 
Bulletin, May 1982, pp. 53-54. 
"Human Rights: The United States at Belgrade", by Dante B. Fascell --Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on February 24,1978, Department of State Bulletin, 
May 1978, pp. 39-41. 
"Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements", Department of State 
Bulletin, March 1984, pp. 8-11. 
"Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements", Department of State 
Bulletin, April 1985, pp. 29-34. 
"Secretary Vance Discusses Administration's Objectives for Belgrade Review Conference on 
CSCE", Department of State Bulletin, June 1977, pp. 669-670. 
"Soviet Military Exercise", Department of State Bulletin, October 1981, p. 51. 
"The CDE and European Security in the 1980s", by Gerhard Mally, Department of State 
Bulletin, January 1984, pp. 49-51. 
"The Foreign Policy of Human Rights", by Edmund S. Muskie, Department of State Bulletin, 
December 1980, pp. 7-9. 
"United States at Belgrade", by D. B. Fascell, Department of State Bulletin, May 1978, pp. 
39-41. 
Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1960. 
Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1986. 
295 
2.6.4 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1963. 
Documents on Disarmament, 1964, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1965. 
Documents on Disarmament, 1966, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1967. 
Documents on Disarmament, 1969, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1970. 
2.7. WEU 
Western European Union Assembly, The proposed European security conference, 1954- 
1971, Brief prepared by Mr. E. Nessler (Rapporteur), Paris: General Affairs Committee, 
Western European Union Assembly, Seventeenth Ordinary Session, December 1971,99 
pages. 
3. NEWSPAPERS, NEWS ARCHIVES 
Le Monde 
The Daily Telegraph 
The Financial Times 
The Guardian 
International Herald Tribune 
New York Times 
The Times 
The Sunday Times 
Current Digest of the Soviet Press 
Keesing's Contemporary Archives 
4. INTERVIEWS 
Mr. Richard Darilek (Rand, Cooperation), 15 February 1992 
Mr. Jonathan Dean (Union of Concerned Scientists), 11 February 1992 
Mr. Steve Flanagan (US Department of State), 15 February 1992 
Mr. John Finerty (US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe), 18 February 
1992 
Ambassador James E. Goodby (Carnegie Mellon University), 14 and 16 February 1992 
Mr. Richard Hallenbeck (Science Applications International Corporation), 14 February 1992 
Mr. William Odom (Hudson Institute), 17 February 1992 
Mr. Don 0. Stovall (US Department of Defense), 16 February 1992 
Mr. John Toogood (Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security), 8-9 December 
1992 
Mrs. Jenonne Walker (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 15 February 1992 
Mrs. Jaimie Young (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), 18 February 1992 
296 
B. SECONDARY SOURCES 
BOOK CHAPTERS, ARTICLES 
"Russia's Record Since Helsinki: 5 Years of Cheating", Interview with Max M. Kampelman, 
U. S. News and World Report, 90, February 9,1981, pp. 37-38. 
"Six Months After: The East European Response to Helsinki", The Atlantic Community 
Quarterly, 14: 1, Spring 1976, pp. 59-65. 
"Soviet 100,000 Man Baltic Exercise Tests New Tactic", Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 115, September 14,1981, p. 27. 
"The Helsinki Conference-- Six Years Afterwards" Soviet News, 4 August 1981, No. 6082, p. 
249 and p. 252. 
Acimovic, Ljubivoje, "CSCE and the Non-Aligned States", Survival, XVIII: 3, May-June 
1976, pp. 112-115. 
Acimovic, Ljubivoje, "Future Perspectives of Confidence-Building Measures as a Means to 
Stabilize International Relations", in Karl Kaiser (ed. ), Confidence-Building Measures, Bonn: 
Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, December 1983, pp. 
109-135. 
Acimovic, Ljubivoje, "Les aspects militaires de la securite europeenne", Politique etrangere, 
37: 6,1972, pp. 783-800. 
Acimovic, Ljubivoje, "Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), XXXIV: 807,20 November 1983, pp. 
15-21. 
Acimovic, Ljubivoje, "The CSCE and Military Aspects of European Security", in F. A. M. 
Alting von Geusau (ed. ), Uncertain Detente, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
1979, pp. 132-149. 
Acimovic, Ljubivoje, "The CSCE Process from a Yugoslav Perspective", in Hanspeter 
Neuhold (ed. ), CSCE, N+N Perspectives: The Process of the Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe from the Viewpoint of the Neutral and Non Aligned Participating States, 
The Laxenburg Papers No. 8, December 1987, Vienna: Wilhem Braumüller, pp. 79-99. 
Alford, Jonathan, "Confidence-Building Measures and Verification", in Karl Kaiser (ed. ), 
Confidence-Building Measures, Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für 
Auswärtige Politik, December 1983, pp. 61-78. 
Alford, Jonathan, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspect", in 
Jonathan Alford (ed. ), The Future of Arms Control, Part III, Confidence-Building Measures, 
Adelphi Paper 149, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979, pp. 4-13. 
Alford, Jonathan, "The Usefulness and the Limitations of CBMs", in William Epstein and 
Bernard T. Feld (eds. ), New Directions in Disarmament, New York: Praeger, 1981, pp. 133- 
142. 
297 
Allyn, Bruce, "Soviet Views of CBMs", in John Borawski (ed. ), Avoiding War in the Nuclear 
Age: Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 
1986, pp. 116-130. 
Andelman, D. A., "The Road to Madrid", Foreign Policy, No. 39, Summer 1980, pp. 159-172. 
Andreani, Jacques, "La Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe", in 
Regionalisme et universalisme dann le droit international contemporain, Paris: Pedone, 1977, 
pp. 113-128. 
Andren, Nils, "European Security Conference: A Swedish Scholar's View", The Atlantic 
Community Quarterly, 10: 3, Fall 1972, pp. 312-330. 
Aspin, Les, "A Surprise Attack on NATO - Refocusing the Debate", NATO Review, 25: 4, 
August 1977, pp. 6-13. 
Bach, H., "Detente and Military Behaviour and Significance of CBM's", Coexistence, 14: 1, 
1977, pp. 138-147. 
Ball, George W., "Capitulation at Helsinki", The Atlantic Community Quarterly, 13: 3, Fall 
1975, pp. 286-288. 
Beaufre, A., "La Conference europeenne sur la securite", Strategie, April-June 1973, pp. 33- 
43. 
Bechtholdt, H. "From the First to the Second Round in Helsinki", Aussenpolitik, 24: 1,1973, 
pp. 24-34. 
Beglov, S. "Dialogue Goes Ahead", International Affairs (Moscow), March 1967, pp. 44-49. 
Berg, Rolf, "Military Confidence-Building in Europe", in Allen Lynch (ed. ), Building 
Security in Europe, East-West Monograph Series Number Two, New York: Institute for East- 
West Security Studies, 1986, pp. 9-68. 
Bertram, Christoph, "Confidence-Building Measures as Military Constraints", in Karl Kaiser 
(ed. ), Confidence-Building Measures, Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft 
für Auswärtige Politik, December 1983, pp. 103-108. 
Bertram, Christoph, "Europe After the CSCE", Aussenpolitik, 16: 4,1976, pp. 211-220. 
Bertram, Christoph, "European Arms Control", in Nils Andren and Karl E. Birnbaum (eds. ), 
Beyond Detente: Prospects for East-West Co-operation and Security in Europe, East-West 
Perspectives 3, Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1976, pp. 123-137. 
Bertram, Christoph, "Rethinking Arms Control", Foreign Affairs, 59: 2, Winter 1980-81, pp. 
352-365. 
Bertram, Christoph, "West German Perspectives on European Security: Continuity and 
Change", The World Today, 27: 3, March 1971, pp. 115-123. 
Betts, Richard K., "Hedging Against Surprise Attack", Survival, XXIII: 4, July-August 1981, 
pp. 146-156. 
298 
Betts, Richard K., "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability", International Security, 
5: 4, Spring 1981, pp. 117-149. 
Birnbaum, Karl E., "Alignments in Europe: The CSCE Experience", The World Today, 37: 6, 
June 1981, pp. 219-223. 
Birnbaum, Karl E., "Confidence Building as an Approach to Cooperative Arms Regulations 
in Europe: General Considerations", in Karl E. Birnbaum (ed. ), Arms Control in Europe: 
Problems and Prospects, The Laxenburg Papers No. 1, Laxenburg, Austria: Austrian Institute 
for International Affairs, March 1980, pp. 79-87. 
Birnbaum, Karl E., "Confidence Building in East West Relations", in Karl E. Birnbaum (ed. ), 
Confidence Building and East- West Relations, The Laxenburg Papers No. 5 (Proceedings of a 
Conference organised by the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 15-16 September 
1982), March 1983, Vienna: Wilhem Braumüller, pp. 9-22. 
Birnbaum, Karl E., "East-West Diplomacy in the Era of Multilateral Negotiations: The Case 
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe", in Nils Andren and Karl E. 
Birnbaum (eds. ), Beyond Detente: Prospects for East-West Co-operation and Security in 
Europe, East-West Perspectives 3, Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1976, pp. 139-157. 
Birnbaum, Karl E., "Les Etats membres du Pacte de Varsovie et la C. S. C. E. ", Politique 
etrangere, 38: 6,1973, pp. 665-674. 
Birnbaum, Karl E., "The Geneva Phase Conference of the CSCE. An Immediate Report", 
Europa Archiv, 29: 10,25 May 1974, pp. 305-317. 
Blacker, Coit D., "Negotiating Security: The MBFR Experience", Arms Control, 7: 3, 
December 1986, pp. 215-240. 
Blacker, Coit D., "The MBFR Experience", in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and 
Alexander Dallin (eds. ), U. S. -Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 123-143. 
Blaker, James R., "On-site Inspections: The Military Significance of an Arms-control 
Proposal", Survival, XXVI: 3, May-June 1984, pp. 98-106. 
Borawski, John, "The World of CBMs", in John Borawski (ed. ), Avoiding War in the Nuclear 
Age: Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 
1986, pp. 9-39. 
Borawski, John, "Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe", Parameters, XVI: 
4, Winter 1986, pp. 68-75. 
Borawski, John, "Political and Legal Dimensions of Assuring CSBM Compliance in 
Europe", in Symposium on Verification of Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm: Swedish 
National Defence Research Institute, 1985, pp. 113-125. 
Bowker, Mike, and Phil. Williams, "Helsinki and West European Security", International 
Affairs (London), 61: 4, Autumn 1985, pp. 607-618. 
299 
Bacchus, M. "Multilateral Foreign Policy Making: The Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe", in David A. Caputo (ed. ), The Politics of Policy Making in America, 
San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1977,189 pages. 
Brauch, Hans Günter, "CBMs and the CSCE", Arms Control Today, 10: 10, November 1980, 
pp. 1-4. 
Brauch, Hans Günter, "Confidence-Building and Disarmament Supporting Measures", in 
William Epstein and Bernard T. Feld (eds. ), New Directions in Disarmament, New York: 
Praeger, 1981, pp. 145-160. 
Brauch, Hans Günter, "Limiting Surprise Attack Options for Central Europe: Suggestions for 
M(B)FR", The Korean Journal of International Studies, X: 2,1979, pp. 115-125. 
Braun, Aurel, "Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament", in Robert 
Spencer (ed. ), Canada and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Toronto: 
University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies, 1984, pp. 202-227. 
Brayton, Abbott A., "Confidence-Building Measures in European Security", The World 
Today, 36: 10, October 1980, pp. 382-391. 
Bromke, Adam, "The CSCE and Eastern Europe", The World Today, 29: 5, May 1973, pp. 
196-206. 
Buch, Heinrich, "Detente and Military Behaviour: Practice and Significance of Confidence- 
Building Measures", Co-existence, 14: 1 (Special Issue), 1977, pp. 138-147. 
Canby, Steven L., "Arms Control, Confidence-Building Measures, and Verification", in 
Edward C. Luck (ed. ), Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative, New York: New York 
University Press, 1983, pp. 198-212. 
Canby, Steven, "Mutual Force Reductions: A Military Perspective", International Security, 2: 
3, Winter 1978, pp. 122-135. 
Caravelli, John M., "Soviet and Joint Warsaw Pact Exercises", Armed Forces and Society, 9: 
3, Spring 1983, pp. 393-426. 
Carle, Francois, "Les pourparlers exploratoires d'Helsinki (premiere partie)", Etudes 
internationales, IV: 3, September 1973, pp. 297-361. 
Carle, Francois, "Les pourparlers exploratoires d'Helsinki (deuxieme partie)", Etudes 
internationales, IV: 4, December 1973, pp. 502-551. 
Carle, Francois, "La deuxieme phase de la Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en 
Europe", Etudes internationales, VI: 2, June 1975, pp. 165-187. 
Ceska, Franz, "Madrid: Was it Worth It? ", NATO's Sixteen Nations, 28: 6, Special 2,1983, 
pp. 50-52. 
Chernoff, Fred, "Negotiating Security and Disarmament in Europe", International Affairs 
(London), 60: 3, Summer 1984, pp. 429-437. 
300 
Chosudovskij, Evgenij, "Confidence Building and Confidence-Building Measures in East- 
West Interactions", Co-existence, April 1984, pp. 23-26. 
Colard, Daniel, "La Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe: ses origins et la 
position du Gouvernement francais", Chronique de politique etrangere, 26: 5, September 
1973, pp. 531-552. 
Crean, G. G., "European Security - The CSCE Final Act: Text and Commentary", Behind the 
Headlines, XXXV: 2-3,1976, pp. 1-21. 
D'Aboville, Benoit, "CBMs and the Future of European Security", in F. Stephen Larrabee 
and Dietrich Stobbe (eds. ), Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, East-West Monograph 
Series Number One, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983, pp. 192-209. 
D'Aboville, Benoit, "Le projet de Conference europeenne sur le desarmement et 1'echeance 
de Madrid", in Pierre Lellouche (ed. ), La securite de 1'Europe dans les annies 80. - Les 
relations est-ouest et le theatre europeen, Paris: IFRI, 1980, pp. 393-403. 
D'Aboville, Benoit, "The French Approach to Conventional Arms Control", in Uwe Nerlich, 
and James A. Thomson (eds. ), Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe, 
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 154-157. 
Darilek, Richard E., "Building Confidence and Security in Europe: The Road to and from 
Stockholm", The Washington Quarterly, 8: 1, Winter 1985, pp. 131-140. 
Darilek, Richard E., "Reducing the Risks of Miscalculation: The Promise of the Helsinki 
CBMs", in F. Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds. ), Confidence-Building Measures in 
Europe, East-West Monograph Series Number One, New York: Institute for East-West 
Security Studies, 1983, pp. 59-90. 
Darilek, Richard E., "Separate Processes, Converging Interests MBFR and CBMs", in Hans 
Guenter Brauch and Duncan L. Clarke (eds. ), Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation, 
Cambridge: Ballinger, 1983, pp. 237-257. 
Darilek, Richard E., "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe. A Tale of Two 
Cities: Stockholm, Vienna", Survival, XXIX: 1, January-February 1987, pp. 5-20. 
Darilek, Richard E., "East-West Confidence Building: Defusing the Cold War in Europe" in 
Michael Krepon, Michael Newbill, Khurshid Khoja, and Jenny S. Drezin (eds. ), Global 
Confidence Building. New Tools for Troubled Regions, London: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 275- 
290. 
Darilek, Richard E., and John K. Setear, "Constraints in Europe", in Robert D. Blackwill and 
F. Stephen Larrabee (eds. ), Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989, pp. 379-404. 
Davies, Richard T., "The United States and Poland, 1980-82", The Washington Quarterly, 5: 
2, Spring 1982, pp. 143-149. 
Davy, Richard, "Helsinki Scoreboard", The World Today, 32: 8, August 1976, pp. 279-281. 
Davy, Richard, "No Progress at Belgrade", The World Today, 34: 4, April 1978, pp. 128-135. 
301 
Davy, Richard, "Procedural Wrangles in Belgrade", The World Today, 33: 9, September 
1977, pp. 321-325. 
Davy, Richard, "The CSCE Summit", The World Today, 31: 9, September 1975, pp. 349-357. 
Davy, Richard, "The ESC and the Politics of Eastern Europe", The World Today, 28: 7, July 
1972, pp. 289-295. 
Davy, Richard, "The United States", in Nils Andren and Karl E. Birnbaum (eds. ), Belgrade 
and Beyond. - The CSCE Process in Perspective, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
1980, pp. 3-15. 
Dean, Jonathan, "Berlin in a Divided Germany: An Evolving International Regime", in 
Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds. ), US-Soviet Security 
Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 
83-105. 
Dean, Jonathan, "MBFR: From Apathy to Accord", International Security, 7: 4, Spring 1983, 
pp. 116-139. 
Dean, Jonathan, "Verifying Force Reductions and Confidence-Building Measures", in 
Symposium on Verification of Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm: Swedish National 
Defence Research Institute, 1985, pp. 101-112. 
Dean, Jonathan, "Will Negotiated Force Reductions Build Down the NATO-Warsaw Pact 
Confrontation? ", The Washington Quarterly, 11: 2, Spring 1988, pp. 69-84. 
Dehaime, Jean, "Le projet franrais de conference de desarmement en Europe et la reunion de 
Madrid", Defense nationale, November 1980, pp. 95-106. 
Devillers, Philippe, "La Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe", Defense 
nationale, March 1975, pp. 39-59. 
Dewey, Arthur E. (Ltcol. ), "Who's Afraid of a European Security Conference? ", Military 
Review, 53: 7, July 1973, pp. 5-16. 
Dimecker, R. S., "Between Helsinki and Belgrade: A Balance Sheet of CSCE", Strategic 
Review, 5: 4, Fall 1977, pp. 74-83. 
Dobrosielski, Marian, "The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Its Origins- 
Development-Meaning", in Polish Institute of International Affairs, Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe. A Polish View, Warsaw: PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, 
1976, pp. 5-66. 
Dobrosielski, Marian, "The Source and Origin of the CSCE", Studies on International 
Relations, No. 5,1975, pp. 48-58. 
Edwards, G., "The CSCE After 10 Years", International Relations, VIII: 4, November 1985, 
pp. 397-406. 
Edwards, Geoffrey, "Quo Vadis? The New Proposals at the CSCE Follow-Up Meeting in 
Belgrade", International Relations, VI: 4, November 1978, pp. 462-473. 
302 
Edwards, Geoffrey, "The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe After Ten 
Years", International Relations, VIII: 4, November 1985, pp. 397-406. 
Edwards, Geoffrey, "The Madrid Follow-up Meeting to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe", International Relations, VIII: 1, May 1984, pp. 49-72. 
Ehni, Reinhard W., "Confidence-Building Measures: A Task for Arms Control and 
Disarmament Policy", NATO Review, 28: 3, June 1980, pp. 23-26. 
Erickson, J. B., "`Shield-72': Warsaw Pact Military Exercises", RUST, Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute for Defence Studies, December 1972, pp. 32-34. 
Fascell, Dante B., "The Madrid CSCE Meeting", The Washington Quarterly, 5: 4, Autumn 
1982, pp. 202-208. 
Fisher, Cathleen S., "The Preconditions of Confidence Building: Lessons from the European 
Experience", in Michael Krepon, Michael Newbill, Khurshid Khoja, and Jenny S. Drezin 
(eds. ), Global Confidence Building. New Tools for Troubled Regions, London: Macmillan, 
2000, pp. 291-312. 
Flanagan, Stephen J., and Andrew Hamilton, "Arms Control and Stability in Europe: 
Reductions are Not Enough", Survival, XXX: 5, September-October 1988, pp. 448-463. 
Flanagan, Stephen J., "The CSCE and the Development of Detente", in Derek Leebaert (ed. ), 
European Security: Prospects for the 1980s, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979, pp. 
189-232. 
Fontaine, Andre, "Detente-Entente-Cooperation", in Frans A. Alting von Geusau (ed. ) 
Uncertain Detente, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979, pp. 26-41. 
Gasteyer, Curt, "The Soviet Union and Belgrade", in Nils Andren and Karl E. Birnbaum 
(eds. ), Belgrade and Beyond- The CSCE Process in Perspective, Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980, pp. 27-37. 
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, "Confidence-Building Measures as a Means of Facilitating 
Disarmament Progress and Alleviating International Tensions", in Karl Kaiser (ed. ) 
Confidence-Building Measures, Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für 
Auswärtige Politik, December 1983, pp. 5-8. 
Ghebali, Victor-Yves, "Considerations sur certain aspects militaires de la detente: les 
`mesures de confiance' d'Helsinki", Defense nationale, April 1977, pp. 21-35. 
Ghebali, Victor-Yves, "La dynamique de la confiance militaire daps le processus de la CSCE: 
des MDC aux MRCS", Ares: Defense et securite, 1984-1985, pp. 469-489. 
Ghebali, Victor-Yves, "La Reunion de Belgrade sur les suites de la Conference sur la securite 
et la cooperation en Europe: evaluation et perspectives", Defense nationale, June 1978, pp. 
57-70. 
Ghebali, Victor-Yves, "Le bilan interimaire de la C. S. C. E. ä la veille de Belgrade", Politique 
etrangere, May 1977, pp. 109-129. 
303 
Ghebali, Victor-Yves, "Le processus de la CSCE: bilan d'une decennie (1975-1985)", 
Regards sur l'actualite, No. 113, July-August 1985, pp. 44-52. 
Ghebali, Victor-Yves, "Les resultats de la Reunion de Madrid sur les suites de la CSCE", 
Defense nationale, December 1983, pp. 123-143. 
Ghebali, Victor-Yves, and Fred Tanner, "Confidence-Building Measures in Arms Control: 
The Mouse that Roared", International Defense Review, 10/1988, pp. 1269-1272. 
Goetze, Bernd A., "Verification of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures: Evolution 
and Future Prospects", in J. Altmann and J. Rotblat (eds. ), Verification of Arms Reductions, 
London: Springer-Verlag, 1989, pp. 140-150. 
Goodby, James E., "The Stockholm Conference: Negotiating a Cooperative Security System 
for Europe", in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds. ), U. S. - 
Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988, pp. 144-172. 
Goodby, James E., "To Reduce the Risk of War- The Stockholm Negotiation", in R. B. 
Byers, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Allen Lynch (eds. ), Confidence Building Measures and 
International Security, East-West Monograph Series Number 4, New York: Institute for East- 
West Security Studies, 1987, pp. 39-54. 
Graczynski, Manfred, "Observations of Military Exercises and On-Site Inspections", in J. 
Altmann and J. Rotblat (eds. ), Verification of Arms Reductions, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
1989, pp. 151-156. 
Groll, Götz von, "East-West Talks in Helsinki", Aussenpolitik, 23: 3,1972, pp. 371-382. 
Groll, Götz von, "Les documents finaux de la CSCE", Aussenpolitik, 26: 3,1975, pp. 247- 
269. 
Groll, Götz von, "The CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade", Aussenpolitik, 28: 4,1977, pp. 
363-374. 
Groll, Götz von, "The Final Act of the CSCE", Aussenpolitik, 26: 3,1975, pp. 247-269. 
Groll, Götz von, "The Foreign Ministers in Helsinki", Aussenpolitik, 24: 3,1973, pp. 255- 
274. 
Groll, Götz von, "The Geneva CSCE Negotiations", Aussenpolitik, 25: 2,1974, pp. 158-165. 
Groll, Götz von, "The Helsinki Consultations", Aussenpolitik, 24: 2,1973, pp. 123-129. 
Gruszka, Witold, "The Prevention of Surprise Attacks and Limiting Armaments in Europe", 
translated by Bengt Scottland, in Adam D. Rotfeld (ed. ), From Confidence to Disarmament, 
Warsaw: PWN- Polish Scientific Publishers, 1986, pp. 201-218. 
Hansen, Lynn M., "Confidence and Security Building at Madrid and Beyond", in Stephen F. 
Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds. ), Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, East-West 
Monograph Series Number One, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983, 
pp. 134-164. 
304 
Hansen, Lynn M., "Confidence Building in Europe: Problems and Perspectives", in Karl E. 
Birnbaum (ed. ), Confidence Building and East-West Relations, The Laxenburg Papers No. 5 
(Proceedings of a Conference organised by the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 15- 
16 September 1982), Vienna: Wilhem Braumüller, March 1983, pp. 45-58. 
Hansen, Lynn M., "The Political and Practical Dimensions of Verifying Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures", in Symposium on Verification of Disarmament in Europe, 
Stockholm: Swedish National Defence Research Institute, 1985, pp. 133-143. 
Hassner, Pierre, "The Politics of Western Europe and East-West Relations", in Nils Andren 
and Karl E. Birnbaum (ed. ), Beyond Detente: Prospects for East-West Co-operation and 
Security in Europe, East-West Perspectives 3, Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1976, pp. 15- 
36. 
Hassner, Pierre, "Nouvelle phase en Europe: de l'instabilite politique au desiquilibre 
militaire", Defense nationale, December 1975, pp. 7-20. 
Hinds, Jim E., "The Limits of Confidence", in John Borawski (ed. ), Avoiding War in the 
Nuclear Age. Confidence Building Measures for Crisis Stability, Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
Press, 1986, pp. 184-198. 
Holst, Johan Jörgen, "A CBM Regime in Europe -19 Interrelated Propositions", in R. B. 
Byers, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Allen Lynch (eds. ), Confidence-Building Measures and 
International Security, East-West Monograph Series Number 4, New York: Institute for East- 
West Security Studies, 1987, pp. 31-38. 
Holst, Johan Jörgen, "Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework", Survival, 
XXV: 1, January-February 1983, pp. 2-15. 
Holst, Johan-Jörgen, "Confidence-Building Through Openness about Military Activities", in 
Karl Kaiser (ed. ), Confidence-Building Measures, Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen 
Gesellschaft %r Auswärtige Politik, December 1983, pp. 33-52. 
Holst, Johan-Jörgen, and Karen Alette Melander, "European Security and Confidence- 
building Measures", Survival, XIX: 4, July-August 1977, pp. 146-154. 
Hopmann, Terrence P., "Asymmetrical Bargaining in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe", International Organization, 32: 1, Winter 1978, pp. 141-177. 
John, Ieuan G., "The Helsinki-Belgrade Connection", International Relations, V: 6, 
November 1977, pp. 137-153. 
Jones, Christopher, "The Warsaw Pact: Military Exercises and Military Interventions", Armed 
Forces and Society, 7: 1, Fall 1980, pp. 5-30. 
Kampelman, M. M., "Armaments and Human Rights: U. S. Statements Before the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe", World Affairs, 144, Fall 1981, pp. 91-109. 
Kampelman, M. M., "The Helsinki Process is in Danger", The Atlantic Community 
Quarterly, 20: 2, Summer 1982, pp. 174-178. 
305 
Kampelman, M., "Negotiating with the Soviets in Madrid", World Affairs, 144: 4, Spring 
1982, pp. 299-512. 
Kampelman, Max M., "Trust us, Comrades... ", The Atlantic Community Quarterly, 19: 3, Fall 
1981, pp. 331-338. 
Kampelman, Max, "The United States and the CSCE", in Dix ans de CSCE: bilan et 
perspectives, Geneva: IUHEI, 1986, pp. 14-20. 
Kastl, Jorg, "The CSCE Review Meeting in Madrid", NATO Review, 31: 5,1983, pp. 12-20. 
Kirk Laux, Jeanne, "Prelude ä la Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe: 
1'experience du groupe des Neuf comme exemple de diplomatie independante des petits 
Etats", Politique etrangere, 38: 6,1973, pp. 675-696. 
Kirk-Laux, Jeanne, "Divergence ou coalition: la position des pays de 1'Europe de l'Est ä 
1'egard de la Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe: 1965-1972", Etudes 
internationales, IV: 1-2, March-June 1973, pp. 89-120. 
Kissinger, Henry A., "Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack", Foreign Affairs, 38: 4, 
July 1960, pp. 557-575. 
Klein, Jean, "Arms Control, desarmement regional et securite en Europe", Defense nationale, 
August-September 1974, pp. 53-67. 
Klein, Jean, "Continuite et ouverture dans la politique francaise en matiere de desarmement", 
Politique Etrangere, 44: 2,1979 (Supplement to No. 1,1980), pp. 213-247. 
Klein, Jean, "Desarmement ou "arms control": la position francaise sous la Ve Republique, " 
Etudes Internationales, III: 3, September 1972, pp. 356-389. 
Klein, Jean, "Enjeu et signification de la Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en 
Europe", Annuaire de 1'U. R. S. S. et des pays socialistes europeens, 1975, pp. 595-611. 
Klein, Jean, "Les aspects militaires de la detente en Europe et les perspectives d'une reduction 
mutuelle des forces dans un cadre regional", Etudes internationales, IV: 1-2,1973, pp. 136- 
142. 
Klein, Jean, "Les aspects politiques et militaires de la securite en Europe debattus dans le 
cadre de la premiere commission de la CSCE", Annuaire de l'U. R. S. S. et des pays socialistes 
europeens, 1975, pp. 613-636. 
Klein, Jean, "Mesures de confiance et securite en Europe", Defense nationale, October 1980, 
pp. 59-77. 
Korey, William, "The Helsinki/Madrid Meeting", The Washington Quarterly, 5: 2, Spring 
1982, pp. 193-198. 
Kovrig, Bennett, "European Security in East-West Relations: The History of a Diplomatic 
Encounter", in Robert Spencer (ed. ), Canada and the Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe, Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies, 1984, 
pp. 3-19. 
306 
Krepon, Michael, "The Decade for Confidence-building Measures", in Michael Krepon (ed. ), 
A Handbook of Confidence-building Measures for Regional Security, 2°d Edition, Handbook 
No. 1, Washington, D. C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1995, pp. 1-10. 
Levy, Jack S., "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical 
Problems", World Politics, XXXVI: 1, October 1983, pp. 76-99. 
Lewis, Kevin N., and Mark A. Lorell, "Confidence-Building Measures and Crisis Resolution: 
Historical Perspectives", Orbis, 28: 2, Summer 1984, pp. 281-306. 
Lipatti, Valentin, "De Helsinki ä Belgrade: Considerations sur la securite et la cooperation en 
Europe", Revue roumaine d'etudes internationales, X: 3,1976, pp. 267-274. 
Li Gatti, Valentin, "Quelques considerations sur les aspects militaires de la securite en 
Europe", in Dix ans de CSCE: bilan etperspectives, Geneva: IUHEI, 1986, pp. 41-58. 
Lins, Joseph A. H., "NATO View of Security Conferences", The Atlantic Community 
Quarterly, 11: 1, Spring 1973, pp. 55-64. 
Mickintosh, Malcolm, "The Warsaw Pact Today", Survival, XVI, 1974, pp. 122-126. 
Maresca, John J., "Helsinki Accord, 1975", in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and 
Alexander Dallin (eds. ), US. -Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 106-122. 
M; stny, Vojtech, "`We Are in a Bind' Polish and Czechoslovak Attempts at Reforming the 
Warsaw Pact, 1956-1969", Cold War International History Project, Bulletin 11, Cold War 
Flcashpoints: New Evidence on Warsaw Pact Military Planning, Washington DC.: Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 1999. 
Mearsheimer, John J., "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe", International 
Security, 7: 1, Summer 1982, pp. 3-39. 
Meehan III, John F. (Major), "Soviet Maneuvers: Summer 1971", Military Review, LII: 4, 
April 1972, pp. 14-21. 
Mellbin, Skjold, "The Helsinki Process: Issues of Security and of Confidence-Building", 
NATO Review, 33: 4, August 1985, pp. 7-13. 
Mendelevich, Lev, "Diplomatic Notes on the 1972-1973 Helsinki Multilateral Consultations 
to Prepare the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe", International Affairs 
(Moscow), December 1983, pp. 88-111 and p. 132. 
Morris, C. E., "The Prospects for a European Security Conference", Army Quarterly and 
Defense Journal, 102: 1, October 1971, pp. 7-11. 
Multan, Wojciech, "Military Detente in Europe and the CSCE: Problems and Prospects", in 
Polish Institute of International Affairs, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: 
a Polish View, Warsaw: PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, 1976, pp. 113-136. 
Neagu, Romulus, "Military Aspects of Security in Europe at the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe", Revue roumaine d'etudes internationales, IX: 4,1975, pp. 349-360. 
307 
Nerlich, Uwe, "Stabilizing Measures: Barriers against Soviet Surprise Attack or 
Intervention? ", in Uwe Nerlich (ed. ), The Western Panacea: Constraining Soviet Power 
through Negotiation, Volume II of Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983, pp. 257-265. 
Nimetz, Matthew, "CSCE: Looking to Madrid", NATO Review, 28: 2, April 1980, pp. 6-8. 
Nunn, Sam, "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions -- A Need to Shift our Focus", The 
Atlantic Community Quarterly, 16: 1, Spring 1978, pp. 18-21. 
Nunn, Sam, "Senator Nunn's Rejoinder", The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Spring 1979, 
pp. 76-77. 
Nunn, Sam, and John W. Warner, "Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War", The Washington 
Quarterly, 7: 2, Spring 1984, pp. 3-7. 
Pabsch, Wiegand, "Detente and Disarmament", NATO Review, 25: 5, October 1977, pp. 9-13. 
Palmer, Michael, "A European Security Conference. Preparation and Procedure", The World 
Today, 28: 1, January 1972, pp. 36-46. 
Palmer, Michael, "The European Community and a Security Conference", The World Today, 
28: 7, July 1972, pp. 296-303. 
Peronne, Louis-P., "Madrid: dialogue sur un fil", Etudes, November 1980, pp. 437-445. 
Povolny, Mojmir, "The Soviet Union and the European Security Conference", Orbis, 18: 1, 
Spring 1974, pp. 201-230. 
Proektor, D., "Military Aspects", International Affairs (Moscow), June 1974, pp. 69-71. 
Regner, Vaclav, "A Conference on Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe", NATO's Sixteen Nations, October - November 1983, pp. 34-36. 
Regner, Vaclav, "Conference on Military Detente and Disarmament in Europe", NATO's 
Fifteen Nations, December 1980 -. January 1981, pp. 45-46. 
Rosenthal, Benjamin S., "America's Move", Foreign Affairs, 51: 2, January 1973, pp. 380- 
391. 
Rotfeld, Adam D., "Confidence- and Security-Building Measures", in Derek Paul (ed. ), 
Defending Europe: Options for Security, Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis, 1985, pp. 119-126. 
Rotfeld, Adam Daniel, "Confidence Building Measures", Polish Perspectives, XXIV: 5, May 
1981, pp. 18-26. 
Rotfeld, Adam, "European Security and Confidence Building: Basic Aims", in Karl E. 
Birnbaum (ed. ), Confidence Building and East-West Relations, The Laxenburg Papers No. 5 
(Proceedings of a Conference organised by the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 15- 
16 September 1982), Vienna: Wilhem Braumüller, March 1983, pp. 105-112. 
308 
Rotfeld, Adam-Daniel, "CBMs Between Helsinki and Madrid: Theory and Experience", in F. 
Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds. ), Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, East- 
West Monograph Series Number One, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 
1983, pp. 91-133. 
Rotfeld, Adam-Daniel, "Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and European 
Security", in R. B. Byers, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Allen Lynch (eds. ), Confidence-Building 
Measures and International Security, East-West Monograph Series Number 4, New York: 
Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1987, pp. 55-66. 
Rotfeld, Adam-Daniel, "Developing a Confidence-Building System in East-West Relations: 
Europe and the CSCE", in Allen Lynch (ed. ) Building Security in Europe, East-West 
Monograph Series Number Two, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1986, 
pp. 71-127. 
Rotfeld, Adam-Daniel, "New Confidence-Building Measures: Poland's Experience and 
Perspectives", in Karl E. Birnbaum and Bo Huldt (eds. ), Building Confidence and Security in 
Europe, Conference Papers 9, Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 
1987, pp. 7-19. 
Salisbury III, Thomas, "Kavkaz-76", Military Review, LVII: 6, June 1977, pp. 47-55. 
Schelling, Thomas C., "Confidence in Crisis", International Security, 8: 4, Spring 1984, pp. 
55-66. 
Schmidt, Helmut, "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture", Survival, XX: 1, January- 
February 1978, pp. 2-10. 
Schütze, W., "La Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe", Etudes, April 1972, 
pp. 511-529. 
Schwarz, Hans Peter, "A Doubtful Device (European Security Conference)", Survival, XIII: 
2, February 1971, pp. 49-55. 
Sherer, Albert W. Jr., "Helsinki's Child: Goldberg's Variation", Foreign Policy, No. 39, 
Summer 1980, pp. 154-159. 
Sherer, C., "Breakdown at Belgrade (CSCE)", Washington Review of Strategic and 
International Studies, 1: 4, Autumn 1978, pp. 79-85. 
Shulman, Marshall D., "A European Security Conference", Survival XI: 12 December 1969, 
pp. 373- 381. 
Skilling, H. Gordon, "The Belgrade Follow-Up", in Robert Spencer (ed. ), Canada and the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre 
for International Studies, 1984, pp. 283-307. 
Skilling, H. Gordon, "The Madrid Follow-Up", in Robert Spencer (ed. ), Canada and the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre 
for International Studies, 1984, pp. 308-348. 
309 
Smouts, Marie-Claude, "Les suites institutionnelles de la Conference sur la securite et la 
cooperation en Europe", Revue francaise de science politique, 24: 6, December 1974, pp. 
1230-1236. 
Solesby, Tessa, "Helsinki to Belgrade - and Beyond", NATO Review, 26: 3, June 1978, pp. 
16-22. 
Spencer, Robert, "Canada and the Origins of the CSCE, 1965-1973", in Robert Spencer (ed. ), 
Canada and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Toronto: Centre for 
International Studies, University of Toronto, 1984, pp. 20-100. 
Stoeckli, Fritz, "Les plans du Pacte de Varsovie: L'heure de verite", RMS (Revue militaire 
Suisse), Vol. 10,1992, pp. 5-13. 
Stovall, Don 0., "The Stockholm Accord: On-Site Inspections in Eastern and Western 
Europe", in Lewis A. Dunn and Amy E. Gordon (eds. ), Arms Control Verification and the 
New Role of On-Site Inspection, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990, pp. 15-38. 
Toogood, J. D., "Direct Military Implications of the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe", Canadian Defence Quarterly, 3: 3, Winter 1973-1974, pp. 40-42. 
Toogood, J. D., "From Helsinki to Belgrade: What Happened to the Confidence Building 
Measures", Canadian Defence Quarterly, 8: 2, Autumn 1978, pp. 12-14. 
Toogood, J. D., "Helsinki 1975: What Was Achieved in the Field of Confidence-Building 
Measures? ", Canadian Defence Quarterly, 5: 2, Winter 1975, pp. 28-32. 
Toogood, John D., "Military Aspects of the Belgrade Review Meeting", Survival, XX: 4, 
July-August 1978, pp. 155-158. 
Torovsky, Rudolf, "Building Confidence and Security in Europe", NATO's Sixteen Nations, 
December 1984- January 1985, pp. 36-39. 
Turbiville, Graham H. Jr., "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers: Recent Exercise Patterns and Their 
Implications for European Security", Military Review, LVIII: 8, August 1978, pp. 19-35. 
Turbiville, Graham H. Jr., "Warsaw Pact Forces in Hungary: A Key Element in Pact 
Contingency Planning", RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence 
Studies, December 1976, pp. 47-51. 
Turbiville, Graham H., "Warsaw Pact Exercise Shield-72", Military Review, LIII: 7, July 
1973, pp. 17-24. 
Valenta, Jiri, "Soviet Options in Poland", Survival, XXIII: 2, March-April 1981, pp. 50-59. 
Van Oudenaren, John, "Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Soviet Policy and 
Objectives", in Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson (eds. ), Conventional Arms Control and 
the Security of Europe, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 40-64. 
310 
Van Oudenaren, John, "The Soviet Conception of Europe and Arms Negotiations", in Uwe 
Nerlich (ed. ), The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the Competition over Europe (Volume 1 of 
Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies), Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983, pp. 
161-194. 
Vemant, Jacques, "La Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe", Politique 
etrangere, 38: 1,1973, pp. 13-25. 
Vetschera, Heinz, "Effects of Basket I: Security and Confidence-Building", in Hanspeter 
Neuhold (ed. ), CSCE, N+N Perspectives: The Process of the Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe from the Viewpoint of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Participating States, 
The Laxenburg Papers No. 8, December 1987, Vienna: Wilhem Braumüller, pp. 101-125 
Vigor, P. H., "Soviet Military Exercises" (A lecture given at R. U. S. I. on 31st March 1971), 
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, No. 663, September 1971, 
pp. 23-29. 
Vincineau, Michel, "La position beige sur la securite europeenne", Politique etrangere, 37: 6, 
1972, pp. 733-763. 
Wallroth, Bengt, "Experience from Observer Participations at the Swedish Manoeuvre 
`VASTGRANS 1985', " in Symposium on Verification of Disarmament in Europe, 
Stockholm: Swedish National Defence Research Institute, 1985, pp. 74-78. 
Walschap, Hugo, "The Great European Jamboree: The East, the West, the Non-Aligned and 
the Neutrals at the Pan-European Meeting (CSCE)", Res Publica, 18: 1,1976, pp. 33-57. 
Wegener, Henning, "CBMs: European and Global Dimensions", in F. Stephen Larrabee and 
Dietrich Stobbe (eds. ), Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, East-West Monograph No. 
One, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983, pp. 165-190. 
Wettig, Gerhard, "Security Policy and CSCE in Belgrade", Aussenpolitik, 29: 3,1978, pp. 
289-299. 
Wirth, Timothy E., "Confidence- and Security-Building Measures", in Robert D. Blackwill 
and F. Stephen Larrabee (eds. ), Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989, pp. 342-358. 
Yost, David S., "Arms Control and European Security: An Overview of START, INF, 
MBFR, and CSCE/CDE", in Rudolf Avenhaus and Reiner K. Huber (eds. ), Quantitative 
Assessment in Arms Control, London: Plenum Press, 1984, pp. 13-47. 
Yost, David S., "Arms Control Prospects at Madrid", The World Today, 38: 10, October 
1982, pp. 387-394. 
Zorgbibe, Charles, "La Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe et le contröle 
des armements", Chronique de politique etrangere, 26: 4, July 1973, pp. 405-416. 
311 
2. BOOKS, MONOGRAPHS AND PAPERS 
Les projets de conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe, Problemes Politiques et 
Sociaux, No. 137-138, August 1972, Paris: La Documentation francaise, 46 pages. 
Acimovic, Ljubivoje, Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe, Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981,349 pages. 
Alford, Jonathan (ed. ), The Future of Arms Control, Part III, Confidence-Building Measures, 
Adelphi Paper 149, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979,39 pages. 
Alting von Geusau, F. A. M. (ed. ), Uncertain Detente, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1979,310 pages. 
Andren, Nils, and Karl E. Birnbaum (ed. ), Beyond Detente: Prospects for East-West Co- 
operation and Security in Europe, East-West Perspectives 3, Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1976, 
199 pages. 
Association pour la coordination des etudes et recherches de defense et de strategie 
(A. C. D. E. S. ), Les mesures de confiance essentiellement militaires en Europe. Journee de 
reflexion, 23-24 mars, Strasbourg, Dossier No. 8, Paris: Fondation pour les etudes de defense 
nationale, 1984,204 pages. 
Bechhoefer, Bernhard G., Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, Washington D. C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1961,641 pages. 
Bertram, Christoph, The Future of Arms Control: Part H. Arms Control and Technological 
Change: Elements of a New Approach, Adelphi Paper 146, London: IISS, 1978,32 pages. 
Betts, Richard, Surprise Attack, Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982,318 
pages. 
Birnbaum, Karl E. (ed. ), Arms Control in Europe: Problems and Prospects, The Laxenburg 
Papers No. 1, Laxenburg, Austria: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, March 1980, 
120 pages. 
Birnbaum, Karl E. (ed. ), Confidence Building and East-West Relations, The Laxenburg 
Papers No. 5 (Proceedings of a Conference organised by the Austrian Institute for 
International Affairs, 15-16 September 1982), Vienna: Wilhem Braumüller, March 1983,132 
pages. 
Blackwill, Robert D., and F. Stephen Larrabee (eds. ), Conventional Arms Control and East- 
West Security, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989,491 pages. 
Bloed, Arie (ed. ), From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process, 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990,285 pages. 
Borawski, John (ed. ), Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age: Confidence-Building Measures for 
Crisis Stability, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986,234 pages. 
Borawski, John, From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm 
Conference, London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988,260 pages. 
312 
Brandt, Willy, People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975, London: Collins, 1978,524 pages. 
Brauch, Hans Günter, and Gerd Neuwirth (eds. ), Confidence and Security Building Measures 
in Europe Ii From Vienna 1990 to Vienna 1992 - Documents, AFES-PRESS Report No. 28, 
Mosbach: Peace Research and European Security Studies, 1992,52 pages. 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Power and Principle. Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977- 
1981, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983,587 pages. 
Byers, R. B., F. Stephen Larrabee, and Allen Lynch (eds. ), Confidence-Building Measures 
and International Security, East-West Monograph Series Number 4, New York: Institute for 
East-West Security Studies, 1987,157 pages. 
Cynkin, Thomas M., Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis, New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1988,263 pages. 
Dean, Jonathan, Meeting Gorbachev's Challenge: How to Build Down the NATO-Warsaw 
Pact Confrontation, London: Macmillan, 1989,445 pages. 
Dean, Jonathan, Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation, 
Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986,286 pages. 
Dyson, Kenneth, European Detente: Case Studies of the Politics of East-West Relations, 
London: Frances Pinter, 1986,250 pages. 
European Cooperation Research Group (EUCORG), "The Origins of the European 
Conference on Security and Cooperation", London, January 1973,4 pages. 
European Cooperation Research Group (EUCORG), "Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe: The Second Phase", Report 7, London, June 1975,7 pages. 
European Cooperation Research Group (EUCORG), "Helsinki Plus Four Months", Report 8, 
London, November 1975,15 pages. 
Ferraris, Luigi Vittorio (ed. ), Report on a Negotiation: Helsinki-Geneva-Helsinki, 1972-1975, 
Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff and Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes 
Internationales, Geneve, 1979,439 pages. 
Freedman, Lawrence, Arms Control. Management or Reform, Chatham House Papers 31, 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986,102 
pages. 
Freeman, John, Security and the CSCE Process: The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, 
London: Macmillan, 1991,222 pages. 
From Helsinki to Belgrade. The Soviet Union and the Implementation of the Final Act of the 
European Conference: Documents and Material, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977,315 
pages. 
Garthoff, Raymond L., Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to 
Reagan, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985,1147 pages. 
313 
Ghebali, Victor-Yves, Diplomatie de la detente: la CSCE, d'Helsinki a Vienne (1973-1989), 
Bruxelles: Etablissements Emile Bruylant, 1989,444 pages. 
Ghebali, Victor-Yves, Mesures de confiance et desarmement en Europe: De 1 Acte final 
d'Helsinki au Document de Stockholm, Problemes Politiques et Sociaux, Paris: La 
Documentation francaise, April 1987,40 pages. 
Ghebali, Victor-Yves, Confidence-Building Measures Within the CSCE Process: Paragraph- 
by-Paragraph Analysis of the Helsinki and Stockholm Regimes, UNIDIR Research Paper, No. 
3, New York: United Nations, 1989,108 pages. 
Ghebali, Victor-Yves, Dix ans de Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe: 
bilan etperspectives, Geneva: NHEI, 1986,93 pages. 
Gillian, Brian J., Alan Crawford, and Komel Buczek, Compendium of Confidence-Building 
Proposals, ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 45, Second Edition, Ottawa: Department of 
National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, November 1987,343 
pages. 
Goetze, Bernd A., Security in Europe. A Crisis of Confidence, New York: Praeger, 1984,225 
pages. 
Griffith, William E., The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany, Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1978,325 pages. 
Helsinki What Next? The Situation since the European Security Conference, Berlin: 
Panorama DDR, 1977,87 pages. 
Hinterhoff, Eugene, Disengagement, London: Stevens & Sons Limited , 1959,445 pages. 
Holmes, Michael, "Compliance with Confidence-Building Measures: From Helsinki to 
Stockholm", Background Paper 30, Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and 
Security, February 1990,8 pages. 
Jones, Christopher D., Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the 
Warsaw Pact, New York: Praeger, 1981,322 pages. 
Kaiser, Karl (ed. ), Confidence Building Measures, Proceedings of an International 
Symposium 24-27 May 1983, Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für 
Auswärtige Politik, December 1983,236 pages. 
Keliher, John G., The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search 
for Arms Control in Central Europe, New York: Pergamon Press, 1980,204 pages. 
Kissinger, Henry, White House Years, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 
1979,1521 pages. 
Klaiber, Wolfgang, Laszlo Hadik, Joseph Harped, James Sattler, and Stanislav Wasowski, 
Era of Negotiations: European Security and Force Reductions, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington 
Books for the Atlantic Council of the United States, 1973,192 pages. 
314 
Klein, Jean, Securite et desarmement en Europe, Paris: Economica for 1'Institut francais des 
relations internationales, 1987,123 pages. 
Krehbiel, Carl C., Confidence-and Security-Building Measures in Europe. The Stockholm 
Conference, New York: Praeger, 1989,389 pages. 
Larrabee, F. Stephen, and Dietrich Stobbe (eds. ), Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, 
East-West Monograph Series Number One, New York: Institute for East-West Security 
Studies, 1983,221 pages. 
Lawrence, Marilee Fawn, A Game Worth the Candle: The Confidence- and Security-Building 
Process in Europe --An Analysis of US. and Soviet Negotiating Strategies, Santa Monica: 
The Rand Corporation (The Rand Graduate School, P-7264-RGS), June 1986,273 pages. 
Leebaert, Derek (ed. ), European Security: Prospects for the 1980s, Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington Books, 1979,302 pages. 
Legault, Albert, and Michel Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament, 
1945-1988, Montreal: McGill University Press, 1992,663 pages. 
Lynch, Allen (ed. ), Building Security in Europe, East-West Monograph Series Number Two, 
New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1986,181 pages. 
Lodgaard, Sverre, and K. E. Birnbaum, (eds. ), Overcoming Threats to Europe: A New Deal 
for Confidence and Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, for the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 1987,235 pages. 
Macintosh, James, Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control 
Process: A Canadian Perspective, Arms Control and Disarmament Studies No. 1, Ottawa: 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1985,136 pages. 
Macintosh, James, Confidence Building in the Arms Control Process: A Transformation 
View, Aims Control and Disarmament Studies, No. 2, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade, 1996,85 pages. 
Macintosh, James, Confidence and Security Building Measures: A Sceptical Look, Working 
Paper No. 85, Canberra: Australian National University Peace Research Centre, July 1990,38 
pages. 
Manin, Aleth, La Conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe, Notes et etudes 
documentaires, No. 4271-4272, Paris: La Documentation francaise, 15 March 1976,47 
pages. 
Maresca, John J., To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973- 
1975, Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1985,292 pages. 
Mastny, Vojtech, Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security: Analysis and 
Documentation, Durham: Duke University Press, 1986,389 pages. 
Möttölä, Kari (ed. ), Ten Years After Helsinki. The Making of the European Security Regime, 
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986,184 pages. 
315 
Neuhold, Hanspeter (ed. ), CSCE, N+N Perspectives: The Process of the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe from the Viewpoint of the Neutral and Non Aligned 
Participating States, The Laxenburg Papers No. 8, December 1987, Vienna: Wilhem 
Braumüller, 194 pages. 
Palmer, Michael, The Prospects for a European Security Conference, London: Chatham 
House, PEP, 1971,107 pages. 
Ploss, Sidney I, Moscow and the Polish Crisis: An Interpretation of Soviet Policies and 
Intentions, London: Westview Press, 1986,182 pages. 
Prendergast, William B., Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction?: Issues and Prospects, 
Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978,75 pages. 
Rotfeld, Adam Daniel (ed. ), From Helsinki to Madrid: Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe. Documents 1973-1983, Warsaw: Co-operative Publishers for the Polish 
Institute of International Affairs, 1983,347 pages. 
Ruehl, Lothar, MBFR: Lessons and Problems, Adelphi Paper 176, London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1982,37 pages. 
Sizoo, Jan, and Rudolf Th. Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-Making: The Madrid Experience, The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984,348 pages. 
Spencer, Robert (ed. ), Canada and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies, 1984,440 pages. 
Stanley, Timothy W., and Darnell M. Whitt, Detente Diplomacy: United States and European 
Security in the 1970's, New York: Dunellen Company, 1970,170 pages. 
Three Years at the East West Divide. The Words of U. S. Ambassador Max Kampelman at the 
Madrid Conference on Security and Human Rights, edited by Leonard R. Sussman, New 
York: Freedom House, 1983,133 pages. 
Van Oudenaren, John, Detente in Europe: The Soviet Union and the West since 1953, 
London: Duke University Press, 1991,490 pages. 
Whetten, Lawrence L., Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and 
the Warsaw Pact Countries, London: Oxford University Press, 1971,244 pages. 
Wolfe, Thomas W., Soviet Power and Europe 1945-19 70, London: The John Hopkins Press, 
1970,534 pages. 
3. UNPUBLISHED PAPERS 
Bluth, Christopher, "The Origins of MBFR: West German Policy Priorities and Conventional 
Arms Control", Paper presented at the Ford Foundation Conventional Arms Control Project 
Workshop, The Brookings Institution, Washington D. C., 11 February 1992,41 pages. 
Darilek, Richard E., "Confidence Building and Arms Control in the East-West Context: 
Lessons from the Cold-War Experience in Europe", 1992,39 pages. 
316 
Toogood, John D., "The Impact of the International Environment on Confidence Building 
Measures", 1985,18 pages. 
4. YEARBOOKS AND ANNUAL PUBLICATIONS 
4.1 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (IISS) 
"Europe: Security and Change", Strategic Survey 1975, London: IISS, 1976, pp. 57-58. 
Strategic Survey 1975, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976, p. 120. 
"Confidence-Building Measures", Strategic Survey 1977, London: IISS, 1978, pp. 99-100. 
"Negotiating European Security: CSCE", Strategic Survey 1979, London: IISS, 1980, pp. 
119-120. 
4.2 ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (RIIA) 
RITA, Documents on International Affairs, 1954, London: Oxford University Press, 1957. 
RIIA, Documents on International Affairs, 1955, London: Oxford University Press, 1958. 
RIIA, Documents on International Affairs, 1958, London: Oxford University Press, 1962. 
4.3 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) 
4.3.1 Appendices and Tables in SIPRI Yearbooks 
* "Notifications of Military Manoeuvres in Europe, as of February 1976", in World 
Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1976, Stockholm: Almgvist & Wiksell, 1976, 
pp. 476-477. 
* "Notifications of Military Manoeuvres in Europe, January 1976 - February 1977, in 
Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe", 
in World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1977, Stockholm: Almqvist & 
Wiksell, 1977, pp. 404-406. 
* "Notifications of Military Manoeuvres in Compliance with the Final Act of the Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe", in Arms Control: A Survey and Appraisal of 
Multilateral Agreements, London: Taylor & Francis, 1978, pp. 223-227. 
* "Notifications of Military Manoeuvres in 1978, in Compliance with the Final Act of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe", in World Armaments and 
Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1979, London: Taylor & Francis, 1979, pp. 663-665. 
* "Notifications of Military Manoeuvres in 1979, in Compliance with the Final Act of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe", World Armaments and Disarmament, 
SIPRI Yearbook 1980, London: Taylor & Francis, 1980, pp. 417-419. 
317 
* "Notifications of Military Manoeuvres in 1980, in Compliance with the Final Act of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe", World Armaments and Disarmament, 
SIPRI Yearbook 1981, London: Taylor & Francis, 1981, pp. 495-496. 
* "Notified Military Manoeuvres in Europe, 1975-1980", World Armaments and 
Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1981, London: Taylor & Francis, 1981, pp. 497. 
* "Notifications of Military Manoeuvres in 1981, in Compliance with the Final Act of the 
CSCE", in World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1982, London: Taylor & 
Francis, 1982, pp. 60-62. 
* "Notifications of Military Manoeuvres in 1982, in Compliance with the Final Act of the 
CSCE", World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1983, London: Taylor & 
Francis, 1983, pp. 611-613. 
* "Notifications of Military Manoeuvres in 1983, in Compliance with the Final Act of the 
CSCE", World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1984, London: Taylor & 
Francis, 1984, p. 581. 
* "Notifications of Military Manoeuvres in 1984, in Compliance with the Final Act of the 
CSCE", World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1985, London: Taylor & 
Francis, 1985, p. 539. 
4.3.2 Articles in SIPRI Yearbooks 
"Confidence-Building Measures in Europe", World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI 
Yearbook 1976,1976, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976, pp. 323-329. 
Barton, David, "The Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Europe", World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1984, 
London: Taylor & Francis for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1984, pp. 
557-580. 
Goldblat, Josef, and Ragnhild Ferm, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe", World 
Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1979, London: Taylor & Francis for the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1979, pp. 510-511 and 656-662. 
Reinius, Ulf, and Ragnhild Ferm, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe", World 
Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1980, London: Taylor & Francis for the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1980, pp. 407-420. 
Lodgaard, Sverre, "European Security and the Madrid Conference", World Armaments and 
Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1981, London: Taylor & Francis for the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 1981, pp. 483-494. 
Reinius, Ulf, "The CSCE and a European Disarmament Conference", World Armaments and 
Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1982, London: Taylor & Francis for the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 1982, pp. 51-59. 
318 
Reinius, Ulf, "Talks on Security and Cooperation in Europe", World Armaments and 
Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1983, London: Taylor & Francis for the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 1983, pp. 605-609. 
g2 : ý. 
319 
